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[2011] ZAECMHC 18
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Ngqukumba v Minister of Safety and Security and Others (1354/2010) [2011] ZAECMHC 18 (20 October 2011)
IN THE HIGH COUR OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION: MTHATHA)
CASE NO: 1354/2010
In the matter between:
ANELE NGQUKUMBA
…....................................................................
Applicant
And
MINISTER OF SAFETY AND SECURITY
…............................
1
st
Respondent
STATION COMMISIONER, MTHATHA
CENTRAL POLICE STATION
…..............................................
2
nd
Respondent
COMMANDING OFFICER, VEHICLE
SAFEGUARD UNIT, GROUP SIX, MTHATHA
…..................
3
rd
Respondent
JUDGMENT
PAKADE ADJP.:
[1] This is an application in which the applicant seeks
an order declaring the seizure and retention of his motor vehicle, a
Toyota
Hilux with registration letters and number BTR 190 EC, by the
members of the South African Police Service Mthatha, unlawful. The
further order sought by the applicant is a
mandamus
directing
the respondents to release the motor vehicle to the applicant,
forthwith.
[2] The application is opposed by the respondents and
answering affidavit on their behalf has been deposed to by Ms
Nomsithelo Dungelo,
( Nomsithelo) a constable employed by the first
respondent and stationed at the motor vehicle identification section
in Mthatha.
[3] During February 2010, the applicant’s motor
vehicle, which the applicant uses as a taxi to convey passengers for
reward
, was seized by members of the South African Police Service at
Golden Egg taxi Rank in Mthatha without a seizure warrant. The police
officers who seized the motor vehicle informed the driver thereof,
Anele Mkhatshwa, that there is information at the disposal of
the
police that the vehicle was a stolen item. Thereafter, the vehicle
was driven by Mr Mkhatshwa to the police station, on the
instructions
of the police. A further search was made on the vehicle in the police
station . The police found that the chassis
and engine numbers of the
vehicle had been grounded off. They conveyed their finding to Mr
Mkhatshwa and also directed him to tell
the owner of the vehicle to
come to the police station.
[4] The applicant went to the police station where he
met the investigating officer, Inspector Mncwati who indeed confirmed
to him
the information the police had about the vehicle and also the
finding by the police of grounded engine and chassis numbers . The
applicant refuted that allegation and even produced documents
purporting to show that the vehicle belonged to him although still
registered in the name of one Nqadolo James from whom he had
purchased it. He further explained to Mncwati that the reason for
having the vehicle registered in the name of Nqadolo James is that in
terms of the sale agreement he had with him, ownership had
to remain
with Nqadolo until the full purchase price of the vehicle had been
paid, which was not the case at the time of the seizure
of the motor
vehicle.
[5] The police refused to release the vehicle to him on
that day relying on the ground that they were still investigating
about
it. When the applicant wanted to know when the investigations
would be completed, Mncwati responded that in two weeks time the
investigations would have been completed.
[6] After two weeks, the applicant went back to the
police station to demand the release of his motor vehicle. Inspector
Mncwati
informed him that he had circulated the motor vehicle but had
found nothing irregular in it, nevertheless he still needed experts
to conduct further investigations on the vehicle. The applicant
protested against further investigation and demanded immediate
release of the vehicle to him but Mncwati refused. He left the police
station.
[7] On his return after a month, Inspector Mncwati told
him that the investigations were still incomplete as he was still
awaiting
for the arrival of the experts from Toyota South Africa
Manufacturers. He then told the applicant to come back after six
months
as the experts were delayed by their busy schedule. The
applicant then consulted with the attorneys of record who
subsequently
brought the present application.
[8] The applicant was quick to aver that the police
official never disclosed to him that the motor vehicle had some
irregularities.
They only relied on information that the motor
vehicle is stolen, so said the applicant. He had told Inspector
Mncwati that there
was nothing irregular in the motor vehicle as, on
information he had received from Nqadolo James, the vehicle had been
cleared
by the police who issued a clearance certificate to him. It
is clear that if the applicant went to the police station , he should
have been responding to a report given to him by Mkhatshwa that his
vehicle had been impounded by the police and that suspicious
features
had been found thereon upon its inspection at the police station. He
had nothing to gainsay the finding of the suspicious
features in the
vehicle but only the information which the police had, by producing
the registration certificate of the vehicle.
Even then, he failed to
produce the police clearance certificate to them. The result is that
these suspicious features on the vehicle
are still intact and remain
unchallenged.
[9] Save to admit that the seizure was done without a
warrant, the respondents have countered the applicant’s
averment that
there was no reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is
an item to warrant a seizure. Their case is that the police were
investigating
a case of possession of a suspected stolen motor
vehicle against one Njiyela Simbonile who had been charged with that
offence.
The police officers aver that when Njiyela Simbonile was
interrogated about possession of a suspected stolen motor vehicle (a
different
vehicle from the one in issue in this application), he
volunteered information to the police that he had also been involved
in
stealing the motor vehicle which is the subject matter of these
proceedings. At the time the police received this information this
motor vehicle had not yet been seized. The said Njiyela offered to
take the police to the taxi rank where the vehicle was parked
in
order to point it out to them. Indeed, the police went to the taxi
rank next to Golden Egg together with Njiyela. On their arrival
in
that rank, Njiyela pointed out a motor vehicle in which Mkhatshwa was
seated on its driver’s seat, as the vehicle which
was stolen by
him. The police confronted the driver, and informed him that they had
information that the motor vehicle in which
he was seated was stolen.
Mkhatshwa responded that he knew nothing about that because the
vehicle did not belong to him.
[10] At the police station the police found the
following irregularities in the vehicle:- its chassis plate appeared
to have been
tampered with; the engine number was grounded off and
the manufacturers tag plate had been removed.
[11] Nomsithelo stated that the applicant never visited
the charge office up till the day of her deposition to the answering
affidavit.
She disputed that the motor vehicle was ever cleared of
any irregularity by the police as alleged by the applicant . Based on
these
irregularities, the respondents aver that in terms of the
National Road Traffic Act, 93 of 1996
the applicant is prohibited
from lawfully taking possession of the vehicle. Further, an expert
from Toyota South Africa Motor Vehicle
identification unit, Mr
Francois Muller, inspected the motor vehicle at the police station
and found the following defects:
1. That the job number tag firewall had been removed and
thereafter tampered with;
2. The rest of the engine number commencing with 3y was
removed and therefore tampered with;
3. The manufacturer’s plate was removed from the
Hi-Ace bus and replaced into this vehicle;
4. The chassis plate was cut out from a bus and
re-welded onto this motor vehicle;
5. The job tag was removed and
6. The engine number was removed.
It is worth noting that these findings correspond with
the finding which had earlier been made by the police before the
arrival
of the expert from Toyota South Africa.
[12] The applicant deposed to a replying affidavit in
which he denied the information allegedly offered by Njiyela to the
police
that the motor vehicle was stolen. He further denied that the
chassis plate of the motor vehicle had been tampered with and /or
removed from another vehicle and placed onto his motor vehicle; that
there were no engine numbers on the motor vehicle and that
the
manufacturer’s tag plate was removed from another vehicle and
placed on to this vehicle. He stated that even if those
irregularities were found on the vehicle they were found after the
search and the seizure had been made without a warrant. From
this
premise, the applicant concludes that these
ex post
facto
findings are irrelevant for the determination of this application,
whose nature is spoliation.
[13] The principles which apply in this case and which
are not in dispute are the following:
1. The respondents bear the onus of proving, on a
balance of probabilities, that the seizure of the motor vehicle was
lawful, otherwise
the vehicle should be returned to the applicant.
2. If the respondents succeed in discharging the onus
relating to the seizure of the motor vehicle, the applicant bears the
onus
of proving that the requirements of section 31(1)(a) of the
Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 (the Act) have been satisfied.
These
are that no criminal proceedings had been instituted concerning
the vehicle or that the vehicle will not be required at the trial
as
evidence or for purposes of an order of court.
3. The onus that rests on the applicant is to show that
no proceedings have been instituted and that there is no reasonable
likelihood
that proceedings may be instituted in the foreseeable
future.
4. If the applicant discharges this onus, the vehicle
will have to be returned to the applicant unless the respondents were
to discharge
the onus of showing that the applicant may not lawfully
possess it.
5. The method of showing that the applicant may not
lawfully possess the vehicle is for the respondent to show that the
vehicle
is stolen.
6. In the event of a genuine dispute of fact on the
papers the matter must be decided on the respondents’ version,
even on
issues where the onus is on the respondents.
[14] Mr Notyesi, who appeared for the applicant,
informed the Court , at the commencement of the hearing , that the
applicant was
seeking a final relief on the papers and would not
argue in the alternative that the matter be referred to oral
evidence.
[15] I must state right from the outset that the
respondents’ version is that there were no criminal proceedings
which had
yet been instituted as the case was still under
investigation at the time of the applicant bringing this application
but were,
nonetheless, certain that such proceedings would be
instituted in the near future once the investigations are completed.
[16] In terms of section 20 of the Act, which is
applicable in this case, the State may seize an article –
(a) which is concerned in or is on reasonable grounds
believed to be concerned in the commission or suspected commission of
an offence….
(b) which may afford evidence of the commission or
suspected commission of an offence…
[17] It is common cause or is not disputed in the papers
that the seizure of an article under section 20 must be based on at
least
a reasonable suspicion that the article was the one
contemplated in section 20. The approach to the interpretation of
section 20
has been laid down in a number of cases. In
Ndabeni
v Minister of Law and order
1
,
Didcott
J said:
“
The second respondent no doubt thought there
were reasonable grounds for the belief he had. That, however, was by
the way.
Section 20
of the
Criminal Procedure Act calls
for the
existence in fact of reasonable grounds. And whether these exist in a
given case must be determined objectively
.
Milner J
once
said: ‘There can only be reasonable cause to believe…
where, considered objectively, there are reasonable grounds
for the
belief… It cannot be said that an officer has reasonable cause
to believe… merely because he believes he
has reasonable cause
to believe.”
[18] This test was followed in this Division in a number
of cases, including the unreported Full Bench judgment of Zilwa AJ in
Hiya vs Minister of Safety and Security and
another
2
;
Sigwebendlana vs Minister of Police,
3
reportable
judgment of
Davis AJ
and
Kgotso Zinja vs Minister of Safety and
Security and another
4
,
unreported judgment of
Pakade
J.
In all these cases, this Court held that
there must be a reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure of a
motor vehicle as contemplated
in
section 20
and that if the Court
finds that there was no such reasonable suspicion to justify the
seizure,
cadit quaestio,
the
vehicle must be returned to the person from whom it was seized if
he/she may lawfully possess it. This Court emphasized that
the test
to determine the reasonableness of the suspicion is objective.
[19] I now turn to summarize the salient facts of the
applicant’s case after which I will do the same in the
respondent’s
case for purposes of coming up to a decision. The
applicant’s case, as gleaned from the founding papers, is that
the police
failed to show that, objectively, they had reasonable
suspicion before they effected the seizure, that the motor vehicle is
stolen
and that the information on which they relied as establishing
that reasonable suspicion was not sufficient to enable them to
formulate
that suspicion because the person who furnished them with
it neither made a statement to the police nor deposed to a supporting
affidavit in these proceedings. Secondly, relying on the Full Bench
judgment of
Hiya vs Minister of Safety and Security
,
Kgotso
Zinja and Minister of Safety and Security
he contends that the
factors relating to the finding of irregularities in the motor
vehicle when being searched subsequent to the
seizure, are subjective
and irrelevant in spoliation proceedings.
[20] The respondent’s case, on the contrary, is
based on the objectively determined factors of reasonable suspicion
and on
the subjectively determined factors of the finding of
suspicious features in the motor vehicle subsequent to the seizure.
[21] In
Hiya vs Minister of
Safety and Security
,
Zilwa
AJ
had the following to say on these tests
5
“
The respondent, throughout, bore the burden of
proof to show the reasonableness of the belief that the vehicle was
an article liable
to be seized in terms of the section. Mr Sivuku,
who appeared for the respondent, was very hard pressed to submit to
the contrary.
In my view the mere fact that after the vehicle had
been seized in terms of the warrant that was issued upon application
by the
policemen, was subsequently found to have suspicious features
such as the allegedly ground engine number and altered chassis number
[which facts are disputed by the appellant], is irrelevant for the
purpose of determining the issue. Even if the respondents’
version could be accepted that indeed such unsatisfactory features
were found on the vehicle, the point of the matter is that before
the
vehicle was seized and such features were found the seizure in the
first place had to be proper and had to comply with the
requirements
of
section 20
”.
[22] Based on the Hiya judgment, this Court had the
following to say in the
Zinja vs Minister of
Safety and Security
judgment
6
:
“…
the proper approach in my view, is to
first determine if the motor vehicle that was seized is an article
which was liable to be
seized in terms of
section 20.
If it is not
such article then cadit quaestio, that is the end of the matter and
the applicant must succeed in this application.
But if the court
finds it was an article liable to be seized then an enquiry must be
held as to the validity of the seizure warrant.”
This approach was followed in the subsequent judgments
of
Zukiso Manzi vs Member of Executive Council
and others
7
unreported judgment,
Mzukisi
Buthongo vs Minister of Safety and Security and others
8
also
unreported judgments of this Division and
Guga
vs Minister of Safety and Security and others
9
.
[23] In the Zinja judgment although the respondents’
papers disclosed that there were suspicious features in the motor
vehicle
seized, found after the seizure, the court did not deal with
the subjective test relating to the subsequent finding of those
features
because the subjective test had been held to be irrelevant
in determining the reasonableness of the suspicion
10
.
[24] The Full Bench judgment of
Hiya
did not consider another judgment of this Court in
Mbuthuma vs MEC for Safety and Security of the
Eastern Cape Province
11
which
had been decided in the previous year and which was decided on the
basis of objectively determined factors of suspicious features
discovered before the seizure of the motor vehicle. In that case,
Madlanga J
had said
that it was common knowledge
12
that
engine and chassis numbers would be tampered with where it is
intended that a stolen vehicle be sold intact. Such tampering
would
ground a reasonable belief that the vehicle has been stolen and will
justify a seizure without warrant or the consent of
the owner. The
judgment does not , in my view , consider the second step in the
enquiry , concerning the validity of the seizure
justified by a
warrant or by consent of the applicant . If the court finds that s 20
of the Act had been satisfied it should go
further and consider the
validity of the seizure by section 21 or 22 of the Act.
[25] The facts in the Mbuthuma case are crisply that
three police officers visited the applicant’s place in
connection with
a red Isuzu light delivery van. They found the
applicant and asked him the whereabouts of this van. The applicant’s
response
was in the negative. Meanwhile, the two motor vehicles, a
Toyota Venture and a Toyota Hilux were in the applicant’s
premises.
The three policemen inspected these two vehicles and found
that the engine and chassis numbers thereof had been grinded off and
restamped. They then seized the two vehicles without a warrant.
[26] These facts are distinguishable from those of Hiya.
In Hiya the finding of tampering with the chassis and engine numbers
in
the motor vehicle was made subsequent to the seizure whereas in
Mbuthuma it preceded the seizure. It would appear in my view, that
the Hiya matter was correctly decided on the basis of objective test
and the court correctly, in my view, rejected the application
of the
subjective test shown by the finding of suspicious features after the
seizure. The Mbuthuma case was again, in my view,
correctly decided
on the objective test because the police officers entertained, before
the seizure, a reasonable belief that the
two vehicles were stolen.
The reasonable belief which the police officers had would be the
basis for issuing a warrant but leaving
the vehicles to obtain a
warrant would certainly defeat the object of the seizure .
[27] The applicant has fashioned his cause of action on
the spoliation remedy. In
Nino Bonino vs De
Lange
13
,
Innes CJ defines spoliation as an illicit deprivation of another of
the right of possession which he has in regard to movable
or
immovable property or even in regard to legal right.
[28] In order for the applicant to succeed in spoliation
proceedings, he must allege and prove that he was in peaceful and
undisturbed
possession of his property. The possession is not the one
in the juridical sense and it suffices if the holding of the property
by the applicant was with the intention of securing some benefits for
him. The cause of the applicant’s possession is irrelevant
whether the respondent has a stronger right of possession or not.
Actual possession not the right to possession is protected (
Yeko
vs Qhana
)
14
.
The applicant must further allege and prove unlawful dispossession,
either without his consent or without legal process such as
court
order or seizure warrant. Applicant’s possession and the
respondent`s rights to possession are not justiciable in the
proceedings for a
mandament van spolie
,
there are no real defenses which do not amount to a denial of the
applicant’s allegation.
[29] The respondents’ defence is that they
complied with the law in seizing the motor vehicle because they had
information
from a reliable source, a suspect in another case, that
the vehicle is stolen. Their submission is that the information they
had
was sufficient to satisfy section 20 of the Act. Further, they
state that Mkhatshwa, the driver of the motor vehicle, consented
to
the seizure. In my view, only the applicant, and not his agent, the
driver of the motor vehicle, could legally give consent
to the
seizure of the motor vehicle.
[30] In the replying affidavit filed, the applicant
denied that there was information in terms of which the respondents
acted in
seizing the motor vehicle as the person who furnished it,
would have deposed to an affidavit to that effect or would have made
a statement to the police which would have then been made available
to the court.
[31] As Davies AJ said in
Sigwebendlana
vs Minister of Police
15
,
it is for the court to judge whether objectively there were
reasonable grounds for such belief; that in the absence of more
detailed
information, it is not possible for the court to come to
that conclusion. I agree with this observation. The information on
which
the police officers relied in seizing the item must be placed
before the court to enable it also to make a finding on the same
information . That information which the police officers have must be
scrutinized by the court because acting on unverified information
interferes with the undisturbed possession of a person’s
property which infringes a person` s constitutional right to
property
16
. The
ipse dixit
of
the police without the evidence of Njiyela Simbonile is insufficient
to generate a reasonable belief especially when their ipse
dixit is
viewed against their very failure to institute criminal proceedings
on the vehicle . This would then mean that the vehicle
is not an item
that is required for purposes of evidence or exhibit or an order of
court in a criminal trial. If the information
at the disposal of the
police is anything to go by it would not have been difficult to
institute criminal proceedings in connection
with the vehicle because
there was readily available evidence.
[32]
In Dyani vs Minister of
Safety and Security and others
17
,
Jafta J
found that the
circumstances of that case justified an order that the vehicle be
returned to the applicant on the basis that such
relief would be
similar to the relief granted in spoliation applications.
[
33
]
Jafta J
was also, in my view, correct because
in spoliation proceedings the court is concerned with whether there
was a lawful seizure or
not. A seizure in terms of section 21, with a
warrant or in terms of section 22, without a warrant, is lawful
provided that it
complies with section 20. If it does not, it is
unlawful and
cadit quaestio,
(that
is the end of the matter)
18
.
This is so because the court is dealing with spoliation which
requires speedy relief to be given on the simple facts of possession
and dispossession. This, naturally involves short affidavits filed
expeditiously on those limited facts so that adjudication takes
place
ante omnia
and
speedily
19
.
This is so because spoliation is a remedy
sui
generis
afforded to possessors whether
mala
fide
or
bon fide
or thieves, who have been deprived of possession
unlawfully, to have such possession restored to them
ante
omnia
so that he remains in undisturbed
possession of his property. There is significant distinction between
the possessory remedy of
spoliation and
rei
vindicatio
which are both remedies for
reclaiming possession. If the litigant chose to recover possession
with the
rei vindicatio,
then
he must prove the requirements thereof. Therefore the case to which
Mr Matyumza, counsel for the respondents, referred in
Van
Der Merwe and another vs Taylor NO and others
20
is not relevant to spoliation but to
rei
vindicatio.
[34] Mr Matyumza submitted that because of the tampering
with the chassis and engine numbers in the vehicle, it would be
contrary
to law to release the vehicle with tampered parts as such
will be a contravention of
section 68
(6)(b) of the
National Road
Traffic Act, 93 of 1996
. He referred to the following cases for this
submission:
Powell NO vs Van Der Merwe
21
;
Vrystaat Motors vs Henry Bhgnant (Edms) Bpk
22
;
Khan vs Minister of Law and Order
23
;
Nel vs Deputy Commissioner of Police, Grahamstown and others
24
;
Minster Van Wet En Order En Ander vs Datnis Motors (midlands) (Edms)
Bpk
25
;
Van Der Merwe and another vs Taylor NO and others
26
;
Ngwenduna Boya vs Minister of Safety and Security and others
27
unreported judgment of this court by Miller J;
Marvalanie Development (Pty) Ltd and Another
vs Minister of Safety and Security
28
;
Kgosana vs Otto
29
and
Hako vs Minister of Safety
and Security
30
.
[35] Mr Matyumza contended that on the basis of these
authorities the judgment in
Ntombentsha
Mgxongo vs Minister of Safety and Security
31
Full Bench judgment of this division:
Hiya
vs Minister of Safety and Security; Dyani vs Minister of Safety and
Security; Khonono vs Minister of Safety and Security and
two others;
Mzileni vs Minister of Safety and Security
32
by
Rall AJ; Shumane vs Minister
of Safety and Security
33
by
Peko J; Tshongozi vs Minister of Safety and Security
and Guiliano vs Minister of Law and Order
34
were all wrongly decided.
[36] The cause of action in the cases referred to by Mr
Matyumza was based on
rei vindicatio
in which the adjudication of the merits of the
respondent’s rights is permissible. The list of cases which Mr
Matyumza contends
were wrongly decided had their cause of action
couched in the spoliation remedy which is adjudicated speedily and
ante omnia.
In
Painter
vs Strauss
35
the court said about the spoliation remedy:
“
the
mandament
van spolie
is
employed to prevent people from taking the law into their own hands
and it requires the property dispoiled to be restored as
a
preliminary to any enquiry or investigation in the merits of a
dispute”
[37] Lastly, I must now consider whether or not the
applicant can lawfully possess the vehicle in the light of section 31
(1) (a)
of the Act which provides that if no criminal proceedings are
instituted in connection with the article or if it is not required
at
the trial for purposes of evidence or order of court it shall be
returned to the person from whom it was seized if such person
may
lawfully possess it or if such person may not lawfully possess it, to
a person who may lawfully possess it. The onus is on
the respondents
to show that the applicant may not lawfully possess the vehicle. In
this respect the respondents state that the
applicant is prohibited
from lawfully possessing the motor vehicle with tampered chassis and
engine numbers. Here, this Court is
bound by the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Appeal in
Marvanic
Development Pty (Ltd) and another vs Minister of Safety and Security
and another
36
where
in similar circumstances the Court refused to release the vehicle to
the applicant until such time as he has been issued with
new chassis
and engine numbers under the National Road Traffic Regulations and
with a police clearance certificate by the registering
authority. The
recent authority on the same point is that of
Phakule
and Thafeni vs Minister of Safety and Security
37
an
unreported judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal on matters which
emanated from this Division. In both decisions of the Supreme
Court
of Appeal the finding of suspicious features in the motor vehicle was
made before the seizure.
[38] That the use of a motor vehicle with tampered
chassis and engine numbers on a public road is unlawful is clear from
the peremptory
language of
section 89
(1) (2) (3) of the
National
Road Traffic Act. It
provides as follows:
“
(1) Any person who contravenes or fails to
comply with any provision of this Act or with any direction,
condition, demand, determination,
requirement, term or request
thereunder, shall be guily of an offence.
(2) Any person convicted of any offence in terms of
subsection(1) read with section42(1) or (2), 44(1),45(2),46(1) or
64(1), (2),(5)
or (9) shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment
for a period not exceeding six years.”
Section 42(1) prohibits the operation of a motor vehicle
which is not roadworthy on a public road. Section 44(1) provides that
if
a motor vehicle is not roadworthy a traffic officer or an examiner
of vehicles may, by notice in the prescribed form served on the
driver, owner, or operator of such vehicle, direct that such vehicle
shall not be operated on a public road or that such vehicle
shall
only be operated on the prescribed conditions. The traffic officer is
empowered by section 3 (1) to direct that a motor vehicle
whose
engine and chassis numbers differ with the registration and licensing
document of such vehicle be taken forthwith to any
police station for
police clearance. The finding of grounded chassis and engine numbers
in a vehicle subsequent to its seizure
justifies in my view, the
detention thereof until a clearance certificate is issued by the
police and the vehicle reregistered
under the
National Road Traffic
Act.
ORDER
[39] The following order is therefore made:
The seizure of the motor vehicle, described as Toyota
Hilux with registration letters and number BTR 190 EC is declared
unlawful
and is set aside;
The retention of the same motor vehicle by the members
of the South African Police Service in Mthatha is declared lawful
until
such time the police clearance certificate is issued and the
vehicle reregistered under the
National Road Traffic Act, 93 of
1996
;
Each party is ordered to pay its own costs.
__________
L.P Pakade
ACTING DEPUTY JUDGE PRESIDENT
For the applicant : Mr Notyesi
Instructed by : Mvuzo Notyesi Inc
For respondent : Adv Matyumza
Instructed by : State Attorney
Heard on : 08 March 2011
Delivered on : 20 October 2011
1
1984(3)SA
500 ;D at 511 D-F
2
Case
no: 506/99
3
Case
no:27/94
4
Case
no:47/2005
5
Page
6 par 2
6
Case
no: 47/05, par 17
7
Case
no:148/05
8
Case
no
9
[2011]ALL
SA 413(ECM)
10
Hiya
vs Minister of Safety and Security
11
1998
(1) SACR367(TKD)
12
Page
370 b-e
13
1906
TS 120
14
1973(4)
SA735 (A)
15
supra
16
Section
25(1)
of the Constitution,108 1996
17
2001(1)
SACR 634(TKD) at 642 f
18
Kgotso
Zinja v Minster of Safety and Security
19
Willowvale
estates cc and another vs Bryanmore estates LTD
1990 (3) SA 954
(WLD)
20
2008(1)SA
1 (CC)
21
2005(5)
SA 62 (SCA)
22
1996(2)SA
448 at 462 H-463 G- H
23
1991(3)
SA 439
24
1953(1)SA
487 (E)
25
1989(1)
SA 926 A
26
2008(1)
SA 1 (CC)
27
Case
no:360/09
28
2007(3)
SA 159 (SCA)
29
1991(2)
SA113 (W)
30
1996(2)
SA 891 (TKD)
31
Case
no A21/05
32
Case
no: 5505/03 NPD
33
Case
no: 550/02
34
1990(4)SA
308 (W)
35
1951
3 SA 307(O)
36
supra
37
2011(2)SACR
358 (SCA)