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2012
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[2012] ZAECELLC 1
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Wesbank A Division of Firstrand Bank Ltd v Schroder, In re: Stoltz v Wesbank A Division of Firstrand Bank Ltd and Another (EL1450/2011, ECD2485/2011) [2012] ZAECELLC 1 (24 February 2012)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, EAST LONDON
Case
no: EL1450/2011
ECD2485/2011
In
the matter between:
Wesbank
A Division of Firstrand Bank Limited
…...............................
Plaintiff
and
Denzil
Noel Schroder
…........................................................................
Defendant
and
In
the Application of:
Gerard
Stoltz (in his capacity as Debt Counsellor)
….........................
Applicant
and
Wesbank
A Division of Firstrand Bank Limited
…....................
1
st
Respondent
Denzil Noel Schroder
…..............................................................
2
nd
Respondent
JUDGMENT
D.
VAN ZYL J:
This matter concerns the provisions of section 86(11)
of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (
“
the Act”
).
In March 2004 the defendant purchased a Opel Astra Classic motor
vehicle from a dealership in East London and to that end entered
into an instalment sale agreement (
“
the agreement”
)
with the seller. The plaintiff subsequently acquired all right,
title and interest in and to the agreement. On 30 August 2011
the
plaintiff issued summons against the defendant wherein it claims
that the defendant is in breach of the terms of the agreement
and
that it has cancelled the agreement as a result. It seeks to obtain
possession of a motor vehicle (
“
the vehicle”
)
as envisaged in the agreement for the purpose of recovering the
monies which it says the defendant owes it. When the action
became
opposed the plaintiff applied for summary judgment. Although the
defendant filed a notice opposing the application for
summary
judgment he chose not to file an opposing affidavit as envisaged in
Rule 32(3)(b) of Uniform Rules of this Court. Instead,
at the
hearing of the matter he elected to rely on an application which was
filed by a debt counsellor, namely Gerhard Stoltz
(“
the
applicant”
)
in his capacity as
“
the
debt counsellor of the defendant”
in terms of
section 86(11) of the Act
(“the application”)
.
The plaintiff and the defendant are cited therein as
the first and second respondents respectively.
In this application this court is asked to order, in
the exercise of its discretion in terms of section 86(11) of the
Act, that
a review of the defendant’s indebtedness to the
plaintiff which was pending in the magistrates’ court prior to
the
present proceedings, be resumed and that the summary judgment
application either be dismissed, or be stayed pending a conclusion
of the debt review process. Section 86(11) on which the application
is based reads as follows:
‘
If a credit provider who has given notice to terminate a
review as contemplated in subsection (10) proceeds to enforce that
agreement
in terms of Part C of Chapter 6, the Magistrate’s
Court hearing the matter may order that the debt review resume on any
conditions
the court considers to be just in the circumstances.’
In
Collett v Firstrand Bank
2011(4) SA 508 (SCA)
(
the
Collett case
) it was held that the words
‘
hearing the matter’
in this
sub-section relate to the proceedings to enforce the agreement and
consequently refer to the enforcing court, which may
be either the
High Court or the Magistrate’s Court (at 518 D).
It is common cause that the agreement is a credit
agreement as envisaged in section 8 of the Act. On 17 November 2007
the defendant
applied for a debt review in terms of section 86(1) of
the Act. The application was made to the respondent and the
plaintiff
was duly notified of the application two days later by way
of the prescribed form as required in sub-section (4)(b) of section
86. On 16 December the applicant notified the plaintiff that the
application was successful, meaning that the defendant is
over-indebted as envisaged in section 79 of the Act (‘
the
particular consumer is or will be unable to satisfy in a timely
manner all the obligations under all credit agreements to
which the
consumer is a party’
). The applicant
thereafter on 10 March 2009 issued a proposal in terms of section
86(7)(c)(ii) of the Act recommending that the
defendant’s
obligations be re-arranged and that the magistrates’ court
make an order accordingly. This
“
proposal”
took the form of an application in terms of the
rules of the magistrates’ court and it was set down for
hearing on 23 April
2009.
The plaintiff instructed a firm of attorneys to
represent it in the proceedings in the magistrates’ court.
According to
the applicant a postponement of the proceedings was
requested by the attorney concerned in order to enable the plaintiff
an opportunity
to make a counter proposal with regard to the
restructuring of the defendant’s indebtedness. The matter was
thereafter
for the same reason postponed on a further two occasions.
When it became clear on 8 October 2009 that no settlement would be
reached the application was postponed to 28 January of the following
year in order to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to file
an
opposing affidavit so as to have the matter enrolled for hearing on
the opposed roll for argument. By 28 January the plaintiff
had not
filed an opposing affidavit and the matter was again remanded to
enable the plaintiff to do so. This continued until
the plaintiff
eventually on 22 March 2011 by electronic mail provided the
applicant with an opposing affidavit. The original
signed affidavit
was only delivered on 14 July 2011.
However, in the interim and prior to the filing of the
opposing affidavit, the plaintiff on 25 November 2010, more than two
years
after the debt review process first commenced, terminated the
debt review of the agreement by giving notice of its intentions in
terms of section 86(10) of the Act. It is not in dispute that the
defendant was in default of his obligations under the agreement
and
that the plaintiff was as a result entitled to cancel the debt
review (the
Collett case
at
515 E–F). Relying on the plaintiff’s conduct, or rather
the lack thereof, the applicant’s case is that the
plaintiff
failed to participate in good faith in the debt review process. The
applicant contends that if it was serious in doing
so the plaintiff
would have provided him with a counter proposal upon receipt of the
proposed re-structuring of the defendant’s
obligations and
timeously filed its opposing affidavit after the matter was referred
to the magistrates’ court for an order
as contemplated in
section 86(7)(c) of the Act. With reliance on the judgment in the
Collett
case at 517F
wherein the Court per Malan JA stated that ‘
Should
the credit provider fail or refuse to participate in the review, a
resumption of the process may well be ordered’
,
it is contended that this court should, in the exercise of its
discretion in terms of section 86(11), give consideration to
the
plaintiff’s conduct during the debt review process and order a
resumption thereof.
The plaintiff’s answer to applicant’s
accusations of delay and a lack of participation in the debt review
process
is that there was an agreement between the applicant and the
plaintiff’s ‘
representative that the
Respondent would not file Opposing Affidavits in debt review matters
before the Magistrate’s Court
in East London, but would rather
undertake
bona fide
negotiations with the
Applicant and only once the Applicant advised that such negotiations
were fruitless or that the 2
nd
respondent
(
“
the defendant”
)
could not accommodate the Respondent’s
(
“
the
plaintiff”
) C
ounter Proposal that
the Respondent would be required to file such Opposing Affidavit.’
It is further stated that the plaintiff
bona
fide
participated in the debt review
proceedings by providing the applicant with a certificate of balance
and a counter proposal with
regard to the re-structuring of the
defendant’s obligation in terms of the agreement.
I may further add that the plaintiff at the hearing of
the matter by way of a point
in limine
raised an objection to
the applicant’s
locus standi
to bring the application,
the submission being that the defendant, as a party to the summary
judgment proceedings, is the proper
person to bring the application.
The objection was foreshadowed in the plaintiff’s answering
affidavit although on a different
basis. The argument that the
mandate or statutory function of a debt counselor in respect of a
particular credit agreement comes
to an end when the credit provider
terminates the debt review to that agreement is very seductive. I
however do not intend to
deal with this objection but would rather
determine the application on its merits where the issues have been
properly ventilated
and addressed by the parties. For reasons which
are to become clearer later in this judgment, I am of the view that
the applicant
cannot succeed with the application. It will
accordingly be assumed for purposes of this judgment that the
applicant does indeed
possess the necessary
locus standi
to
bring the application in terms of section 86(11).
The issue raised by the applicant must be decided on
the three sets of affidavits filed in the application and the
ordinary rules
of procedure, as formulated in the well-known
dictum
of Corbett JA in
Plascon-Evans Paints
Ltd v Van
Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A) at 634 H-C, must
accordingly apply. An applicant who seeks final relief in motion
proceedings must, in the event of conflict,
accept the version set
up by his opponent unless the latter’s allegations are in the
opinion of the court not such as to
raise a real, genuine or
bona
fide
dispute of fact, or are so far-fetched or clearly untenable
that the court is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers.
(See also
Ripoll-Dausa v Middleton NO and Others
[2005] ZAWCHC 6
;
2005 (3) SA
141
(C) at 151A – 153C.) A real or genuine dispute of fact can
only exist where the court is satisfied that the party who purports
to raise the dispute in his affidavit seriously and unambiguously
addressed the fact said to be disputed. Further, where the
facts
averred are such that the disputing party must necessarily possess
knowledge of them and be able to provide an answer or
countervailing
evidence if they are not true or accurate but, instead of doing so,
rests his case on a bare or ambiguous denial,
the court will
generally have difficulty in finding that the test is satisfied.
Applied to the facts of the present matter, I am not
satisfied that the plaintiff has dealt with the factual allegations
of the
applicant on which he relies for his contention that the
plaintiff did not participate in good faith in the debt review
process,
in a manner so as to raise a real, genuine or
bona
fide
dispute of fact. The plaintiff chose not to deal with
the applicant’s assertions concerning the events which
followed upon
the referral of his proposal to the magistrates’
court in terms of section 86(7)(c) of the Act. The deponent to the
plaintiff’s
answering affidavit, a certain Da Cruz employed as
a manager at the plaintiff’s Debt Review Centre in
Johannesburg, sought
in a rather opportunistic and disingenuous
fashion to distance the plaintiff therefrom by stating that the
applicant’s
allegations in the relevant paragraphs of his
founding affidavit refer to
Firstrand Bank
and not the
plaintiff and therefore does not concern the plaintiff. The
plaintiff is a division of Firstrand Bank. No doubt this
caused the
applicant to refer to the Plaintiff as Firstrand Bank instead of
Wesbank. It is quite evident from what the applicant
says in his
founding affidavit and the relevant correspondence and documentation
referred to that there can be no doubt that
he was referring to the
plaintiff. The only reasonable conclusion that I can come to is that
this is simply an attempt not to
deal with the applicant’s
version of the relevant events which preceded its cancellation of
the debt review in November
2010 because the plaintiff is unable to
do so.
That this is so is further evident from the plaintiff’s
contention as to the existence of an agreement between the applicant
and a representative of the plaintiff with regard to the filing of
an opposing affidavit in the debt review proceedings in the
magistrates’ court. This evidence poses a number of problems.
Not only is it characterized by vagueness and a lack of detail,
but
the deponent has quite clearly no personal knowledge of what had
transpired between the applicant and the unidentified
representative. A confirmatory affidavit is annexed to the
plaintiff’s answering affidavit of an erstwhile candidate
attorney
in the office of the firm of attorneys who represented the
plaintiff in East London, namely Don Maree Attorneys, who simply
states
that she confirms the affidavit of Da Cruz
“
insofar
as it relates to my involvement in the matter.”
What
her involvement in the matter was is not stated in either of the
affidavits. The plaintiff’s reliance on making a counter
proposal also does not assist the plaintiff in this enquiry. The
proposal referred to was, as appears from the correspondence
disclosed by the applicant, only made in May 2011, nearly 6 months
after
the plaintiff
had already terminated the debt review. What purpose it was intended
to serve at that stage is not known and any
reliance thereon in
these proceedings is not only misplaced but is also misleading. Of
even more importance is the fact that
the plaintiff made it clear on
24 April 2009 in a letter from its attorneys, rejecting the
applicant’s proposed restructuring
of defendant’s
obligations after he had submitted it to the magistrates’
court, that it was no longer willing to
make any counter proposals.
I accordingly conclude that the issue relating to the plaintiff’s
failure to actively and in
a meaningful manner participate in the
debt review process must be decided on the plaintiff’s papers
and in favour of the
plaintiff.
Counsel for the plaintiff however sought to argue that
even if the plaintiff’s version is to be accepted, it does not
mean
that it can be concluded that the plaintiff did not participate
in the debt review process. Her argument is that after the applicant
referred his proposal to the magistrates’ court recommending a
restructuring of the defendant’s obligations, the
matter had
to be dealt with in terms of the rules of that court regulating
application proceedings. Accordingly, so it was argued,
the
proceedings became adversarial in nature and there was consequently
no longer any duty on the part of the plaintiff, as a
party to those
proceedings, to engage with the applicant and make any counter
proposals. Further, and if the applicant was of
the opinion that the
plaintiff was delaying the finalisation of the proceedings, he
should have invoked the rules of that court
so as to enforce a
response from the plaintiff.
I do not agree with this submission. Such an approach
is contrary to the purpose of the Act and the nature of the debt
review
process as envisaged by section 86 and 87 of the Act. The
purpose of the Act was dealt with in the
Collett
(supra)
case (at 514 E-G). To the aims
listed in that judgment may be added the aim of providing ‘
for
a consistent and accessible system of consensual resolution of
disputes arising from credit agreements.’
(Section
3(h)). That the aim is to provide for a consensual and by necessary
implication, a participative process in the resolution
of issues
arising from credit agreements, is supported by section 86(5) of the
Act. As stated by Malan JA in the
Collett
(supra)
case, where the consumer has applied
for a debt review before the credit provider has proceeded to
enforce the credit agreement,
the credit provider is obliged, ‘…
as
section 86(5) requires, not only to comply with any reasonable
request by the debt counsellor to facilitate an evaluation of
the
consumer’s indebtedness and the prospects for responsible debt
restructuring, but also to participate in good faith
in the review
and negotiations.
This duty to negotiate does not
terminate when the debt counsellor refers his proposal to the
magistrates’ court, but continues,
pending the hearing.’
(at 516 F-G.)(My emphasis)
The reason why the duty to negotiate does not terminate
upon a referral by the debt counsellor of his proposal to the
magistrates’
court lies in the fact that, as found by Malan JA
in the aforementioned judgment (at 515E), there is only one unified
process
under sections 86 and 87 of the Act, the purpose of which is
the restructuring of the consumer debt by amending the terms of the
credit transaction between the parties. The debt review is
continuing process that only terminates when the debt counsellor’s
proposal culminates in an order as envisaged in section 87 or, where
the consumer is in default, the credit provider before the
finalisation of the debt review process terminates the debt review
relating to that specific credit agreement as authorized by
section
86(10). (
Collett (supra)
case at 515B and 516C-E.)
The Act and its regulations do not prescribe a
procedure for the referral by the debt counsellor of his proposal to
the magistrates’
court as contemplated by sections 86(7)(c)
and 87(1). In
National Credit Regulator v Nedbank Ltd and Others
2009 (6) SA 295
(GNP) (the
NCR
case) at 313 C-E it was
held that the proposal must take the form of an application as
governed by the rules of the magistrates’
court. This
arrangement appears to have found the approval of the Supreme Court
of Appeal in the
Collett(supra)
case (at 515 B-C). I do not
believe, as was suggested by counsel for the plaintiff in argument
that the use of application proceedings
in terms of the rules of the
magistrates’ court as a vehicle to drive the debt review
process envisaged in section 87(1),
means that it must be conducted
in an adversarial manner as that term is understood. In other words,
that the applicant alone
has the primary responsibility for defining
the issues and for investigating and advancing the dispute. This not
only runs counter
to the aim of the Act to encourage the consensual
resolution of disputes arising from credit agreements, but is also
contrary
to the finding in the
Collett (supra)
case, namely
that the duty of both the consumer and the credit provider to
negotiate does not terminate when the debt counsellor
refers his
proposal to the magistrates’ court, but continues pending the
hearing (at 516 F-G). Further, the issues to be
decided by that
court are defined in the Act and not by the parties. Another aspect
is that, as pointed out by du Plessis J in
the
NCR(supra)
case,
although the debt counsellor is the applicant in the proceedings
envisaged in section 86 and 87 of the Act, he fulfills
a statutory
function and is not a litigant in the ordinary sense (at 311G).
Quite clearly the finding that the debt counsellor’s
proposal and the hearing relating thereto must be by way of
application
procedure, is to fill a
lacuna
in
the Act. It is regrettable that the legislature has not seen it fit
to put into place a more simplistic and less formal procedure
for
dealing with the referral of the proposal of the debt counsellor to
the magistrates’ court and the manner in which
the hearing is
to be conducted as envisaged in section 87(1) of the Act. The
unfortunate result of this is that, as in the instant
case, once the
proposal is referred to the magistrates’ court, the matter
then lands up in the hands of lawyers at which
time the spirit of
cooperation more often than not sadly disappears. The result is
unnecessary delays in the finalization of
the debt review process
and the resultant incurring of further costs. This does nothing to
promote a process of which the aim
is the public good, namely to
provide assistance to an over-indebted consumer while at the same
time recognising the ‘
principle of satisfaction by
the consumer of all responsible financial obligations’
(Section 3(g)).
I accordingly conclude that the plaintiff’s
attitude that once the applicant has referred his proposal for the
restructuring
of the defendant’s debt to the magistrates’
court it was no longer willing to make any further proposals,
thereby
effectively preventing an early consensual resolution of the
matter, is in conflict with the aims of the Act and a factor which
must be considered in the exercise of this court’s discretion
in terms of section 86(11) of the Act. This is however not
the only
consideration. As stated by Malan J in the
Collett
(supra)
case, where there are good grounds
to conclude that the proposed restructuring will not lead to the
‘…
satisfaction by the consumer of all
responsible financial obligations’
(Section
3(g) and (i)) or a rearrangement as contemplated by section
86(7)(c), the court considering the resumption of the debt
review
may very well refuse to order its resumption (at 517G). This
consideration involves an assessment of the prospects of
the
proposed restructuring of the consumer’s debts being made an
order of court as envisaged in section 87(1). That section
requires
the relevant court to make its decision by having regard to inter
alia
‘…
the consumer’s financial means,
prospects and obligations’
. The said court is
in essence called upon to decide, on the information placed before
it, whether the proposed restructuring
of the consumer’s debts
is viable in that it would resolve the consumer’s
over-indebtedness while at the same time
provide a balance between
the respective rights and obligations of the credit provider and the
consumer. (Section 3(d).)
As in every other case where the court is called upon
to exercise a statutory direction, it is in my view incumbent upon a
party
who seeks to invoke the provisions of section 86(11), whether
it be in proceedings such as the present or when raised as a request
in summary judgment proceedings (
Collet
(supra)
case at 518H – 519A), to place
sufficient information before the court to show that it should
exercise its discretion in
his favour. This information is, on the
strength of the
Collett (supra)
case, not to be limited to the conduct of the credit
provider during the debt review process but must also relate to the
prospect
that the court as envisaged in section 87(1) will sanction
the recommendation of the debt counsellor and order a rearrangement
of the consumer’s obligations. To this extent information
regarding the consumer’s financial position as at the time
of
the application in terms of section 86(11) must for obvious reasons
become relevant. Where, as in the present case, the court
is called
upon to exercise its discretion some two years after the debt
counsellor’s initial proposal, the consumer’s
current
financial position is of particular importance. It may have improved
or deteriorated to the extent that the proposed
debt rearrangement
may no longer be capable of implementation in its original form. I
must however stress that an application
in terms of section 86(11)
should not turn into an enquiry as envisaged in section 87(1). That
is the task of the court that
would be asked to consider the debt
counsellor’s proposal after a resumption of the debt review.
The need to disclose information
to the court which is called upon
to exercise its discretion in terms of section 86(11), is for the
limited purpose of assessing
the prospects of the restructuring
proposal relied upon being made an order as contemplated in
paragraph (ii) of section 87(1)(b).
The consideration relating to the prospect of the
restructuring proposal leading to the satisfaction of the
defendant’s
financial obligations or to an order as
contemplated in section 87(1), was not addressed by the applicant in
his papers. Save
to state that the defendant has been making
payments in terms of the proposed rearrangement of his obligations,
there is no information
relating to his financial position or
prospects. I do not agree with counsel for the applicant that this,
and considerations
relating to whether the proposed rearrangement of
the consumer’s debt would strike a balance between the
interests of the
credit provider and that of the consumer, are
matters which must be dealt with in the debt review process once it
has been reinstated.
The reason is simply that the court exercising
its discretion in terms of section 86(11) must ensure that there are
good grounds
for doing so. It must be satisfied that a resumption of
the debt review process is
bona fide
, that it is justified
and not simply a delaying tactic, or as in the present case, will
lead to an unnecessary delay in the finalisation
of the proceedings
instituted by the credit provider for the recovery of monies owing
to it in terms of the agreement.
On the facts of the present matter I am not persuaded
that the plaintiff did not have good grounds for rejecting the
proposed
rearrangement of the defendant’s obligations when it
terminated the debt review. The amendments which the applicant
proposed
should be made to the instalment sale agreement to achieve
a restructuring of the defendant’s obligations would mean that
the latter would settle his indebtedness over two hundred and forty
months (twenty years) as opposed to fifty two months. In
terms of
the agreement ownership of the vehicle vests in the plaintiff, and
it has the right in the event of the defendant being
in default of
his obligations, to take possession of the vehicle. It is this right
which the plaintiff now seeks to enforce in
the summary judgment
proceedings. I agree with counsel for the plaintiff that an
implementation of the proposed rearrangement
of the defendant’s
obligations would effectively result in the plaintiff losing its
security due to a depreciation in the
value of the vehicle over the
proposed extended time period. Otherwise than an exotic sports
vehicle, it is unlikely that the
vehicle in the present matter would
increase in value. This must be weighed against the fact that to
sell the vehicle, as the
plaintiff proposes to do, would serve to
reduce the defendant’s indebtedness. I am accordingly not at
all convinced that
the proposed rearrangement of the defendant’s
obligations in terms of the agreement is viable and that there
exists any
reasonable prospect that it would in its present form be
sanctioned by a court in a resumed debt review process.
In the result the application in terms of section
86(11) should be dismissed. Insofar as the costs of the application
is concerned,
I am of the view that an appropriate order would be
one of no order as to costs. The reason therefore is twofold:
Firstly, the
plaintiff’s conduct and lack of willingness to
commit to a meaningful participation in the debt review process
deserves
censure. The manner in which the plaintiff dealt with this
issue in these proceedings also leaves much to be desired. Secondly,
the applicant acted in his statutory capacity as debt counsellor in
bringing the proceedings in terms of section 86(11) of the
Act.
There is nothing to indicate that he was not
bona fide
in
doing so or that the application was devoid of any merit.
Turning then to the application for summary judgment,
the parties were
ad idem
that should the application in terms
of section 86(11) fail, it must follow that the plaintiff would be
entitled to judgment.
As stated earlier, the defendant acknowledges
that he is in default of his obligations in terms of the agreement.
Further, over
indebtedness is not a defence on the merits (the
Collett (supra)
case at 518G). In terms of the agreement the
plaintiff is entitled to costs on an attorney and client scale.
One other matter remains for the attention of the
taxing master and in respect whereof I must express my displeasure.
In its papers
filed in the application the plaintiff’s
deponent unnecessarily dealt with matters of law and advanced, what
amounts essentially
to legal argument. In support of this he annexed
a number of judgments including the judgment in the
Collett
(supra
) case. In addition, all the documents which already
form part of the record in the summary judgment application were
unnecessarily
annexed to the answering affidavit. Then there is for
an inexplicable reason also annexed a second set of all the
documents already
filed in the application. The result of all of
this is that the indexed papers came to 316 pages. Pages 132 to 166
and 171 to
286 served no purpose at all in deciding the issues in
the application and counsel for the plaintiff could advance none.
These
papers were filed in the section 86(11) application and not in
the summary judgment application. The plaintiff would accordingly,
by reason of the costs order which I intend making in the
application, not be entitled to recover any of the costs of the
aforementioned
pages.
For these reasons I make the following order:
(1) The application in terms of
section 86(11)
of the
National Credit Act 34 of 2005
is dismissed.
(2) There will be no order as to the costs of the
aforementioned application.
(3) Summary judgment is granted in favour of the
plaintiff in the following terms:
(a) The plaintiff’s cancellation of the
installment sale agreement is confirmed.
(b) An attachment order is issued authorizing the
plaintiff to take possession of the Opel Astra Classic Motor vehicle
which forms
the subject matter of the aforementioned agreement.
(c) The plaintiff is given leave to approach this court
for an order enforcing the remaining obligations of the defendant in
terms
of the said agreement.
(d) The defendant pays the plaintiff’s costs to
date on an attorney and client scale, such costs to include
collection charges.
D.
VAN ZYL
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Matter
heard on : 21 February 2012
Judgment
delivered : 24 February 2012
Counsel
for Plaintiff /
1
st
Respondent : Adv M.L. Beard
Instructed
by : Don Maree Attorneys
Plaintiff
/ 1
st
Respondent’s Attorney
19 Tecoma Street
Berea
EAST
LONDON
Counsel
for
Defendant/
Applicant/
2
nd
Respondent : Adv S.A. Collett
Instructed
by : 2Gerard Stoltz
Applicant
and Defendant’s /
2
nd
Respondent’s Attorneys
Unit 2, Vancott House
15-17
Devereux Avenue
Vincent
EAST
LONDON