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[2012] ZAKZDHC 24
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Georges Briere SA v Mthimunye Engineering Works CC and Others (2518/2011) [2012] ZAKZDHC 24 (15 May 2012)
IN
THE KWAZULU-NATAL HIGH COURT, DURBAN
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case
No: 2518/2011
In
the matter between:
GEORGES
BRIERE SA
…................................................................................
Applicant
and
MTHIMUNYE
ENGINEERING WORKS CC
…....................................
First
Respondent
CHURCH,
GARY JOHN
….............................................................
Second
Respondent
CHURCH,
MICHAEL DAVID
…..........................................................
Third
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Delivered: 15 May 2012
MBATHA
J
[1] The Applicant is a
French private limited liability company duly incorporated in terms
of the laws of France and having its
principal place of business in
France. The business of the Applicant is the design, manufacture and
marketing of industrial pumps
and components throughout the world.
[2] The Applicant
manufactures pumps for industrial used named BROQUET pumps, named for
the inventor of the pumps, a certain Mr
Broquet, who invented the
pumps in the year 1880. Over the years the pumps had been redesigned
and the Applicant continued to use
the name BROQUET in relation to
its pumps and acquired the trade mark in the early 1970’s in
France, but because of the time
that had passed these patented
designs have since expired. These pumps are called “gear pumps”
or “external gear
pumps” and were designed in such a way
that it was capable of pumping viscous sugar fluids used in the sugar
industry. This
application concerns the type of Broquet pump called
the BBMC type which has six (6) asymetrical lobes and was available
in seven
(7) different sizes. It is generally referred to as
massecuite pumps.
[3] The deponent to the
Applicant’s founding affidavit is a Mr O F D Briere who
explained that his great grandfather founded
the company that was
named after him in 1927. Both his grandfather and father were also
involved with the business of the applicant
and his father, J F
Briere, deposed to an affidavit in the application. In this affidavit
Mr Briere Sr explained that during the
1980’s he conducted
extensive tests of each of the Brouquet pumps and was able to prepare
three (3) unique performance graphs
including the curves/lines as
described by his son in the founding affidavit and that these graphs
represented original work carried
out by him on behalf of the
Applicant. These graphs are depicted as annexures “OB5 to OB8”
to the application papers
and forms the subject matter for the relief
being sought in prayer 1 of the applicant’s Notice of Motion.
The Respondents
were accused of infringing the copyright of the
Applicant by reproducing and/or copying and/or making adaptations or
distributing
copies of annexures “OB5-OB8”
[4] In the main answering
affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondents it is conceded that the
performance graphs depicted in annexure
“OB9” to the
papers are practically identical to those depicted in annexures
“OB5-OB8”. Annexure “OB9”
contains the same
graphs as those depicted in annexures “OB5-OB8” except
that it purports to emanate from the First
Respondent. In the
answering affidavit a breach of copyright was admitted and in
argument before me it was conceded on behalf of
the First Respondent
that the order in paragraph 1 of the Notice of Motion should be
granted. I will deal with this aspect at the
end of this judgment.
[5] The First Respondent
is a close corporation and the Second and Third Respondents its
members in equal shares. Third Respondent
deposed to the main
affidavit in opposition to the relief being sought. According to him
First Respondent provides professional
engineering services to
various industries including the sugar industry. In the case of a
pump the first respondent will only manufacture
a specific pump to an
order from a customer, which in the case of a Broquet pump initially
consisted of manufacturing parts of
the pump from specifications
supplied to it by for example the sugar industry as the applicant did
not have an active after service
sales to readily supply spare parts
to its pumps and it was sometimes just too expensive for the imports
of the parts to be made.
Third Respondent’s father purchased an
engineering workshop and conducted business under the style D & D
Engineering
in 1983. This business was the predecessor to the First
Respondent and commenced providing replacement parts for numerous
fabrications
of machinery that were difficult to source during what
was referred to in the affidavit as “
the apartheid years”
.
During or about 1985 D & D Engineering were provided with
drawings made by the Illovo Sugar Group of various pinions , shafts
and bushing for Broquet pumps and “reverse engineered”
these parts to produce replacement parts for the Broquet pumps
from
the drawings provided. Eventually other sugar mills followed suit and
by 1987 D & D Engineering had been approached by
a foundry by the
name of Rely Prescision Casting, a Johannesburg based company, who
made patterns of various parts of Broquet pumps
from samples provided
by sugar mills and D & D Engineering then machined these parts to
the specifications provided. The First
Respondent alleged that at
that stage the sugar mills were the customers of Rely Precision
Casting and D & D Engineering merely
machined the parts on order
from the latter. At a later stage Rely Precision Castings were able
to supply complete pumps to the
local market, similar in nature to
the Broquet pumps and called its pumps RM pumps.
[6] During 2001 the
Applicant was formed and took over the business of D & D
Engineering as a going concern and continued to
provide precision
machining services to Rely Precision Castings including complete RM
pumps. During 2006 the driving force behind
the pump business of Rely
Precision Castings died and First Respondent took over the business
in supplying pumps to industries
similar to the Broquet pumps but
changed the name of the pump from an RM pump to that of an MP pump
and sold the first MP pump
during 2007.
[7] It was disputed that
the First Respondent slavishly copied the Broquet pumps. Although the
basis of the pump remained the same
this is not due to any unique
feature thereof as the pump in question has been in the public domain
for approximately 30 years
and its basic mould and features can be
accessed on the internet. The fact that the mould resembles that of a
Broquet pump is according
to the Respondents entirely fortuitous as
that is what an external gear pump with rotor lobes looks like. It is
also claimed that
the MP pumps had undergone significant changes from
the original Broquet pumps the most notable of which is that
stainless steel
is used in its manufacture as opposed to ductile iron
and mild steel, a wear plate was introduced and the direction of flow
was
configured to go both clockwise and anti-clockwise. Respondents
were adamant that it was never the intention to pass its pumps of
as
Broquet pumps and resisted the relief sought in the Notice of Motion,
apart from that in paragraph 1 thereof.
[8] The applicant sought
the following relief in the Notice of Motion:
Interdicting and
restraining the Respondents from infringing the Applicant’s
copyright subsisting in its BBMC performance
graph and in its
brochures for its BROQUET BBMC pump indicated in annexure “OB
5” to annexure “OB 8”
to the founding affidavit,
by reproducing and/or copying and/or marking adaptations of these
works and/or distributing copies
thereof;
Interdicting and
restraining the Respondents from passing off their “MP”
pumps or the components of their pumps (the
“offending
pumps”), as being that of the Applicant, or as being connected
or associated in the course of trade with
the Applicant or made
under its licence, by
Manufacturing or selling
the offending pumps in the form shown in annexure OB9 to the
founding affidavit;
Using the parts codes
currently used by them in relation to the offending pumps; or
Using the performance
graphs and other works covered by the order in (a) in relation to
the offending pumps;
Directing the Respondent
to deliver up to the Applicant or its agents all offending pumps,
including the components thereof, or
other articles including
drawings, moulds and/or computer programs or aids used for
manufacturing the First Respondent’s
pumps and components
thereof, in the possession of or under the control of the
Respondents;
Ordering an enquiry into
damages;
In the event of an
enquiry in terms of prayer (d) above being ordered and the parties
being unable to reach agreement as to the
future pleadings to be
filed, discovery, inspection or other matters of procedure relating
to the enquiry, an order authorising
either of or any party to make
application to this Honourable Court for directions in regard
thereto; and
Granting the Applicant
the costs of this application.
[9] Subsequently an
amendment was sought to delete paragraph (c) and to substitute for it
a new paragraph (c) to read as follows:
“
Interdicting
and restraining the respondents from competing unlawfully with the
applicants by selling the offending pumps in the
form shown in
annexure ‘OB 9’ to the founding affidavit in conjunction
with the;
Parts codes currently used by
them in relation to the offending pumps; or
The performance graphs and
other works covered by the order in (a) in relation to the offending
pumps.”
[10] The application
for this amendment came about after it became apparent that the
Respondents admitted that annexure “OB9”
was a
reproduction of the Applicant’s original documents relating to
the Broquet pumps and the application was opposed on
the basis that
the Applicant now seeks to build a case from its replying affidavit
which is impermissible in application proceedings.
It is trite law
that an application for an amendment should as a rule be granted
unless the prejudice to the other party is of
such a nature that the
proposed amendment should not be granted. The amendment addressed
facts that were fully canvassed in the
affidavits and consist of an
additional argument that may avail the Applicant based on the papers
filed. It is difficult to imagine
in what respects the Respondents
would have changed the contents of the affidavits filed in opposition
to the application had the
proposed amendment been an order sought
from the beginning. For these reasons the amendment is granted.
[11] The Applicant filed
its replying affidavit out of time and also not within the period
that Respondents agreed that it may have
in addition to the time
period provided for in Rule 6. The Applicant brought a substantive
application for condonation for its
late filing of this affidavit and
this application was likewise opposed by the Respondents. I have been
informed by the parties
during argument that this aspect of the case
had been settled and by consent the late filing of the Applicant’s
replying
affidavit is to be condoned with the Applicant to pay the
costs of this application for condonation.
[12] The Respondents also
filed an application to strike out certain portions of the affidavits
deposed to by Shaun Lawrence Ayliffe
and Dominique Chevillard in
support of the Applicant’s application. The aim was to remove
any references in these affidavits
to evidence of a hearsay nature
and conclusions drawn by the witness Chevillard. Hearsay evidence
falls to be ignored even in the
absence of a formal objection thereto
or an application to strike out the contents that amounts to hearsay
evidence and the same
will apply to conclusions drawn by a witness
not supported by any facts and based on conjecture or idle
speculation.
PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHERS v SOUTH AFRICAN RUGBY FOOTBALL
UNION AND OTHERS
1
[13] This was a fiercely
contested piece of litigation and the Respondents in particular took
every conceivable objection that seemed
open to them and added
considerably to the volume of the record. On behalf of the
Respondents, by way of example, heads of argument
were filed to cater
for each of the objections taken. I fully intend to deprive the
Respondents of costs of these applications,
excluding the application
for condonation which became settled, that cluttered up the record
whatever the merits of the applications.
More about this will follow
in due course.
[14] What this case comes
down to in the end is about passing-off and unlawful competition.
[15] A passing-off action
protects the goodwill or reputation of a trader’s business,
merchandise or services against a false
representation by a
competitor that the business and so on of the competitor is that of
the Applicant or that it is associated
with it. The onus of
establishing the likelihood of confusion on a balance of probability
rests upon the Applicant; and inasmuch
as these proceedings are by
way of affidavit I must decide whether the Applicant has succeeded in
discharging that onus by virtue
only of those facts that are admitted
by the Respondents or which are not the subject of a genuine dispute.
SOLMIKE (PTY) LTD v
WEST STREET TRADING CO (PTY) LTD
2
[16] The test to be
applied to determine whether a representation amounts to a
passing-off, is whether there is a reasonable likelihood
that the
members of the public may be confused into believing that the
business of the one is connected to the business of the
other
CAPITAL ESTATE &
GENERAL AGENCIES (PTY) LTD v HOLIDAY INN INC
3
[17] The bulk of other
case law that I was referred to deals with merchandise on sale to the
general public where it is a lot easier
for such a confusion to be
stealthily and cunningly created as the average shopper is not likely
to spend time to give reflection
on what he or she is purchasing and
a body of shoppers may more easily be deceived by a creative and
alluring passing-off into
believing that what they are buying is the
product of the Applicant whilst they would be buying the competitor’s
product
instead.
[18] I am mindful of the
fact that it is virtually common cause that the pumps called MP pumps
by the Respondents is outwardly similar
to the Broquet pumps and was
admittedly virtually duplicated over a long period of time. A
passing-off can occur even if the name
of the product does not have a
similarly sounding brand name, as in this case, but the external
appearance has become the embodiment
of the product and the consumer
would be easily convinced that the product is that of the Applicant
despite the fact that the brand
name is different and not capable of
confusion with that of the Applicant. Whether a passing-off had
occurred in such circumstances
would depend on the peculiar facts of
a case. Counsel for the Respondents has taken issue with what has
been stated by me and I
quote extensively from his heads of argument:
“
16.
Public policy is against protecting the shape and configuration of
functional or utilitarian articles (as opposed to an article
whose
shape is capricious or which incorporates capricious features or
shape as was the case in
Weber
Stephen
Products
Co. v Alrite Engineering (Pty) Ltd
1992 (2) (A) 496C-497B; 504 D-F). It is submitted that the Applicant
is seeking to acquire, by the relief that it is asking for,
a
monopoly in respect of functional and utilitarian pumps of a
particular shape and configuration and having particular attributes.
It is submitted that as a matter of law it cannot do this. Its clear
intention in this regard appears from its founding papers
and the
relief sought (to which reference has been above).
Briere
7.3-7.7/24-26
17. It is well
established that the law pertaining to passing –off (and indeed
the law pertaining to trade marks) does not
create monopolies.
18. Competition is
fundamental to our economic system. The overriding principle was
stated in
Premier Hangers CC v Polyoak (Pty) Ltd
[1996] ZASCA 119
;
1997
(1) SA 416
(a) 423 D-E
‘
What
does see, in general, to be established in that the absence (or
expiration) of statutory protection is regarded as opening
the field
to competition by copying or imitating and that is quite legitimate.’
And at 424 H-I
(with reference to
Schultz v Butt
1986 (3) 667 (a)
‘
The
finding was that the copying per se was not unlawful. It was only the
existence of extraneous factors that rendered the unsuccessful
party’s conduct unlawful. Thus it appears to me that in our
law, as in many of the foreign systems to which Ms Fellner refers,
where statutory protection can be claimed but is not or where
statutory protection expires or is lost, anyone is free to copy.’
See also:
Aruba
Construction (Pty) Ltd v Aruba Holdings (Pty) Ltd
2003 (2) SA 155
© 171 - 172
19. This principle
is reinforced particularly in the law relating to passing-off whereas
as a matter of policy passing-of relief
is excluded in the case of
the shape or configuration of functional or utilitarian articles or
components of functional or utilitarian
articles.
20. In John
Waddington Ltd v Arthur & Harris (Pty) Ltd
1968 (1) SA 38
(T),
(upheld on appeal
1968 (3) SA 405
(T) the Court stated (at 407H-408A)
‘
Once
the patent of, say a machine, has expired, the rights to the making
and selling of that machine became public property. I conceive
the
position to be that anyone can then go to the patents office and get
a copy of the specifications. I think he is then entitled
to copy
those and make a machine, line to line, angle for angle, also as to
the length, width, thickness and quality of materials
exactly the
same as the machine that had been patented… He is entitled to
make an exact replica.’
See also
Benchairs
Ltd v Chair Centre Ltd
[1974] RPC 429
435-436
21. In Agriplas
(Pty) Ltd v Andrag & Sons (Pty) Ltd
1981 (4) SA 973
(C) 881H, the
Court after reviewing the authorities stated:
‘
It
seems to me therefore that on purely logical grounds that reputation
and goodwill for which a trader can seek protection must
relate to
the non-functional elements only and that purely functional elements
of the article can in the absence of a statutory
or contractual
limitation be freely copied. It follows that the get-up which the
competing trader cannot relates to the non-functional
elements only.’
In making these
comments the learned departed from the decision in
William
Lasar v Sabon Precision Machine Co (Pty) Ltd
1954 2 PHA 37
c/f Daimler
Chrysler Aktiengesellschaft v Afinta Motor Corporation (Pty)
Ltd
[2001] 2 All SA 219
(T) 230a-231h
Weber-Stephen
Products Co v Alrite Engineering (Pty) Ltd
(supra)
22. It is
submitted that public policy has set its face against the
monopolisation of functional shapes in the absence of statutory
protection such as a design registration or patent protection.”
[19] I do not think the
passages and references to the case law leads to the inevitable
conclusion that a passing-of cannot be said
to have occurred if the
brand name of a product is not its essentially recognisable feature,
but its shape is.
[20] It is common cause
that the Respondents supplied the parts of pumps and the MP Pumps
with its own trade name affixed to the
pumps to specific consumers
such as the sugar industry and not to the general public. The
consumers of the Respondents’ pumps
could not possibly have
been under any misapprehension that what were sold to them were not
Broquet pumps but pumps manufactured
by the First Respondent given
the long history of the initial manufacture and cloning of parts of
the Broquet pumps by the predecessors
to the First Respondent and
later the manufacture of the MP pumps by the First Respondent. The
probabilities are simply overwhelmingly
in favour of the fact that
the specific consumers knew that they were not purchasing Broquet
pumps and any evidence in the affidavits
to that effect was in any
event based on inconclusive speculation and hearsay.
[21] I therefore conclude
that the Applicant has failed to establish that leg of its
application.
[22] I now consider the
amended portion of the Applicant’s application dealing with
unlawful competition.
[23] The deponent to the
Applicant’s founding affidavit referred to the turnover of its
business in South Africa in Euros
which I was invited to multiply by
10 to provide the South African equivalent in Rands. The Applicant’s
turnover in new pumps
was R221 500.00 in 1993 and peaked at R1 058
180.00 in 1998. Thereafter a downward trend was noticeable with all
sales terminating
by 2005 when the turnover reached the zero mark
with regard to new pumps and R6 400.00 in respect of spare parts
supplied. It is
this decline in business that caused the Applicant to
launch investigations and to determine, probably correctly, that the
decline
in business was due to the activities of the First
Respondent.
[24] Competitive trading
is unlawful if it involves a wrongful interference with another
trader’s rights and is actionable
in terms of the
lex
aquilia
if
it directly results in loss. The test for wrongfulness is one of
fairness and honesty having regard to the
boni
mores
and
the general sense of justice of the community. Questions of public
policy may be important in a particular case, for example
the
importance of a free market and competition.
SCHULTZ v BUTT
4
[24] For this leg of the
application the Applicant relied heavily on the admission by the
First Respondent that it used the Applicant’s
brochure and
infringed the Applicant’s copyright. The explanation advanced
on behalf of the First Respondent that it did
not copy the
performance graphs directly from material of the Applicant but was
given the material by Rely Precision Casting when
it purchased its
business as a going concern did not sit well with the deponent to the
Applicant’s affidavit. He says this
explanation lacks candour
and should therefore be rejected as false. Given the history of the
First Respondent I do not necessarily
agree that this infringement
was based on the bad faith alleged on the Applicant’s behalf.
It had ceased to be any kind of
competitor at all since 2005 and it
was only during November 2009 that a letter was addressed to the
First Respondent on behalf
of the attorneys acting on behalf the
Applicant to address the issue of passing off. The allegation of
infringement of copyright
was not addressed in this letter but in
fairness to the Applicant it may not have known about it at that
stage. Suffice it to say
that I do not think that the infringement of
the Applicant’s copyright, which may occur even if not done in
a direct and
deliberate manner, ought to be given the weight that the
Applicant attaches to it.
[25] On behalf of the
Applicant considerable reliance was placed on the facts and
conclusions reached in the case of
Shultz v Butt
supra. I can
do no better than quote the relevant argument from the Applicant’s
heads of argument:
“
17.
As noted in the
locus
classicus
in the field,
Schultz
v Butt
:
“
In
order to succeed in an action based on unfair competition, the
plaintiff must establish all the requisites of Aquilian liability,
including proof that the defendant has committed a wrongful act. In
such a case, the unlawfulness which is a requisite of Aquilian
liability may fall into a category of clearly recognized illegality….
But it is not limited to unlawfulness of that kind.
In the Dun and
Bradstreet case supra at 218 CIRBETT J referred to the fact that in
the cases of Geary & Son (Pty) Ltd v Gove
(supra) and Combrinck v
De Kock
(1887) 5 SC 405
emphasis was placed upon criteria such as
fairness and honesty in competition and said:
“
Fairness
and honesty are themselves somewhat vague and elastic terms but,
while they may not provide a scientific or indeed infallible
guide in
all cases to the limits of lawful competition, they are relevant
criteria which have been used in the past and which,
in my view, may
be used in the future in the development of the law relating to
competition in trade.”
18. The relief
sought by the applicant in prayer (c) of its notice of motion, as it
is sought to be amended, is based on the law
as it is stated
Schultz
v Butt
. The applicant does not contend that the reverse
engineering (i.e. duplication) of its valves is
per se
unlawful, but it is existence of extraneous factors – some
special unfairness in what has been done – that has rendered
the copying unlawful.
19. The facts in
Schultz v Butt
are illustrative of the manner in which copying
can be rendered unlawful. It will be recalled that Schultz had, in
that case, reverse
engineered a boat hull designed and developed by
Butt and had then spent some hours (600 in total) “re-working”
it.
Schultz then sold boats, including the copied hull, in
competition with Butt. In addition, Schultz registered a design right
in
respect of a boat including an identical hull to that which had
been developed by Butt.
20. In that case,
the court made it clear that the boat hull which had been reversed
engineered by Schultz was in the public domain
and that there was
nothing confidential about it. It added tlhat:
“
Anyone
may ordinarily make anything produced by another which is in the
public domain: One may freely and exactly copy it without
his leave
and without payment of compensation.”
21. The court went
on, however, to make clear that the question in that case (as in this
case) is:
“
Whether
one may lawfully copy the product of another but whether A, in making
a substantially identical copy, with the use of B’s
mould, of
an article made by B, and selling it in competition with B, is
engaging in unfair competition.”’
[26] I do not consider
that the facts in the
Shultz v Butt
case compare favourably to
the facts in the present application. The use of the specifications
of the Brouquet pump was freely
available and there is an absence of
the contemporaneous and dishonest type of activity so apparent in the
Schultz v Butt
case. The Applicant could apparently not have
cared less about its pumps in South Africa for the period 2005 to
November 2009 when
it ought to have known that it had pumps working
in the sugar industry that will at least require replacement parts
from time to
time.
[27] As it is the duty of
the court to assess the general sense of justice of the community or
boni mores
in determining the aspect of unlawfulness of
competition in the trade, I should record that having regard to all
the facts in this
case the actions of the First Respondent do not
provoke in me any sense of moral indignation. Such competition as
there were has
therefore not been shown by the Applicant to warrant
the label of unfairness.
[28] It follows that the
application must fail on this leg as well.
[29] In the answering
affidavit on behalf of the First Respondent it was immediately
conceded that the performance graphs and its
publication constituted
an infringement of copyright and a tender was made to refrain from
continuing to do so. The fact that prayer
1 of the Notice of Motion
has to be granted does not necessarily mean that the Applicant will
be entitled to the costs of this
application. The infringement of
copyright formed part of the evidence for the other and more material
relief sought and in that
the Applicant was singularly unsuccessful.
It is not possible to separate the costs incurred in respect of the
copyright infringement
from the overall costs of the application.
[30] I intend to deprive
the Respondents of the costs of the interlocutory applications as the
application for amendment of the
Notice of Motion has been granted.
The Applicant will not be awarded the costs of the application for
the amendment as it should
have asked for the relief it subsequently
sought at the stage when the application was launched. Although there
was some merit
in the First Respondent’s application to strike
out, I have mentioned elsewhere in this judgment that this
constituted an
unnecessary exercise and the Applicant ought not to be
burdened with the costs of this application. To avoid any confusion I
intend
to disallow all the costs incurred in respect of the
interlocutory applications (excluding the opposed application for
condonation)
including heads of argument filed pursuant thereto.
[31] I therefore make the
following orders:
(a) Interdicting and
restraining the Respondents from infringing the Applicant’s
copyright subsisting in its BBMC performance
graph and in its
brochures for its BROQUET BBMC pump indicated in annexure “OB
5” to annexure “OB 8” to
the founding affidavit, by
reproducing and/or copying and/or marking adaptations of these works
and/or distributing copies thereof
is granted.
(b) The Applicant is
ordered to pay the Respondents costs including the costs consequent
on the employment of two (2) counsel where
applicable, and the costs
will include the Respondents costs incurred in the application for
condonation for the late filing by
the Applicant of its replying
affidavit.
(c) There will be no
orders of costs in respect of the interlocutory applications.
_____________________
MBATHA J
Date of hearing: 23
September 2011
Date of Judgment: 15 May
2012
Counsel for the
Applicant: Adv G.D. Marriott SC
Instructed by: D M KISCH
ATTORNEYS
Locally represented by:
SHEPTSTONE & WYLIE
24 Richefond Circle
Ridgeside Office Park,
Umhlanga Rocks
c/o 35 Samora Machel
Street (Aliwal Street)
DURBAN
Counsel for the
Respondents: Adv G.E. Morley SC
Instructed by: ADAMS &
ADAMS ATTORNEYS
3
rd
floor,
Lincoln House
30 Dullah Omar Road
(Masonic Grove)
DURBAN
1
2000
(1) SA 1
(CC)1 (para 105)
2
1981
(4) SA 706D
& CLD at 712 H
3
1977
(2) SA 916
AD
4
1986
(3) SA 667
AD
19