About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Pietermaritzburg
>>
2012
>>
[2012] ZAKZPHC 45
|
|
Akoo and Others v Master of the High Court and Others (5612/11) [2012] ZAKZPHC 45 (31 July 2012)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA, PIETERMARITZBURG
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
Case No. 5612/11
In the matter between:
M.R.O.S Akoo &
Twenty two Others
…............................................................
Applicant
and
The Master of the High
Court & Thirty Seven Others
…............................
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Heard: 25 June 2012
Delivered: 31 July
2012
D. PILLAY J
[1] This is an
application for leave to appeal against my judgment in which I
dismissed the application for an order in the following
terms:
‘
2(a)
The 36
th
(HBZ Bank) and 37
th
(Rohinton
Meherjina) respondents are forthwith interdicted and restrained from
disclosing or furnishing to the respondents any information
or
documents in respect of applicants’ banking account held with
the 36
th
respondent as set forth in the subpoena issued by the second
respondent on 11 February 2011 (the subpoena) or any other subpoena
subsequently issued in this regard.
The
respondents are interdicted from proceeding with or participating in
any enquiry or hearing in terms of section 415 or section
417 of the
Companies Act 61 of 1973 or otherwise relating to the affairs of
Rollco Roofing Systems (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation)
.
. . .
3.
Pending the final determination of the application paragraphs 2(a)
and 2(b) operate as interim relief pending the decision of
the first
respondent relating to the expungement applications and or
proceedings to be instituted by the applicant.’ (
sic
)
[2] My primary reason for
dismissing the application was that it was accompanied by neither the
application to expunge foreshadowed
in the notice of motion, nor the
review anticipated in the communications between the various parties
involved in this application,
in particular, the discussion with the
Master as evidenced in the transcript of those discussions. Those
applications or, at least
one of them, was a precondition for
confirming the interdict granted or noted by agreement between the
parties. Were the applicants
aware that they had to launch at least
one of those applications and to do so timeously?
[3] The subpoenas were
issued on 11 February 2011. The applicants’ attorneys Abbas
Latib and Company asked Deneys Reitz attorneys
for the HBZ Bank to
delay their response to the subpoena. Deneys Reitz indicated to Abbas
Latib and Company that having attended
the interrogation before the
Master they ascertained that the Master insisted on the documents
being produced by subpoena at the
next hearing. In view of the
Master’s attitude Deneys Reitz invited Abbas Latib to
‘
take
whatever steps you deem necessary to interdict our client from
producing the documents. You may of course also consider taking
the
Master on review or appearing at the next hearing and objecting each
time a request is made for documents relating to one of
the companies
which you represent’.
That letter is dated 9
March 2011.
[4] On
5 May 2011 the parties were assembled before the Master. Still, there
was no sign of either of the applications. Mr Manickum
represented
the applicants or some of them. He was manifestly aware that if a
review is launched the Master would be obliged to
place before the
reviewing authorities all the information that informed the
subpoena.
1
After
two hours of debate, the Master announced that claims of the
respondent creditors had been proved and would remain so until
they
were expunged. The Master then pointed out that she had issued the
subpoena about three months ago and that
‘
the
prudent way of dealing with such subpoena was so the people
objecting, to certain documents being supplied to this proceedings,
to go to court and have certain parts of the subpoena, or the whole
of the subpoena (challenged).
2
’
(
sic
)
[5] The Master also urged
that if there were parts of the subpoena which were not objectionable
the enquiry could proceed on those
parts. She then suggested that she
put the applicants on terms
‘
and
ask you to go to court and get that interdict, because we can not
wait forever. It’s been more than a month if not more
since
there has been a threat of having an interdict being brought for
supplying the information . . . so I can not then sit in
this
proceeding and deal with that issue, because it will be like I am
reviewing my own decision. . . . and therefore Mr Manickum
your
clients then have to go and bring this interdict within fourteen days
so that we can know whether we can proceed with all
the information,
or with some of it.’
3
(
sic
)
The above extracts from
the discussion with the Master show that the applicants and Mr
Manickum who represented them could have
been in no doubt as to what
steps they needed to take to challenge the subpoenas.
[6] The interdict was
launched a month later, well over the 14 days set by the Master.
Interim relief was granted or noted until
the matter came before me
on 30 September 2011 for final determination. At that stage there was
still no sign of the applications
to expunge the claims of creditors
or to review the subpoenas. Realising that the applications
foreshadowed in paragraph 3 of the
notice of motion had still not
been launched, Mr Olsen SC who appeared with Mr Manickum for the
applicant proffered an amended
order prayed. The amended order was to
enable the applicants to institute the review proceedings. Clearly
the applicants were aware
that they had to launch the review
proceedings as a necessary consequence of the interim interdict and
that they had failed to
do so.
[7] What was the
explanation for the delay? The reason advanced from the bar in this
application for leave to appeal for not launching
the application
sooner was because the applicants were engaged in discussions to
avoid litigation. Even if I were to accept this
explanation, such
discussions had ended if not by 3 March 2011 with the correspondence
from Deneys Reitz, then at least by 5 May
2011 in discussions with
the Master.
[8] Mr Manickum submitted
that I should have imposed the draft amended order proffered by Mr
Olsen. This submission misconstrues
the circumstances in which a
court may of its own accord vary the order sought. In the face of
vigorous, justifiable resistance
from Ms Lennard for the respondents
I could not impose such an order
mero motu
. Besides, the
applicants had given me no reason to come to their aid. On the
contrary, I could not discount the possibility that
their application
was a delaying tactic to prevent disclosure to the Master.
[9] The nature of the
relief sought gave the court a discretion. The final relief sought in
this application was inherently of an
interim nature. It could endure
only until the applications to expunge and review were launched.
Those applications would have
incorporated further interim relief if
needed. But they had to be launched to justify this urgent
interlocutory application. From
the time the interim relief was
granted on 8 June and extended on 8 July, 26 July and 5 August 2011
the applicants launched neither
the applications to expunge nor the
review. By that stage any right that the applicants had to the relief
had whittled down to
a privilege or indulgence.
[10] To confirm the rule
would have had the effect of final relief with no hope of the further
applications in sight. The notice
of motion promised no date by which
they would be launched. Effectively, the applicants could have
avoided indefinitely the proceedings
to test the validity of the
subpoena and the claims of the creditors. In the meantime, the work
of the Master would be frustrated.
She would have been able to
neither insist on compliance with the subpoena nor completion of her
enquiry. The applicants’
dilatoriness in launching the
applications to expunge and review was the principle reason for their
application failing.
[11] Besides the adverse
inferences I drew from their delay, the nature of the relief sought
confirmed that the applicants were
reluctant to allow the enquiry to
proceed at all. In this application for leave to appeal Mr Manickum
confirmed, as the Master
had indicated, that there were items listed
in the subpoena to which the applicants had no objection. However,
the relief claimed
in the Notice of Motion is to bar all the
information sought via the subpoena without distinguishing the items
to which the applicants
had no objection. Consequently, the
applicants had no valid reason to stall the enquiry altogether.
[12] Turning to the
requirements for an interdict, I did not spell out the reasons for an
interim and final interdict in my judgment.
However, having read the
heads of argument for this application it seems I should have done
so. In this application for leave to
appeal Mr Manickum submitted
that the applicants had merely to establish a
prima facie
and
not a clear right.
[13] The requirements for
an interim interdict are the following:
(1) A
prima facie
right on the part of the applicant;
(2) A well-grounded
apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief is not granted
and the ultimate relief is granted;
(3) A balance of
convenience in favour of granting the interim relief;
(4)
The absence of any other satisfactory remedy available to the
applicant.
4
How these requirements
meld together is explained as follows in
Joubert NO and others v
Maranda Mining Company (Pty) Ltd and Others
[2010] 2 All SA 67
(GNP) para 26:
“
The
requisites for an interim interdict are well known The applicants are
obliged to show that the right which is the subject-matter
of the
main application which they seek to protect by means of interim
relief is clear, or if not clear, is
prima
facie
established,
though open to some doubt. If the right is only
prima
facie
established
then it must be shown that there is a well-grounded apprehension of
irreparable harm to the applicants if the interim
relief is not
granted and they ultimately succeed in establishing their right; that
the balance of convenience favours the granting
of interim relief;
and that the applicants have no other satisfactory remedy.”
[14] The requirements for
a final interdict are the following:
(1) A clear right on the
part of the applicant;
(2) An injury actually
committed or reasonably apprehended;
(3)
There is no other satisfactory remedy available to the applicant.
5
[15]
The applicants held the interim remedy for the harm apprehended in
their hands but they let it slip away when the failed to
launch the
applications to expunge or to review. Initially, the irreparable harm
the applicants allegedly apprehended was that
the Master issued the
subpoena unlawfully by not consulting them first. I rejected this
ground. In this application for leave to
appeal they rely on
Nedbank
Ltd v Master of the High Court WLD
2009
(3) SA 403
(W). They change tack to deny that the actions of the
Master can be classified as administrative. For the purposes of this
judgment
it is therefore safe to assume that their compliant is no
longer that the Master deprived them of just administrative action.
[16] Another ground of
irreparable harm the applicants allegedly apprehended was the breach
of their private financial information
if the HBZ Bank disclosed its
records of their accounts to the Master at the enquiry. The
applicants baldly alleged that disclosure
of their bank account
information would be a breach of their privacy but failed to prove
how such disclosure, if it did breach
their privacy, was unreasonable
or unjustifiable.
[17]
Their challenge to the subpoena raised a constitutional issue, be it
on the grounds of administrative action or privacy. As
such, the
applicants had to plead and prove their constitutional rights
succinctly. Irrespective of whether they relied on just
administrative action or privacy, they had to prove that their right
trumped the creditors’ rights and the Master’s
duty to
issue subpoenas when called upon by creditors to do so. The case the
applicants presented was not pitched as a constitutional
challenge.
Instead, it was a muddled complaint of procedural and substantive
administrative law breaches by the Master in issuing
the subpoena. To
rely on
Nedbank
in
this application for leave to appeal because that case holds that a s
417 enquiry is not administrative,
6
and
therefore the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000
(PAJA) and its time limits do not apply, is selective if not
opportunistic. If
Nedbank
is
correct then the applicants have no right in administrative law to
challenge the subpoena and I should hold that applicants failed
to
show any
prima
facie
right
to the relief they sought.
[18]
As far as the privacy argument goes, any prejudice the applicants
might suffer as a result of the disclosure is
mitigated
by s
417 (7) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (CA) which declares the
enquiry to be private and confidential. In addition, in terms
of
s 65
(1) of the
Insolvency Act
24
of 1936
the presiding officer shall
disallow irrelevant questions by a creditor and may disallow any
question which would prolong the interrogation
unnecessarily
.
Subsection (2) invokes
the law
relating to privilege to apply to a witness summoned to produce a
book or document or give evidence. These qualifications
that mitigate
the potential prejudice of disclosure are the means by which the
legislature seeks to strike the balance between
the rights of
creditors and the public interest on the one hand and the rights of
persons prejudiced by the disclosure. The Supreme
Court of Appeal
struck the balance to hold that the relevance of the documents to be
disclosed trumps the right to privacy.
7
Although the applicants included
Gumede
in their bundle they failed to show why it did not apply
to this case. Furthermore,
section 417
is held to be consistent with
the right to privacy.
8
The applicants failed to prove that the statutory
balance did not protect them adequately.
[19] Whether my judgment
is appealable at all is a point that neither counsel addressed. The
application was interim in the sense
that the applicants requested
that the interdict operate pending the decision of the Master to
expunge the claims of creditors
or the decision of a reviewing court.
As an interim order it is not appealable. If they had launched the
applications to expunge
or review by the time I heard the
application, the need for the interdict would have fallen away. Their
failure to launch those
applications implies not only an intention to
delay the liquidation proceedings but also possibly a lack of
conviction in the merits
of those applications.
[20]
The application also was final in the sense that it was for
confirmation of the interim relief obtained earlier. Furthermore,
the
effect of the order was that the subpoenas remained in force and the
enquiry in terms of
ss 415
or
417
continues. If I granted the
application before the applications to expunge or review were
launched, the Master would have been
forced to appeal against my
order to set aside the subpoena before she could enforce it. In that
sense too the application before
me was for a final interdict. As an
application for a final interdict the authorities
9
require
the applicants to establish a clear right.
[21] I
did not have to determine the validity of the subpoena finally. That
is a matter for the court reviewing the subpoena or
the enquiry. All
I needed to be convinced of is that the Master did not act
irrationally or unjustifiably in issuing the subpoenas.
For instance,
if she was unable to produce any information on which to found her
decision to issue the subpoena or issued the subpoena
with the
intention of obtaining extraneous information,
10
her
decision would be irrational. Hence my enquiry into the circumstances
precipitating the subpoena was for the limited purpose
of ensuring
that the subpoena met the requirements for legality. Based on my
finding that the Master had grounds for issuing the
subpoena it
followed that the applicants failed to establish not only a clear
right but also a
prima
facie
right
to impugn the subpoenas.
[22]
In sharp contrast to the requirements for an interdict, the threshold
requirements for a subpoena do not require an applicant
for a
subpoena to make out a
prima
facie
case.
It is sufficient to persuade the court or in this the Master that
there is fair ground for suspicion that the person proposed
to be
examined can probably give information about what is suspected.
11
[23] Irrespective of
whether the application for the interdict before me is characterised
as interim or final the applicants had
to show a well-grounded
apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief is not granted
and the ultimate relief is granted,
or they had to show an injury
actually committed or reasonably apprehended. As I have elaborated
above, the applicants failed to
make out any case either in
administrative law or privacy that trumps the Master’s
statutory duty to act on information provided
by creditors as to
where assets of the company in liquidation might be found. The
applicants’ rights, whatever they may be,
have to be balanced
with the creditors’ rights to have the subpoena issued on their
request.
[24]
The relevance of the information sought through the subpoena is
obvious. It is the Master who determines relevance not the
party
seeking to prevent disclosure. The respondents established that there
were links between accounts held by HBZ Bank for the
applicants who,
in their various capacities, managed or operated accounts for several
entities. These links which informed the
Master’s decision to
issue the subpoena were canvassed more fully in my initial judgment.
For instance, whether Mr Aslam
Akoo of Steelworld Roofing Systems CC,
a business similar to Rollco in liquidation, received a salary of R6
million per annum from
Rollco in liquidation must attract the
interests of the latter’s creditors and the scrutiny of the
liquidators. Steelworld
could be Rollco reincarnated. The Master acts
in the public interest when conducting enquiries into the liquidation
of legal entities.
Her issuing the subpoena was in the execution of
those responsibilities. Accordingly, the right to privacy and the
private interests
of the applicants must yield in favour of the
public interest. This is the tenor of
Harksen
v
President of The Republic of South Africa And Others
2000 (2) SA 825
(CC).
Podlas v Cohen And Bryden NNO And Others
[1994] 2 All SA 489
(T) makes this point succinctly in the
following extract:
‘
A
person who is subpoenaed to give evidence before any legally
constituted tribunal empowered to subpoena witnesses, is, generally
speaking, obliged to obey it. This seems to be so because he or she
is called upon to perform what may be described as a public
duty (
Van
Aswegen v Lombard
1965 3 SA 613
(A) 623E). Personal freedom therefore becomes subordinate to the
public interests.’
[25] Whether the
application for the interdict is interim or final the absence of a
satisfactory remedy is always a requirement.
The alternative remedy
was the applications to expunge or review which vested in the
applicants themselves, and which they failed
to invoke timeously. The
fact that those applications have since been launched does not alter
the situation as far as this application
goes. If they are entitled
to interim relief they would ask for it in those applications. Any
interim relief sought would be attenuated
by the fact that the
appellants do not object to disclosure of some of the documents
subpoenaed.
[26]
Any review whether brought in terms of the PAJA,
s 151
of the
Insolvency Act or
the Uniform Rules of Court must be brought within a
reasonable time.
12
An
application for review failed on the mere ground that it was brought
after an unreasonable and unexplained delay of 13 months.
13
In
cases of inordinate delay, the Constitutional Court (CC) has held
that it is open to a court to raise the issue of the delay
of its own
accord.
14
The
applicants had a duty to explain why they not merely delayed but
failed to launch the applications to expunge and review before
30
September 2011 when this application had to be determined finally.
Without any such explanation the prognosis for a reviewing
court
entertaining a late review was bleak. Besides, if the applicants had
launched the applications to expunge and review they
would have
demonstrated their seriousness and good faith in challenging the
subpoenas and the ss 415 and 417 proceedings. These
considerations
influenced my findings on the prospects of success of the review,
which were superficial, provisional and relevant
only the extent that
it was necessary to determine the interdict before me.
[27] Ultimately, granting
an interdict is at the discretion of the court. If I was wrong to
dismiss the application for any reason
and if the applicants’
grounds of appeal have merit, granting leave to appeal is now
entirely academic. The applicants have
since my judgment launched
applications to expunge the claims of the respondent creditors and
for the review of the subpoena. If
the application to expunge
succeeds then everything flowing from the subpoenas will also fall
away. The prospects of the applications
to expunge and review being
disposed of before any appeal from my judgment are great.
[28] Mr Manickum raised
several additional grounds of appeal against my judgment. None of
them are relevant for the purposes of
granting or refusing leave to
appeal in view of my reasons above. However, one of his grounds which
would have been appealable
if it could alter the outcome was merits a
cursory response. That ground of appeal is whether PAJA applies to
the issuing of the
subpoena and s 417 of the CA and the Close
Corporations Act No 69 of 1984 (CCA).
[29]
Mr Manickum submitted that I ‘implemented’ the provisions
of section 1(1) of PAJA. Relying on
Nedbank
above
he
contended that the acts of the Master in conducting an enquiry in
terms of s 417 of the CA do not constitute administrative action.
When I concluded that the applicant should have instituted the review
of the subpoenas within 180 days I did not implement PAJA;
implementation of PAJA fell within the remit of the reviewing court.
The reference to PAJA was merely to indicate that time limits
for
launching the review would apply. I made the statement in passing.
Even if I misdirected myself in doing so it is a peripheral
issue
which, if corrected on appeal, would not reverse the effect of the
outcome of my judgment.
[30]
As to whether PAJA applies to s 417, case law inclines towards
answering the question in the negative; the enquiry is not
administrative but investigative resulting not in decisions but
findings to facilitate the liquidation.
15
In
Nedbank
Ltd v Master of the High Court WLD
2009
(3) SA 403
(W) the learned judge of the Witwatersrand Local Division
concluded that when the Master gives effect to s 417 of the Act he
does
not act administratively; accordingly PAJA does not apply.
Citing the CC’s decision in
Bernstein
and Others v Bester and Others NNO
[1996] ZACC 2
;
1996
(2) SA 751
(CC) para 95 and 97 he reasoned that ss 417 and 418 were
purely investigative measures to facilitate the winding up of a
company.
Taking evidence from a witness in a winding up had no
adverse effect on the right of any person. The commissioner had no
powers
to decide any rights or obligations but merely to report to
the Master and the court. So the reasoning went.
[31] In
Bernstein
the CC analysed whether ss 417 and 418 of the CA violated s 24 of the
Constitution the CC. It observed:
‘
There
is certainly an argument to be made for the proposition that
enquiries conducted pursuant to the provisions of ss 417 and
418 of
the Act and the performance by commissioners of their duties to
report thereunder constitute administrative action within
the meaning
of s 24 of the constitution.’
16
[32]
The CC doubted the application of s 24(b) and (c) of the Constitution
to ss 417 and 418 of the CA saying that those subsections
would apply
only if the nature of the enquiry is characterised as being
‘administrative action’.
17
The CC
also had ‘difficulty’ in fitting (the enquiry) into the
mould of administrative action saying that it could not
see
‘
how
s 24(c) of the Constitution can be applied to the enquiry, because it
is hard to envisage “administrative action”
taken by the
commissioner in respect whereof it would make any sense to furnish
reasons. The enquiry after all is to gather information
to facilitate
the liquidation process. It is not aimed at making decisions binding
on others.’
18
[33] However, the CC
concluded as follows:
‘
It
is in my view unnecessary, however in the circumstances of this case,
to provide an answer to the question and to decide if s
24 or any
part thereof, applies to ss 417 and 418 enquiries and whether it
applies to all such enquiries, whether conducted by
the Court, the
Master or the commissioner. It is unnecessary, in my view, because
even assuming that the enquiry constitutes administrative
action,
this does not assist the applicants in establishing that the
provisions of ss 417 and 418 are inconsistent with s 24(b)
or (c) of
the constitution.’
19
Nedbank’s
citation of the
obiter
in
Bernstein
is incomplete to
the extent that it omits to refer to the
ratio
quoted above.
Furthermore,
Bernstein
was decided before
PAJA was promulgated.
That is as far as the nature of a
s 417 enquiry goes. What of the nature of the Master’s decision
to issue a subpoena?
[34]
The
learned authors of
Insolvency
Law
opine
that as an organ of State, the decisions of the Master will be
subject to the provisions of PAJA since she regularly makes
decisions
which constitute ‘administrative action’ as defined in
PAJA.
Section
417 anticipates several acts by the Master and commissioners in
performing their functions. Some acts do require decisions,
for
example the decision to summons a person or to issue a subpoena. Such
decisions by the Master are typically administrative.
20
The
question therefore as to what the nature is of the Master’s
decision to issue a subpoena in s 417 proceedings and whether
PAJA
applies to it has yet to be determined. For present purposes I do not
need to do so.
Ultimately
,
w
hatever
the nature of the act, its lawfulness is what counts.
21
Accordingly, the
application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
___________
D. Pillay J
Counsel for the
Applicants: Mr Manikam, Instructed by
Abbas Latib & Company
c/o Von Klemperers
Attorneys
Pietermaritzburg
Counsel for the
Respondents: Mrs U. Lennard, instructed by
Lockhat & Associates
c/o Tomlinson Mnguni
James
Attorneys
1
Page
267 line 10-15
2
Page
305
3
Page
306
4
Joubert
NO and others v Maranda Mining Company (Pty) Ltd and others
[2010] 2 All SA 67
(GNP) para 26;
Johannesburg Municipal
Pension Fund and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others
2005 (6) SA 273
para 8.
5
Ladychin
Investments (Pty) Ltd v South African National Roads Agency Ltd and
Others
2001 (3) SA 344 (N)
6
Nedbank
para 51-52
7
Gumede
and Others v Subel SC, Arnold NO and Others
(2006)
3 ALL SA 411
(SCA) para 19-20
8
Bernstein
and Others v Bester and Others NNO
[1996] ZACC 2
;
1996
(2) SA 751
(CC)
9
Mosii
v Motseoakhumo
1954
4 All SA 111
(A
);
De
Villiers v Soetsane
1975
1 All SA 514
(E)
;
V
& A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Helicopter and
Marine Service (Pty) Ltd and Others
[2004]
2 All SA 664
(C) para 11;
Starke
NO and another v Schreiber and Others
[2001]
1 All SA 167
(C) at 174
10
Laskarides
and Another v German Tyre Centre (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation and
Others NNO)
2010 (1) SA 390
(W) para
9, 12, 13
11
Bestbier
v Chief Magistrate, Stellenbosch and Another
(2006)
2 ALL SA 598
(C) para 8-9
; Cooper NO
and Others v South African Mutual Life Assurance Society and Others
(2001) 1 ALL SA 355
(A)
12
Gqwetha
v Transkei Development Corporations Ltd and Others
[2006] 3 All
SA 245
(SCA);
Chairperson: Standing Tender Committee and others v
JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd and Others
[2005] 4 All SA 487
(SCA) para 28-29;
Beweging vir Christelik-Volkseie Onderwys and
others v Minister of Education and Others
[2012] 2 All SA 462
(SCA)
13
P
G Bison Ltd v Johannesburg Glassworks (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) And
Others
[2006] ZAGPHC 48
;
2006 (4) SA
535
(W) para 12
14
Camps
Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and Another v
Harrison and Another
2011
(4) SA 42
(CC) para 53-54
15
PM
Meskin et al
Insolvency Law
para 1.9 Lexis Nexis Online;
16
Bernstein
para 94
17
Bernstein
and Others v Bester and Others
[1996] ZACC 2
;
1996
(2) SA 751
para 95 A-B
18
Bernstein
para 97
19
Bernstein
para 99
20
Bestbier
above
21
Le
Roux and Others v The Honourable Magistrate Viana and Others
[2008]
1 All SA 546
(SCA)
para 1