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[2012] ZAKZPHC 38
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Sayed and Another v Levitt NO and Another (AR101/2011, 5582/2010) [2012] ZAKZPHC 38; 2012 (2) SACR 294 (KZP) (25 June 2012)
REPORTABLE
IN THE KWAZULU-NATAL
HIGH COURT, PIETERMARITZBURG REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: AR101/2011
Case No: 5582/2010
In the matter between
Basheer Sayed
….............................................................
First
Applicant
Somcharee
Chulchumphorn
…..................................
Second
Applicant
and
Levitt NO
…...................................................................
First
Respondent
The National Director
of
Public Prosecutions
…...........................................
Second
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Delivered on: 25 June
2012
STEYN J
[1] This is a criminal
matter, which is part heard, and at an advanced stage of the
proceedings, since the applicants have been
convicted on various
counts of the Organised Crime Act,
1
the Sexual Offences Act
2
and the Immigration Act.
3
It has been found that
they managed an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activities that relate to foreign females being
used as prostitutes
and that the applicants were living of the earnings of prostitution.
4
This court is satisfied
that the matter is properly before it and that this court should
exercise its review powers which include
its inherent jurisdiction.
5
[2] As a general rule,
the review of unterminated criminal proceedings is a power which is
sparingly exercised and only in exceptional
circumstances.
6
The rationale for such an
approach is obvious since the remedy against a wrong decision is to
appeal after the case has been concluded.
Steyn CJ in
Ismail
and Others v Additional Magistrate, Wynberg and Another
,
infra
has emphasised that
courts will exercise such exceptional review powers in limited
circumstances:
“
As to the
second ground I should point out that it is not every failure of
justice which would amount to a gross irregularity justifying
interference before conviction. As was pointed out in
Walhaus
and Others v Additional Magistrate, Johannesburg and Another
1959 (3)
SA 113
(A) at 119, where the error relied upon is no more than a
wrong decision, the practical effect of allowing an interlocutory
remedial
procedure would be to bring the magistrate’s decision
under appeal at a stage when no appeal lies. Although there is no
sharply
defined distinction between illegalities which will be
restrained by review before conviction on the ground of gross
irregularity,
on the one hand, and irregularities or errors which are
to be dealt with on appeal after conviction, on the other hand, the
distinction
is a real one and should be maintained.
A
Superior Court should be slow to intervene in unterminated
proceedings in a court below, and should, generally speaking, confine
the exercise of its powers to “rare cases where grave injustice
might otherwise result or where justice might not by other
means be
attained.
”
7
(My emphasis)
It is trite that an
applicant who wants to succeed with a review of unterminated
proceedings should make out a case that he/she
would suffer
irreparable prejudice if the trial is allowed to proceed to
conclusion.
8
In addition to the
aforesaid, an applicant should show that a complaint falls within one
of the grounds of review as stipulated
in section 24 of the Supreme
Court Act.
9
Section 24 of the Act
provides for the following grounds:
“
(a)
Absence of jurisdiction on the part of the Court;
(b) Interest in the cause, bias,
malice or the commission
of the offence of corruption on the
part of the presiding judicial officer;
(c) Gross irregularity in the
proceedings;
(d) The admission of inadmissible
or incompetent
evidence or the rejection of
admissible or competent evidence.”
[3] In the present matter
the applicants, in main, relied on the following irregularities,
10
which they consider to be
so gross that the proceedings fall to be reviewed and set aside:
(i) An
ad hoc
interpreter was used who had not been sworn, nor was any enquiry
conducted into the interpreter’s competency and ability
to
interpret from Thai into English; and
(ii) The record reflects
that the interpreter used, was not fluent in English, and at times
the court could not understand what
was said, in addition to the
aforesaid the record reflects that it was equally difficult to
understand what was said by the interpreter;
and
(iii) The
ad hoc
Thai interpreter was used by the State counsel, the second
respondent, to consult with the State witnesses who testified at the
trial; and
(iv) The first
respondent, had difficulty in communicating with the interpreter in
Court, even in an instance as simple as administering
the oath; and
(v) The aforesaid
irregularities impacted adversely on the fair-trial rights of the
applicants.
Ms Hemraj SC, assisted by
Ms Bheemchund, strongly argued that the irregularities complained of,
tainted the entire proceedings before
the court and that the
convictions ought to be set aside as grossly irregular. Ms Hemraj has
comprehensively listed extracts from
the record in her heads of
argument, which show that the court ought to have been alarmed by the
quality of the translations by
the interpreter, but failed to
question her competency even though the interpreter at times asked
that the matter be simplified.
It was argued that interpreters are
duty bound to accurately translate what is said by each witness, and
not just convey the import
of the evidence as is claimed by the first
respondent.
Mr Khuzwayo, who acted on
behalf of the second respondent, submitted that the court ought to
view the applicants’ belated
objection with extreme caution as
it is conveniently raised in view of their convictions. He placed
reliance on the fact that the
first respondent and the second
respondent are highly experienced officers of court and have no
reason to lie. Mr Khuzwayo was
however at pains to direct us to any
part of the record that shows that the learned magistrate has sworn
the casual interpreter
or conducted an enquiry into her competency.
He was referred to the appearances as per the charge sheet, which
indicated that on
2 October 2008, 11 December 2008, 12 December 2008
and 12 January 2009, that Mr P Twala acted as the interpreter. The
Thai interpreter’s
name appears on the record for the first
time on 7 August 2008 and thereafter on 3 January 2009. Whilst it is
most likely that
the casual interpreter would have been sworn on
these dates no swearing was conducted on the said dates. Mr Khuzwayo
elected to
use lines 18-20, at page 130, where it is recorded as
follows:
Court: The interpreter has taken an
oath to interpret to the best of her ability
Mr Zwane: Yes.
He concluded in
submitting that it would not be in the interest of justice to order
that the trial should start de novo since the
witnesses have gone
back to their country of origin.
Legal Framework:
[4] Section 6(2) of the
Magistrates’ Court Act
11
places a duty on the
presiding officer to call a competent interpreter to translate
evidence into a language that is understood
by the accused.
12
The section should be
read together with the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, 1996, more specifically
section 35(3) which reads as
follows:
“
Every
accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right
—
to be informed of the charge with
sufficient detail to
answer it;
(i) to adduce and challenge
evidence;
to be tried in a language that the
accused person understands or, if that is not practicable, to have
the proceedings interpreted
in that language;”
In terms of section 35(4)
of the Constitution the rights referred to above should be made clear
to an accused person in a language
that he/she understands. Inasmuch
as it is of fundamental importance to receive legal representation it
is important to understand
and follow the evidence, because without
such understanding the right to a fair trial would be meaningless and
non-existent. Furthermore
if an accused, in an adversarial system,
cannot understand the language used, then his/her participation in
the trial would be
compromised.
The Magistrates' Courts
Rules in addition provide for an oath or affirmation to be taken by
an interpreter upon entrance into office.
The Rules, however,
distinguish between
ad hoc
interpreters and interpreters
permanently employed by the Department. Subrule 68(3), read with
68(4) and 68(5) provide for the oath
to be administered to a casual
interpreter.
[5] It is common cause
that at the time when the matter was heard in the regional court in
Durban, Ms Buttemer, a Thai citizen,
was used as an
ad
hoc
interpreter
during the trial proceedings. Accordingly the provisions of Rule 68
of the Magistrates’ Court Act should have
found application
read with section 6 of the Magistrates’ Court Act and read with
the constitutional rights as provided for
in the Constitution. This
means that an oath or affirmation should be taken before a presiding
officer and be administered in the
prescribed manner and recorded on
the record, provided that the Court, using the services of the casual
interpreter, is satisfied
that the interpreter is a competent
interpreter.
13
[6] I shall now turn to
the grounds of the application and the responses of the respondents.
It is necessary to quote verbatim from
the answering affidavit filed
by the first respondent, since I consider it relevant in deciding
upon this review:
“
1.5 It is
conceded further that rule 68(4) of the Magistrates’ Courts
Rules of Court requires the presiding officer to endorse
upon the
record that the oath has been taken by the casual interpreter, and
the record is silent in this regard.
Notwithstanding the above I can
state that
I would not
have commenced the trial without
ensuring that the casual interpreter was properly sworn in either by
myself or by another judicial
officer.
In this regard the
affidavit by the interpreter attached hereto and marked ‘Annexure
A’ fortifies this assertion that
I did swear her in.
It is conceded further that the
record is littered with
instances where the
interpreter
could not immediately understand the gist of what she was required to
interpret
and asked that the matter be simplified. She always
however,
in my respectful opinion, managed to sufficiently convey
the import of what she was required to interpret.
1.9 It should be borne in mind that
the acoustics in the court room are not ideal. On many occasions the
court lacked ventilation
and air-conditioning. In summer the
temperature soars to unbearable levels and doors have to be opened to
obtain some relief. On
those occasions noise from the general public
throughout the building affects the ability to hear correctly and
also the recording.
This can be found in the many instances of
‘inaudible’ recorded by the transcribers.
The interpreter,
in order
apparently to protect her identity, for her own safety, wore a
headscarf throughout the proceedings
, exposing only her eyes.
Naturally this distorted her normal speech, making it difficult for
others to hear her, and must also
have affected her hearing.
Notwithstanding the above I will
abide by the decision
of the Honourable Court.”
14
(My emphasis)
[7] The second respondent
filed not only an answering affidavit but also a supplementary
affidavit. The relevant part of the supplementary
affidavit reads as
follows:
“
4.
. . .
This matter was first heard in the
Regional Court in 2008 i.e. four years ago and when I deposed to the
Answering Affidavit I had
forgotten some of the details. After
continuously applying my mind and reflecting back into the matter
I
clearly recall that the enquiry in terms of section 6(2) of the
Magistrates’ Court Act and the swearing in of the interpreter
were in fact duly also conducted in the Regional Court.
This is
confirmed by the record on page 222 lines 18-20.
5.
The fact that I did not mention
this fact in my Answering Affidavit was an honest error as this
matter started about (4) years ago.
I submit that
the
matter would not have proceeded without the swearing in of the
interpreter and without conducting the enquiry in terms of section
6(2) of the Act.
”
15
(My emphasis)
[8] The supplementary
affidavit of the second respondent states that she erroneously forgot
to mention that the swearing in of the
interpreter was duly conducted
in the regional court. When the content of the second respondent’s
answering affidavit
16
is considered it shows
that she positively states that the swearing in was conducted in the
district court, implying that the district
court record would serve
as proof that the interpreter was duly sworn. The answering affidavit
reads as follows:
“
. . . . .
. I can solemnly confirm that the enquiry in terms of section 6(2) of
the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944 as to
the interpreter’s
English language competency and the subsequent swearing of the
interpreter were duly conducted during the
early stages of the
accused district court appearances . . . . . .
[T]ranscripts
before court only relate to the accused appearance in the Regional
Court, therefore the enquiry in terms of section
6(2) of the
Magistrates’ Court Act and the swearing in of the interpreter
will not appear from the transcripts before court.
”
17
(My emphasis)
Evaluation of the
Applicants’ grounds
[9] I shall now deal with
the proceedings before the regional court and the regularity of the
proceedings. At first, was any inquiry
conducted into the Thai
interpreter’s competency and was she duly sworn by the Court
a
quo
?
The record is not
endorsed and does not show that any enquiry was conducted into the
competency of the interpreter. The learned
regional court Magistrate
states in his affidavit that he would not have commenced the trial
without ensuring that the
ad hoc
interpreter was properly
sworn either by himself or another judicial officer. This, in my
view, is not a positive averment that
refutes the applicants’
allegations. I shall deal with the aforesaid statement in two parts.
Firstly, whether the learned
Magistrate would have commenced the
trial without the interpreter being sworn. It cannot be expected of a
review court or an appeal
court, tasked with considering the
regularity of the proceedings before a lower court, to take into
account the integrity of each
and every presiding officer and what
he/she would normally do in court. Such an exercise would detract
from the duties of a review
court and in itself would be subjective
in nature.
The transcribed record is
of paramount importance when a determination has to be made whether a
procedure followed, was regular
and in accordance with justice. It is
for this very reason that the prescribed enquiry should be conducted
and recorded on the
record. Simply put to determine whether a court
has exercised its discretion properly, in this instance, whether Ms
Buttemer should
have been appointed as a competent interpreter, this
court has to consider the appropriateness of the enquiry, looking at
the questions
asked and the answers given. If this was done it would
have been an easy task to determine that the said interpreter was not
only
competent to interpret from Thai into English but that she was
sufficiently conversant in both of the languages.
To merely accept that a
procedure was followed as argued by Mr Khuzwayo, in the absence of
any record that was so endorsed, would
be unjust and has the
potential to cause a severe injustice.
[10] Secondly, reliance
is placed by the first respondent on another presiding officer
conducting the enquiry and the swearing in.
I fail to see how the
learned Magistrate would have determined whether the interpreter was
duly sworn by another presiding officer
if the record does not
reflect such a procedure or enquiry. It has been noted that no other
presiding officer’s name is mentioned
in the answering
affidavit. I agree with the views of Yekiso J, in
Saidi
,
18
that it cannot be
accepted that a procedure, which is not borne out by the record was
followed purely on the presiding officer’s
ipse
dixit
.
19
This Court in the absence
of any enquiry to analyse or consider is at a disadvantage to
determine that the interpreter utilised,
was suitably qualified and
competent to have acted as a casual interpreter. The record most
certainly does not show that she was
sufficiently conversant in
English.
Admissibility of
‘unsworn evidence’
[11] Our Courts have
consistently held that only evidence of sworn witnesses
20
would be considered as
admissible evidence.
21
It is also trite that
only admissible evidence can be accepted as evidence, which places an
obligation on presiding officers to
determine, for example, whether
youthful witnesses understand the nature of the oath before
administering the oath. In
S
v Lin
22
the court held that
interpreters are to a certain extent witnesses
23
and accordingly an
interpreter has to be sworn like any other expert witness.
24
[12] The affidavit of the
first respondent, seemingly suggests that the interpreter’s
inability to understand what should
be interpreted, should be excused
since the interpreter was entirely covered with a scarf, exposing
only her eyes which must have
led to her speech being distorted and
her hearing being affected.
Ex
facie
the
record there is however no application by the State to disguise the
identity of the interpreter for reasons of safety as described
by the
learned Magistrate. In
casu
there
is order that such exceptional conduct was allowed in order to
protect the safety of the interpreter. The mere fact that the
court
allowed the interpreter to wear a headscarf, disguising her identity
begs the question whether her identity was ever revealed
in an open
court when she was sworn in. A mere consideration of the general oath
that should have been administered serves as sufficient
proof that
the identity of the casual interpreter should have been revealed and
made known to the public. It reads as follows:
“
I –
(Full name) do hereby swear/truly affirm that I shall truly and
correctly to the best of my ability interpret from the
language I may
be called upon to interpret from in the proceedings of __________
held in the Magistrates’ Court of ___________
into either of
the official languages and vice versa: So help me God/The declaration
is true.”
I shall now turn to the
applicants’ ground of review that the interpreter could not
speak English fluently and that they had
great difficulty in
understanding what she was saying when she interpreted, and that her
interpretation from Thai into English
was inaccurate.
25
[13] On the hand the
learned regional magistrate concedes that the record is littered with
instances where the interpreter could
not immediately understand the
gist of what she was required to interpret and on the other hand he
claims that the interpreter
managed sufficiently to convey the import
of what was to be interpreted. It is difficult to establish from the
record what brings
the presiding officer to this conclusion that the
interpreter was conveying the import of what was said by
Thai-speaking the witnesses.
Without a due proficiency and
understanding of the Thai language, it cannot be said that she
sufficiently conveyed the import of
what was required to be
interpreted.
26
It goes without saying
that when one determines whether an interpreter is fairly and
accurately interpreting what is said by every
witness in court that
it requires a proficiency and understanding of the language used by
the witnesses.
27
Failing the ability to
speak the language, there exists another method to determine the
accuracy of what was said and that is to
inquire into what was said
by the witnesses, by using the services of a qualified Thai
interpreter who would have compared the
transcribed record with the
audio recording.
28
It is common cause that
no such enquiry was conducted in this instance.
[14] The first respondent
also relied on the content of Annexure “A” in support of
his contention that he had sworn
the interpreter. The annexure reads
as follows:
“
1.
“
. . . I
am a Thai female
2.
During the year 2008 I went to the
Thai Embassy to update my drivers licence details, I met Mr Jeerasak
Pomsuwan who worked at the
Thai Embassy, He noticed that I have my
College Degree B.S.C. and that my English was good. He wanted to know
about my English.
I informed him that I thought
(sic)
Primary
School children in an English School. Mr Jeerasak requieired
(sic)
my help as he stated that in KwaZulu-Natal the police and court
wanted some one
(sic)
to assist with translation from Thai to
English and vice versa; I agreed to assist.
3.
Soon after I was contacted by the
police who picked me up from home and took me to court. I remember
going to “L” Court
in Durban and I met the Magistrate Mr
Levitt. The Magistrate told me to stand in the box. He asked me if I
know what it is to be
sworn inn
(sic)
. I said to him that I
saw in T.V. programme. The Magistrate then explained to me what it is
and then I repeated after him with
my hand raised So help me God. I
clearly remember doing this. This is all I wish to state at this
stage.”
The aforesaid statement
which was deposed to on 24 August 2010, is silent on any enquiry
conducted by the learned Magistrate into
the casual interpreter’s
ability and proficiency to translate from English into Thai, and
vice
versa
.
I have noted that the interpreter fails to refer to any date on which
she was sworn. Neither her nor the first respondent stipulates
what
was explained to her before she took the oath, or that she had
understood the nature of the oath.
This case has
demonstrated that it is not merely sufficient to be bilingual or
fluent in a language, an interpreter should be able
to have a basic
understanding of the legal process, since it is expected of an
interpreter to translate exactly what was said and
if the translation
is improper, due to a lack of understanding, it would result in
evidence being distorted. This court need not
decide upon this issue,
since there was no enquiry conducted.
[15] In my view the
irregularities that occurred during the trial has a direct bearing on
the findings of the Court
a
quo
and
directly impacted on the fairness of the trial. There is no doubt
that the participation of the applicants in the trial was
compromised
and that their rights had been violated.
[16] Given the
irregularities that occurred in this matter, the question remains
whether all of the proceedings before the court
a
quo
should
be set aside or whether only some of the evidence should be set
aside.
29
It is evident that the
test that should find application is whether the irregularity
produced a miscarriage of justice. In
Siyotula
the
Court held:
“
Prejudice
in this context means prejudice in the conduct of a party’s
case. If that kind of prejudice may reasonably result,
the
proceedings must be set aside.
The
court does not balance this prejudice against other kinds of
potential hardship, such as the inconvenience, delay, and wasted
expense suffered by the parties if the matter must commence
de
novo
.
These
considerations cannot cancel out the prejudicial effect of an unfair
trial. Nothing can do that.
The question therefore is whether
there is any reasonable possibility of prejudice to the accused if
(a) the evidence of Le Roux and
Steinhous is interpreted to the accused in open court by an official
interpreter; and
(b) the evidence of the accused is
declared inadmissible and struck from the record with the result that
the defence case will commence
afresh.”
30
(My emphasis)
[17] In my view the
irregularities complained of are real and not speculative or
premature.
31
It impacts on the
evidence adduced before the regional Court and the fact that the
evidence was considered as admissible evidence
when it should have
been regarded as inadmissible evidence. It is for this very reason
that the matter cannot be referred to be
heard by the first
respondent, since he has knowledge of the inadmissible evidence and
has already delivered a judgment based on
such evidence.
32
For the aforesaid reasons
I am convinced that the applicants have made out a case to have the
proceedings before the first respondent
reviewed and set aside, since
the irregularities cannot be cured without prejudicing the
applicants.
[18] In the result the
following order is made:
The proceedings before
the court
a quo
is set aside and it is directed that the
trial commence
de novo
before another regional Magistrate.
The second respondent is
ordered to pay the costs of the application.
The costs in para (ii)
above shall include those consequent upon the employment of two
counsel.
________________________
Steyn J
Nkosi J: I agree
__________________________
Nkosi J
Steyn J: It is so
ordered.
Date of Hearing: 31 May
2012
Date of Judgment: 25 June
2012
Counsel for the
applicants: Adv P Hemraj SC with
Adv K Bheemchund
Instructed by: DMI
Attorney
c/o Mornet Attorneys
Counsel for the
respondents: Mr Khuzwayo
Instructed by: The State
Attorney: KZN
1
Act
No. 121 of 1998.
2
Act
No. 23 of 1957.
3
Act
No. 13 of 2002.
4
The
judgment, as per pages 70-85, shows that the applicants have been
acquitted
on counts 2, 16 and 17 and found guilty on counts 1,3-7,10-15 and
18-21.
Counts 8 and 9 were withdrawn by the State.
5
See
Moulded
Components and Rotomoulding South Africa (Pty) Ltd v
Coucouralas
and Another
1979 (2) SA 457
(W) and the statement of Botha J at
463A, emphasising that a court will exercise its inherent
jurisdiction whenever justice requires
it to do so.
6
See
McIntyre
and Others v Pietersen and Another
1998
(1) BCLR 18
(T) at
20F-G;
Moodley and Others v NDPP and Others
2008 (1) SACR 560
(N).
7
Ibid
at 5g –
6a.
8
Walhaus
and Others v Additional Magistrate, Johannesburg and another
1959
(3)
SA 113
(A);
Ismail and Others v Additional Magistrate, Wynberg
and Another
1963 (1) SA 1
(A);
Key v Attorney General, Cape
Provincial Division and Another
[1996] ZACC 25
;
1996 (4) SA 187
(CC);
Levack
and Others v Regional Magistrate Wynberg and Others
1999 (4) SA
747
(C) at 754.
9
Act
No. 59 of 1959.
10
See
founding affidavits of both applicants, at pages 5-22 of the record.
11
Act
No. 32 of 1944.
12
See
Section 6(2) of the Magistrates’ Court Act, reads as follows:
“
(2)
If, in a criminal case, evidence is given in a language with which
the accused is not in the opinion of the court sufficiently
conversant, a competent interpreter shall be called by the court in
order to translate such evidence into a language with which
the
accused professes or appears to the court to be sufficiently
conversant, irrespective of whether the language in which the
evidence is given, is one of the official languages or of whether
the representative of the accused is conversant with the language
used in the evidence or not.”
13
For
a discussion of the role of interpreters, see Du Toit et al
‘Commentary on
the
Criminal
Procedure
Act’ Revision 45 (2010) at 22-18C to 22-18D.
14
See
pages 499 and 500 of the record.
15
See
supplementary affidavit page 3.
16
See
answering affidavit at page 526.
17
See
page 526 of record.
18
2007
(2) SACR 637
(C) at 644 g-h.
19
Ibid
at 644g-h.
20
See
section 162
of the
Criminal Procedure Act, No. 51 of 1977
.
21
See
S v T
1973
(3) SA 794
(A) at 796 G-H;
S v Vuma
Zonke
2000 (1) SACR
619
(C);
S v Bezuidenhout
(2002) 4 All SA 451
(SCA);
S v B
2003 (1) SA 52
(SCA);
S v Sikhipa
2006 (2) SACR 439
(SCA);
S
v Swartz
2009 (1) SACR 452
(C) at para 15.
22
[2010]
1 All SA 358
(W).
23
See
S v Naidoo
1962
(2) SA 625
(A) at 632G.
24
The
Court held in
Lin
,
supra, that it is
“
logical
to accept the passage in which
Wigmore
describes the interpreter as ‘a kind of witness’. ….
[T]he witness
being
examined is saying something not perhaps understood by the Court or
the
Court recorder.”
(At
para 35).
25
See
founding affidavit, pages 9-10.
26
This
case needs to be distinguished from cases wherein intermediaries are
used
since they are permitted to convey the general purport of any
question asked to a child witness. (See
s 170A(2)(b).
I am also
mindful of what is stated in
S v Booi and Another
2005 (1)
SACR 599
(B) at para 25:
“
An
intermediary must specifically undertake to convey correctly and to
the best of his or her ability the general purport of what
is being
said to and by the witness, before
she
or he begins to help the witness.
An
intermediary needs to be reminded or cautioned that his or her role
in court is, generally speaking, just as important as and
similar to
that of an interpreter. He or she is an interpreter of a special
kind. This is in line with
Rule 61(1)
-(2) of the Uniform Rules and
especially Rule 68(1)-(50 of the Magistrates’ Courts Rules
which applies to the court
a
quo
.”
(My
emphasis)
27
See
S v Mponda v S
[2004]
4 All SA 229
(C) at para 34 where it is observed by
Binns-Ward
AJ, as he then was, that presiding officers should formally satisfy
themselves
as to the relevant expertise of the casual interpreter.
28
See
S
v Lin
[2010]
1 All SA 358
(W) at 362a-c, where the Court made use of
qualified
interpreters to evaluate the services of the Mandarin interpreter.
29
See
S
v Siyotula
2003
(1) SACR 154
(ECD).
30
Ibid
at 159c-f.
31
Cf.
S
v The Attorney-General of the Western Cape
;
S
v The Regional
Magistrate,
Wynberg and Another
1999 (2) SACR 13
(C) at 25j-26b.
32
See
R
v Mabaso
1952
(3) SA 521
(A).