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[2012] ZAFSHC 103
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Mokheseng v S (A247/2011) [2012] ZAFSHC 103 (31 May 2012)
FREE STATE HIGH
COURT, BLOEMFONTEIN
REPUBLICK OF SOUTH
AFRICA
Case No. : A247/2011
In die appeal of:-
TELLO VINCENT
MOKHESENG
…...............................................
Appellant
and
THE STATE
…...........................................................................
Respondent
CORAM:
C J
MUSI, J
et
SNELLENBURG, AJ
JUDGMENT:
SNELLENBURG, AJ
HEARD:
28
MAY 2012
DELIVERED:
31 MAY 2012
[1] The appellant was
convicted on 5 August 2010 in the regional court, Welkom, on one
count of rape and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment
in terms of part
3 of schedule 2 of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act
105
of 1997
[Act 105 of 1997].
A further order was
made in terms of section 52(2)(a) of the Sexual Offences and Related
Matters Amendment Act 32 of 2007.
[2] The appellant appeals
against the said sentence with leave granted on petition after the
court a quo dismissed the appellant’s
application for leave to
appeal against the sentence.
[3] When imposing the
sentence the Magistrate dismissed an application by the appellant in
terms of
section 280(2)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
[the
Act] in terms whereof he requested that the sentence imposed or part
thereof should run concurrently with a previous unrelated
sentence
imposed on 5 May 2009 which sentence he was undergoing. To this end
and according to the South African Police Services
Criminal Records
System printout of the appellant’s criminal record, SAP 69c,
which the Appellant duly admitted, the unrelated
sentence followed on
the appellant’s conviction on one count of housebreaking with
the intention to rob and one count of
robbery, both offences having
been committed on 1 April 2007. The counts were ostensible taken
together for purpose of sentence
and the appellant was sentenced to
14 years imprisonment of which 4 years were suspended for the period
of 10 years on condition
that “
the
appellant is not convicted of the crime of housebreaking with the
intent to rob, housebreaking with the intention to steal or
robbery
with aggravating circumstances during the period of suspension.”
(The period of suspension is either incompetent or it
was wrongly captured on the SAP69.)
[4] The charge of rape
arose from an incident that occurred during the evening of 22 March
2008. At approximately 18h45 Semama Bridget
Hlajoane (the
complainant), at that time 17 years of age, was on her way home. She
was dependent on transport by way of mini bus
taxi service to get
home. As the complainant was unsuccessful to procure passage to her
parental home at the main taxi rank she
made her way, on foot, to
another taxi terminal near Zone 1, Welkom. Whilst walking towards the
taxi terminal, in the vicinity
of the Liberty Centre in Welkom, the
appellant approached the complainant and threatened her, with what
she perceived and believed
to be a handgun, and requested her to
accompany him. The appellant threatened to shoot the complainant
should she attempt to seek
help or otherwise fail to comply with his
instructions. She thus accompanied him, fearing for her life if she
did not.
[5] The appellant and
complainant walked for quite a distance, her destination and fate
unbeknown to her at that time. Although
the complainant and appellant
passed other people on the way and even security guards, she did not
seek assistance due to continuous
threats by the accused that he
would shoot her if she tried to attract any attention to them. He
instructed her to pretend that
they were a couple, walking together.
When they approached people the appellant would threaten the
complainant and then hid what
she though, as stated, to be a handgun.
[6] The appellant thus
forced the complainant to accompany him to his room (quarters) at the
Kopano Clinic, where he was residing.
Here the accused traded what
the complainant had believed to be a handgun for a screwdriver, which
he used to threaten her to comply
with his requests. He forced the
complainant to kiss him where after he proceeded to rape her.
[7] Whilst the appellant
was raping the complainant she managed to get hold of an object and
hit the accused over the head. The
accused lost consciousness and the
complainant was able to make her escape. She did not report the
incident to anybody but proceeded
to the taxi terminal where she was
able to secure safe passage to her aunt’s home.
[8] On arrival at her
aunt’s home the complainant’s father was waiting for her.
He was furious with her for returning
home so late. He slapped her
and returned to his place of residence whilst she stayed behind with
her cousin. She kept her ordeal
to herself and attempted to commit
suicide later that same night by drinking bleach [‘
Jik
’].
She was subsequently hospitalised. Only after she was discharged from
hospital did the complainant confide in her friends
about the rape.
She requested them to keep it to themselves. Later she narrated her
ordeal to her cousin and ultimately proceeded
to lay a charge of rape
with the South African Police Services. She was subsequently taken to
hospital for a medical examination,
although this was only days after
the incident.
[9] The plaintiff was
able to retrace her steps and direct the investigating officer to the
place where she was raped. This turned
out to be the appellant’s
room. He was however nowhere to be found.
[10] Notwithstanding that
the investigating officer, Inspector Matthysen of the South African
Police Services, informed the appellant
telephonically that he was
wanted in connection with an alleged charge of rape and
notwithstanding that the appellant on his own
testimony visited
Welkom at least twice after he was so informed, the appellant failed
to either inform Inspector Matthysen of
his whereabouts or to hand
himself over to the South African Police Services. The appellant
apparently travelled extensively, by
his own evidence, between
Pietermaritzburg and Lesotho. The police eventually arrested the
appellant after receiving information
of his appellant’s
whereabouts.
[11] After the appellant
had finally been arrested the complainant was requested to attend to
an identification parade where she
identified the appellant as the
person who had raped her.
[12] The appellant was
indicted on a charge of rape, convicted and consequently sentenced,
as stated, to 10 years
imprisonment.
[13] The appellant’s
appeal against the sentence is based on the ground that the sentence
is strikingly inappropriate in that
it is out of proportion to the
totality of the accepted facts in mitigation. It is the appellant’s
case that the sentence
is excessive and induces a sense of shock. It
is submitted on his behalf that the sentence disregards the time that
he had been
in custody awaiting trial.
[14] The test that finds
application during this stage of the proceedings is trite, namely has
the trial court misdirected itself
in considering the sentence or has
it exercised its discretion in an unreasonable manner. Does the
sentence, in the circumstances
of the case, induce a sense of shock
or is it disturbingly disproportionate.
S
v Pieters
1987
(3) SA 717
(A). Sentence is primarily at the discretion of the trial
court. Where the trial court thus exercises its discretion properly
and
reasonably, the court of appeal will have no power to interfere.
[15] Where the crime of
which the accused is convicted brings the matter within the purview
of section 51 of 105 of 1997, the point
of departure for any court
when proceeding with imposition of an appropriate sentence is
succinctly set out in
S
v Malgas
2001
(1) SACR 469
(SCA).
1
It means that a court no
longer has a clean slate to inscribe whatever sentence it thinks fit
for the specified crime(s) where Parliament
had enacted minimum
sentencing legislation. The trial court needs to approach the
question of sentencing, conscious of the fact
that the minimum
sentence had been ordained as the sentence which ordinarily should be
imposed, unless substantial and compelling
circumstances were found
to be present. This was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of
Appeal in
S
v Matyityi
2011
(1) SASV 40 (SCA) para 10.
[16] A sentence of 10
years for rape falling under part 3 of schedule 2 will and can
therefore, barring substantial and compelling
circumstances, never be
strikingly shocking or inappropriate. On the contrary, that is the
absolute minimum sentence that the court
must impose in terms of the
applicable minimum sentence regime.
[17] As so aptly stated
by Ponnan JA in Matyityi supra at para 23:
“
Despite
certain limited successes there has been no real let-up in the crime
pandemic that engulfs our country. The situation continues
to be
alarming. It follows that, to borrow from Malgas, it still is 'no
longer business as usual'. And yet one notices all too
frequently a
willingness on the part of sentencing courts to deviate from the
minimum sentences prescribed by the legislature for
the flimsiest of
reasons - reasons, as here, that do not survive scrutiny. As Malgas
makes plain, courts have a duty, despite any
personal doubts about
the efficacy of the policy or personal aversion to it, to implement
those sentences. Our courts derive their
power from the Constitution
and, like other arms of State, owe their fealty to it. Our
constitutional order can hardly survive
if courts fail to properly
patrol the boundaries of their own power by showing due deference to
the legitimate domains of power
of the other arms of State. Here
Parliament has spoken. It has ordained minimum sentences for certain
specified offences. Courts
are obliged to impose those sentences
unless there are truly convincing reasons for departing from them.
Courts are not free to
subvert the will of the legislature by resort
to vague, ill-defined concepts such as 'relative youthfulness' or
other equally vague
and ill-founded hypotheses that appear to fit the
particular sentencing officer's personal notion of fairness.
Predictable outcomes,
not outcomes based on the whim of an individual
judicial officer, is foundational to the rule of law which lies at
the heart of
our constitutional order.”
[18] The trial court,
whilst evaluating the different elements that are applicable to
sentencing so as to enable it to balance the
various interests,
clearly appreciated that it should apply the Malgas principle’s
and that the personal circumstances of
the accused must be taken into
consideration. The trial court had this to say at p150 of the record:
“
In
State v Mdamvu
2005 (1) SACR 54
SA it was said ‘the sentence
imposed by the court must balance all factors relevant to sentencing
against the bench mark
of the legislature.’ Therefore meaning
that the accused’s personal circumstances must also be taken
into consideration.”
and also at p151 of the
record:
“
The
circumstances of this case are indeed serious. In
State
v Abrahams
2002 (1) SACR 116
SCA 25 it was said that ‘where factors of
substance do not compel the conclusion that the application of the
prescribed sentence
would be unjust, then the sentence must be
imposed’.”
[19]
The
mere fact that the trial court appreciates how it should go about the
sentencing phase does not
per
se
guarantee
that there was no misdirection or improper exercise of the sentencing
discretion. It therefore remains to consider whether
the trail court
has either misdirected itself or has improperly exercised its
discretion with regards to any matter.
[20] The appellant
elected not to testify under oath during the sentencing part of the
trial. That is his constitutional right,
but his silence is not
without consequence.
2
Likewise, no evidence was
led on his behalf. His representative did however place certain
personal circumstances on record,
which
were accepted by the respondent. Mitigation was then argued on the
appellant’s behalf.
[21] The appelant’s
personal and other mitigating circumstances were argued to include
that the appellant was 28 years of
age when he committed the crime.
He is not married but is the biological father of two daughters aged
2 years and 13 years respectively.
Both daughters reside permanently
with their biological mothers. The appellant was busy with his second
year of studies in a human
resources course at the Central University
of Technology, Welkom. It was argued on his behalf that the crime was
the appellant’s
first sexual offence and that he spent a year
and seven months in custody awaiting his conviction. It was also
argued that the
rape was not planned and that the complainant did not
suffer any physical injuries.
[22] On behalf of the
appellant it was also contended that the appellant had remorse in
that he instructed his representative to
advise the court that if he
should be found guilty he will accept the verdict and that he is then
remorseful about what he has
done. In light of all the mitigation
factors, it was premised that the appellant would be a prime
candidate for rehabilitation.
[23] The appellant argues
that the cumulative effect of the afore-mentioned factors constituted
substantial and compelling circumstances,
which would justify the
court and should have moved the court to impose a lesser sentence
than the prescribed minimum sentence
of 10 years if it exercised its
discretion properly. The appellant further argues that the court
over-emphasised the aggravating
circumstances and in particular the
seriousness of the offence; the interest of the society; the
deterrent effect of the sentence;
the effect of the offence on the
complainant, i.e. how traumatised she was during the trial and the
fact that she tried to commit
suicide; the fact that the complainant
was threatened by what she believed to be a firearm and the finding
that the previous conviction
constituted an aggravating circumstance
in so far that the accused showed a propensity to commit violence.
[24] The calculated
manner with which the appellant perpetrated this crime speaks for
itself. The fear that he instilled in the
complainant forced her to
walk past various individuals without seeking assistance. One can
only speculate regarding how this would
have ended had the
complainant not been brave enough to hit the appellant over the head
so as to enable her to make her getaway.
It may well be that this
resulted therein that there were no serious physical injuries. The
absence of physical injuries was however
not by the appellant’s
doing. He wasn’t finished raping the complainant. She ended the
crime perpetrated on her.
[25] In terms of section
51(3)(aA) of Act 105 of 1997 the absence of apparent physical
injuries to the complainant shall not constitute
substantial and
compelling circumstances justifying the imposition of a lesser
sentence. The appellant however argues that it must
be considered
cumulatively together with other mitigating factors. On the facts of
this case, at best for the appellant, the absence
of physical
injuries will, even when weighed cumulatively with other
circumstances, constitute a neutral factor for purposes of
sentencing.
[26] With regards to the
submissions that the appellant’s age is a mitigating factor in
this case, either viewed singularly
or cumulatively with the other
mitigating circumstances, it is apposite to quote Ponnan JA’s
succinct summary of the relevant
principles regarding age as
mitigating factor, as set out in the Matyityi case at para 14:
“
It
is trite that a teenager is prima facie to be regarded as immature
3
and
that the youthfulness of an offender will invariably be a mitigating
factor
4
unless
it appears that the viciousness of his or her deeds rules out
immaturity.
5
Although
the exact extent of the mitigation will depend on all of the
circumstances of the case, in general a court will not punish
an
immature young person as severely as it would an adult.
6
It
is well established that, the younger the offender, the clearer the
evidence needs to be about his or her background, education,
level of
intelligence and mental capacity, in order to enable a court to
determine the level of maturity and therefore moral blameworthiness.
7
The
question, in the final analysis, is whether the offender's
immaturity, lack of experience, indiscretion and susceptibility to
being influenced by others reduce his blameworthiness.
8
Thus,
whilst someone under the age of 18 years is to be regarded as
naturally immature,
9
the
same does not hold true for an adult. In my view a person of 20 years
or more must show by acceptable evidence that he was immature
to such
an extent that his immaturity can operate as a mitigating factor.
10
At
the age of 27 the respondent could hardly be described as a callow
youth. At best for him, his chronological age was a neutral
factor.
Nothing in it served, without more, to reduce his moral
blameworthiness. He chose not to go into the box, and we have been
told nothing about his level of immaturity or any other influence
that may have been brought to bear on him, to have caused him
to act
in the manner in which he did.”
[27] The appellant placed
no evidence before the trial court that would qualify his age of 28
as anything more than a neutral factor.
For the same reasons his
moral blameworthiness stands unaffected.
[28] The next mitigating
factor strongly relied on in the proceedings was the appellant’s
remorse. To my mind, the trial court
erred by taking this aspect into
consideration as a mitigating factor. It was an error in favour of
the appellant. I say this because
the court below accepted the
submission on behalf of the appellant that he will accept the court’s
verdict if found guilty
and that he will then (and only then) be
remorseful for what he has done.
[29] First and foremost
the fact that the appellant indicated through his legal
representative, after he was in any event convicted
for the crime,
that he will accept the trial court’s verdict must if anything
be a neutral factor. The appellant pleaded
not guilty and after all
the evidence was led he was convicted.
In casu
the appellant
can, in any event, not be found to have truly taken responsibility
for his actions, nor is there any evidence that
justifies a finding
that he genuinely appreciates the error of his ways. To tender an
apology in this manner after all is said
and done, by way of the
legal representative does not prove true contrition, at least not on
the facts of this case. The appellant
did not evidence such remorse
and contrition by conduct.
[30] The proof that the
tender by the appellant was nothing more than a stratagem to procure
a more lenient sentence as opposed
to true remorse and contrition for
the consequences his actions appears from the fact that contrary to
his instructions to his
legal representative, the appellant proceeded
to attempt to note an appeal to the High Court in his personal
capacity (without
assistance from his legal representative) against
his conviction.
In this notice of appeal the
appellant noted that the trial court misdirected itself in finding
him guilty as he was not
‘
a person that
raped a complainant’
and that the court
erred in accepting the evidence regarding his identification as the
perpetrator. This proves beyond doubt that
the appellant has not
accepted responsibility for his actions nor does he appear to have
any form of understanding and insight.
Of course, the trial court was
unaware of this when accepting the tender. But the trial court did
not appreciate the true nature
of contrition and remorse when it
accepted the tender on behalf of the appellant.
[31] In the Matyityi case
it was held [at para 14] with regards to remorse and contrition as
factors for mitigation:
“
There
is, moreover, a chasm between regret and remorse.
11
Many
accused persons might well regret their conduct, but that does not
without more translate to genuine remorse.
12
Remorse
is a gnawing pain of conscience for the plight of another. Thus
genuine contrition can only come from an appreciation and
acknowledgement of the extent of one's error.
13
Whether
the offender is sincerely remorseful, and not simply feeling sorry
for himself or herself at having been caught, is a factual
question.
It is to the surrounding actions of the accused, rather than what he
says in court, that one should rather look.
14
In
order for the remorse to be a valid consideration, the penitence must
be sincere and the accused must take the court fully into
his or her
confidence.
15
Until
and unless that happens, the genuineness of the contrition alleged to
exist cannot be determined. After all, before a court
can find that
an accused person is genuinely remorseful, it needs to have a proper
appreciation of, inter alia: what motivated
the accused to commit the
deed; what has since provoked his or her change of heart; and whether
he or she does indeed have a true
appreciation of the consequences of
those actions. There is no indication that any of this, all of which
was peculiarly within
the respondent's knowledge, was explored in
this case.”
[32] It was also
submitted on behalf of the appellant that the trial court erred by
failing to take into consideration the time
that the appellant was in
custody prior to his conviction. The evidence however shows that the
appellant was convicted and sentenced
on the other unrelated matter
on 5 May 2009. The appellant was arrested in connection with this
matter only on 7 January 2009.
The appellant therefore only spent
approximately 4 months in custody on the rape charge where after he
started to serve his prison
term. That is not an inordinate delay and
in context to the other elements of sentencing it is not a
substantial and compelling
circumstance.
[33] The appellant stood
before court during the sentencing phase as a convicted person having
to serve a long-term prison sentence
of effectively 10 years. The
effect of the sentence would form part of his personal circumstances.
This aspect was neither argued
as a personal circumstance that the
trial court had to consider, nor did the court below appreciate that
it should consider it
as such. In order to evaluate whether this
factor would justify a lesser sentence when weighed singularly or
cumulatively or whether
it may be relevant in terms of section 280(2)
of the Act, all the other relevant elements of sentencing must be
evaluated and balanced.
[34] The court correctly
emphasised the seriousness of the offence. At present sexual offences
against women are rife. The psychological
injuries that the
complainant suffered need no speculation. The complainant tried
unsuccessfully to commit suicide that same fateful
evening. She
carried the burden on her own for several days. She was humiliated,
marginalised and stripped of her right of security
of her person and
privacy. The complainant had to face her rapist in order to identify
him. She had to recount the events of her
ordeal in court which was
clearly (and understandable) a very emotional experience for her.
[35] The court in
Matyityi supra with reference in para 10 to what was said in
S
v De Bee
r [SCA Case No 121/04, 12 November 2004, unreported
judgment para 18] confirmed the relevance of these considerations:
“
Rape
is a topic that abounds with myths and misconceptions.
16
It
is a serious social problem about which, fortunately, we are at last
becoming concerned. The increasing attention given to it
has raised
our national consciousness about what is always and foremost an
aggressive act. It is a violation that is invasive and
dehumanising.
The consequences for the rape victim are severe and permanent. For
many rape victims the process of investigation
and prosecution is
almost as traumatic as the rape itself.”
and further in para 17:
“
Furthermore,
courts generally do not have the necessary experience to generalise
or draw conclusions about the effects and consequences
of a rape for
a rape victim.
17
As
Muller & Van der Merwe put it: ‘It is extremely difficult
for any individual, even a highly trained person such as
a magistrate
or a judge, to comprehend fully the range of emotions and suffering a
particular victim of sexual violence may have
experienced. Each
individual brings with himself or herself a different background, a
different support system and, therefore,
a different manner of coping
with the trauma flowing from the abuse’.
”
18
[36] The Supreme Court of
Appeal reiterated the strong message to perpetrators of these crimes
[at para 20]:
“
As
this court has previously sought to make clear, women in this country
‘have a legitimate claim to walk peacefully on the
streets, to
enjoy their shopping and their entertainment, to go and come from
work, and to enjoy the peace and tranquillity of
their homes without
the fear, the apprehension and the insecurity which constantly
diminishes the quality and enjoyment of their
lives’ (S v
Chapman).
[1997] ZASCA 45
;
[1997 (2) SACR 3
(SCA)].”
[37] In light of the
above it follows that the personal circumstances and other mitigating
factors, even when weighed cumulatively,
does not constitute
substantial and compelling circumstances in the present matter that
justified a departure from the prescribed
minimum sentence. It is
after all not business as usual. The court below correctly found that
substantial and compelling circumstances
were absent. It imposed the
minimum sentence of 10 years imprisonment. Having regard to all of
the circumstances encountered in
this matter, the minimum sentence is
a manifestly fair and just one. That is however not the end of the
matter in this instance.
[38] As stated at the
outset, the Magistrate dismissed an application in terms of section
280(2) of the Act that she should order
that the sentence or part
thereof should run concurrently with the prison term that the
appellant is already serving.
[39] As mentioned above
the appellant was sentenced on 5 May 2009 to an effective 10 years
imprisonment.
[40] The Magistrate held
that due to the fact that the offences were totally separate and did
not appear to have any bearing on
one another she could not make any
order as requested. She therefore failed to exercise any discretion
whatsoever.
[41] The pertinent part
of Section 280 reads as follows:
“
280
Cumulative or concurrent sentences
(1) When a person is at
any trial convicted of two or more offences or when a person under
sentence or undergoing sentence is convicted
of another offence, the
court may sentence him to such several punishments for such offences
or, as the case may be, to the punishment
for such other offence, as
the court is competent to impose.
(2) Such punishments,
when consisting of imprisonment, shall commence the one after the
expiration, setting aside or remission of
the other, in such order as
the court may direct, unless the court directs that such sentences of
imprisonment shall run concurrently.”
[Sub-s. (2) substituted
by s. 47 (a) of Act 129 of 1993.]
[42] Clearly the trial
court misdirected itself regarding the discretion it had to consider
whether on the facts of the matter it
would be justified to order
that the sentence or part thereof run concurrently with the sentence
that the appellant was serving.
[43] The present crime of
which the appellant was convicted was committed a mere 11 months
after the date on which the substance
of the previous conviction
occurred. The appellant’s actions, as the court below held,
showed a propensity towards violence.
The accused did not deduce any
evidence to displace this conclusion. An even more aggravating factor
is the fact that the appellant
committed this crime whilst the
criminal proceedings in the other matter had already begun.
[44] On the other hand it
needs to be considered what the effect of the sentences would be if
it runs consecutively. The appellant
will serve an effective term of
20 years imprisonment.
[45] The fact that the
term of the sentence that the appellant is presently undergoing does
not in the circumstances justify a lesser
sentence, does not by
necessary implication mean that the court should not in light of this
personal circumstance consider ameliorating
the effect of the
sentences by ordering that part of it be served concurrently with the
term being served.
[46] All facts considered
it will not be disproportionate to the crime or the interest of
society if it be ordered that 2 years
of the minimum sentence imposed
run concurrently with the sentence that the appellant is serving. The
appellant will effectively
serve a term of 18 years.
[47] In the result:
The appeal succeeds;
The sentence of 10 years
imprisonment is confirmed. It is however ordered that 2 years
thereof should run concurrently with the
sentence that the appellant
is currently serving.
______________________
N. SNELLENBURG, AJ
I concur.
______________________
C J MUSI, J
On behalf of the
appellant: Adv. M. Strauss
Instructed by:
The Director: Public
Prosecutions
BLOEMFONTEIN
On behalf of the
respondent: Me S. Kruger
Instructed by:
Legal Aid SA
BLOEMFONTEIN
NS/eb
1
S
v Malgas is also
reported at
2001 (2)
SA 1222
and
[2001] 3 All SA 220.
2
S
v Matyityi, supra para 21.
3
S
v Ngoma
[1984] ZASCA 59
;
1984 (3) SA 666
(A) at 674E-F
4
Terblanche
p 196.
5
S
v Dlamini
1991 (2) SACR 655
(A)
(1992 (1) SA 18)
at 666b - f.
6
S
v Mohlobane
1969 (1) SA 561
(A) at 565C - E.
7
S
v Lehnberg en 'n Ander
1975 (4) SA 553
(A) at 561A - C.
8
S
v Van Rooi en Andere 1976 (2) SA 580 (A).
9
S
v Machasa en Andere
1991 (2) SACR 308
(A).
10
S
v Dlamini
1991 (2) SACR 655
(A)
(1992 (1) SA 18)
at 666e.
11
S
v Martin
1996 (2) SACR 378
(W) at 383g - i.
12
S
v Mokoena
2009 (2) SACR 309
(SCA) para 9.
13
S
v D
1995 (1) SACR 259
(A) at 261a - c.
14
SS
Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 2 ed (2007) p 203 -
4; S v Volkwyn
1995 (1) SACR 286
(A).
15
S
v Seegers
1970 (2) SA 506
(A).
16
A
Nicholas Groth
Men who Rape – The Psychology of the
Offender (
1979)
17
S
v Gerber
2001 (1) SACR 621
(W) ([2002]
1 All SA 43)
; S v R 1993 (1)
SACR 209 (A) (1993 (1) SA 476).
18
Pages
653 - 4.