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[1979] ZASCA 1
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Administrateur Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk [1979] ZASCA 1 (25 May 1979)
SAFLII
Note:
This
case was originally published by Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd. Juta
retains copyright as far as it subsists. An English
translation of
this case is available at:
http://saflii.org/za/other/ZAENGTR/1979/1.html
IN
DIE HOOGGEREGSHOF VAN SUID-AFRIKA
(APPèLAFDELING)
In
die saak tussen:
ADMINISTRATEUR,
NATAL
APPELLANT
V
TRUST
BANK VAN AFRIKA
BPK
RESPONDENT
Parallel
citation:
1979 (3) SA 824
(A)
Coram:
Rumpff HR, Jansen AR, Trollip AR, Joubert AR en Trengove AR
Heard:
March 5, 1979
Judgment:
May 25, 1979
UITSPRAAK
Case
Information
Appèl
teen 'n beslissing in die Natalse Provinsiale Afdeling (MOSTERT R).
Die feite blyk uit die uitspraak van RUMPFF HR
en uit die verslag in
1978 (2) SA 256
(N) .
M
L Mitchell namens die appellant: (a) Our law does, or should, allow
an action for damages based on negligent misstatement in certain
defined circumstances. (b) The respondent made a negligent
misstatement, causing the appellant to take certain action and
thereby
suffer damages. (c) The respondent had a "duty of care"
to the appellant in making such statement (misstatement): that
the
appellant suffered damages in an agreed amount is common cause. (d)
The respondent is liable to the appellant upon a proper
application
of the principles relating to agency on the facts of this case. Since
the judgment was given there have been at least
two articles in Law
Journals dealing with the topic which is the subject of this appeal,
namely (a) an article by D B Hutchinson
95 SALJ at 515; (b) an
article by G F Lubbe Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse RomeinsHollandse Reg
band 41 nr 4, November 1978 at 374 and
at least one judgment of the
Supreme Court: see Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR
Construction (Pty) Ltd1978 (4) SA
901 (N). A claim for damages
resulting from a negligent statement is actionable, according to our
law of delict, if (a) the person
making the statement knew, or ought
to have known, that the plaintiff in the circumstances would rely
upon such statement; (b)
the defendant knew, or ought to have known,
that the
1979
(3) SA p827
plaintiff
would suffer damages in consequence of such reliance, should the said
statement be untrue; (c) the statement was given
for a serious
purpose; (d) a relationship between the parties exists in terms of
which the defendant intended the plaintiff to
rely upon the
correctness of the statement, and the plaintiff was entitled to, and
did, rely upon and act upon such statement;
(e) the plaintiff, as a
result of his reliance upon such statement, being false, suffers
damages, whether by way of economic loss
or otherwise. See Mathews v
Young 1922 AD at 504; Van Zyl v African Theatres Ltd
1931 CPD 61
;
Perlman v Zoutendyk
1934 CPD 151
; Fichardt's Motors (Pty) Ltd v
Nienaber
1936 OPD 221
; Alliance Building Society v Deretitch
1941 TPD
203
; Western Alarm System (Pty) Ltd v Coini & Co
1944 CPD 271
;
Herschel v Mrupe 1954 (3) SA at 472; Currie Motors (Pretoria) (Pty)
Ltd v Motor Union Insurance Co Ltd
1961 (3) SA 872
; Murray v Mclean
NO
1970 (1) SA 133
; Bristow v Lycett
1971 (4) SA 223
; Scottish
Rhodesian Finance Ltd v Taylor
1972 (4) SA 436
; Dillon NO v Bentley
1973 (2) SA 452
; Latham v Sher
1974 (4) SA 687
; SA Bantoe Trust v
Ross en Jacobz
1977 (3) SA 184
; Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty)
Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd (supra). In accordance with the
dicta in Minister van Polisie
v Ewels 1975 (3) SA at 597A and
Minister of Police v Skosana 1977 (1) SA at 34G the stage of social
and economic development has
been reached when it is desirable for
this Court to settle and finally determine that, subject to the
conditions referred to above,
an action based upon a negligent
statement causing economic or other loss, should be sustained by our
Courts. The English law has
long acepted the existence of such a
right. Beginning with the dissentient judgment of DENNING LJ in
Candler v Crane Christmas
& Co
(1951) 1 All ER 426
; and
culminating in the decision in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller and
Partners Ltd
(1961) 3 All ER 891
this principle is now
well-established as part of the English law, and has been applied in
the following cases: W B Anderson and
Sons Ltd and Others v Rhodes
(Liverpool Ltd and Others)
(1967) 2 All ER 850
(wholesaler); Ministry
of Housing and Local Government v Sharp and Another
(1970) 1 All ER
1009
(public official); Mutual Life and Citizens' Assurance Co Ltd
and Another v Evatt
(1971) 1 All ER 150
(insurance company); Dutton v
Bognor Regis United Building Co Ltd and Another (1972) 1 All ER
(officer of local authority); Howard
Marine and Dredging Co Ltd v A
Ogden and Sons (Excavations) Ltd
(1978) 2 All ER 1134
(charter of
barges). The official of the respondent, on behalf of the respondent,
was negligent in stating that the first defendant
in the Court a quo
was the registered owner of the property in question. The respondent
owed the appellant a "duty of care".
The Court a quo erred
in perfunctorily dismissing the claim of the appellant. The
respondent had no authority to contract on behalf
of the registered
owner of the property, alternatively, he exceeded his authority. See
Blower v Van Noorden
1909 TS 890
; Claude Neon Lights (SA) Ltd v
Daniel 1
976 (4) SA 403.
The respondent's servant was performing a
function equivalent to that of an attorney and should have exercised
the same degree
of diligence as would be expected of an attorney. See
Incorporated Law Society v Kantor
1914 TPD 510.
The analogy in the
judgment of the Court a quo that the respondent was doing what
advocates and attorneys do daily, namely conveying
information
1979
(3) SA p828
to
others on behalf of their clients in the form of letters and
pleadings, is untenable.
David
Gordon SC namens die respondent: (i) In fact the appellant's
complaint is that it was induced to conclude an agreement as
a
consequence of an alleged negligent misrepresentation, which does not
give rise to an action according to the principles of our
law; (ii)
on the facts as set forth in the stated case the actio legis Aquiliae
is not available to it; (iii) any misrepresentation
or misstatement
made by the respondent was not a cause of the appellant's loss; (iv)
even if the appeal succeeds the appellant
was at fault in relation to
the damage it suffered. The essential nature of the appellant's case
is that it concluded a contract
with a party in circumstances where
it intended to contract with another party or parties and has
suffered loss by performing its
part of the bargain. If it was in
fact induced to do so then the true nature of the appellant's case is
that it was induced, by
reason of a negligent misstatement, to
conclude a contract. There is no such action according to the
principles of modern South
African law. See Hamman v Moolman 1968 (4)
SA at 348, 349; Latham and Another v Sher and Another
1974 (4) SA
687
; Du Plessis v Semmelink
1976 (2) SA 500.
The
actio legis Aquiliae is available to a person, who has suffered
pecuniary loss as a consequence of a statement made negligently
by
another. See Herschel v Mrupe
1954 (3) SA 464
; Suid-Afrikaanse
Bantoetrust v Ross en Jacobs
1977 (3) SA 184
; Greenfield Engineering
Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd
1978 (4) SA 901
; Price
"Aquilian Liability for Negligent Statements" 67 SALJ at
138;
68 SALJ 78.
In other common law jurisdictions the necessity to
impose some judicial restraint on recovery for economic damage
negligently caused
has led to a denial of the remedy except where (i)
a "special relationship" exists; see Hedley Byrne & Co
Ltd v Heller
and Partners Ltd
[1963] UKHL 4
;
1964 AC 465
; or (ii) the parties have a
relationship in contract, Ultramares Corporation v Touche and Others
74 ALR 1139
; Kessler and Fine "Culpa in Contrahendo" 77
Harvard Law Review at 406, 447 (1964); (iii) it is part of the
business of
the representor to supply information of the kind
supplied for the guidance of others, see Mutual Life Ltd v Evatt 1971
AC at 802;
or (iv) consideration of policy require the grant of
relief, see Caltex Oil (Aust) (Pty) Ltd v The Dredge "Willemstad"
11 Aust LR 227 (per STEPHEN J at 260); cf Minister van Polisie v
Ewels
1975 (3) SA 590.
In our law, however, if due weight is given to
the essential of "wrongfulness" in damnum iniuria datum
there is no necessity
to categorise actionable situations. In order
to succeed the appellant must establish that Nel's conduct in writing
"The registered
owner of the above property, Mr P Bijo, has
instructed me to negotiate with your Department with regard to the
above expropriated
land" was wrongful, in the sense that the
inaccuracy contained therein invaded some right (i) enjoyed by the
appellant; and
(ii) recognised by law. In resisting the recognition
of the existence of any such right or its invasion by Nel the
respondent relies
upon the decision in Herschel v Mrupe 1954 (3) SA
at 464. For the purpose of this submission it is assumed that the
judgments delivered
in that case would have contained the same
reasoning if Herschel had chosen to sue Mrupe's attorney. There is
nothing in morals
1979
(3) SA p829
RUMPFF
HR
and
good conscience which compels one to the notion that there existed a
right in the appellant to rely upon the respondent for
information
and a duty on the part of the respondent to provide it with care. The
risk that the appellant might pay compensation
to a person not
entitled to receive it was not a danger created by the respondent.
Whatever steps the appellant claims the respondent
ought to have
taken are steps which were available to it and accordingly the
appellant was at fault in relation to the damage suffered.
Section 1
(1) (a) of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956. In this
regard portions of the judgment delivered by MOFFITT
AJA in Dominion
Freeholders Ltd v Aird and Another (1966) 67 SR (NSW) at 162 are
pertinent.
Mitchell
in repliek.
Cur
adv vult.
Postea
(May 25).
Judgment
RUMPFF
HR: In die onderhawige saak sou die respondent in die Hof a quo en in
hierdie Hof kon betoog het dat in ons reg nalatige
wanvoorstelling
nie as deliktuele eisgrond bestaan nie. Dit het die eksipiënt
gedoen in Suid-Afrikaanse Bantoetrust v Ross
en Jacobz1977 (3) SA 184
(T). Klaarblyklik onder invloed van oa akademiese aanvoorwerk ná
die gewysdes in Perlman v Zoutendyk
1934 CPD 151
en Herschel v
Mrupe1954 (3) SA 464 (A) , het die Hof in die Bantoetrust- saak in 'n
eksepsiestadium pertinent beslis dat so 'n
eisgrond wel bestaan. Die
Hof sê dan ook:
"Ek
twyfel of daar 'n enkele akademiese kommentator is wat gekant is teen
so 'n aksie".
Die
uitdrukking "nalatige wanvoorstelling", wat 'n vertaling
van "negligent misrepresentation" is, gee nie wesenlik
die
probleem in ons reg behoorlik weer nie en skep die indruk van 'n
voorstelling in kontraktuele verband. In kontraktuele verband
het
"wanvoorstelling" 'n ietwat regstegniese betekenis. Dit
moet bv 'n voorstelling van 'n bestaande feit wees en behels
dus
gewoonlik nie die uitspreek van 'n mening of die gee van advies nie.
Hierdie vereiste is nie noodwendig van toepassing op 'n
"nalatige
wanvoorstelling" nie. Miskien moet die uitdrukking "nalatige
wanbewering" (negligent misstatement)
liewer gebesig word, maar,
indien die uitdrukking "nalatige wanvoorstelling" behoue
bly, moet bogenoemde caveat in gedagte
gehou word.
Die
respondent in die onderhawige saak aanvaar nie alleen die bevinding
in die Bantoetrust- saak nie maar betoog uitdruklik dat
so 'n
eisgrond wel in ons reg bestaan en verwys oa na 'n beslissing van die
Natalse Hof in Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd
v NKR
Construction (Pty) Ltd1978 (4) SA 901 (N), waarin die bevinding van
die Bantoetrust- saak gevolg is. In die Greenfield Engineering-
saak
word oa verwys na 'n artikel van prof McKerron te 1 van die 1973
South African Law Journal ("Liability for Mere Pecuniary
Loss in
an Action under the lex Aquilia") en 'n artikel van prof Boberg
in die 1972 Annual Survey of South African Law te
131 - 136, waarin
sekere gewysdes bespreek word. In die uitspraak word ook na die
volgende verwys te 916:
1979
(3) SA p830
RUMPFF
HR
"See
further Pieter Pauw, 'Aanspreeklikheid vir "suiwer vermoënskade"
in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg' De Jure April
1975 at 2 31; Fleming James
Jr "Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss caused by
Negligence: a pragmatic appraisal' Vanderbilt
Law Review vol 25
(1972) at 43 - 58; reprinted in The Journal of the Society of Public
Teachers of Law New Series vol XIII No 2
(July 1972) at 105 - 118;
Lawson Negligence in the Civil Law (1955) at 29 - 36.
The
question whether pure economic loss is historically compatibble with
the notion of damnum in Roman-Dutch law has been much debated
- see,
eg, Susan Scott 'Nalatige Wanvoorstelling in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg'
THRHR 1976 at
347; THRHR 1977
at 58, 165; Pieter Pauw 'Weer eens
Nalatige Wanvoorstellings' THRHR 1978 at 53".
Soos
in die Bantoetrust- saak, gaan dit in die onderhawige geval, wat die
feite betref, nie oor die begrip van aanspreeklikheid
in die algemeen
vir suiwer vermoënskade weens nalatigheid nie, maar oor die
spesifieke probleem van vermoënskade veroorsaak
deur nalatige
wanbewering.
In
die onderhawige saak is daar aan die Hof a quo voorgelê 'n
aantal feite by wyse van 'n gestelde saak en in die gestelde
saak
word dit nie ontken nie dat nalatige wanbewering (buite kontraktuele
verband) tot verhaalbare vermoënskade aanleiding
kan gee. In die
uitspraak van die Hof a quo waarteen appellant in hoër beroep
kom, is dan ook bevind dat daar wel 'n eisgrond
weens nalatige
wanbewering bestaan, maar daar is bevind, wat die feite betref, dat
die eiser nie kon slaag nie. Die eiser in die
saak is nou appellant
en daar was wesenlik net een verweerder, die huidige respondent. Die
uitspraak van die Hof a quo is te vinde
onder Administrator, Natal v
Bijo and Another1978 (2) SA 256 (N). Bijo was die eerste verweerder
maar omdat vonnis by verstek reeds
teen Bijo gegee was, het die Hof a
quo na respondent verwys as die verweerder. Vanselfsprekend beroep
appellant hom op die stelling
dat daar in ons reg vergoeding van
vermoënskade weens nalatige wanbewering geëis kan word. Wat
die reg betref, is hierdie
Hof dus in 'n ietwat eienaardige posisie
geplaas. Wesenlik versoek beide partye hierdie Hof om die seël
te druk op wat in
die Bantoetrust- saak met weinig woorde en geen
motivering nie, gesê is.
Ek
dink dat dit aanvaar kan word, uit wat verskillende skrywers oor die
onderwerp geskryf het, dat die reg op vergoeding van suiwer
vermoënskade in sekere beperkte gevalle in die Romeinse reg
erken is maar dat dié reg tog verband gehad het met 'n
saak of
'n corpus. Dit kan ook aanvaar word dat in die Romeins-Hollandse reg
in sekere gevalle vergoeding van suiwer vermoënskade
toegeken is
wat daarop dui dat Aquiliese aanspreeklikheid oor die
Romeinsregtelike grens van saakbeskadiging uitgebrei is. In hierdie
verband kan genoem word die uitspraak in Cape of Good Hope Bank v
Fischer
4 SC 368
, waarin na Voet 20.1.11 en Matthaeus De Auctionibus
1.19.86 verwys word; Van Bynkershoek Obs Tumult 11, 195; Pieter Pauw
"Aanspreeklikheid
vir Suiwer Vermoënskade in die
Suid-Afrikaanse Reg" in De Jure band 1 te 23; J C van der Walt
Risiko Aanspreeklikheid
uit Onregmatige Daad te 309 (ongepubliseerde
proefskrif); prof Price "Patrimonial Loss and Aquilian
Liability"
1950 THRHR 87.
Hoe ook al die uitsprake van die
verskillende Regters in hierdie Hof in Herschel v Mrupe (supra)
vertolk word, skyn dit duidelik
te wees dat die bestaan van so 'n reg
in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg nie deur hierdie Hof verwerp is nie. Die
reg is eerder erken.
Die onbevredigende toestand wat in ons reg
bestaan ná die Herschel- saak, die
1979
(3) SA p831
RUMPFF
HR
verskillende
uitsprake van Provinsiale Afdelings sedertdien en die houding van
sowel appellant as respondent in hierdie Hof is gegronde
redes waarom
daar tans 'n uitspraak gegee moet word wat die bestaan van so 'n reg
in ons gemeenreg erken of verwerp. Ek is bewus
van die volgende
aanhaling wat verskyn in die 1974 SALJ te 408:
"Nor
is it desirable for a lower court to embrace the exhilarating
opportunity of anticipating a doctrine which may be in the
womb of
time, but whose birth is distant (per LEARNED HAND J in Spectator
Motor Service Inc v Walsh
139 F 2d 809
at 823 (1944))".
In
die onderhawige geval duur die geboortepyne reeds so lank dat die tyd
aangebreek het om selfs miskien met 'n keisersnee die kind
in die
wêreld te laat kom. Ek dink dat mens dadelik moet byvoeg dat
dit voorspelbaar is dat hierdie kind 'n probleemkind
gaan word. Met
die nodige liefde, en veral dissipline, kan dit egter 'n nuttige rol
in die regslewe speel.
By
die ondersoek van hierdie probleem sou mens uitvoerig na die
Anglo-Amerikaanse regstelsels kon verwys. Trouens, Susan Scott meld
juis in haar artikel oor "Nalatige Wanvoorstelling as Aksiegrond
in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg" THRHR 1977 te 176:
"Die
posisie is duidelik baie onbevredigend en dit is jammer dat die Howe
nie meer op die ontwikkeling in die Anglo-Amerikaanse
regstelsels
gelet het nie".
Dit
skep egter 'n probleem. In sy artikel "Aquilian Liability for
Negligent Statements" in die 1950 SALJ te 139 verklaar
prof
Price:
"In
Anglo-American law, where there is as yet no touchstone of liability
for patrimonial loss, the matter is one of great confusion.
In fact,
it is no exaggeration to say that the law is in a deplorable
condition".
Vir
die wat lief is om sonder enige voorbehoud na die Engelse reg te kyk,
is dit ook nuttig om die artikel van prof Price in die
1959 Acta
Juridica "Aquilian Liability and the Duty of Care: A Return to
the Charge" te 120 te lees. Te 138 verskyn oa
die volgende:
"That
great exponent of the common law, Stallybrass, was at pains to remark
'Roman law dispensed with any special duty between
the parties. In
Roman law there was liability wherever there was damage unjustifiably
done. The Roman doctrine, restricted as it
was by rules similar to
those of contributory negligence and remoteness, provided a simpler
and better solution of the problems
involved than English law with
its reliance upon a duty to take care'.
In
this the learned author was following the views of Buckland :
'There
is a difference which is apt to be disregarded in comparisons of the
two systems. The Roman law had no such tort as negligence.
Possibly
English law has not, but the discussion ordinarily proceeds on the
assumption that there is such a tort. In Roman law
there was the
delict of wrongful damage to property, which might be committed by
carelessness'.
To
which one might reasonably add that the delict in its final and
complete stage of development is committed by the wrongful causing
of
patrimonial loss of any kind, whether the incidence of that loss
arises from physical harm to the person or corporeal property,
or
otherwise".
In
para 5 van sy betooghoofde het appellant aangevoer dat na aanleiding
van die beslissings in Minister van Polisie v Ewels1975
(3) SA 590
(A) te 597 en Minister of Police v Skosana1977 (1) SA 31 (A) te 34,
die sosiale en ekonomiese ontwikkeling die stadium
bereik het wat dit
wenslik maak dat hierdie Hof, onderhewig aan voorwaardes genoem in
para 4 van die betooghoofde, finaal beslis
dat 'n eis gebaseer op
nalatige wanbewering wat vermoënskade veroorsaak, erken word.
Dan lees para 6 soos volg:
"The
English law has long accepted the existence of the right set out in
the
1979
(3) SA p832
RUMPFF
HR
previous
paragraph hereof. Beginning with the dissentient judgment of DENNING
LJ in Candler v Crane Charistmas & Co
(1951) 1 All ER 426
(CA)
and culminating in the decision in Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller
and Partners Ltd
[1963] UKHL 4
;
(1963) 2 All ER 575
, this principle is now
well-established as part of the English law, and has been applied in
the following cases: W B Anderson and
Sons Ltd and Others v Rhodes
(Liverpool) Ltd and Others
(1967) 2 All ER 850
(wholesaler); Ministry
of Housing and Local Government v Sharp and Another
(1970) 1 All ER
1009
(public official); Mutual Life and Citizens' Assurance Co Ltd
and Another v Evatt (1971)
1 All ER 150
(insurance company); Dutton v
Bognor Regis United Building Co Ltd and Another
(1972) 1 All ER 462
(officer of local authority); Howard Marine and Dredging Co Ltd v
Ogden and Sons (Excavations) Ltd
(1978) 2 All ER 1134
(charter of
barges)".
In
'n bespreking van die gewysde in die Bantoetrust- saak supra in die
TSAR 1977 (3) verklaar prof J C van der Walt op 273 die volgende:
"Die
tweede faktor wat van besondere belang by aanspreeklikheid op grond
van nalatige wanvoorstelling is, is die feit dat suiwer
finansiële
verlies - dit wil sê vermoënsverlies wat nie voortspruit
uit 'injury to person or property' nie - dikwels
ter sprake is. Veral
in die Anglo-Amerikaanse reg is die verhaalbaarheid van sulke
vermoënsverlies om regspolitieke redes
in beginsel ontken. Die
deurbreking van hierdie diepgewortelde Engelsregtelike benadering en
beginsel geskied besonder langsaam.
Die oergrond vir die skeptisisme
wat betref die prinsipiële beskerming van suiwer ekonomiese
belange is weer eens die ou liberalistiesindividualisties
getoë
vrees vir 'n te wye en sware aanspreeklikheid. Fleming (The Law of
Torts (1971) te 164) skryf tereg:
'Though
rarely acknowledged with candour, the factor most strongly against
the intrusion of negligence into the sphere of economic
interests is
the pervasive apprehension that it would involve too heavy and
unpredictable a burden on enterprise'.
Die
uitspraak in die Hedley Byrne- saak (hierbo) het oënskynlik
hierdie beginsel 'n nekslag gegee veral as 'n mens Lord DEVLIN
se
verwerping daarvan lees (602 - 603):
'This
is why the distinction is now said to depend on whether financial
loss is caused through physical injury or whether it is
caused
directly. The interposition of the physical injury is said to make a
difference of principle. I can find neither logic nor
common sense in
this... I am bound to say, my Lords, that I think this to be
nonsense. It is not the sort of nonsense that can
arise even in the
best systems of law out of the need to draw nice distinctions between
borderline cases. It arises, if it is the
law, simply out of a
refusal to make sense. The line is not drawn on any intelligible
principle'.
Die
Hedley Byrne- saak het egter, wat die Engelse reg betref, nie die
gemelde 'nonsense' beëindig nie. Dit leef kragtig voort
in die
Engelse reg en verseker dat nog meer 'nice distinctions' gemaak word
(vgl Weller & Co v Foot and Mouth Disease Research
Institute
(1965) 3 All ER 560
; Electrochrome Ltd v Welsh Plastics Ltd
(1968) 2
All ER 205
; British Celanese Ltd v A H Hunt (Capacitors) Ltd
(1969) 2
All ER 1252
; SCM (UK) Ltd v Whittal and Son Ltd
(1970) 2 All ER
417)
".
Ek
verwys na die Engelse reg op hierdie wyse omdat dit, vir sover dit
beginselomskrywing betref, na my mening nie veel sal help
om 'n
beroep op die Engelse reg te doen nie, veral gesien ook die verskil
tussen ons reg en die Engelse reg tov die oorsprong van
die eisgrond.
Dat by 'n oplossing van die begrensingsprobleem skere faktore in die
Engelse reg in aanmerking geneem word wat ook
in ons reg oorweeg sou
kon word, val natuurlik nie te ontken nie.
Na
my mening kan en behoort die eisgrond in die onderhawige saak in die
uitgebreide trefgebied van die lex Aquilia geplaas te word.
Hieruit
sou volg dat, volgens ons heersende norme, daar onregmatigheid vereis
1979
(3) SA p833
RUMPFF
HR
word
en skuld. Die vrees van die sg "oewerlose aanspreeklikheid"
kan ook alleen dan besweer word, indien by elke gegewe
geval dit die
taak van die Hof is om te beslis of daar in die besondere
omstandighede 'n regsplig op die verweerder gerus het om
nie 'n
wanbewering teenoor eiser te doen nie, en ook of die verweerder in
die lig van al die omstandighede, redelike sorg uitgeoefen
het, onder
andere, om die korrektheid van sy voorstelling vas te stel. By
afwesigheid van 'n regsplig, is daar geen onregmatigheid
nie.
Die
Hof sal ook die eisgrond binne redelike perke hou deur behoorlik
aandag te gee aan die aard van die wanbewering en die vertolking
daarvan en ook deur behoorlik aandag te gee aan die probleem van
kousaliteit. Dit gebeur in elk geval ook nie selde nie dat 'n
hof
gevra word om soortgelyke probleme op te los wat ontstaan uit
wanvoorstelling in kontraktuele verband of uit estoppel. Dit
is 'n
bekende regterlike taak.
Omdat
daar in die praktyk, soos in die onderhawige geval, na Engelse
beslissings verwys sal word, in verband met sekere situasies
wat mag
aanleiding gee tot wat ons as 'n regsplig mag beskou, is dit
noodsaaklik om aan te toon hoe basies die Engelse begrip van
"duty
of care", hoewel 'n onding in ons gemene reg tog, in hierdie
besondere geval, tot 'n mate aansluiting vind by die
opvatting van 'n
regsplig soos dit in ons reg behoort te bestaan, omdat
beleidsoorwegings ook hier ter sprake kom. Millner, in
sy Negligence
in Modern Law (1967), verwys te 24 ev na twee elemente van die "duty
of care" begrip, nl: "(1) the
negligence issue" en
"(2) the duty issue". Te 26 verskyn oa die volgende:
"The
duty concept, on the contrary, shows abounding vitality. The key to
this paradox is the utility of this concept as a device
of judicial
control over the area of actionable negligence on grounds of policy.
Here the ascertainment of liability is linked
to the second of the
two elements of duty of care referred to above. This second element
is not at all concerned with reasonable
foresight; it is to do with
the range of interests which the law sees fit to protect against
negligent violation. It is only when
this policy function of the duty
of care concept is ignored and the matter examined exclusively in
terms of reasonable foresight,
that the conclusion that the duty
concept is redundant, 'an unnecessary fifth wheel on the coach', is
inescapable. Even so, the
concept serves in practice as a mode of
addressing that part of the negligence issue which is concerned with
the risk to the particular
plaintiff, and the reasoning of a judgment
may be clothed in the language of 'duty', whatever the hidden springs
of the decision
may be.
Divorced
from its role as a monitor of policy, the duty of care concept
becomes dipensable, and is in fact dispensed with in other
systems of
law. The Roman law, as Buckland pointed out, made no reference to a
precedent duty of care in the Aquilian action, which
is a remedy
somewhat analogous to the negligence action of the common law. Culpa,
unlike negligence, was not defined with reference
to a particular
person or class. Failure to take that care which a reasonable man,
the bonus paterfamilas or paterfamilias diligens,
would take, was
culpa, and, if damage to property resulted, there was liability
(subject only to a causal nexus). This was unlawful
damage, damnum
injuria datum, and the 'unforeseeable plaintiff' rode home with the
rest. Modern civil law still maintains this
approach".
Hierdie
laaste paragraaf weerspieël ook natuurlik die posisie in ons
gemene reg, nieteenstaande die veelvuldige verwysing na
die begrip
van "duty of care" in ons gewysdes. Die beskouing van
hierdie skrywer dat "the unforeseeable plaintiff"
saam
huistoe gery het, moet gesien word in die lig van die betekenis van
daardie uitdrukking in die Engelse reg. Fleming verklaar
in The Law
of Torts 4de uitg te 136:
"In
short, recognition of a duty of care is the outcome of a value
judgment, that the plaintiff's invaded interest is deemed
worthy of
legal protection against
1979
(3) SA p834
RUMPFF
HR
negligent
interference by conduct of the kind alleged against the defendant. In
the decision whether or not there is a duty, many
factors interplay:
the hand of history, our ideas of morals and justice, the convenience
of administering the rule and our social
ideas as to where the loss
should fall. Hence, the incidence and extent of duties are liable to
adjustment in the light of the
constant shifts and changes in
community attitudes".
Ten
slotte kan ook met nut vewys word na die minderheidsuitspraak van
Lord REID en Lord MORRIS of Borth-Y-Gest in Mutual Life &
Citizens' Assurance Co Ltd and Another v Evatt
(1971) 1 All ER 150
te
162 waar oa die volgende gesê word:
"In
our judgment it is not possible to lay down hard and fast rules as to
when a duty of care arises in this or in any other
class of case
where negligence is alleged. When in the past Judges have attempted
to lay down rigid rules or classifications or
categories they have
later had to be abandoned".
Natuurlik
kan by wyse van eliminasie sekere basiese omstandighede by voorbaat
uitgeskakel word as grond vir 'n eis om skadevergoeding
weens
nalatige wanbewering. So gaan die hierbo genoemde
minderheidsuitspraak verder, wat die feite van daardie saak betref,
en
sê:
"In
this class of case the first principle is that no duty beyond the
duty to give an honest answer can arise when advice is
given casually
or in a social context, and the reason is that it would be quite
unreasonable for the enquirer to expect more in
such circumstances
and quite unreasonable to impose any greater duty on the adviser. The
law must keep in step with the habits
of the reasonable man and
consider whether ordinary people would think they had some obligation
beyond merely giving an honest
answer.
It
may be going too far to say that a duty to take care can only arise
where advice is sought and given in a business or professional
context, for there might be unusual cases requiring a wider
application of this principle. But for present purposes we think that
the appropriate question is whether this advice was given on a
business occasion or in the course of the appellant company's
business
activities".
Wat
wel in gedagte gehou moet word, is dat in ons reg die
aanspreeklikheid weens nalatige wanbewering ter sprake kom as
deliktuele
aanspreeklikheid, buite kontraktuele verband. Dit is
onnodig om te beslis of daar deliktuele aanspreeklikheid binne
kontraktuele
verband kan wees, vgl Hamman v Moolman1968 (4) SA 340
(A) te 348.
Wat
die feite van die onderhawige saak betref, is dit onnodig om die
gestelde saak volledig te herhaal omdat dit reeds in
1978 (2) SA 256
(N) gedoen is. Art 9 (1) van Ord 19 van 1945 (N) bepaal dat, wanneer
die Administrateur (die eiser) besluit het om enige grond
te onteien,
hy op die eienaar van sodanige grond 'n kennisgewing van onteiening
moet laat dien. Sub-art (2) van art 19 bepaal dat:
"Elke
kennisgewing van hierdie aard moet òf persoonlik op die
eienaar bedien òf per aangetekende pos aan hom
gestuur word
mits die plek waar hy hom bevind geredelik vasgestel kan word".
Dit
moet in die onderhawige geval aanvaar word dat die Administrateur,
deur sy beamptes, vasgestel het dat "Bijo, colonial
born Indian
No 8536/8537 of Ottowan, Natal", in 1928 die geregistreerde
eienaar van die grond geword het. Dit moet ook aanvaar
word dat die
beamptes van die Administrateur sonder behoorlike ondersoek bevind
het dat "Mr Bijo, 50/52 Russom Street, Verulam",
dié
mnr Bijo is wat die geregistreerde eienaar was. As gevolg van hierdie
nalatigheid is die brief aan "Mr Bijo"
gerig wat in
Russomstraat, Verulam, woon en daarin word gesê dat hy die
geregistreerde eienaar van die grond is. Gewapen
met hierdie brief
1979
(3) SA p835
RUMPFF
HR
het
Bijo (in werklikheid P Bijo) na die verweerder gegaan en hom
geïdentifiseer as P Bijo van Russomstraat, Verulam. Verweerder
word beskryf as 'n maatskappy wat besigheid dryf oa as bankiers en
finansiële adviseurs en wat ook deur sy eiendomsafdeling
besigheid dryf deur eiendomstransaksies. Volgens die gestelde saak is
die funksie van die eiendomsafdeling om op te tree as eiendomsagente
maar nie gewoonlik om klante advies te gee in verband met vergoeding
weens onteiening nie. Die verweerder erken egter dat ene Nel
wat
namens verweerder opgetree het in die loop van sy diens opgetree het.
Soos gesê, het die eiser self, deur sy beamptes,
in die brief
aan Bijo voorgestel dat "Bijo" die geregistreerde eienaar
is. Verweerder het, nadat hy deur Bijo geraadpleeg
is, 'n brief
geskryf aan eiser en gesê:
"The
registered owner of the above property Mr P Bijo has instructed me to
negotiate with your Department with regard to the
above expropriated
land".
In
daardie stadium kan dit aanvaar word dat verweerder voorsien het dat
as gevolg van sy vertoë en bemiddeling daar uiteindelik
'n
bedrag aan Bijo uitbetaal sou kon word. Die eerste vraag wat
ontstaan, is of daar 'n regsplig was wat op verweerder die las
gelê
het om nie in sy brief aan eiser na P Bijo as die geregistreerde
eienaar van die grond te verwys nie. Dit is duidelik
dat Bijo
verweerder as agent gebruik het om te onderhandel. In die onderhawige
geval het eiser self skriftelik beweer dat Bijo
aan wie die brief
geregistreer is die geregistreerde eienaar was. Verweerder moes
klaarblyklik hierdie brief gesien het en het
dus aanvaar dat eiser
erken dat Bijo, wat die brief ontvang het, die geregistreerde eienaar
was. Wat verweerder gedoen het, was
bloot om sy klant te identifiseer
en om te herhaal wat eiser self skriftelik verklaar het. Al sou
verweerder egter nie die brief
van eiser aan Bijo gesien het nie en
slegs op mondelike voorstelling van Bijo opgetree het, sou die
bewering in verweerder se brief
dat P Bijo die geregistreerde eienaar
is, nietemin slegs 'n bewering wees ter identifikasie van sy klant.
Verweerder kon nooit
droom (laat staan nog redelikerwyse verwag) dat
eiser, op wie die statutêre plig gerus het om vergoeding te
betaal aan die
geregistreerde eienaar, nie behoorlik sou vasstel wie
die geregistreerde eienaar is nie. Dit skyn my duidelik te wees dat
verweerder
slegs as agent vir onderhandelingsdoeleindes opgetree het
en in geen ander hoedanigheid hoegenaamd nie. Dit is natuurlik waar
dat
verweerder 'n fout begaan het maar, in die besondere
omstandighede van die onderhawige saak, waar daar mi geen regsplig op
verweerder
om nie 'n onjuiste bewering aangaande wie die
geregistreerde eienaar was, aan eiser te doen nie. Selfs as sou
verwag gewees dat
verweerder redelike stappe moes doen om vas te stel
of sy bewering korrek was, is dit nog mi vergesog van eiser om te
verwag dat
'n hof moet bevind dat verweerder na die Akteskantoor moes
gaan (en in hierdie geval ook nog verdere stappe moes doen) om vas te
stel of sy klant wel die geregistreerde eienaar is. In die
onderhawige saak sou enige redelike persoon in die posisie van
verweerder
immers verwag dat eiser nie die fout sou begaan om
vergoeding aan te bied aan iemand wat nie die geregistreerde eienaar
is nie
en enige redelike stappe wat verweerder moes gedoen het, moet
beoordeel word in die lig van daardie feit. Daar is ook nog 'n
opmerklike
omissie in die gestelde saak. Tevergeefs soek mens 'n
bewering (wat erken sou moes gewees het) dat eiser die bedrag aan P
Bijo
uitbetaal het
1979
(3) SA p836
RUMPFF
HR
as
gevolg van die bewering wat verweerder in sy brief aan eiser gedoen
het. Klaarblyklik is die uitbetaling nie gedoen weens wat
in
verweerder se brief verskyn nie, maar weens die fout wat eiser
oorspronklik begaan het om mnr Bijo van 50/52 Russomstraat, Verulam,
te beskou as die geregistreerde eienaar. Die appèl word
afgewys met koste.
JANSEN
AR, TROLLIP AR, JOUBERT AR en TRENGOVE AR het saamgestem.
Appellant
se Prokureurs: Adjunk-Staatsprokureurs, Natal en Bloemfontein.
Respondent se Prokureurs: Wartski, Greenberg & Vennote,
Durban; E
G Cooper & Seuns, Bloemfontein.
SAFLII
Note:
This
case was originally published by Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd. Juta
retains copyright as far as it subsists. An English
translation of
this case is available at:
http://saflii.org/za/other/ZAENGTR/1979/1.html