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[2012] ZAGPPHC 353
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Zoeco System Managers CC v Minister of Safety and Security NO and Others (54447/12) [2012] ZAGPPHC 353; 2013 (2) SACR 545 (GNP) (6 December 2012)
NOT
REPORTABLE
NORTH
GAUTENG HIGH COURT PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 54447/12
DATE:06/12/2012
In
the matter between:
ZOECO
SYSTEM MANAGERS
CC
................................................................
Applicant
and
MINISTER
OF SAFETY AND SECURITY
N.O.
…........................................
First
Respondent
THE
PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER OF SAPS,
MPUMALANGA
N.O.
.........................................................................................
Second
Respondent
WARRANT
OFFICER M C TSOAI
N.O.
…...................................................
Third
Respondent
THE
MAGISTRATE, WITBANK
N.O.
.............................................................
Fourth
Respondent
JUDGMENT
TEFFO,
J:
[1]
The applicant brought an urgent application against the respondents
where it seeks an order for the return of the following
movable
properties which were seized by the servants of the first respondent
namely:
1.1
19 Computer boxes;
1.2
20 Screens;
1.3
16 Flash drives;
1.4
1 Keyboard;
1.5
1 Printer;
1.6
1 Router;
1.7
Cash in the amount of R10 718,30;
1.8
1 Cash register with keys;
1.9
1 Lucky draw drums with keys;
1.10
Slips and receipts;
1.11
Keys and envelopes.
[2]
The application is opposed.
[3]
The following facts are common cause between the parties;
3.1
The aforementioned goods were confiscated on 6 September 2012 from
the applicant’s business premises.
3.2
The police seized the said goods in terms of a search warrant that
was issued by the fourth respondent in her capacity as the
Magistrate, Witbank in terms of section 21 of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977 (“the Act’).
3.3
The warrant was issued on the strength of an affidavit deposed to by
Warrant Officer Tsoai, the third respondent in this matter.
3.4
There was a previous search warrant which was also issued by the
fourth respondent in terms of which goods were confiscated
from the
applicant’s business premises on 4 May 2012 by the servants of
the first respondent.
3.5
The aforementioned goods were returned to the applicant after it had
launched an urgent application in this Court due to the
invalidity of
the abovementioned search warrant.
[4]
The applicant challenges the validity of the search warrant that
resulted in the search of its premises on 6 September 2012
and the
seizure of the aforementioned goods. It claims the return of all the
goods seized in terms of a mandament van spolie.
URGENCY
[5]
The applicant contends that the executors of the warrant did not only
dispossess it of the articles seized. They also despoiled
it of the
use of its business premises. The executors of the warrant, after the
search and seizure, locked up the business premises
and took the
keys.
[6]
The applicant trades as an internet cafe providing electronic
internet facilities and related facilities to the public.
[7]
It contends further that its dispossession of the premises is
continuing and it has to pay rent in respect of the business
premises.
[8]
It is also the applicant’s contention that it continues to pay
staff salaries and water and electricity accounts for the
business
premises.
[9]
Accordingly it faces dire financial consequences if the dispossession
of its business is allowed to continue.
[10]
According to the applicant the search and the seizures were done in a
manner to cripple the business.
[11]
The applicant contends that the warrant is bad in law and the
execution thereof was done in a way which brings the administration
of justice into dispute.
[5]
The applicant states that where there was an unlawful exercise of
public power, society demands that it be corrected speedily
so as not
to lose confidence in the state organs involved.
[6]
It further states that if it has to bring this application in the
ordinary course of events, it would have lost the business
premises,
become financially crippled and would have lost all the goodwill that
the business built up.
[7]
It alleges that the search and seizure constitutes an infringement of
its right to privacy as guaranteed by section 14 of the
Constitution
Act of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution").
[8]
It contends that its urgency as referred to above, is based on
commercial urgency and that there are therefore special circumstances
that render the matter urgent.
[9]
On the other hand the respondents deny the applicant’s
allegations and submissions relating to the urgency of the matter.
[10]
The issues for determination are the following:
10.1
Whether the applicant is entitled to bring this application by way of
urgency.
17.2
Whether the applicant is entitled to the relief sought in terms of
prayer 2 of the notice of motion.
[18]
Rules 6(12)(a) and (b) provide as follows:
11
(a) In urgent applications the court or a judge may dispense with the
form and service provided for in these rules and may dispose
of such
matter at such time and place and in such manner and in accordance
with such procedure (which shall as far as practicable
be in terms of
these rules) as to it seems meet (b) In every affidavit or petition
filed in support of any application under paragraph
(a) of this
subrule, the applicant shall set forth explicitly the circumstances
which he avers render the matter urgent and the
reasons why he claims
that he could not be afforded substantial redress at the hearing in
due course."
[19]
In Caledon Street Restaurant CC
1998 JOL 1832
SE, Kroon J summarised
the rules which pertain to urgent applications as follows:
“
Subject
to the provisions of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court, the
provisions of Rule 6(5) are peremptory. Rule 6(5)(a)
provides that an
application must be in a form as near as may be in accordance with
Form 2(a). In terms of Rule 6(5)(b) an applicant
is obliged to
nominate a day at least five days after service on the respondent, on
or before which the respondent must notify
the applicant of the
intended opposition. Rule 6(5)(d)(ii) provides that within 15 days of
such notification, the respondent who
is opposing the application
must file opposing affidavits. Sub-rule 5(f) provides for the
application thereafter to the registrar
for a date for the hearing of
the matter, the date on which the registrar may be so approached
depending on whether or not the
replying papers are filed by the
applicant, which is also to be done within a prescribed time period.
[11]
The applicant contends that it determined in accordance with the
degree of urgency of the matter, shortened time frames in
its notice
of motion, within which the respondents had to give notice of their
opposition and file their answering affidavits on
or before Tuesday,
25 September 2012. It also pointed out that the respondents elected
to completely ignore the time frames as
set out in the notice of
motion. Both parties’ attorneys of record communicated with
each other and this led to the removal
of the matter from the roll of
2 October 2012. According to the applicant the respondents filed its
notice of intention to oppose
on 1 October 2012, a day prior to the
date on which the matter was originally enrolled. The parties as a
result agreed that the
matter be removed from the roll and
re-enrolled for 9 October 2012, This was done according to the
applicant to avoid non-compliance
with the Practice Directive in this
Court and to ensure that all papers would be in court on the day of
the hearing. The respondents
were then requested by the applicant’s
attorney to ensure that their answering affidavit be filed by not
later than 2 October
2012. The applicant contends further that this
was not done and on 4 October 2012 it received unsigned copies of the
respondents’
answering affidavit. This therefore made it
impossible for the replying affidavit to be prepared and filed before
12h00 on Thursday
preceding 9 October 2012 for the hearing of the
matter. The replying affidavit was then prepared and filed on 4
October 2012. As
a result the matter was then re-enrolled for 16
October 2012. The applicant maintains that the removal and
re-enrolling of the
matter cannot be used against it to frustrate the
bringing of its application in the urgent court. All this was done as
a result
of the respondents who ignored the time frames which were
set out in the notice of motion. It further contends that the
respondents
did not advance reasons why they chose to ignore the time
frames or why was that necessitated. It is also contended that the
respondents
do not claim any prejudice in so far as the shortened
time periods are concerned but rather chose to rely on the perceived
illegal
business as the basis for not rendering the application
urgent.
[12]
The applicant contends that up and until 4 May 2012, it was in
peaceful and undisturbed possession of all the items that were
on the
premises.
[13]
The respondents on the other hand contend that spoliation
applications are by their very nature not urgent. They deny that
the
articles were seized without justification and that the applicant is
entitled to conduct business and earn a livelihood by
way of gambling
activities. According to the respondents the applicant runs an
illegal interactive gambling business.
[14]
Counsel for the respondents did not take issue on whether or not the
matter is urgent.
[15]
In an application of this nature, the applicant has to satisfy two
requirements. The applicant has first to show that it would
suffer
real loss or damage if it has to rely solely or substantially on the
normal procedure provided for in the Uniform Rules
of Court.
Secondly, it has to be determined whether the deviation from the
prescribed time limits would not prejudice the respondents
(Vukani
Gaming Eastern Cape (Pty) Ltd and Others v Eastern
Cape
Gambling and Betting Board Case No 60.6/10 Eastern Cape High Court).
[16]
From the applicant’s submissions it is clear that since the
respondents searched its premises, seized items from the
premises and
locked them up, it cannot continue to run its business. It continues
to suffer real loss or damage as it cannot use
its business premises.
It therefore faces dire financial consequences if the dispossession
of its business is allowed to continue.
No evidence has been adduced
on the papers to the effect that deviation from the prescribed time
limits would prejudice the respondents.
What comes out from the
respondents’ contentions is that the applicant is conducting an
illegal gambling business at the
premises. It is clear from the
papers that the applicant did what it could to bring the matter to
court on an urgent basis. It
wanted to comply with the rules and the
respondents ignored the time frames within which they were to file
their papers. From the
above facts and submissions I am persuaded
that the applicant has satisfied the requirements of Rule 6(12) in
bringing this application
by way of urgency.
[17]
The applicant contends that there was unlawful dispossession of the
items in its possession as the warrant which was issued
as statutory
authorisation for the search and seizure, was ultra vires the
provisions of the Act.
[18]
The onus is however on the first to third respondents to prove on a
balance of probabilities that the warrant was valid.
[28]
The affidavit deposed to by the third respondent states the
following:
28.1
He received information from the Mpumalanga Gaming Board that illegal
gambling activities were taking place at the applicant’s
premises.
28.2
He went to the premises where he observed people entering and exiting
the premises, from which some kind of business was clearly
being
conducted.
28.3
The applicant does not have a licence to operate any gambling
business at the premises.
28.4
In order to gather evidence that illegal gambling activities were
taking place at the premises, he applied for authority in
terms of
section 252A of the Act to make use of agents to conduct a police
action at the premises.
28.5
The agents were supplied with money for purposes of going to the
premises to gamble.
28.6
During the police action at the premises the following evidence was
gathered:
28.6.1
People entering the premises exchange money for a voucher with a pin
number.
28.6.2
The pin number is loaded on a computer on which various gambling
games are available.
28.6.3
The amount on the voucher is reflected on the computer giving access
to the various gambling games by way of indicating the
amount for
gambling purposes.
28.6.4
In the event of money being won in gambling, the voucher is presented
to the cashier at the premises and the winnings are
paid in cash by
the cashier.
28.7
On completion of the police action in terms of section 252A of the
Act, a search warrant was obtained for the search of the
premises and
seizure of the articles.
28.8
On 4 May 2012 articles were seized at the applicant’s premises
in terms of the search warrant referred to above.
28.9
The applicant then brought an urgent application in this Court for
the return of the articles seized on 4 May 2012.
28.10
Due to the invalidity of the search warrant which was issued for the
search of the premises on 4 May 2012 as a result of certain
legal
requirements not having been met, the articles seized on 4 May 2012,
were returned to the applicant.
28.11
After the articles seized on 4 May 2012 were returned to the
applicant the third respondent received information on a regular
basis that illegal gambling activities continued on the premises.
[29]
The respondents contend that on the strength of the affidavits
deposed to by the third respondent:
29.1
It appeared to the fourth respondent that the applicant was
conducting an illegal interactive gambling business on the premises.
29.2
There were reasonable grounds for believing that articles referred to
in section 20 of the Act were on the premises.
29.3
There was more than sufficient information to justify the issuing of
the search warrant by the fourth respondent.
29.4
The issuing of the search warrant is not indicative of any failure on
the part of the fourth respondent properly to apply his
mind to the
matter.
29.5
The search warrant was validly issued by the fourth respondent.
[30]
The applicant contends that the contents of the affidavit by the
third respondent describes in full detail all the steps that
were
taken prior to the raid in May 2012.
[31]
It contends further that the third respondent did not disclose in the
affidavit which items were seized at its premises on
4 May 2012. He
only states that due to the invalidity of the warrant all the
articles seized on 4 May 2012 were returned to the
applicant.
[32]
It is the applicant’s further contention that the third
respondent makes a generalised statement that after the return
of the
items that were seized in May 2012, he received information that
“they just continue with this illegai gambling activities
at
the premises”. He does not disclose who have this information,
what was the nature thereof. Further he states that he
now even
strongly believe that items on the premises were involved in or can
produce proof of the commission of certain crimes.
[33]
The applicant also made the following submissions:
33.1
The third respondent’s affidavit is silent on:
33.1.1
Any observation whether the items described in the original warrant
of May 2012 and seized
thereunder,
remained on the premises after it was returned.
33.1.2
Whether any further observation revealed that it was suspected to be
used in connection with the new crime other than that
he received
information that the illegal gambling activities continued.
33.1.3
Whether the current warrant is sought as the seizure is in respect of
the old suspected offence and that the items were needed
for evidence
in that regard or whether the warrant has been sought for the new
suspected commission of the offences.
[34]
According to the applicant there is absolutely no information on oath
before the fourth respondent to create a suspicion that
the items
described in Annexure “D” were on the premises, or that
the third respondent or anybody else observed the
business after May
2012. The items described in Annexure “D" to the warrant
are described in wide and vague terms and
cannot even reasonably be
associated with a search and seizure where the statutory offence is
internet gambling. There is no basis
set out in the affidavits why
cellphones, audio and video footage, etc, had to be search for. The
statement is silent on whether
electronic and computer equipment and
software are indeed present at the premises and why any such items
are part of the suspected
offence.
[35]
The applicant also contends that had the fourth respondent applied
her mind to the matter at hand, she could never have formed
the
reasonable suspicion on the information under oath that there was
sufficient information to justify the issue of the warrant.
[36]
In terms of section 21(1)(a) of the Act, a magistrate may issue a
search and seizure warrant for the seizure of an article
referred to
in section 20 “if it appears to such magistrate from
information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for
believing
that any such article is in the possession or under the control of or
upon any person or at any premises within his area
of jurisdiction”.
[37]
In terms of section 20 of the Act, an article which is liable to
seizure by the State includes any article:
37.1
Which is concerned in or is on reasonable grounds believed to be
concerned in the commission of an offence.
37.2
Which may afford evidence of the commission or suspected commission
of an offence.
[38]
In Minister of Safety and Security v Van der Merwe and Others
2011
(2) SACR 301
(CC) the following remarks were made:
“
Sections
20 and 21 of the CPA give authority to judicial officers to issue
search and seizure warrants. The judicious exercise of
this power by
them enhances protection against unnecessary infringement They
possess qualities and skills essential for the proper
exercise of
this power, like independence and the ability to evaluate relevant
information so as to make an informed decision.
Secondly,
the section requires that the decision to issue a warrant be made
only if the affidavit in support of the application
contains the
following objective jurisdictional facts: (i) the existence of a
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed
and (ii) the
existence of reasonable grounds to believe that objects connected
with the offence may be found on the premises or
persons intended to
be searched. Both jurisdictional facts play a critical role in
ensuring that the rights of a searched person
are not lightly
interfered with. When even one of them is missing that should spell
doom to the application for a warrant."
[39]
The court goes on to state that “the third safeguard relates to
the terms of the warrant. They should not be too general.
To achieve
this the scope of the search must be defined with adequate
particularity to avoid vagueness or overbreadth. The search
and
seizure operation must be confined to those premises and articles
which have a bearing on the offence under investigation.
The last
safeguard comprises the grounds on which an aggrieved searched person
may rely in a court challenge to the validity of
a warrant The
challenge could be based on vagueness, overbreadth or the absence of
jurisdictional facts that are foundational to
the issuing of a
warrant' (Minister of Safety and Security v Van der Merwe and Others,
supra).
[40]
The court continued to state that the principle of intelligibility
requires that even in the case of a CPA warrants “the
person
whose premises are being invaded should know why” (Minister of
Safety and Security v Van der Merwe and Others, supra).
[41]
The court then held that:
“
What
emerges from this analysis is that a valid warrant is one that, in a
reasonably intelligent manner:
1.
states the statutory provision in terms of which it is issued;
2.
identifies the searcher;
3.
clearly mentions the authority it confers upon the searcher;
4.
identifies the person, container or the premises to be searched;
5.
describes the articles to be searched for and seized, with sufficient
particularity; and
6.
specifies the offence which triggered the criminal investigation and
names the suspected offender."
(Minister
of Safety and Security v Van der Merwe and Others, supra.)
[42]
The court then gave the following guidelines to be observed by a
court considering the validity of the warrants:
42.1
The person issuing the warrant must have authority and jurisdiction.
42.2
The person authorising the warrant must satisfy herself that the
affidavit contains sufficient information on the existence
of the
jurisdictional facts.
42.3
The terms of the warrant must be neither vague nor overbroad.
42.4
A warrant must be reasonably intelligible to both the searcher and
the searched person.
43.5
The court must always consider the validity of the warrants with a
jealous regard for the searched person’s constitutional
rights.
42.6
The terms of the warrant must be construed with reasonable
strictness.
[43]
Information must be placed on oath before a judicial officer (which
can include hearsay information) from which it appears
to such
judicial officer that there are reasonable grounds for believing that
an article referred to in section 20 of the CPA is
within his or her
jurisdiction.
[44]
The “reasonable grounds for believing” in section
21(1)(a) are not grounds measuring up to an objective standard,
but
are grounds which in the subjective opinion of the judicial officer
are reasonable (Mandela and Others v Minister of Safety
and Security
and Another
1995 (2) SACR 397
(W) at 404g-
[45]
The belief on the part of the judicial officer that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the article in question is
an
article referred to in section 20 of the CPA is not objectively
justiciable. The court may therefore not interfere with the
judicial
officer’s decision merely because the decision is considered to
be wrong (Mandela and Others v Minister of Safety
and Security and
Another, supra, at 404).
[46]
The
court goes on to state that “the third safeguard relates to the
terms of the warrant. They should not be too general.
To achieve this
the scope of the search must be defined with adequate particularity
to avoid vagueness or overbreadth. The search
and seizure operation
must be confined to those premises and articles which have a bearing
on the offence under investigation.
The last safeguard comprises the
grounds on which an aggrieved searched person may rely in a court
challenge to the validity of
a warrant The challenge could be based
on vagueness, overbreadth or the absence of jurisdictional facts that
are foundational to
the issuing of a warrant' (Minister of Safety and
Security v Van der Merwe and Others, supra).
[47]
Applying the above legal principles to the present matter, it is
clear from the papers that the affidavit by the third respondent
explains in full detail the events that led to the issue of the
search and seizure warrant and the search and the seizure of the
articles at the applicant’s business premises on 4 May 2012.
Owing to the invalidity of that search and seizure warrant,
the
articles seized at the applicant’s business premises were
returned. In his statement the third respondent does not mention
which articles have been returned to the applicant. Four months later
a new warrant was issued by the fourth respondent based also
on
information under oath by the third respondent to the effect that
after the return of the articles that were seized at the applicant’s
business premises in May 2012, he received information on regular
basis that “they just continue with illegal gambling activities
at the premises". He further states that he now has even
stronger reasonable grounds to believe that items on the premises
were involved in and/or can produce proof of the commission of the
crimes under the relevant gambling legislation. On this basis
he
continues to state that these items should be seized in terms of the
relevant provisions of the Act. The third respondent further
states
that the defects in the previous application which emanated in the
faulty search warrant have now been rectified. This statement
is
concluded by the words “I therefore apply for a search warrant
to seize the items mentioned in Annexure ‘D’
to this
statement'.
[48]
On 6 September 2012 the third respondent and members of the first
respondent visited the applicant’s business premises,
searched
and seized the articles in terms of the new warrant that was issued.
[49]
In his statement that led to the issue of the above warrant in terms
of which a search and seizure of articles was done at
the applicant’s
business premises on 6 September 2012, the third respondent does not
give information in detail as to what
transpired that led to the
issue of the warrant. Nothing from the statement explains the events
after the return of the articles
that were seized on 4 May 2012 and
what actually transpired until on 6 September 2012. He just states in
general terms that he
received information on regular basis that they
just continued with illegal gambling activities. He does not state
that him or
his colleague visited the business premises again and
found that the illegal gambling continued. The source of information,
its
nature and status is not disclosed. No reasons are advanced as to
why such information should be relied upon (Minister of Safety
and
Security v Ndiniso 2007 (SCA) 29 RSA).
[50]
The applicant contends that it never received Annexure “D"
before the hearing of the matter. The fact that this
new warrant was
applied for to search and seize the articles allegedly mentioned in
Annexure “D” which was never given
to the applicant prior
to the hearing of the matter is a clear indication that when the
search and the seizure took place on 6
September 2012 the applicant
did not know what was to be searched for and seized in terms of the
warrant. This warrant did not
therefore describe the articles to be
searched for and seized, with sufficient particularity.
[51]
I also agree with the applicant that the articles listed in Annexure
“D” to the warrant of 6 September 2012 are
described in
wide and vague terms and cannot be reasonably associated with a
search or seizure where the offence is internet gambling.
[52]
There is also no information from the statement by the third
respondent as to what information or defects existed in the warrant
that led to the search and seizure of the applicant’s business
premises on 4 May 2012 and also what was rectified except
the
information that the defects were rectified.
[53]
From the issues raised I find it difficult to accept that sufficient
evidence was placed before the fourth respondent to constitute
objective jurisdictional facts which could justify a reasonable
suspicion by the fourth respondent regarding a suspected offence
or
items connected with an offence.
[54]
I agree with the applicant’s contention that had the fourth
respondent applied her mind to the matter, she would have
realised
that the information contained in the third respondent’s
statement does not contain or is insufficient to constitute
these
objective jurisdictional facts.
[55]
In Minister of Safety and Security v Van der Merwe and Others it was
held that both jurisdictional facts namely (i) the existence
of a
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed; and (ii) the
existence of reasonable grounds to believe that objects
connected
with the offence may be found on the premises or persons intended to
be searched, play a critical role in ensuring that
the rights of a
searched person are not lightly interfered with. Further that when
even one of them is missing, that should spell
doom to the
application of the warrant.
[56]
In the circumstances I make a finding that the search and seizure
warrant issued by the fourth respondent on 6 September 2012
is
invalid for the reasons advanced above.
[57]
The warrant is therefore set aside.
[58]
In Ivanor v Chairperson North West Gambling Board
2012 ZASCA 92
the
court referred to the case of Schoeman v Chairperson of the North
West Gambling Board
[2005] ZANWHC 81
where the police obtained a
search warrant and searched the business premises of the applicant
and seized various items. There
was no dispute that the machines were
gambling machines. That they were in the applicant’s possession
and that he did not
hold a licence or permit issued by the Board to
possess them. The applicant sought an interim order declaring the
search warrant
unlawful and directing the respondents to restore
possession to him of all the articles seized. The court dismissed the
application
on the basis that section 9 of the National Gambling Act
precluded him from possessing the machines without a licence. The
full
court in dismissing the appeal relied on the decision of
Carlisle J in Yuras v District Commandant of Police, Durban
1952 (2)
SA 173
(N) at 173 and held that the appellant was not entitled to an
order for the restoration of his machines until he produced an
appropriate
licence. The court in the Ivanor matter concluded that
the decision of the full court in Schoeman was wrong and overruled.
It held
that the appellant who was in undisturbed and peaceful
possession was entitled to the restoration of his machines once the
search
warrant was declared unlawful and set aside.
[59]
The applicant’s contention has always been that prior to 4 May
2012 he was in an undisturbed and peaceful possession
of the items
that were seized by the third respondent and members of the first
respondent on 4 May 2012. After the articles were
returned the third
respondent and members of the first respondent unlawfully
dispossessed it of its equipment, money and the premises
on 6
September 2012. It contends that it was entitled to possession of its
articles.
[60]
Following the reasoning in the Ivanor matter I also find that the
applicant is entitled to restoration of all the articles
that were
seized in terms of the search and seizure warrant that was issued on
6 September 2012.
[61]
I therefore make the following order:
61.1
The search and seizure warrant issued by the fourth respondent on 6
September 2012 is declared invalid and set aside.
61.2
The respondents and any other respondent who is in possession or
control of the applicant’s movable goods and monies
listed in
Annexure “D” hereto, are directed and ordered to
forthwith return and restore possession of the movable goods
and
monies that were removed by the third respondent and other members of
the SAPS (who were under the control of the second respondent)
from
the applicant’s business premises which are situated at Aztec
Riches Shop 44C, Saveway Crescent, Mandela Street, Witbank.
61.3
The first to third respondents are ordered to pay the costs jointly
and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.
NJ
TEFFO
JUDGE
OF THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT, PRETORIA
FOR
THE APPLICANT:N JAGGA
INSTRUCTED
BY: VARDAKOS ATTORNEYS FOR THE FIRST TO THIRD
RESPONDENTS:
T W G BESTER
INSTRUCTED
BY: THE STATE ATTORNEY
DATE
OF HEARING: 16 OCTOBER 2012
DATE
OF JUDGMENT:6 DECEMBER 2012