De Villiers v Potgieter NO and Others (611/05) [2006] ZASCA 142; 2007 (2) SA 311 (SCA) (1 December 2006)

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[2006] ZASCA 142
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De Villiers v Potgieter NO and Others (611/05) [2006] ZASCA 142; 2007 (2) SA 311 (SCA) (1 December 2006)

THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF
SOUTH AFRICA
Not reportable
CASE
NO
: 611/05
In the matter
between :
DE
VILLIERS, ANDRIES NOLTE
Appellant
- and -
POTGIETER,
P J, NO
First respondent
POTGIETER,
A C E, NO
Second respondent
POTGIETER,
P J, NO
Third respondent
_____________________________________________________________________________
Coram: STREICHER,
MLAMBO JJA & COMBRINCK AJA
Heard: 17
NOVEMBER 2006
Delivered:
1 DECEMBER 2006
Summary: Eviction
– applicability of doctrine of notice assumed – transfer of
property to second purchaser with knowledge of prior
sale not a
nullity – separate action for setting aside transfer pending – no
basis for alleged right to occupy alleged by first
purchaser –
second purchaser as owner entitled to eviction order – special
costs order.
Neutral
citation: This judgment may be referred to as
De Villiers v
Potgieter
[2006] SCA 170 (RSA)
_____________________________________________________________________________
J
U D G M E N T
_____________________________________________________________________________
MLAMBO JA
MLAMBO JA:
[1] The respondents, acting in their capacities as
trustees of the Potgieter Family Trust, instituted motion proceedings
in the Northern
Cape Division of the High Court for the eviction of
the appellant from a certain property known as Portion 1 of the farm
Nooitgedacht
278, situated in the district of Vryburg (the property).
The appellant opposed the proceedings and also instituted a counter
application
seeking to set aside a deed of transfer in terms of which
the property was registered in the name of ‘Die Trustees van tyd
tot
tyd van die Potgieter Familie Trust’. The matter came before
Williams J who granted the eviction and dismissed the counter
application.
The appellant abandoned the counter application and it
plays no further role in these proceedings. With the leave of this
court the
appellant now appeals against the eviction order.
[2] The disputes between the parties originate from an
agreement for the sale of shares concluded on 21 June 2002 by the
appellant
and one Kevin Grant Keeley (Keeley) in terms of which the
latter sold all the issued shares in Bulpan Beeste (Edms) Bpk
(Bulpan)
to the appellant for R553 680 (‘the share
agreement’). The share agreement provided that the appellant would
take possession
of the shares and effective control of Bulpan on 1
July 2002 or on some other date (‘of sodanige latere datum’)
(‘the effective
date’). Keeley warranted that as at the effective
date Bulpan would be the owner of the property. The purchase price of
the shares
was payable on the effective date and against payment of
the purchase price the share certificates together with blank
transfer forms
had to be delivered to the appellant. In the event the
purchase price was not paid and the shares were not transferred to
the appellant.
It is, however, common cause that the appellant took
occupation of the property on an unspecified date before 6 September
2002 ‘uit
hoofde van die ooreenkoms’. The share agreement does
not provide for the taking of occupation of the property by the
appellant.
The words ‘uit hoofde van’ can therefore not be
interpreted to mean ‘in terms of’. They have to be interpreted to
mean ‘by
reason of’. It follows that it is common cause that the
appellant took occupation of the property by reason of the fact that
the
share agreement had been entered into. Support for the
interpretation is to be found in the appellant’s answer to the
allegation
by the respondents that they were the owners of the
property and that he was not entitled to occupy the property. The
appellant said
in his answering affidavit:
‘Soos
reeds hierbo vermeld word dit uitdruklik ontken dat die Applikante
die eienaar is van die betrokke eiendom, dat die Applikante
geregtig
is op oordrag, okkupasie en/of besit van die betrokke eiendom en is
ek die persoon wat geregtig is uit hoofde van die aandele
transaksie
dat die maatskappy die eienaar van die eiendom bly en dat dit deur my
as aandeelhouer en direkteur namens die maatskappy
geokkupeer en
besit mag word. Ek is ook regmatig in besit van die eiendom.’
He therefore alleges that the respondents are not the
owners of the property, that Bulpan is the owner of the property and
that he
as shareholder and director of Bulpan is entitled to occupy
and be in possession of the property on behalf of Bulpan. Although he
added that he is also lawfully in possession of the property he
advanced no basis for the allegation.
[3] Keeley
guaranteed in the share agreement that as at the effecive date of the
agreement, all debts of Bulpan of whatever nature,
including debts
for income tax, would have been settled. During August 2002 the
appellant discovered that Bulpan was indebted to
the Receiver of
Revenue in breach of the guarantee in the agreement. When the
appellant took up this issue with Keeley the latter
stated that he
was in no position to pay the debt and proposed that the share
agreement be cancelled and that the appellant purchase
the property
direct from Bulpan. It was thereafter agreed that Keeley’s
attorney, Abraham Johannes Swanepoel (Swanepoel) would
prepare two
agreements, one cancelling the share agreement and another for the
purchase of the property by the appellant from Bulpan.
The appellant
was prepared to go along with this suggestion.
[4] On
4 September 2002 Keeley and the appellant went to Swanepoel’s
offices to sign the cancellation and the sale of property agreements.
On their arrival at Swanepoel’s offices only the cancellation
agreement was ready for signature and Swanepoel requested two hours
to prepare the outstanding agreement. On that basis the appellant
signed the cancellation agreement and went into town to while away
time whilst the sale of property agreement was being prepared. He was
contacted later by Swanepoel’s office and informed that Keeley
had
taken the agreement to his home and that same would be ready for
signature the next morning. When appellant went to Keeley’s
house
the next morning to sign the agreement Keeley informed him that he
was no longer interested in going ahead with the transaction
as he
had received a better offer. The appellant expressed his unhappiness
at Keeley at this turn of events and informed him that
he was not
entitled to behave that way.
[5] On
6 September 2002 Keeley, acting on behalf of Bulpan, concluded an
agreement with the respondents for the sale of the property
for an
amount of R681 000. On 21 October 2002 the appellant having
heard of this transaction, telephoned the first respondent
and, inter
alia, informed him that there was a dispute between him and Keeley
regarding the share agreement and the circumstances
under which he
came to sign the cancellation agreement. He told him that he was in
the process of taking steps to set aside the cancellation
agreement
and to enforce compliance by Keeley of his obligations in terms of
the share agreement. The first respondent brought the
appellant under
the impression that no contract had been concluded and told him that
he would not proceed with the matter. The appellant’s
attorney also
spoke to the respondent’s attorney Swanepoel who was aware of how
it came about that the cancellation agreement was
concluded. The
conversation took place on 6 September 2002, the day upon which
Bulpan sold the property to the respondents in terms
of an agreement
drafted by Swanepoel and signed by him as a witness. Swanepoel never
told the appellant’s attorney about this agreement
notwithstanding
an undertaking by him to advise Keeley to sell the property to the
appellant and to keep the appellant’s attorney
informed of
developments. On 5 November 2002 the property was transferred to the
respondents. Swanepoel acted as the conveyancer.
[6] In a letter dated 10 September 2002 the appellant’s
attorney wrote to the respondents’ attorneys:
‘Onder
die omstandighede is ons van mening dat u deur middel van `n
bedrieglike wanvoorstelling ons kliënt oorreed het om tot
sy
nadeel die kansellasieooreenkoms te onderteken in antisipasie dat `n
vervangende ooreenkoms tot stand sal kom. Indien ons kliënt
bewus was van die ware toedrag van sake sou hy die koopooreenkoms
nooit gekanselleer het nie en mnr Keeley by die terme daarvan gehou
het. Ons beskou dus die kansellasieooreenkoms as ongeldig en hou u
kliënt by die terme en voorwaardes van die aanvanklike
ooreenkoms
op 21 Junie 2002 onderteken.’
[7] As
stated above the property was transferred to ‘Die Trustees van tyd
tot tyd van die Potgieter Familie Trust’. In his answering
affidavit the appellant contended that the description of the
transferee was contrary to the provisions of the
Deeds Registries Act
47 of 1937
, that the transfer was for that reason void and that the
respondents consequently never acquired ownership of the property.
The appellant
contended furthermore in his answering affidavit that,
under the false pretext that the property would be sold to him, he
was persuaded
to cancel the agreement and that he had instructed his
attorney to institute action against Keeley for the cancellation of
the agreement
of cancellation and for performance of the share
agreement. He instructed his attorney at the same time, in the event
of the transfer
having been a valid transfer conferring a valid title
to the property, to claim as against the respondents an order setting
aside
the transfer of the property to the respondents on the basis of
them having been aware of his claim in respect of the property before
transfer was effected.
[8] The appellant subsequently abandoned the contention
that the transfer of the property to the respondents is void but we
were informed
from the bar that he did institute an action in the
North West High Court against Keeley and the respondents for the
relief referred
to above. That action is still pending. The appellant
therefore decided to have the questions whether he is entitled to
cancel the
agreement cancelling the share agreement and whether he is
entitled to an order cancelling the transfer of the property or an
order
directing that the property be transferred back to Bulpan
decided in another action. Notwithstanding this decision by the
appellant
and his apparent acceptance of the validity of the transfer
until set aside, he submitted in the court below as well as before us
that, in terms of the doctrine of notice, the respondents could not
claim to have a valid title to the property.
[9] Under
the doctrine of notice a personal right in respect of property may
prevail against a real right acquired with knowledge
of that personal
right.
1
The appellant claims that having cancelled the agreement cancelling
the share agreement the share agreement was re-instated; that
he
therefore has a personal right in respect of the shares; that such
personal right in respect of the shares is in effect a personal
right
in respect of the property; and that the personal right in respect of
the property should prevail against the respondents’
real right in
the property as the real right was acquired by the respondents with
knowledge of the appellant’s personal right.
[10] The court below stated that an action for the
cancellation of the cancellation of the share agreement had not been
instituted
(it must have been instituted subsequently) – and that
the matter consequently had to be decided on the basis of the share
agreement
having been cancelled ie on the basis that the appellant
had no rights other than the rights flowing from the cancellation of
the
share agreement.
[11] The court a quo erred in its apparent assumption
that the agreement cancelling the share agreement could only be
cancelled by
a court. As stated above the appellant’s attorney, on
10 September 2001 notified the respondents attorneys that he
considered the
agreement to be invalid and that he held the
respondents bound to the terms of the share agreement. If the
appellant was entitled
to have the agreement cancelling the share
agreement avoided by the court he was entitled to do so himself by
notifying the respondents
accordingly. In the light of the conclusion
to which I have come it is not necessary to decide whether the
appellant was entitled
to cancel the agreement cancelling the share
agreement or to decide whether the doctrine of notice is applicable
in the circumstances.
These are matters that will have to be decided
in the action that has now been instituted by the appellant. I shall
merely assume
without deciding that the agreement has been cancelled,
that the share agreement revived and that the doctrine of notice does
apply.
[12] If
the doctrine of notice does apply the transfer of the property to the
respondents is not a nullity. The respondents are the
owners of the
property and will remain the owners until the transfer to them is
cancelled or the property is transferred to another
person.
2
As owners the respondents merely had to allege that they were the
owners of the property and that the appellant was in occupation
thereof, which they did allege. It was then for the appellant to
establish his right to be in occupation of the property.
3
As stated above the appellant does allege that his occupation is
lawful but he advances no basis for the contention other than to
admit that he took occupation by reason of the share agreement and to
state that as shareholder and director of Bulpan he is entitled
to
possession of the property on behalf of Bulpan. Nowhere is it alleged
that he took occupation in terms of an agreement with Bulpan,
the
owner of the property, or that he acquired a right to occupy on any
other basis. It is also not alleged that he ever became the
shareholder and director of Bulpan. He was entitled to the transfer
of the shares in Bulpan against payment of the purchase price
but it
is clear from the agreement cancelling the share agreement that the
purchase price was never paid and no mention is made in
the
cancellation agreement or anywhere else of a re-transfer of the
shares. In the circumstances the shares were obviously not
transferred
to the appellant. In any event if ever the appellant
became the shareholder and director of Bulpan he clearly was no
longer the shareholder
or director at the time when the property was
transferred to the respondents and when the respondents claimed his
eviction from the
property.
[13] In the circumstances the appellant as the
registered owner of the property is entitled to an eviction order
against the appellant
who has not established a right to be on the
property.
[14] Keeley
and Swanepoel were not joined as parties to these proceedings and no
affidavit by either of them was filed. The facts
stated above are, in
accordance with what can conveniently be referred to as the
Plascon-Evans rule, unless stated otherwise, the
facts averred in the
respondents’ affidavits and admitted by the appellant and the facts
averred in the appellant’s affidavits.
These facts may be denied by
Keeley and Swanepoel but should they be true they are disturbing
especially in as much as they involve
an attorney. Should they
eventually, in the pending action against the respondents, be found
to be true and depending on the complicity
of the respondents it may
well become appropriate to alter the costs order to which the
respondents would otherwise be entitled.
For these reasons the
appropriate costs order would be one similar to the order made in
Sindani v Van der Merwe and Others
2002 (2) SA 32
(SCA) at
38D-I.
[15] In the result the following order is made:
(a) The
appeal is dismissed with costs. The 7 day period referred to in para
1 of the order of the court a quo will run as from the
date of this
judgment.
(b) The respondents shall not be entitled to tax the
costs of appeal until the proceedings between the parties and Keeley
in the
North West High Court have been finally determined by judgment
or otherwise.
(c) The appellant is granted leave to apply to this
court for an order setting aside or altering the order for costs in
(a), provided
the application for such order is filed with the
Registrar of this court within 21 days of the final determination of
the proceedings
in the High Court by judgment or otherwise.
__________________
D MLAMBO
JUDGE OF APPEAL
COMBRINCK Wnd AR
[16] Ek het die uitspraak van my kollega Mlambo gelees.
Ek kan ongelukkig nie daarmee saamstem nie.
[17] Hy
sê tereg in para [12] dat volgens die beslissing van
Chetty
v Naidoo
(voetnota 3) moet `n geregistreerde eienaar ten einde
‘n bevel van uitsetting te verkry, slegs beweer dat hy die eienaar
is en dat
die respondent in besit is. Wat die saak verder sê
egter, is dat indien die eienaar erken in sy funderende stukke dat
die respondent
regmatig besit het maar sy reg beëindig is, moet
hy daardie feit bewys. Jansen AR het dit so gestel:
‘
If he
concedes in his particulars of claim that the defendant has an
existing right to hold (eg, by conceding a lease or a hire-purchase
agreement, without also alleging that it has been terminated:
Boshoff
v Union Government
,
1932 TPD 345
at p 351;
Henning v Petra
Meubels Beperk
,
1947 (2) SA 407
(T) at p 412) his statement of
claim obviously discloses no cause of action. If he does not concede
an existing right to hold, but,
nevertheless, says that a right to
hold now would have existed but for a termination which has taken
place, then
ex facie
the statement of claim he must at least
prove the termination, which might, in the case of a contract, also
entail proof of the terms
of the contract.’
(P20F-G)
[18] Respondente het toegegee dat appellant in besit
gestel is deur Bulpan. Eerste respondent het by sy funderende
verklaring beide
die aandeleooreenkoms en die kansellasieooreenkoms
aangeheg. Hy het dit gedoen ten einde aan te toon wat die bron was
van appellant
se besit en hoe dit beëindig is. Soos in paragraaf
[2] hierbo gestel is dit gemene saak dat appellant voor 6 September
2002
in besit gestel is van die eiendom. Dit kan slegs wees deur
Bulpan en die waarskynlikhede is oorweldigend dat dit was in
afwagting
van uitvoering van die aandeleooreenkoms. Dat die
gevolgtrekking regverdig is word beam deur eerste respondent in sy
repliserende
verklaring waar hy meld dat Keeley aan hom gesê
het dat hy appellant in besit gestel het. Respondent gee nie voor dat
appellant
onregmatig in besit gestel is nie. Hulle maak staat daarop
dat sy regmatige besit beëindig is of onregmatig geword het by
sluiting
van die kansellasieooreenkoms. Hulle dra die bewyslas om
sodanige beëindiging te bewys.
[19] Op die stukke voor ons (ek beklemtoon dit aangesien
ek nie die hof wil bind of beinvloed wat die aksie gaan verhoor) was
appellant
deur ‘n bedrieglike wanvoorstelling oorreed om die
kansellasieooreenkoms te teken. Die respondente het nie gepoog om dit
te betwis
nie. Hulle kon dit maklik gedoen het by wyse van beëdigde
verklarings van Keeley en Swanepoel. Appellant het deur sy prokureur
in die brief van 10 September 2002 die kansellasieooreenkoms nietig
verklaar soos hy geregtig was om te doen. Sodanige nietigverklaring
het tot gevolg gehad dat die aandeleooreenkoms herleef het en
appellant se besit steeds regmatig was.
[20] Respondente was te alle tye bewus van appellant se
besit selfs nog voor hulle die koopooreenkoms aangegaan het. Hulle
was
op 21 Oktober 2002 deur appellant vertel dat hy Keeley nog hou by
die aandeleooreenkoms en dat hy die kansellasieooreenkoms nietig
verklaar het. Die eerste respondent het hom toe doelbewus mislei (op
eerste respondent se eie weergawe) deur aan hom te kenne te
gee dat
die Trust nog onderhandel met Keeley en dat geen koopooreenkoms
aangegaan is nie. Eerste respondent se flou verskoning dat
die
koopooreenkoms tussen die Trust en Bulpan niks met appellant te make
gehad het nie gaan nie op nie. Dit lyk meer asof appellant
opsetlik
mislei is ten einde te voorkom dat hy die oordrag by wyse van
interdik verbied.
[21] My
slotsom is: appellant was in regmatige besit van die eiendom,
respondente moes bewys dat sy besitreg beëindig is, hulle
het
nie die bewyslas gekwyt nie. Oordrag is geneem met die wete van die
appellant se persoonlike reg op die aandele en sy besit uit
hoofde
van die aandele-ooreenkoms.
[22] Na
my mening was die respondente nie geregtig op ‘n uitsettingsbevel
nie. Die appèl moes slaag en die bevel van die
hof
a quo
dienooreenkomstig gewysig word.
____________________
P C COMBRINCK
WNDE APPèLREGTER
STREICHER AR
[23] Ek
stem saam met die uitspraak van my kollega Mlambo AR en wens die
volgende by te voeg. Dit is natuurlik so dat indien `n eienaar
in sy
funderende stukke erken dat die persoon in besit van sy eiendom `n
reg het om die eiendom te okkupeer en nie ook beweer dat
daardie reg
om die eiendom te okkupeer beëindig is nie, die eienaar geen
skuldoorsaak uitmaak nie. Dit is ook so dat indien
die eienaar beweer
dat die okkupeerder regmatig in besit van die eiendom gekom het hy
ook moet bewys dat die besit beëndig is.
Ek stem saam met my
kollega Mlambo, vir die redes deur hom genoem, dat die respondente
nie beweer het dat die appellant regmatig
in besit van die eiendom
gekom het nie. Daar was dus geen bewyslas op die respondente om te
bewys dat regmatig verkrygde besit tot
`n einde gekom het nie. Soos
uitgewys deur Mlambo sê die appellant wel in sy antwoordende
verklaring dat hy regmatig in besit
is maar verstrek hy geen
feitelike basis vir die bewering nie. Die eerste respondent in sy
repliserende verklaring sê dat Keeley
hom verseker het ‘dat
die kontrak met De Villiers geldiglik gekanselleer is en (dat hy
voorts gesê het) dat hy wel aan De
Villiers okkupasie gegee het
in die sin dat hy 30 beeste op die betrokke grond laat loop, maar dat
hy hom kennis sal gee om die eiendom
te ontruim’. Ten beste vir die
appellant kan moontlik aan die hand van hierdie bewering
geargumenteer word dat dit uit die stukke
blyk dat hy regmatiglik `n
okkupeerder ter bede geword het. Indien sodanige okkupasie nie deur
Bulpan Beeste (Edms) Bpk as eienaar
beëindig is nie is dit
duidelik dat dit deur die nuwe eienaar beëindig is.
[24] `n Bevel ooreenkomstig die bepalings van para [15]
word gevolglik gemaak.
___________________
P E STREICHER
APPèLREGTER
1
G Lubbe ‘A doctrine in search of a theory:
reflections on the so-called doctrine of notice in South African
law’
(1997)
Acta Juridica
246
; and
Cussons and Others v
Kroon
2001 (4) SA 833
(SCA) at 839 para [9].
2
See
Cussons and Others v Kroon supra
.
3
Chetty v Naidoo
1974 (3) SA 13
(A) at
20A-E.