S v Carter (535/06) [2006] ZASCA 140; 2007 (2) SACR 415 (SCA) (1 December 2006)

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[2006] ZASCA 140
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S v Carter (535/06) [2006] ZASCA 140; 2007 (2) SACR 415 (SCA) (1 December 2006)

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THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
REPORTABLE
Case no: 535/2006
In
the matter between
G
CARTER APPELLANT
and
THE
STATE RESPONDENT
Coram:
MTHIYANE,
HEHER and MLAMBO JJA
Heard:
24
NOVEMBER 2006
Delivered: 1 DECEMBER
2006
Summary:
Criminal procedure
– appeal – condonation – failure to file record of proceedings
– responsibility of registrar of High Court
in terms of s 316(7) of
CPA – no lapsing of appeal – SCA rule 8 not applicable to
criminal appeals.
Criminal procedure – appeal – plea of guilty at trial – failure
of trial judge to comply with s 112(2) of CPA – effect.
Criminal procedure-appeal – s 322(1) of CPA – failure of justice
– meaning in context of non-compliance with s 112(2).
Neutral citation:
This
judgment may be cited as
Carter v S
[2006] SCA 168 (RSA)
_____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
__________________________________________________________________
HEHER
JA
HEHER
JA:
[1] On
20 February 1996 the appellant, then age 23, appeared before M J
Strydom J and assessors charged with three counts of robbery
with
aggravating circumstances and two counts of murder. He pleaded guilty
to one count of robbery and both counts of murder. His
pleas were
supplemented by a written statement prepared by his counsel which he
signed. He was convicted in accordance with his pleas.
On 5 March
1996 an effective sentence of 18 years was imposed.
[2] The
appellant applied for leave to appeal against his sentence. On 27
March 1996 the application was refused. He petitioned this
Court for
leave to appeal out of time. His application for condonation was
dismissed on 12 February 1997.
[3] On
7 May 1997 the appellant sought leave to appeal against his
convictions and condonation for the late application for such leave.
On 5 April 2000 Stafford DJP granted him condonation and leave to
appeal to this Court.
The
application for condonation.
[4] The
appellant had been released on bail sometime prior to his first
appearance in the High Court on 31 October 1994. When he was
granted
leave to appeal to this Court his bail of R5000 was extended on
appropriate conditions: he was required to report every Thursday
to
Florida police station, he was to pursue his appeal and should he not
do so he was required forthwith to present himself to commence
his
sentence. As appears from the respondent’s affidavit in the
condonation application the appellant faithfully reported until
April
2004 when the investigating officer purported to release him,
unilaterally, from the obligation ‘aangesien hy niks meer van
sy
saak hoor nie’. The appellant moved to Cape Town. He did not pursue
his appeal nor did he hand himself over to the authorities.
Only in
late 2006 when the seemingly reluctant hand of the law began to close
on him were steps taken to have the appeal heard by
this Court in
circumstances which are described below.
[5] The
record of proceedings in the High Court was lodged with the Registrar
of this Court on 29 September 2006 and was accompanied
by an
application in which the appellant asked for condonation for his late
application for reinstatement of the appeal.
[6] Counsel
for the appellant and the respondent approached the matter as if the
appeal had lapsed by reason of the appellant’s
failure to lodge the
record timeously. Both assumed that SCA rule 8 was applicable. The
rule provides
‘
(1) An
appellant shall within three months of the lodging of the notice of
appeal lodge with the registrar six copies of the record
of the
proceedings in the court
a quo
and deliver to each respondent
such number of copies as may be considered necessary or as may
reasonably be requested by the respondent.
(2) The
time limit for lodging the record may be extended-
(a) by
written agreement of all parties to the appeal; or
(b) by
the registrar upon written request with notice to all of the parties
to the appeal:
Provided
that the registrar shall not be entitled to extend the period for
more than two months.
(3) If
the appellant fails to lodge the record within the prescribed period
or within the extended period, the appeal shall lapse.’
(Ss
(4) – (11) do not require to be quoted in the present context.)
[7] Rule
8 is included by Kriegler and Kruger in Hiemstra,
Suid-Afrikaanse
Strafproses
, 6ed at 877 as one of the rules of this Court which
is applicable to criminal appeals. But in the context of rule 8(1)
‘the lodging
of the notice of appeal’ refers to the opening words
of rule 7,
viz
‘
(1) An
appellant in a civil case shall lodge a notice of appeal with the
registrar . . .’
There
is no provision in the rules or elsewhere for the lodging of a notice
of appeal in criminal cases. The closest one comes seems
to be
Uniform Rule 52(4) which provides that
‘
If
leave to appeal in a criminal case is granted by any division of the
High Court the registrar of that division shall without delay
notify
the registrar of the Supreme Court of Appeal of that fact.’
[8] The
statutory provision which deals with the preparation and lodging of
the record of proceedings in a criminal trial in the event
of an
appeal to this Court is s 316 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 (hereinafter ‘the CPA’) which provides
‘
(7)(a)
If an application under subsection (1) for leave to appeal is granted
and the appeal is not under section 315(3) to be heard
by the full
court of the High Court from which the appeal is made, the registrar
of the court granting such application shall cause
notice to be given
accordingly to the registrar of the Supreme Court of Appeal without
delay, and shall cause to be transmitted to
the said registrar a
certified copy of the record, including copies of the evidence,
whether oral or documentary, taken or admitted
at the trial, and a
statement of the grounds of appeal: Provided that, instead of the
whole record, with the consent of the accused
and the Director of
Public Prosecutions, copies (one of which must be certified) may be
transmitted of such parts of the record as
may be agreed upon by the
Director of Public Prosecutions and the accused to be sufficient, in
which event the judges of the Supreme
Court of Appeal may
nevertheless call for production of the whole record.’
The
notification of the grant of leave with provision for inclusion of a
statement of the grounds of appeal in the record probably
renders a
separate notice of appeal superfluous. More important, s 316 contains
no equivalent of SCA Rule 8(3) which brings about
the lapse of an
appeal on failure to lodge the record within the prescribed period.
The reason for this is obviously that the duty
is imposed on the
registrar of the High Court and not the appellant. This is also
understandable given that a high proportion of
appellants in criminal
matters come to this Court on legal aid.
[9] Consequently,
if there was a failure to comply with s 316(7)(a) in this case,
which as will be seen, was not resolved, then the primary
responsibility must be sought in the office of the registrar of the
High
Court.
In
these circumstances the appeal did not lapse and the application for
reinstatement and condonation relating to it was unnecessary.
[10] But
that is not the end of the matter, unfortunately. Appellants in
criminal cases, whether the State or an accused, are under
a duty to
pursue their appeals with reasonable expedition. The proper
administration of justice demands that they do so. Undue delay
may in
appropriate circumstances even amount to the abandonment of an
appeal. What happened in this case falls not far short of that
situation. It follows that the attorneys representing appellants act
to the potential detriment of both their clients and the public
interest if they choose to ignore the expeditious prosecution of the
appeal because they do not regard their clients as responsible
for
the delay.
[11] As
I have noted, leave to appeal was granted in April 2000. In the
condonation papers there is then a long and unexplained silence
for
15 months. On 13 August 2001 Mr Spangenberg of Schoeman Maree, the
Bloemfontein correspondent of the appellant’s Krugersdorp
attorneys
wrote to the latter in the following terms:
‘
APPèL:
GAVIN CARTER/DIE STAAT
Ons
verwys na bostaande en bevestig dat ons deur die Griffier meegedeel
is dat die oorkonde ingedien is. Die Griffier het ons verder
meegedeel dat kondonasie verleen is vir die laat indien van die
oorkonde. Benewens die korrespondensie wat ons vroeër met u
hieroor gevoer het, dra ons geen kennis van die aangeleentheid nie.
Ons verneem gevolglik graag of u vir ons enige opdragte hierin
het en
of ons die Griffier alternatiewelik in kennis kan stel dat ons nie
hierin as prokureurs optree nie.
Ons
verneem graag dringend van u.’
[12] On
23 August 2001 Mr Lubbe of Swart Redelinghuys Nel & Vennote, the
Krugersdorp attorneys, notified Mr Spangenberg that the
Registrar of
this Court had also notified him that the record was ready for
collection. He asked Spangenberg to collect and forward
it. On 27
August the request was complied with and Lubbe apparently received
the record.
[13] On
3 Decmber 2001 Lubbe wrote requesting his correspondent to confirm
that a date of hearing had not yet been allocated. That
was clearly a
timeous and appropriate step to take in the circumstances. But, the
appellant’s affidavit for condonation explains,
‘
Hierna
het ‘n lang tyderk verloop sonder enige klaarblyklike vordering. My
regsverteenwoordiger deel mee dat sy kantore gewag het
op
terugvoering van die korrespondent. Toe daar telefonies op 26
November 2004 by die korrespondent navraag gedoen is rakende
vordering,
is meegedeel dat laasgenoemde reeds hul lêer gesluit
het.’
This
delay of almost two years in following up the matter with a view to
bringing their client’s appeal to finality is unacceptable.
Redelinghuys & Vennote had apparently been in possession of the
record since September 2001, they were entitled to expect the
allocation of a date for the appeal, and a simple enquiry at the
office of the Registrar of this Court would have revealed the reason
for the non-allocation, whatever that may have been.
[14] I
do not propose to investigate what took place thereafter. A state of
confusion seems to have prevailed which extended beyond
the
appellant’s attorneys to the Director of Public Prosecutions in
Pretoria and the registrars of this Court and the High Court.
On 19
April 2006 the Registrar of this Court informed the Director that
‘
Up
to date of this letter no application for leave to appeal or record
on appeal and or condonation was filed or registered . . .
by this
office.’
On
14 July 2006 the Registrar of the High Court at Pretoria informed Mr
Pienaar (and Mynhardt J) that his office had failed to notify
the
Registrar of the SCA that Stafford DJP had granted the appellant
leave to appeal. Neither of these averments can however, be
wholly
correct, since the Director thereupon produced the record which the
Registrar of the High Court had caused to be prepared
in July 2001
and which was, apparently, the same record as that of which Mr Lubbe
had received a copy from Bloemfontein in August
of that year.
[15] Finally,
during the second half of 2006, the appellant’s attorneys, stirred
into action by rumblings from the office of the
Director, caused a
further record to be prepared and lodged in Bloemfontein. A date for
the hearing of this appeal was then allocated.
[16] One
may fairly ask what the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
was doing in all this time. It too owed duties to the
appellant and
the public to pursue the appeal with reasonable expedition.
Regrettably the answer is ‘Very little’. As Mr Pienaar,
who was
one of the counsel for the State involved in the original
prosecution, has explained in his affidavit, he was absent from
his
permanent office during the period between March 2000 and October
2004 while preparing and prosecuting an extended case. When
he
returned he drew the file in the Carter trial (as a matter of
interest, not duty, since it was no longer his responsibility) to
find out what had happened. To his surprise he found that no progress
had been made in several years. It was largely due to his efforts
that the appeal has eventually reached fruition. There is no doubt
that the office of the Director in Pretoria by its inattention
to the
matter served to compound the neglect of the appellant’s attorneys.
Both sides deserve censure. Whether the appellant personally
was
apprised of what was happening (or why nothing was happening) and
approved is not clear. Grounds for castigating him are absent.
It
plainly suited him if the case appeared to go away – he should have
been told by his attorneys that it would not.
The
appeal against the convictions.
[17] In
R v Mamba
1957 (2) SA 420
(A) at 422A Schreiner JA emphasised
that ‘it will only be in exceptional cases that one who has pleaded
guilty and been convicted
in accordance with his plea will be granted
relief on appeal’. The thrust of counsel’s argument is that the
plea statement did
not deal in such detail with the offences to which
the appellant had pleaded guilty as to enable Strydom J to be
satisfied that the
appellant was guilty of those offences. Such a
level of satisfaction is necessary before a court may convict an
accused person on
a plea of guilty and,
inter alia
, sentence
him to imprisonment without the option of a fine: s 112(1)(b) read
with s 112(2) of the CPA.
[18]
The
three charges to which the appellant pleaded guilty were counts 1, 3
and 4. They were framed in the indictment as follows:
‘
AANKLAG
1
DEURDAT
die beskuldigdes op of omtrent 21 April 1992 en te of naby KLERKSDORP
in die distrik KLERKSDORP wederregtelik en opsetlik
vir BOBO EBENEZER
TLOKOTSI TSHOLO aangerand het deur hom met vuurwapens te dreig en toe
en daar met geweld uit sy besit geld en drank
waarvan die hoeveelheid
onbekend aan die Staat is, sy eiendom of in sy regmatige besit,
geneem het en hom aldus daarvan beroof het.
Verswarende omstandighede
aanwesig synde die gebruik van vuurwapens.
AANKLAG
3
DEURDAT
die beskuldigdes op of omtrent 21 April 1992 en te of naby KLERKSDORP
in die distrik KLERKSDORP wederregtelik en opsetlik
vir BOBO EBENEZER
TLOKOTSI TSHOLO ‘n manlike persoon, gedood het.
AANKLAG
4
DEURDAT
die beskuldigdes op of omtrent 21 April 1992 en te KLERKSDORP in die
distrik KLERKSDORP wederregtelik en opsetlik vir JOHN
NTAMGINI ‘n
manlike persoon gedood het.’
[19] Count
2, to which the appellant pleaded not guilty and of which he was
acquitted without the leading of evidence, is relied on
by the
defence in support of the submission that the plea statement was so
confusing as in fact to relate to that count and not to
count 1.
Count 2 read as follows:
‘
AANKLAG
2
DEURDAT
die beskuldigdes op of omtrent 21 April 1992 en te of naby KLERKSDORP
in die distrik KLERKSDORP wederregtelik en opsetlik
vir BOBO EBENEZER
TLOKOTSI TSHOLO en MTHETHELI MDINGI aangerand het deur hulle met
vuurwapens te dreig en toe en daar met geweld
uit hulle besit
ongeveer R600-00 kontant en 5 x 750 ml bottles brandewyn, hulle
eiendom of in hulle regmatige besit, geneem en hulle
aldus daarvan
beroof het. Verswarende omstandighede aanwesig synde die gebruik van
vuurwapens.’
[20] When
the appellant pleaded guilty the trial of his co-accused Blom and
Mthembu who had denied all the charges was separated.
His counsel
informed the court that he had prepared a written explanation of the
pleas which he read out and handed in. The statement
reads as
follows:
‘
2. Die
begrippe wederregtelikheid, toerekeningsvatbaarheid,
wederregtelikheidsbewussyn en opset is volledig deur my
verdedigingsadvokaat
aan my verduidelik en ek is vertroud hiermee.
3. Ek
pleit vrywilliglik skuldig soos hier onder uiteengesit sonder dat ek
op enige wyse beïnvloed is of dat enige beloftes aan
my
voorgehou is.
Ad
Aanklag 1: Ek pleit skuldig op hierdie aanklag deurdat ek op of
omtrent 21 April 1992 en te of naby Klerksdorp tesame met
beskuldigdes
1 en 3 wederregtelik en opsetlik roof gepleeg het.
Ek erken dat Bobo
Ebenhaeser Tshokotsi Tsholo aangerand is en vuurwapens gebruik is
tydens die roof deur beskuldigdes 1 en 3.
Ek erken verder dat
ek voor die pleging van die roof bewus daarvan was dat beskuldigdes 1
en 3 in besit was van vuurwapens, maar ontken
dat ek daarvan bewus
was dat die vuurwapens in die roof gebruik sou word.
Ek
erken egter dat daar met geweld geld en drank, die eiendom of die
regmatige besit, van bogenoemde persoon geneem is en dat hy aldus
van
geld en drank beroof is. Ek erken verder dat hoewel ek nie bewus
daarvan was dat die vuurwapens in die roof gebruik sou word
nie, ek
nogtans as dader opgetree het aangesien ek die moontlikheid voorsien
het dat beskuldigde 1 en 3 die roof kon pleeg en die
vuurwapens kon
gebruik in die nastrewing van die gemeenskaplike doel “common
purpose” en onverskillig was omtrent die intrede
van die genoemde
handelinge en hulle gevolge.
Die misdaad is
gepleeg onder die omstandighede soos volledig uiteengesit in
paragraaf 4 hieronder.
Ad
Aanklag 3: Ek pleit skuldig op hierdie aanklag deurdat ek op of
omtrent 21 April 1992 en te of naby Klerksdorp, in die distrik
van
Klerksdorp, saam met beskuldigdes 1 en 3 wederregtelik en opsetlik
vir Bobo Ebenhaeser Tshokotsi Tsholo, ‘n manlike persoon,
gedood
het.
Erken die
korrektheid van die oorsaak van dood soos uiteengesit in die
relevante lykskouingsverslag. Alhoewel ek erken dat die oorledene
opsetlik gedood is, erken ek dat ek die misdaad gepleeg het met die
opset by moontlikheidsbewussyn. Alhoewel ek onbewus was toe daar
na
die mynskag beweeg was met die oorledenes, en by welke mynskag hulle
gesterf het, dat beskuldigdes 1 en 3 van voorneme was om
die
oorledenes te skiet, het ek opset by moontlikheidsbewussyn gehad
aangesien ek die moontlikheid voorsien het dat die oorledenes
deur
beskuldigdes 1 en 3 geskiet kon word en het my nogtans met sodanige
intrede versoen. Die misdaad is gepleeg onder die omstandighede
soos
volledig uiteengesit in paragraaf 4 hieronder.
Ad Aanklag 4: Ek
pleit skuldig op hierdie aanklag deurdat ek op of omtrent 21 April
1992 en te of naby Klerksdorp, in die distrik
van Klerksdorp, saam
met beskuldigdes 1 en 3 wederregtelik en opsetlik vir John Ntamgini,
‘n manlike persoon, gedood het.
Ek
erken die korrektheid van die oorsaak van sy dood soos uiteengesit in
die relevante lykskouingsverslag.
Alhoewel ek erken
dat die oorledene opsetlik gedood is, erken ek dat ek die misdaad
gepleeg het met opset by moontlikheidsbewussyn.
Alhoewel ek onbewus
was toe daar na die mynskag beweeg was met die oorledenes, en by
welke mynskag hulle gesterf het, dat beskuldigdes
1 en 3 van voorneme
was om die oorledenes te skiet, het ek opset by moontlikheidsbewussyn
gehad aangesien ek die moontlikheid voorsien
het dat die oorledenes
deur beskuldigdes 1 en 3 geskiet kon word en het my nogtans met
sodanige intrede versoen. Die misdaad is gepleeg
onder die
omstandighede soos volledig uiteengesit in paragraaf 4 hieronder.
4. (Die
omstandighede waaronder die misdrywe gepleeg is).
1. Beskuldigde
(sic) en ek het gedurende die dag en aand van 21 April 1992 sterk
drank ingeneem. ‘n Groot hoeveelheid sterk drank
was verorber
voordat daar om ongeveer 21:30 deur beskuldigdes 1 en 3 en myself na
Jouberton Drankwinkel in die distrik van Klerksdorp
beweeg was met ‘n
voertuig. Beskuldigdes 1 en 3 het die oorledene, vermeld in aanklag
3, wat die bestuurder van die Jouberton Drankwinkel
is, vanaf sy
woonstel na die genoemde Jouberton Drankwinkel geneem waar hulle
(beskuldigdes 1 en 3), wat in besit van vuurwapens
was, die
bestuurder van Jouberton Drankwinkel beveel het om die deur oop te
sluit wat toegang tot die perseel verleen. Beskuldigdes
1 en 3 het na
die bokant van die drankwinkel met trappe op beweeg, maar ek weet nie
wat daar bo gebeur het nie. Beskuldigdes 1 en
3 het egter in die
drankwinkel elk ‘n vuurwapen op die oorledene Tsholo en ene Ndingi
gerig. Die oorledene vermeld in aanklag 4,
John Ntamgini, het by die
genoemde drankwinkel opgedaag en die twee oorledenes het ons drie
beskuldigdes na ‘n mynskag te Klerksdorp
vergesel. Die beskuldigdes
het die twee oorledenes by die mynskag laat sit. Skielik het twee
skote geklap en ek het gesien dat beskuldigdes
1 en 3 hulle skiet. Ek
het nie ‘n pistol gehad nie. Beskuldigdes het die twee oorledenes
in die gat (mynskag) afgegooi. Ek weet
nie op watter dele van hulle
liggame oorledenes geskiet was nie aangesien dit stikdonker was.
Beskuldigde 1 en ek het die volgende
dag na die mynskag teruggekeer
en klippe daarin afgegooi.
2. Alhoewel
ek en beskuldigde 1 ‘n groot hoeveelheid drank voor die pleging van
die misdrywe verorber het, was ek toerekeningsvatbaar
tydens die
pleging van die misdrywe. Die drank het my egter aangetas.
3. Verder
was ek tot ‘n groot mate beïnvloed deur beskuldigde 1, Charl
Blom, wat heelwat ouer as ek is en wat ‘n intimiderende
persoon is.
4. Alhoewel
ek nie onder dwang verkeer het tydens die pleging van die misdrywe
nie, was ek en is ek steeds baie bang vir beskuldigde
1.
5. Alhoewel
ek bewus daarvan was dat beskuldigdes 1 en 3, naamlik Charl Blom en
Ezekiël Mthembu, vuurwapens gehad het, was ek
vooraf onbewus dat
die vuurwapens tydens die aanklag van roof (aanklag 1) en
moordaanklagte (aanklagte 3 en 4) gebruik sou word.
6. Ek
het berou vir my aandeel in die ongelukkige gebeure en pleit op die
relevante aanklagte skuldig aangesien ek opreg wil wees
en genoeg
gely het en eerlik met die agbare hof wil wees en my advokaat versoek
het dat ek op die relevante aanklagte wil skuldig
pleit.’
[21] After
the appellant had confirmed what his counsel had read to the court
the record proceeds
‘
HOF
: Mnr
Van den Berg, sal u blaai na bladsy 3 van die pleitverduideliking?
Die laaste sin van die tweede laaste paragraaf:
“
Ek erken die
korrektheid van die oorsaak van dood soos uiteengesit in die
relevante lykskouingsverslag.”
Ons
weet nie wat die oorsaak van dood is nie. Daar word later in die
verklaring gesê dat die twee oorledenes geskiet is, maar
is
hulle dood aan daardie skietwonde? Is u bereid om vir ons te sê
wat die oorsaak van Tsholo se dood is?
MNR
VAN DEN BERG
: Kan ek net vir die agbare hof inlig dat my geleerde
vriend het wel die, ek het aanvaar hy gaan die lykskouingsverslae
inhandig en
daarvolgens het ek gesê dat die staat gaan dit
geensins betwis nie.
HOF
: Ja,
sê u vir my, wat is die oorsaak van Tsholo se dood, ‘n
skietwond?
MNR
VAN DEN BERG
: Ja, Tsholo is “possibly shooting.”
HOF
: Nou
maar wat sê u? Wat sê u kliënt?
MNR
VAN DEN BERG
: Dit word so erken.
HOF
: Is
hy dood as gevolg van ‘n skietwond?
MNR
VAN DEN BERG
: Dit word so erken en so ook wat die ander oorledene
aanbetref. Ek sal . . . (tussenbei).
HOF
: ‘n
Skietwond van wat, die kop?
MNR
VAN DEN BERG
: Miskien kan die staat net vir u behulpsaam wees,
want dat dit wel ingehandig is.
HOF
: U
kliënt het die skietery gesien, wil u gou by hom hoor? Hy het
tog seer sekerlik gesien of die oorledenes in die kop of in
die maag
of in die bene geskiet is.
MNR
VAN DEN BERG
: Hy het nie presies gesien nie. Dit is so in sy
pleitverduideliking, Edele, en ek sou verkies dat die staat miskien,
die verslae
is beskikbaar. Die verdediging sal geensins ontken dat hy
wel dood is aan skietwonde nie, dit is beide oorledenes. Ek handig
die
lykskouingsverslae met toestemming in.
HOF
: Dit
is dan met betrekking tot Ad aanklag 4.
MNR
VAN DEN BERG
: Aanklag 3 en 4.
HOF
: In
die middel van daardie paragraaf, bladsy 4. Korrektheid van die
oorsaak van sy dood, ‘n skietwond.
MNR
VAN DEN BERG
: Soos die hof behaag.
HOF
: Mnr
Carter, bevestig u dit?
BESKULDIGDE
2
: Ja, Edele.
HOF
: Dat
beide oorledenes dood is as gevolg van skietwonde wat hulle by die
mynskag opgedoen het.
BESKULDIGDE
2
: Ja, Edele.’
[22] The
prosecutor accepted the appellant’s pleas. In a short judgment
Strydom J concluded that the court was satisfied that the
appellant
had admitted all the elements of the offences to which he had pleaded
guilty. He duly convicted the appellant on counts
1, 3 and 4.
Thereafter the trial was apparently postponed until 5 March 1996.
[23] At
the resumed hearing evidence was led in support of the appropriate
sentences. The appellant had in the interim been interviewed
by Ms
Havenga, a psychologist, and Ms Van Heerden, a social worker. Both
prepared reports which were placed before the court. The
reports have
not been included in the record on appeal, but in passing sentence
Strydom J made the following references to their
contents:
‘
Aan
mev. Van Heerden het hy die volgende weergawe gegee. Jy en Blom het
om ongeveer agtuur begin drink. Deur die loop van die dag
het julle
ongeveer twee liters brandewyn gedrink. Toe julle drank opgeraak het
is julle na Mthembu se huis waar julle verder gedrink
het. Ten einde
nog drank te bekom is julle na eerste oorledene se woonstel waarna
die grusame dade soos in die klagstaat verskyn,
gevolg het.
Aan
mev. Havenga het jy vertel dat jy en Blom baie op die betrokke dag
gedrink het. In die vroeë aand het julle voortgegaan
om te drink
totdat julle drank opgeraak het en julle onder die invloed van drank
was. Julle wou verder drink, maar julle het nie
geld gehad om nog
drank te koop nie.
Blom
het toe voorgestel dat julle na Mthembu gaan, Mthembu het ‘n
sjebeen gehad. Mthembu het egter nie meer drank oorgehad nie.
Hy het
gesê dat hy weet waar julle nog drank en geld sou kon kry. Hy
het verwys na die eienaar van ‘n drankwinkel. Blom het
voorgestel
dat julle polisie uniforms moes aantrek, aangesien Tsholo, die
bestuurder van die drankwinkel, dan die deur van die drankwinkel
makliker sou oopmaak. Al drie van julle het polisie uniforms
aangetrek. Selfs ‘n nie-lid word ‘n uniform voorsien, ‘n
duidelike
teken van sluwe beplanning aan julle kant.
Daarna
het julle na Tsholo se woonstel gegaan en hom aangesê om julle
na sy drankwinkel te vergesel waar julle drank wou kry.
Tsholo het
geweier om julle te vergesel, waarna julle hom forseer het om met
julle saam te loop. Volgens jou het alles begin skeef
loop toe julle
in die drankwinkel was, julle het drank begin versamel. Tsholo wou
betaling vir die drank hê. Blom het hom egter
geforseer om sy
brandkluis oop te sluit. Die kluis is oopgesluit en Blom het al die
geld daaruit geneem.
Toe
julle die drankwinkel verlaat het, het ‘n nagwag, Ntamgini, op die
toneel aangekom. Mthembu het hom forseer om julle na julle
motor te
vergesel. Julle het vir Tsholo en Ntamgini in die voertuig laat klim
en julle het na jou halfbroer se plaas gery waar julle
weer gedrink
het. Tsholo wil huis toe gaan en het aan julle gesê dat hy
beoog om na die polisie toe te gaan. Blom het kwaad
geword en Tsholo
aangerand. Jy en Mthembu het hom ook aangerand. Volgens jou het julle
Tsholo en Ntamgini geslaan totdat hulle amper
dood was.
Na
die aanranding het julle die tweestuks geforseer om hulle klere uit
te trek, behalwe vir hulle onderklere. Hulle is na die voertuig
geneem. Julle het reguit na die Eleton myn gery. Daar was oop skagte
by die myn. Julle het by ‘n oop skag stilgehou. Mthembu het
Tsholo
en Ntamgini in die rigting van ‘n oop skag gedruk waar Blom en
Mthembu die twee mans geskiet het en hulle in die skag ingeval
het.
Jy en Blom is daarna terug na die plaashuis waar julle verder gedrink
het. Dit was nog nie die einde nie. Die volgende dag is
jy en Blom
terug na die skag waar julle dit toegegooi het.
Uit
voormelde is dit duidelik dat die oorledene van kant gemaak is sodat
hulle nie teen julle sou kon getuig ten aansien van die
gebeure in
Tsholo se woonstel en in die drankwinkel nie, en dit in omstandighede
waar julle bloot net nog drank en geld vir drank
wou bekom. Geeneen
van die oorledenes het julle enige kwaad aangedoen nie, maar moes met
hulle lewens boet, om sodoende te verhoed
dat julle aan die man
gebring word.’
[24] The
appellant did not give evidence at any stage of the trial. Although
he filed extensive affidavits in the condonation application
he did
not address the prospects of success in the appeal more than
superficially. In particular, he did not attempt to set up any
version which would provide an innocent answer to any of the charges.
Nor did he in his affidavits (or indeed at the trial) take
issue with
or cast doubt on the accuracy of the statements attributed to him by
the expert witnesses.
[25] Both
counsel argued the appeal without reference to or reliance on the
evidence of Havenga and Van Heerden. Defence counsel adopted
the
approach that if the plea explanation fell short of the required
standard the appeal had necessarily to succeed. The only question
which remained, she submitted, was whether it was appropriate to
apply the provisions of s 312 of the CPA and remit the matter to
the
trial court or to set aside the conviction and permit the Director of
Public Prosecutions to charge the appellant afresh if he
thinks fit.
She opted for the last-mentioned as the right course to follow
relying on, among other aspects, the death of both the
original trial
judge and the investigating officer, the virtual concession by the
prosecutor that evidence to prove a case against
the appellant is no
longer available, and the unfairness of continuing to pursue an
accused who has stood in jeopardy for some 14
years since the events
which gave rise to the charge. The co-accused Blom has also departed
the scene. Counsel for the State, by
contrast, cast the whole weight
of his resistance to the appeal on a submission that the plea
explanation was substantially sufficient
to provide the statutory
assurance. He pressed, in the alternative, for a remittal but did not
suggest how that was to take place
in the absence of Strydom J.
The
sufficiency of the plea statement
.
[26] Despite
the submissions of counsel for the State it seems clear to me that
the statement falls materially short of what is necessary
to underpin
the elements of the charges and thereby to satisfy the presiding
judge that the appellant was guilty of the offences.
The statement
should have made clear the extent of the appellant’s participation
in all of the offences but it did not. The result
is that it contains
no facts sufficient to disclose common purpose in the planning of the
offences or, in so far as any of the offences
were not preceded by
agreement (expressly or by necessary implication) as to the scope of
the common purpose it contains no facts
which associate the appellant
by his own conduct with the criminal acts of his co-accused.
[27] The
appellant’s counsel also submitted that the purported plea of
guilty to count 1 is in fact supported by a statement which
relates
to count 2 (to which he pleaded not guilty). That may be so, although
the inference is by no means certain. Count 1 was so
broadly framed
as to apply equally to facts that properly related to count 2. In so
far as
doubt may have arisen
concerning the scope of the intended admission the trial judge should
have asked appropriate questions to clarify
the uncertainty.
Was
there ‘a failure of justice’
?
[28] The
shortcomings in compliance with the terms of s 112(1)(b) and 112(2)
are however not, as counsel supposed, decisive of this
appeal.
Section 322(1) of the CPA confers wide powers on a court on appeal,
but they are qualified:
‘
Provided
that notwithstanding that the Court of Appeal is of opinion that any
point raised might be decided in favour of the accused,
no conviction
or sentence shall be set aside or altered by reason of any
irregularity or defect in the record or proceedings, unless
it
appears to the Court of Appeal that a failure of justice has in fact
resulted from such irregularity or defect.’
The
meaning of ‘a failure of justice’
.
[29] The
terms of the proviso which now exists in s 322(1) of the CPA were
first introduced by an amendment to s 374 of the Criminal
Procedure
Act 31 of 1917 by s 70 of Act 46 of 1935. Its meaning and operation
have frequently been considered since then. The effect
of the
amendment arose for consideration in
R v Rose
1937 AD 467.
At
476 De Wet JA said
‘
The
proviso in our section is the converse of that in the English
section, the proviso operates unless the Court is satisfied that
there has in fact been a failure of justice. If a test analogous to
the House of Lords test is to be applied here, it seems to me
that
the result would be that the conviction is to be affirmed unless the
Court is satisfied that without the irregularity of defect,
the jury
would have acquitted. This test might be in accord with the popular
meaning of the words “failure of justice”
viz
: that an
innocent man has been convicted or that a guilty man has escaped
conviction. But the consequences of giving such a meaning
to the
words are startling. Irregularities could take place in the course of
the trial and inadmissible evidence could be admitted
and yet the
conviction would stand unless the accused could satisfy the Court of
Appeal by reasoning from the record that but for
the irregularity he
would have been acquitted. In view of the whole policy of our
criminal law, I do not think the legislature could
by this amendment
have intended to throw such an
onus
on the accused. If follows
therefore that some other meaning must be given to the words “failure
of justice.”
It
was suggested that the meaning of the proviso was that if, apart from
the irregularity, there was evidence on which a jury could
convict,
then there was no failure of justice and the conviction should not be
set aside. This test, however, is also unsatisfactory
for here again
the Court of Appeal is not in a position to determine the credibility
of the witnesses. The jury may have discarded
what seems clear
evidence against the accused and may have decided to convict on some
inadmissible evidence.
If
we turn to the Dutch version of the words “failure of justice” we
find it is “rechtschending.” This could more correctly
be
rendered “violation of justice,” i.e., the justice due to the
accused. Now the term justice is not limited in meaning to the
notion
of retribution for the wrongdoer: it also connotes that the wrongdoer
should be fairly tried in accordance with the principles
of the law.
This would not mean that every provision of the law should have been
rigidly and precisely observed but that the accused
has not been
substantially prejudiced by non-observance of such provisions. In
other words we come back to the conception of prejudice
to the
accused. It is unnecessary and indeed impossible to attempt to
prescribe the actual limits of such prejudice: the idea is
well known
and its application depends on all the facts and circumstances of
each particular case. I come therefore to the conclusion
that the
meaning of the amendment is that the Court, before setting aside the
conviction, must be satisfied that there has been actual
and
substantial prejudice to the accused.’
[30] In
R v Piek
1958 (2) SA 491
(A) at 497 Ogilvie Thompson JA said
‘
Once
a material irregularity in the proceedings is established, this Court
must allow the appeal unless it is satisfied that no “failure
of
justice has, in fact, resulted from such irregularity” (
vide
proviso to sec. 369 (1) of the Code). In order to be so
satisfied, it must appear to this Court that a reasonable court,
properly
directed, would “inevitably” or “without doubt” have
convicted (
Rex v. Koortz
,
1953 (1) S.A. 371
(A.D.) at p. 380,
and
Rex v. Pethla
,
1956 (4) S.A. 605
(A.D.) at p.612). As was
again pointed out in
Pethla’s
case,
supra
, the
enquiry in such cases relates, not to what the particular trial court
would have decided had the irregularity not been committed,
but to
“
what
a reasonable trial court, properly directed and unaffected by any
irregularity, would have decided”
(per
TINDALL J.A., in
Rex v Patel
,
1946 A.D. 903
at p. 908). It
must however, not be overlooked that, although this enquiry relates
to a notional trial court, the findings of fact,
including findings
on demeanour, made by the actual trial court are not necessarily
wholly disregarded by this Court. As TINDALL,
J.A., put it in
Patel’s
case,
supra
, at p.909
“
But
while the Appeal Court considers the problem as generalized in the
way I have indicated, this does not mean that it pays no regard
to
any findings of fact, including findings on demeanour, in the
judgment appealed from. The appeal Court has regard to the
possibility
that the irregularity may have affected the findings,
but, making allowance for such a possibility, it gives due weight to
those
findings.”
In
the practical application of this principle a great deal must
manifestly depend upon the nature of the particular irregularity
under consideration. It is possible to conceive of irregularities
which must greatly weaken, if not entirely invalidate, the trial
court’s findings of fact.’
[31] In
S v Mushimba en Andere
1977 (2) SA 829
(A) at 844G Rumpff JA
emphasised the role of public policy in the determination of whether
a failure of justice has occurred:
‘
Die
Strafprosesordonnansie vereis dat indien daar ‘n onreëlmatigheid
plaasgevind het, ‘n skuldigbevinding alleen dan tersyde
gestel kan
word indien geregtigheid inderdaad nie geskied het nie. Die
“geregtigheid” waarna hier verwys word, is nie ‘n begrip
wat
veronderstel dat die beskuldigde noodwendig onskuldig is nie.
Geregtigheid wat geskied het in hierdie sin is die resultaat wat
‘n
bepaalde eienskap van verrigtinge aandui. Die eienskap toon aan dat
aan vereistes wat grondbeginsels van reg en regverdigheid
aan die
verrigtinge stel, voldoen is. Die vraag of onreëlmatige of met
die reg strydige verrigtinge in verband met ‘n verhoor
van ‘n
beskuldigde van so ‘n aard is dat dit gesê kan word dat van
daardie grondbeginsels nie nagekom is nie, en geregtigheid
dus nie
geskied het nie, sal afhang van die omstandighede van elke geval en
sal altyd ‘n oorweging van publieke beleid vereis.’
[32] More
recently, in
S v Jaipaul
[2005] ZACC 1
;
2005 (4) SA 581
(CC) (at para 39),
Van der Westhuizen J placed the matter in a constitutional context:
‘
In
terms of s 322(1) the Court of appeal may allow the appeal if it
thinks that the judgment of the trial court should be set aside
on
the grounds of a wrong decision of any question of law or that on any
ground there was a “failure of justice”. Therefore a
failure of
justice must indeed have resulted from the irregularity for the
conviction and sentence to be set aside. In construing
when an
irregularity has led to a failure of justice, regard must be had to
the constitutional right of an accused person to a fair
trial. If an
irregularity has resulted in an unfair trial, that will constitute a
failure of justice as contemplated by the section
and any conviction
will have to be set aside. Whether a new trial may be commenced
against the accused will also require a constitutional
assessment of
whether that would be a breach of the right to a fair trial or not.
The meaning of the concept of a failure of justice
in s 322(1) must
therefore now be understood to raise the question of whether the
irregularity has led to an unfair trial.’
The
importance of context
[33] We
are concerned only with the application of the proviso to s 322(1) in
the context of compliance or non-compliance with the
terms of s
112(2). Irregularities committed in the application of the
last-mentioned section, while not
sui generis
, have
consequences peculiar to that section. Section 312 provides
‘
(1) Where
a conviction and sentence under section 112 are set aside on review
or appeal on the ground that any provision of subsection
(1)(
b
)
or subsection (2) of that section was not complied with, or on the
ground that the provisions of section 113 should have been applied,
the court in question shall remit the case to the court by which the
sentence was imposed and direct that court to comply with the
provision in question or to act in terms of section 113, as the case
may be.
(2) When
the provision referred to in subsection (1) is complied with and the
judicial officer is after such compliance not satisfied
as is
required by section 112(1)(
b
) or 112(2), he shall enter a plea
of not guilty whereupon the provisions of section 113 shall apply
with reference to the matter.’
In
terms of s 113,
‘
(1)
If the court at any stage of the proceedings under section 112(1)(
a
)
or (
b
) or 112(2) and before sentence is passed is in doubt
whether the accused is in law guilty of the offence to which he or
she has pleaded
guilty or if it is alleged or appears to the court
that the accused does not admit an allegation in the charge or that
the accused
has incorrectly admitted any such allegation or that the
accused has a valid defence to the charge or if the court is of the
opinion
for any other reason that the accused’s plea of guilty
should not stand, the court shall record a plea of not guilty and
require
the prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution: Provided that
any allegation, other than an allegation referred to above, admitted
by the accused up to the stage at which the court records a plea of
not guilty, shall stand as proof in any court of such allegation.’
It
is apparent that the legislature has determined that if a conviction
is set aside on appeal and a remittal follows, the accused
does not
plead again; the case is remitted to enable the trial court to deal
with the existing plea of guilty on the basis laid down
in s 112(2).
Nor does the remittal enable the accused to disavow those factual
admissions which he has properly made during the original
proceedings.
[34] Is
there any reason why the fair trial test should require the
conviction and sentencing proceedings to be compartmentalized?
There
may be situations where such a separation is inherent in the notion
of a fair trial, eg when the plea is one of not guilty
and an element
of the offence is proved for the first time during the course of
sentencing. There is however a difference in principle
once an
accused pleads guilty. He thereby indicates that he no longer takes
issue with the prosecution and does not require proof
by it of any of
the elements of the offence. Sections 112(1)(b) and 112(2) are not
concerned with
proof
; there is no question of discharge of an
onus. In order to protect an accused the judicial officer must
satisfy himself, by questioning
the accused if necessary, that the
accused in fact admits the elements of the charge and is therefore
guilty of the offence. Fairness
in the judicial process is a matter
of substance not technicality or procedure (though both may bear on
substance). I see no reason
why any evidence fairly adduced after
conviction but still within the confines of the same trial should not
be used to provide or
strengthen the assurance which s 112(1)(b) and
s 112(2) are designed to provide. As s 113 demonstrates, the
legislature has expressly
provided that if it appears to the court at
any time before sentence is imposed following on a plea of guilty
that there is doubt
as to whether an accused is guilty, the court
must enter a plea of not guilty. That provision is in itself an
example of how fairness
of the conviction is not circumscribed by the
proceedings before conviction.
The
determination of whether a failure of justice has occurred
.
[35] Each
case must be determined according to its own circumstances and in its
own context. In the present instance the following
questions may
assist in arriving at an answer:
(i) Could
the trial court reasonably have been satisfied that the appellant in
fact admitted all the elements of the crimes to which
he had pleaded
guilty and was guilty of those crimes?
(ii) The
appellant was represented by counsel in the proceedings. Did that
conduce to the fairness of the trial?
(iii) Was
the statement made by the appellant in explanation of his pleas
prima
facie
in conflict with those pleas in any respect?
(iv) Were
there shortcomings in the statement?
(v) How
material were such conflicts or shortcomings as existed?
(vi) Was
there evidence led at any stage of the trial which was not contested
by the appellant which had the effect of supplementing
the plea
explanation?
(vii) If
the conviction were to be set aside and the case remitted, as
contemplated in s 312, could anything be gained by such remittal?
(This is really the reverse side of the question posed in the
authorities cited above: Would the result inevitably have been the
same if Strydom J had put the questions which the vagueness in the
plea explanation demanded?)
[36] I
emphase that this is not a case where there is a danger that the
accused was attempting to gild the lily in order to improve
his
sentencing prospects. The statements that he made to the expert
witnesses were wholly against his interest and, apparently, candid.
Nor does it matter that we do not have his exact words or the precise
context of their utterance but are obliged to receive them
at third
hand. The appellant had the opportunity in the sentencing proceedings
to disavow, rebut or cast doubt on the substance of
their evidence.
He did not do so.
The
application of the law to the facts
[37] The
appellant was represented by a counsel experienced in matters of
criminal procedure (as appears from the affidavits in the
condonation
application). One may fairly accept from the plea statement that he
went to some trouble to explain to the appellant
what was involved in
the charges. The judge was careful to obtain the appellant’s
confirmation of what was attributed to him by
his counsel. The
superficial nature of counsel’s preparation is however suggested by
his readiness to admit the causes of death
without appreciating that
they had been unascertainable on post-mortem examination.
[38] There
were no material conflicts between the statement and the pleas. The
facts set out were consistent with the guilt of the
appellant.
Nevertheless there were certain areas which were not addressed or
which were superficially dealt with: whether the robbery
was planned
or developed spontaneously; whether the robbery was facilitated by
the use of firearms; whether the appellant shared
a common purpose to
rob with his co-accused; whether, in so far as the robbery was not
planned the appellant committed any act in
furtherance of the common
purpose to rob; whether there was a common purpose to murder; whether
the murders were pre-planned and,
if not, whether the appellant
committed any act in furtherance of the common purpose. These were
all material matters about which
the trial judge had to be satisfied
before the court could convict the appellant on his pleas of guilty.
Although they were absent
from the plea explanation the learned judge
asked no questions to elucidate such matters as was properly required
of him by s 112(2).
[39] Were
these lacunae closed by the statements made to Havenga and Van
Heerden which are summarized in the judgment on sentence?
I think
they were. The accused went together to the bottle store in order to
obtain further supplies of liquor, knowing that they
had no money to
purchase any and intending to procure entry by passing themselves off
as policemen. We know from the plea statement
that Blom and Mthembu
carried firearms. The only reasonable inference is that they intended
to obtain entrance by threats or force.
There is clear evidence of a
common purpose to rob using firearms if necessary. When Tsholo
refused to accompany them to the store
they forced him to do so.
(This seems to clear up any doubt as to whether the appellant
intended to plead guilty to count 1.) While
they were helping
themselves to the liquor he demanded payment. Blom then forced him to
open the safe and removed all the cash that
it held. The accused left
the bottle store together. When Ntamgini came inconveniently on the
scene Mthembu forced him to accompany
them to the vehicle. All the
accused compelled Tsholo and Ntamgini to enter the vehicle. They
drove to the farm of the appellant’s
half-brother where they drank.
When Tsholo wanted to leave all the accused beat him and Ntamgini
severely, forced them to undress
and took them to the vehicle. At the
mine shaft Blom and Mthembu shot the deceased who fell into the
shaft. The appellant and Blom
returned to the farm to drink. The
following day Blom and the appellant made an attempt to cover the
bodies by throwing stones down
the shaft.
[40] From
all this certain conclusions are either explicit or are the only
reasonable inferences. All three accused participated in
a plan that
involved procuring entry to the bottle store by violence or threats
and stealing liquor and cash. There was a clear common
purpose to rob
in which the appellant foresaw that firearms might be used, but
nevertheless associated himself with the enterprise.
All three
forcefully abducted Ntamgini and Tsholo. They grievously assaulted
both. They joined in carrying them off to the mine shaft.
Both Blom
and Mthembu were still in possession of firearms. From the tenor of
his statement the appellant was either a direct participant
or in
close proximity at all material times. Although he did not assist in
the actual shooting of the deceased his actions before
and after the
event were consistent only with a shared intention to do away with
them and to conceal the crime.
[41] The
appellant furnished no explanation or excuse which was consistent
with a desire to distance himself from the actions of his
co-accused
either during the events or at the trial when the opportunity was
available to him. To the extent that it cannot be said
that a prior
agreement to murder was proved, all the elements identified in
S v
Mgedezi
1989 (1) SA 687
(A) at 705I were present in the
statements which emanated from the appellant during the trial. If
Strydom J had probed the plea explanation
the full story would
certainly have emerged. The appellant has never suggested otherwise
although the opportunity was open to him
during the preparation of
the condonation affidavits (in the context of a reasonable prospect
of success in the appeal). The evidence
not only shows that the
original conviction was correct in substance but emphasizes the
futility in setting aside the conviction
and entering again upon the
s 112(2) procedure.
[42] I
am in the circumstances far from being persuaded that the
irregularities which resulted in non-compliance with the terms of
s
112(2) resulted in a failure of justice.
In
the result this Court has no power to set aside the conviction and
the appeal must fail. The appeal is dismissed.
__________________
J A HEHER
JUDGE OF APPEAL
MTHIYANE
JA )Concur
MLAMBO
JA )