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[2012] ZAGPPHC 94
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Mendelow NO and Another v Master of the High Court Pretoria and Others (75130/2009) [2012] ZAGPPHC 94 (6 June 2012)
REPORTABLE
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTH
GAUTENG, PRETORIA)
CASE
NO: 75130/2009
DATE:06/06/2012
In
the matter between:
MENDELOW,
RONALD
N.O.
........................................................................
FIRST
APPLICANT
LEDWABA,
LAZARUS
N.O.
....................................................................
SECOND
APPLICANT
And
THE
MASTER OF THE
HIGH
.................................................................
FIRST
RESPONDENT
COURT
PRETORIA
THE
MASTER OF THE
HIGH
............................................................
SECOND
RESPONDENT
COURT
JOHANNESBURG
THE
REGISTRAR OF
DEEDS
...............................................................
THIRD
RESPONDENT
PRETORIA
VAN
DEN HEEVER,
THEODORE
.........................................................
FOURT
RESPONDENT
WILHELM
N.O
KEEVEY KAREN
N.O.
.............................................................................
FIFTH
RESPONDENT
IMPERIAL
BANK
LIMITED
......................................................................
SIXTH
RESPONDENT
CRONIN,
PATRICK
HENRY
..............................................................
SEVENTH
RESPONDENT
VALENTE,
RICCARDO
ROSSER
........................................................
EIGHTH
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
BAQWA
A.J
The
Application
[1]
This is an application in which the applicants seek an order in the
following terms:
1.1
The first respondent's certificate issued on 30 August 2001, in terms
of
section 42(2)
of the
Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965
as
amended, by which the first respondent endorsed a power of attorney
dated 24 July 2001, signed by the seventh and eighth respondents
in
their then capacities as the joint executors of the estate of the
late Emily May Valente authorising the transfer of the immovable
property described as Portion 104 (a portion of Portion 65) of the
Farm Rietfontein 2 registration division I.R. Province of Gauteng
measuring 1,2111 (one comma two one one one) hectares held under Deed
of Transfer No. T120046/2001 dated 25 October 2001 (herein
referred
to as "the property") from the estate of the late Emily May
Valente to U Valente Africa (Pty) Limited, (now
in liquidation) is
hereby set aside;
1.2.The
transfer of the property by the former executors in the estate of the
late Emily May Valente to U Valente Africa (Pty) Limited
(now in
liquidation) under deed of transfer No. T120046/2001 be and is hereby
set aside;
1.3.
The said property is hereby ordered to revert to the estate of
the
late Emily May Valente held under Deed of Transfer No.
T71702/1991 for due administration by the first and second applicants
in
accordance with the provisions of the
Administration of Estates
Act No. 66 of 1965
as amended;
1.4.
The third respondent be and is hereby ordered and directed:-
1.4.1.to
cancel the Deed of Transfer No. T120046/2001;
1.4.2.
to transfer the property into the estate of the late Emily May
Valente, estate number 6348/2001.
1.5.
The fourth and fifth respondents, and in so far as the sixth
respondent may have possession of the current Title Deed, the
sixth
respondent, be and are hereby ordered to surrender the Deed of
Transfer No. T120046/2001 dated 25 October 2001 to the
applicants'
attorney, alternatively directly to the third
respondent for due cancellation;
1.6.
In the event of the fourth and fifth and/or the sixth respondent not
surrending the said Deed of Transfer No. T120046/2001,
the third
respondent be and is hereby ordered and directed to cancel the said
Deed and Transfer the property as stipulated in paragraphs!
4.1 and
1.4.2 of this order;
1.7.The
third respondent to cancel the first mortgage bond registered against
the title deeds of the property in favour of the sixth
respondent;
1.8.
The eighth respondent be ordered to pay the costs of these
proceedings on the scale as between an attorney and his own client;
1.9.
The sixth respondent to pay the costs of these proceedings jointly
and severally with the eighth respondent, which liability
shall be
limited to the amount of the taxed party and party costs pertaining
to these proceedings;
HO.The
applicants are hereby authorised to procure payment of the costs
payable by the eighth respondent by appropriating the amount
of such
costs from the cash resources of the estate of the late Emily May
Valente and allocating such appropriation to that portion
of the
estate of the late Emily May Valente which, but for the provisions of
paragrapgh 6 of the Last Will and Testament of the
late Emily May
Valente signed on 23 March 1994, would have vested in and become
payable to the eighth respondent;
1.11.To
the extent necessary any non compliance with the period of 180 days
set out in
section 7(1)
of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act 3 of 2000
in terms of
section 7(2)
of such Act is hereby
considered.
Parties
[2]
The applicants are attorneys practising as such in Johannesburg and
Pretoria, respectively who bring this application in their
representative capacities as joint executors of the deceased estate
of the late Emily May Valente estate number 6348/01.
[3]
The first and second respondents are the Masters of the High Court
Pretoria and Johannesburg.
[4]
The third respondent is the Registrar of Deeds, Pretoria.
[5]
The fourth and fifth respondents are insolvency practitioners who are
cited in their capacities as joint liquidators of U Valente
Africa
(Pty) Limited (in liquidation) ("the company").
[6]
The sixth respondent is Imperial Bank Limited("lmperial").
[7]
The seventh respondent is a practicing attorney, a former executor in
the estate currently administered by the applicants herein.
[8]
The eighth respondent is Ricardo Rosser Valente who is also a former
executor in the estate.
[9]
The applicants seek no order for costs against the first six
respondents nor is a costs order sought against the seventh
respondent
save in the event that an of those respondents oppose
these proceedings in which event the applicants seek an order for
costs occasioned
by such opposition.
Background
[10]
The background of this matter can be summarised as follows:
10.1.The
applicants are the executors in the estate of the late Emily May
Valente, appointed as such on 24 November 2009.
10.2.
Emily May Valente ("the deceased') died on 30 January 2001
having a codicil bequeathing a legacy of R15 000.00 to each
of seven
grand children and a will in terms of which she bequeathed the
residue of her estate, in shares to her two sons, Ricardo
Rosser
Valente ("the eight respondent") and Evan Rosser Valente
("Evan")
10.3.
In terms of her will the deceased nominated the seventh respondent
("Cronin") the eight respondent and Evan as the
executors
in her estate. Evan declined the appointment.
10.4.
The eighth respondent and Cronin were appointed as executors on
10July 2001.
10.5.
During their term as executors eighth respondent engaged in a series
of acts of dishonesty pertaining to the administration
of the estate.
This led to the resignation of Cronin on 28 May 2007 due to the
compromising position in which he found himself.
10.6.
A further consequence was the removal of the eighth respondent as the
remaining executor by the first respondent ("the
Master").
[11
] The relief sought by the applicants falls into three broad
categories:
11.1.
The applicants seek the review and setting aside of the certificate
issued by the Mater in terms of Section 42(2) of the Administration
of Estate Act which made possible the transfer of the property to the
company. They also seek the setting aside of the transfer
which is a
relief sought at administrative law.
11.2.
Further, the applicants seek the return of property to the estate by
means of a transfer back. This relief is sought both
at
administrative law and also by way of condictio but the applicants
have abandoned the latter during the cause of these proceedings.
11.3.
Lastly, the applicants seek to have the first mortgage bond
registered over the property, in favour of the sixth respondent
cancelled.
[12]
Only the sixth respondent filed an answering affidavit in opposition
to this application.
[13]
Initially, the sixth respondent raised four grounds as a basis for
its opposition:
13.1.
Its contention was that the applicants have chosen "the wrong
victim" and that any claim they have should be more
properly
pursued against the eighth respondent.
13.2.
The sixth respondent also contended that Evan had waived his claim to
acquire real rights in the property.
13.3.
The third contention was that the claims vesting in Evan and in the
estate had been extinguished by prescription.
13.4.
Fourthly, the sixth respondent raised estoppel based upon
representations made by Evan, relied upon by the sixth respondent.
[14]
During the cause of the proceedings counsel for the sixth respondent,
Mr Wasserman S.C indicated that sixth respondent would
no longer be
relying on waiver and prescription as grounds on which sixth
respondent bases its opposition.
[15]
The applicant's claim is premised on the exercise by the master of
his powers in terms of Section 42(2) of the Act based on
a material
misrepresentation which can be summarised as follows:
15.1.
Eighth respondent forged his late mother's signature approximately
seven days prior to her passing away on an agreement of
sale in terms
of which the property was disposed of to the company.
15.2.
He forged the signature of his brother and co-heir, Evan on a
document entitled "consent to sale" and presented
the
consent to sale to the first respondent ("the master") with
the intention of inducing the master to endorse the power
of attorney
to transfer in terms of section 42(2) of the Act.
[16]
Applicants contend that the transfer in question was procured
pursuant to a fraudulent scheme by the eighth respondent with
the
objective of misappropriating the property from the deceased estate
for his own benefit and profit.
[17]
It is applicants' further contention that had it not been for the
alleged fraud, the property would have remained an asset
in the
deceased estate and would have been distributed, alternatively
realised and the proceeds thereof distributed in accordance
with the
will of the deceased.
[18]
The sixth respondent does not contest the contention advanced on
behalf of the applicants (and supported by Evan) to the effect
that
the signature on the "consent to sale" is a forgery.
[19]
The application is therefore premised on a review in terms of Section
6 and 7 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
3 of 2000
(PAJA)
Section
7 provides as follows:
"7
Procedure for judicial review.
(1)
Any proceedings for judicial review in terms of Section 6(1) must be
instituted without unreasonable delay and not later than
180 days
after the date-fa) Subject to subsection 2(c), on which any
proceedings instituted in terms of internal remedies as contemplated
in subsection(2)(a) have been concluded; or
(b)Where
no such remedies exist, on which the person concerned was informed of
the administrative action, became aware of the action
and the reasons
for it or ought reasonably have been expected to have become aware of
the action and the reasons."
[20]
The thrust of sixth respondent's submission is premised on the view
that this application has been instigated and in all probability
funded by Evan. It suggests that this is therefore not a genuine
application and that Evan is the real applicant. This submission
is a
rather unusual one to say the least because it pre-supposes that the
court could weigh considerations pertaining a party nor
cited in the
proceedings, ignore the applicants and virtually treat them as
non-participants in these proceedings.
Even
though Evan has filed a detailed affidavit in support of the
applicant's action, I am not persuaded that elevating him to an
applicant in the rather unorthodox manner suggested would be the
proper thing to do both in fact and in law.
It
is common cause that Evan is a beneficiary in the estate which the
applicants have been appointed to administer and it would
be
accordingly inappropriate to treat him otherwise in these
proceedings.
[21]
It is common cause that Evan became suspicious regarding eighth
respondent's dishonesty in his actions regarding the estate
in 2005.
He did not take any action as he would have been entitled to do in
terms of PAJA.
The
sixth respondent's submission would therefore have the effect of
impugning the present action, if Evan was the applicant, as
being
non-compliant with the provisions of section 7 (supra) in that it
would be seen as being unreasonable or outside the 180
day period
prescribed in that section. If that reasoning is accepted, the
further submission is that such non compliance should
not be
condoned.
[22]
On the other hand, the applicants were appointed on 24 November 2009
and about two weeks later, during December 2009, they
brought this
application.
22.1.
Applicants submit that time was of the essence because despite advice
from the applicant's attorney to the fourth respondent
of an
intention to bring these review proceedings to procure the
cancellation of the transfer of the property to the company, the
fourth respondent persisted in his intention to offer the property
for sale by public auction as soon as possible, which he advised
applicants' attorney was the sixth respondent's instruction to him.
22.2.
Applicants further submit that their actions were not driven by Evan
as the relief they seek is not just focused on the property
but on
the estate. It is common cause that there are seven other
beneficiaries in the estate, namely the grandchildren and the
applicants submit that if there are no other liquid assets in the
estate they would have to sell the property in order to ensure
that
what was bequeathed to the other beneficiaries is properly
distributed.
22.3.Applicants
submit that in 2005 Evan had a suspicion about his brother Ricardo
(eighth respondent) dishonesty but no proof.
They submit that it was
only in march 2007 after reviewing the Liquidation and Distribution
Accounts presented by eighth respondent
that he realised that the
sale of the property to the company was effected in a fraudulent
manner. He then instituted winding up
proceedings of the company.
22.4.
Shortly after the institution of the winding up proceedings on 22 May
of 2007 Evan's attorney had received a letter from seventh
respondent
indicating beyond any doubt that the consent purportedly signed by
Evan had been forged. First respondent had exercised
his powers in
terms of Section 42(2) of Act relying on a forged consent which
constituted a material fraudulent misrepresentation.
22.5.
According to the applicants therefore, Evan took action by way of
winding up action when he received proof of dishonesty.
The estate
could nor have taken action prior to the applicants' appointment in
November 2009 because the eighth respondent who
was both the
fraudster and executor was only removed as executor on 27 August
2009.
22.6.
Applicants submit that there was nothing inappropriate in Evan trying
to negotiate joint control of the company prior to receiving
proof of
dishonesty and that had he achieved joint control he would probably
have prevented subsequent actions by eighth respondent
where he
further fraudulently obtained loans using the property as security.
[23] Having considered the facts stated above, I am
not persuaded
that Evan ought to be elevated to the status of applicant in this
matter. I am of the view that the applicants are
properly before
court and that they have taken the only appropriate action available
to them. I am also of the further view that
their action was taken
timeously and in reasonable time and in compliance with section 7 of
PAJA. I find that it is not necessary
to impute whatever knowledge
Evan had to them because Evan is a beneficiary and not an executor in
the estate. Any delay in launching
these proceedings therefore ought
to be condoned.
Estoppel
[24]
The sixth respondent has also raised the defence of estoppel against
the applicants' claim. In doing saw sixth respondent states
that the
estate was always duly represented and that the replacement of the
executors should not be allowed to enure to the benefit
of the estate
at the expense of an innocent third party. Sixth respondent further
submits that the estate facilitated the transfer
of the property to
the company and that it was therefore entitled to assume that the
company was the owner of the property which
was duly authorised to
apply for finance and to cause a bond to be registered over its
property. Sixth respondent therefore submits
that the estate ought to
be estopped from pursuing these proceedings which seek to recover the
property and thereby prejudicing
an innocent third party.
[25]
The question is whether the estate was indeed duly represented at all
material times. In my view, it cannot be said to have
been duly
represented prior to the advent of the applicants. It is common cause
that eighth respondent was the fraudster and executor
at the same
time. He seemed to be hell bent to perpetrate a concatenation of
fraudulent acts from the moment he was appointed as
executor. The
question is whether the defence of estoppel be utilised to legitimise
a series of fraudulent acts. Eighth respondent
failed to disclose
that there was an application to wind-up the company even at the time
when he was being granted a loan and causing
a bond to be registered
over it's property.
[26]
It is instructive to examine this legal principle through the eyes of
his lordship Ponnan JA in the case of
City
of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v RPM Bricks (Pty) Ltd 2008(3)
SA 1 (SCA)
When
he stated the law as follows:
"When
deciding whether the doctrine of astoppel may be raised against a
statutory body, a distinction must be drawn between
(a) acts beyond
or in excess of the legal powers of a public authority; and (b) the
irregular or informal exercise of power granted.
The failure by a
statutory body to comply with the provisions which the legislature
has prescribed for the validity of a specified
transaction falls
within category (a) and cannot be remedied by estoppel because that
would give rise to a transaction which is
unlawful and therefore
ultra vires. This is to be distinguished from the failure by a
statutory body to comply with all the relevant
internal arrangements
and formalities which falls within category (b) and in respect of
which estoppel may be successfully invoked
(paragraphs [11]-[13] at
(5F-6A)"
[27]
It is quite clear from the facts of this case that we are dealing
with a series of unlawful acts which were perpetrated by
the eighth
respondent. He unlawfully caused first respondent to facilitate the
transfer of the property to the company in terms
of section 42(2) of
the Act. He thereafter used the same property to secure loans for his
own personal use and not for the benefit
of the company. It does not
seem proper to me to invoke estoppel to remedy these illegalities.
[28]
It is also significant that counsel for the sixth respondent Mr
Wasserman S.C, conceded that in his view applicants should
have been
allowed to succeed with a similar claim had it been brought in the
year 2001. By making that concession he was seeking
to underline his
attack on what he categorises as an unreasonable delay in bringing
this action at this time. That matter has already
addressed earlier
in this judgment. The point is, if the action should have succeeded
at an earlier time and the delay in bringing
the action in terms of
PAJA is condoned, then logically the claim should succeed.
[29]
Another point to be considered as submitted by counsel for the
applicants, Mr Cook S.C, is that no representation was made
by the
applicants- nor could any have been made - prior to the sixth
respondent advancing funds to the company. The estoppel defence
can
therefore not be upheld against them.
Cancellation
of the bond
[30]
Applicants seek cancellation of the bond over the property presently
registered in the name of the company. The events preceding
the
registration happened as follows:
30.1.
On 16 May 2007 Evan applied for the winding up of the company based
on eighth respondent's malfeasance.
30.2.
A provisional winding-up order was granted on 9 December 2008 and the
company was finally wound-up on 30 April 2009. Thus
in accordance
with section 348 of the old Companies Act, the winding -up commenced
on 16 May 2007.
30.3.
The first mortgage bond registered over the property in favour of the
sixth respondent was registered during October 2008.
30.4.
The registration of the bond was a disposition within the meaning of
section 341 of the old Companies Act. "Disposition"
has the
meaning assigned to it by section 2 of the Insolvency Act, 24 of 1936
(See Henochsburg on the Companies Act, 5th Ed. Vol.
1 p679) The
definition in section 2 includes a reference to mortgage.
[31]
In terms of section 341(2): "Every disposition of its property
(including rights of action) by any company being wound
up and unable
to pay its debts made after the commencement of the winding up, shall
be void unless the court otherwise order".
[32]
It is quite clear that the registration of a bond was a disposition
contemplated in section 341(2) and as such is void and
liable to be
set aside. The purpose of section 341(2) is to ensure that the
property of a company threatened with winding-up is
not improperly
dissipated prior to the commencement of the winding-up and is
available for the satisfaction of the claims of its
creditors on a
footing of equality of treatment subject only to any security or
preference which any of them may enjoy under the
Insolvency Act.
See
Lane No v Olivier Transport
1997 (1) SA 383
C at 385 Henochsberg on
the Companies Act (supra) at p676
Eighth
respondent was clearly dissipating the property in question to
benefit himself.
[33]
In considering this matter if is instructive to make reference to the
judgment of her ladyship, the Honourable Justice Mayat
during the
winding-up proceedings at the South Gauteng High Court in the matter
of
Evan
Rosser Valente v Valente Africa (Pty) Ltd and 2 Others Case No 115/07
(an unreported decision delivered on 30 April 2009).
In
that case the company was the first respondent whilst the eighth
respondent was the second respondent. Justice Mayat stated as
follows: respectfully agree with Acting Justice Epstein that a prima
facie case has been made out in the initial proceedings for
a
provisional winding-up of the first respondent As noted by the
learned Judge it was not disputed that the registration of the
BOE
bond constituted non-compliance with certain sections of the
Companies Act including section 234 read with section 235, as
well as
section 236 of the Companies Act Furthermore, the second respondent
did not obtain a resolution of the directors of the
first respondent
in terms of section 236 of the Companies Act. In addition it was not
disputed that the second respondent utilised
the proceeds of the loan
procured with the security of BOE bond to purchase another property
which was then sold at a profit by
his company Erf 332 Chloorkop
(Pty) Limited. Thus in breach of the second respondent's fiduciary
duties in terms of the Companies
Act the BOE bond was effectively
procured by the second respondent at the expense of the first
respondent entirely for the benefit
of Erf 332 Chloorkop (Pty)
Limited without any compensation to the first respondent and indeed
without also the knowledge of the
first respondent initially.
Thereafter
it became apparent in those proceedings, whilst the second respondent
had already procured the cancellation of the BOE
bond prior to the
hearing of the initial proceedings, he had simply repeated and indeed
exacerbated his fraudulent conduct by procuring
the Imperial Bond for
three times the amount of the BOE bond. The second respondent's
submission in these proceedings that only
a small portion of the R6
million secured by the Imperial bond did not mitigate his conduct,
particularly as it was not in dispute
in the initial proceedings that
the registration of the BOE bond was a contravention of the Companies
Act. In the same way it can
now hardly be disputed that the
circumstances relating to the registration of the Imperial bond,
which was ascertained by the applicant's
attorneys after the initial
proceedings, and which was similar to the circumstances pertaining to
the registration of the BOE bond
also constitute a contravention of
the Companies Act. Furthermore, as already indicated, the second
respondent's failure to disclose
the registration of the Imperial
bond to the applicant and to the court in the initial proceedings is
in my view fraudulent."
Quite
evidently the registration of a bond with sixth respondent was not
only unlawful in contravention of section 341(2) of the
Companies Act
but also a perpetuation of a fraudulent spree that the eighth
respondent had embarked on.
Conclusion
In
summary therefore I find that:
35.1.
The applicants have the necessary locus standi to bring this
application.
35.2.
The application for review is properly premised on PAJA and it falls
properly within the ambit of the provisions of PAJA.
To the extent
that it may not comply with those provisions, such non compliance is
condoned.
35.3.
The first respondent was improperly and unlawfully induced to
facilitate the transfer of the property by the fraudulent actions
of
the eighth respondent.
35.4.
But for the fraudulent actions of the eighth respondent the transfer
of the property from the estate to the company would
not have taken
place.
35.5.
The registration of the bond in favour of the sixth respondent at the
instance of the eighth respondent was both fraudulent
and in
contravention of inter alia section 341(2) of the Companies Act and
as such has to be set aside.
ORDER
[36]
In the result the following order is made:
I.
The first respondent's certificate issued on 30 August 2001, in terms
of
section 42(2)
of the
Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965
as
amended, by which the first respondent endorsed a power of attorney
dated 24 July 2001, signed by the seventh and eighth respondents
in
their then capacities as the joint executors of the estate of the
late Emily May Valente authorising the transfer of the immovable
property described as Portion 104 (a portion of Portion 65) of the
Farm Rietfontein 2 registration division I.R. Province of Gauteng
measuring 1,2111 (one comma two one one one) hectares held under Deed
of Transfer No. T120046/2001 dated 25 October 2001 (herein
referred
to as "the property") from the estate of the late Emily May
Valente to U Valente Africa (Pty) Limited, (now
in liquidation) is
hereby set aside;
2.The
transfer of the property by the former executors in the estate of the
late Emily May Valente to U Valente Africa (Pty) Limited
(now in
liquidation) under deed of transfer No. T120046/2001 be and is hereby
set aside;
3.The
said property is hereby ordered to revert to the estate of the late
Emily May Valente held under Deed of Transfer No. T71702/1991
for due
administration by the first and second applicants in accordance with
the provisions of the
Administration of Estates Act No. 66 of 1965
as
amended;
4.
The third respondent be and is hereby ordered and directed:-
4.1.
to cancel the Deed of Transfer No. T120046/2001;
4.2.
to transfer the property into the estate of the late Emily May
Valente, estate number 6348/2001.
5.The
fourth and fifth respondents, and in so far as the sixth respondent
may have possession of the current Title Deed, the sixth
respondent,
be and are hereby ordered to surrender the Deed of Transfer No.
T120046/2001 dated 25 October 2001 to the applicants'
attorney,
alternatively directly to the third respondent for due cancellation;
6.
In the event of the fourth and fifth and/or the sixth respondent not
surrending the said Deed of Transfer No. T120046/2001, the
third
respondent be and is hereby ordered and directed to cancel the said
Deed and Transfer the property as stipulated in paragraphs
4.4.1 and
4.4.2 of this order;
7.The
third respondent to cancel the first mortgage bond registered against
the title deeds of the property in favour of the sixth
respondent;
8.The
eighth respondent be ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings on
the scale as between an attorney and his own client;
9.The
sixth respondent to pay the costs of these proceedings jointly and
severally with the eighth respondent, which liability shall
be
limited to the amount of the taxed party and party costs pertaining
to these proceedings;
10.The
applicants are hereby authorised to procure payment of the costs
payable by the eighth respondent by appropriating the amount
of such
costs from the cash resources of the estate of the late Emily May
Valente and allocating such appropriation to that portion
of the
estate of the late Emily May Valente which, but for the provisions of
paragrapgh 6 of the Last Will and Testament of the
late Emily May
Valente signed on 23 March 1994, would have vested in and become
payable to the eighth respondent;
11.To
the extent necessary any non compliance with the period of 180 days
set out in
section 7(1)
of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act 3 of 2000
in terms of
section 7(2)
of such Act is hereby
condoned.
IT
IS SO ORDERED.
S.A.
M. Baqwa
Judge
of the Northern Gauteng High Court
Counsel
for the plaintiff: Adv. Cook S.C
Attorneys
for the plaintiff: G.B. Liebmann Behrmann &Co
Counsel
for the defendant: Adv. Wasserman S.C
Attorneys
for the defendant: Victor & Partners