Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Smith Mining Equipment (Pty) Ltd (A882/09) [2012] ZAGPPHC 67 (18 May 2012)

Customs and Excise Law

Brief Summary

Customs and Excise — Tariff classification — Appeal against customs duty determination — Dispute over classification of Kubota RTV 900 Utility Vehicle under competing tariff headings — Appellant classified vehicle under TH 8704.21.80, imposing 29% duty, while respondent contended for TH 8709.19, rendering it duty-free — Court a quo granted relief, setting aside appellant's determination — Main issue concerned the correct interpretation of tariff headings and the nature of the vehicle — Held: The classification of the vehicle under TH 8704.21.80 was upheld, as it was designed for the transport of goods, thus affirming the appellant's determination.

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[2012] ZAGPPHC 67
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Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Smith Mining Equipment (Pty) Ltd (A882/09) [2012] ZAGPPHC 67; 74 SATC 312 (18 May 2012)

NOT
REPORTABLE
IN
THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT. PRETORIA /ES
(REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA)
CASE
NO: A882/09
Court
a quo Case No: 16254/08
DATE:18/05/2012
IN
THE MATTER BETWEEN:
THE
COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH
AFRICAN
..........................................
APPELLANT
REVENUE
SERVICE
...............................................................
(Respondent
in the court a quo)
AND
SMITH
MINING EQUIPMENT (PTY)
LTD
..........................................................
RESPONDENT

.....................................................................................................
(Applicant
in the court a quo)
JUDGMENT
PRINSLOO.
J
[1]
The application heard by the court a quo constituted an "appeal"
in terms of section 47(9)(e) of the Customs and Excise
Act, 91 of
1964 ("the Act") against the determination made by the
appellant on 25 January 2007 in terms of section 47(9)(a)(i)(aa)
of
the Act in relation to the "general purpose" variant of the
Kubota RTV 900 Utility Vehicle ("the vehicle").
[2]
For illustrative purposes it is convenient to quote the relief sought
in the notice of motion before the court a quo:
"1.
The respondent's tariff determination of 25 January 2007 to the
effect that the Kubota RTV 900 Utility Vehicle ('the vehicle')

imported by the applicant must for duty purposes be classified under
Tariff Heading (TH') 8704.21.80 of part 1 of schedule no 1
to the
Customs and Excise Act no 91 of 1964 ('the Act') is set aside.
2.
It is declared, alternatively the respondent is ordered to issue a
new determination, that the vehicle must for duty purposes
be
classified under TH 8709.19 of part 1 of schedule no 1 to the Act."
[3]
In his judgment of 3 July 2009, the learned judge a quo granted the
relief sought with costs. As far as prayer 2 is concerned,
the
learned judge granted the declaratory relief and not the alternative
prayer for an order directing the appellant to issue a
new
determination.
[4]
On 1 December 2009, the learned judge a quo granted leave to appeal
to this full court. The appeal came before us on 11 April
2012.
[5]
The crux of the dispute concerns the correct classification of the
vehicle for customs duty purposes. The competing tariff headings
are
TH 8704.21.80 and TH 8709.19.
[6]
In terms of the appellant's determination, based on the first
mentioned tariff heading, the respondent is liable to pay 29%
customs
duty on the vehicle.
In
terms of the last mentioned tariff heading contended for by the
respondent, the vehicle is rendered duty free.
The
relevant Tariff Headings and Explanatory Notes
[7]
The relevant Tariff Headings referred to ("the relevant Tariff
Headings") fall within section XVII of part 1 of schedule
no 1
of the Act. Section XVII covers "vehicles, aircraft, vessels and
associated transport equipment". There are no Section
Notes
which are applicable to the present dispute.
[8]
The relevant Tariff Headings also fall under chapter 87 of section
XVII which covers "vehicles (excluding railway or tramway

rolling-stock), and parts and accessories thereof. There are no
Chapter Notes which are applicable to this dispute.
[9]
TH 87.04 covers "motor vehicles for the transport of goods"
and includes, inter alia, Tariff Sub Sub Heading 8704.21.80
which
covers "other, of a vehicle mass not exceeding 2000 kg or a
G.V.M. not exceeding 3500 kg, or of a mass not exceeding
1 600 kg or
a G.V.M. not exceeding 3500 kg per chassis fitted with a cab".
This is the Sub Heading under which the vehicle
is classifiable,
according to the appellant.
[10]
The Explanatory Notes to TH 87.04 state, inter alia, the following:
"The
classification of certain motor vehicles in this heading is
determined by certain features which indicate that the vehicles
are
designed for the transport of goods rather than the transport of
persons (heading 87.03). These features are especially helpful
in
determining the classification of motor vehicles, generally vehicles
having a gross vehicle weight rating of less than five
tonnes, which
have either a separate closed rear area or an open rear platform
normally used for the transport of goods, but may
have rear
bench-type seats that are without safety seatbelts, anchor points or
passenger amenities and that fold flat against the
sides to permit
full use of the rear platform for the transport of goods. Included in
this category of motor vehicles are those
commonly known as
'multipurpose' vehicles (eg, van-type vehicles, pick-up type vehicles
and certain sports utility vehicles). The
following features are
indicative of the design characteristics generally applicable to the
vehicles which fall in this heading:
(a)
presence of bench-type seats without safety equipment (eg safety
seatbelts or anchor points and fittings for installing safety

seatbelts)
or
passenger amenities in the rear area behind the area for the driver
and front passengers. Such seats are normally fold-away or

collapsible to allow full use of the rear floor (van-type vehicles)
or a separate platform (pick-up vehicles) for the transport
of goods;
(b)
presence of a separate cabin for the driver and passengers and a
separate open platform with side panels and a drop-down tailgate

(pick-up vehicles);
(c)
absence of rear windows along the two side panels; presence of
sliding, swing-out or lift-up door or doors, without windows,
on the
side panels or in the rear for loading and unloading goods (van-type
vehicles);
(d)
presence of a permanent panel or barrier between the area for the
driver and front passengers and the rear area;
(e)
absence of comfort features and interior finish and fittings in the
cargo bed area which are associated with the passenger areas
of
vehicles (eg floor carpeting, ventilation, interior lighting,
ashtrays)."
[11
] The Explanatory Notes of sub-heading 8704.21 provide as follows:
"The
g.v.w. (gross vehicle weight) is the road weight specified by the
manufacturer as being the maximum design weight capacity
of the
vehicle. This weight is the combined weight of the vehicle, the
maximum specified load, the driver and a tank full of fuel."
[12]
TH 87.09 covers "works trucks, self-propelled, not fitted with
lifting or handling equipment, of the type used in factories,

warehouses, dock areas or airports for short distance transport of
goods; tractors of the type used on railway station platforms;
parts
of the foregoing vehicles".
The Tariff Sub-Headings
are:
8709.1 Vehicles:
8709.11
Electrical 8709.19 Other 8709.90 Parts Tariff Sub-Heading 8709.19,
contended for by the respondent, is relevant only insofar
as it
provides for "other", ie vehicles not powered electrically.
In the case of the vehicle it is diesel powered. For
present
purposes, however, the emphasis remains on the group of vehicles
covered by TH 87.09 (to which reference will be made throughout)
and
the Explanatory Notes quoted hereunder.
The
Explanatory Notes to TH 87.09 state, inter alia, the following:
"This
Heading covers a group of self-propelled vehicles of the types used
in factories, warehouses, dock areas or airports
for the short
distance transport of various loads (goods or containers) or, on
railway station platforms, to haul small trailers.
Such
vehicles are of many types and sizes. They may be driven either by an
electric motor with current supplied by accumulators
or by an
internal combustion piston engine or other engine.
The
main features common to the vehicles of this Heading which generally
distinguish them from the vehicles of Heading 87.01, 87.03
or 87.04
may be summarised as follows:
(1)
their construction and, as a rule, their special design features,
make them unsuitable for the transport of passengers or for
the
transport of goods by road or other public ways;
(2)
their top speed when laden is generally not more than 30 to 35 km/h;
and
(3)
their turning radius is approximately equal to the length of the
vehicle itself.
Vehicles
of this Heading do not usually have a closed driving cab, the
accommodation for the driver often being no more than a platform
on
which he stands to steer the vehicle. Certain types may be equipped
with a protective frame, metal screen, etc, over the driver's
seat.
The
vehicles of this Heading may be pedestrian controlled.
Works
trucks are self-propelled trucks for the transport of goods which are
fitted with, for example, a platform or container on
which goods are
loaded."
The
harmonised system and relevant provisions of the Act
[13]
A detailed resume of the harmonised system, which often comes up for
consideration in matters of this kind, and relevant provisions
of the
Act is offered by the appellant (as respondent) in paragraphs 4 and 5
of the answering affidavit. It is not necessary to
embark upon
unnecessary repetition of those details.
[14]
In terms of section 47(8)(a) of the Act, the interpretation of any
Tariff Heading or Sub Heading, the General Rules of Interpretation

and the Section and Chapter Notes are subject to the Explanatory
Notes to the Harmonised System issued by the Customs Co-operation

Council.
[15]
The meaning of "subject to" as referred to in section
47(8)(a) of the Act, has been considered judicially in this
country
and it has been held that the primary task in classifying goods is to
ascertain the meaning of the relevant Headings and
Section and
Chapter Notes and while the Explanatory Notes should be used in
difficult cases and cases of doubt, they are merely
intended to
explain or supplement the Headings and Notes, not to override or
contradict them - see Secretary for Customs and Excise
v Thomas
Barlow & Sons Ltd
1970 2 SA 660
(A) at 676A-F and International
Business Machines SA (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Customs &
Excise
1985 4 SA 852
(AD) at 864A-C.
Brief
references to relevant South African authorities
[16]
In their comprehensive and useful heads of argument, counsel for the
appellant, Mr Puckrin SC and Ms Kilmartin, dealt with
the relevant
principles of interpretation and related subjects as they have been
crystallised and developed by our courts. I take
the liberty to deal
briefly with some of the references.
[17]
In International Business Machines, supra, the learned judge of
appeal says the following at 863G-I:
"Classification
as between headings is a three-stage process: first, interpretation -
the ascertainment of the meaning of the
words used in the headings
(and relative Section and Chapter Notes) which may be relevant to the
classification of the goods concerned;
second, consideration of the
nature and characteristics of those goods; and third, the selection
of the heading which is most appropriate
to such goods."
[18]
As to the first (interpretation) step, namely the ascertainment of
the meaning of the words used in the Tariff Headings (and
relevant
Section and Chapter Notes, which are absent for present purposes) it
has been held that the interpretation should be done
in accordance
with the ordinary recognised principles of statutory interpretation,
namely the grammatical and ordinary sense of
the words, unless the
context or the subject clearly shows that they were used in a
different sense - see for example Kommissaris
van Doeane en Aksyns v
Mincer Motors Bpk
1959 1 SA 114(A)
at 120D-E.
[19]
When it comes to the second and third stages of classification,
namely the consideration of the nature of the goods and the
selection
of the most appropriate heading, the test is an objective one and
requires a consideration of the nature, form, character
and functions
of the article in question, objectively determined -see Autoware
(Ply) Ltd v Secretary for Customs and Excise
1975 4 SA 318
(W) at
321H-322A.
[20]
The decisive criterion for the customs classification of goods is the
objective
characteristics
and properties of the goods as determined at the time of their
presentation
for customs clearance.
"This
is an internationally recognised principle of tariff classification.
The subjective intention of the designer or what
the importer does
with the goods after importation are, generally, irrelevant
considerations. But they need not be because they
may in a given
situation be relevant in determining the nature, characteristics and
properties of the goods."
-
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Komatsu Southern Africa
(Pty)
Ltd2007
2 SA 157
(SCA) at 160F-161A.
[21]
The purpose for which the thing in question was constructed and
designed may be of fundamental importance in determining the

classification of an item - see Thomas Barlow & Sons, supra, at
677B-E.
[22]
In Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v The Baking Tin (Pty)
Ltd
2007 6 SA 545
(SCA) it was held, at 548G-549D. that the intention
of the manufacturer or importer of goods is not a determinant of the
appropriate
classification for the purpose of the Act. With reference
to Komatsu, supra, it was held that in that decision the court was
suggesting
"no more than that light may be thrown on the
characteristics of the article by subjective factors".
It
was submitted by counsel for the appellant that, having regard to the
particular Tariff Headings in question, the purpose for
which the
vehicle was manufactured is relevant.
The
striking out application
[23]
Before turning to the characteristics of the vehicle, it is necessary
to consider the fact that the learned judge a quo, on
application by
the respondent, struck out certain portions of the record, mainly
annexures to the answering affidavit in the form
of reproductions
from websites dealing with the vehicle and its various attributes and
uses, as offloaded and prepared by representatives
of the appellant.
[24]
Details of the portions struck out appear from the judgment of the
learned judge a quo, and more particularly paragraphs 29-31
thereof.
[25]
Before us, counsel for the appellant indicated that they would not be
contesting the decision to strike out the material referred
to, for
purposes of the appeal. In the circumstances, I shall refrain from
dealing with those passages.
[26]
What was not struck out, however, is the Operators Manual ("the
manual") in respect of the vehicle. This was presented
to the
appellant's tax lawyers. Ms Odendaal and Ms Myburg, when they visited
the respondent's business premises on 5 February 2008
to inspect the
vehicle and to take photographs. The photographs, also not struck
out, are attached to the answering affidavit as
"LM12" and
the manual is attached as "LM13".
[27]
The fact that the manual was supplied to these two officials by the
respondent and, obviously, the correctness of the manual,
are
admitted in the replying affidavit.
[28]
Mr Joubert SC who, with Mr McAslin, appeared for the respondent,
argued that we should ignore the manual for purposes of this
dispute.
In
support of this argument, Mr Joubert relied on a passage from
Autoware (Pty) Ltd v Secretary for Customs and Excise
1975 4 SA 318
(WLD) where the learned judge said the following at 321C-D:
"Another
category of evidence which I consider to be irrelevant is that which
related to the manner in which the vehicles were
described in
advertisements, manuals and elsewhere by their Japanese progenitors
and by the local assemblers and distributors of
Toyota products ..."
In
reply, Mr Puckrin strongly argued that the contents of the manual are
relevant and important and should be taken into account
for purposes
of this judgment. He referred us again to the passage from Thomas
Barlow, supra, at 677D-E where the following is
stated:
"Hence
the purpose for which the thing in question was constructed and
designed is of fundamental importance in determining
whether it is a
vehicle, and, if it isT whether it must be classified under heading
87.01, 87.02 or 87.03 ..." At 677A it
was also stated:
"Hence,
to determine whether or not heading 87.01 applies, one must have
regard to the main purpose for which the vehicle was
constructed and
designed …"
[29]
I add that the manual, annexure "LM13", was also not
targeted to be struck out in the respondent's application to
strike
out which came before the learned judge a quo.
[30]
In my view, the contents of the manual are indeed of prime importance
and relevance for purposes of determining "the objective

characteristics and properties of the goods" as described in
Komatsu at 160E-G and, for that matter, in The Baking Tin at

548H-549B.
The
characteristics and properties of the vehicle
[31]
The basic question for decision is whether the vehicle is
classifiable under TH 8704,21.80 or whether it is classifiable under

TH 87.09 (or, for that matter, TH 8709.19).
Put
differently, is it a "motor vehicle for the transport of goods
... of a vehicle mass not exceeding 2000 kg or a G.V.M.
not exceeding
3500 kg or is it comfortably classifiable as part of "a group of
self propelled vehicles of the types used in
factories, warehouses,
dock areas or airports for the short distance transport of various
loads (goods or containers) or, on railway
station platforms, to haul
small trailers"?
[32]
As far as the latter classification, namely under TH 87.09 contended
for by the respondent, is concerned, it was confirmed
by counsel for
both parties before us, that this classification is restricted to
that group of vehicles of the type used in the
locations mentioned in
the Tariff Heading.
[33]
It is common cause between the parties, and it also appears from the
manual, that the vehicle comes in three models, namely
"general
purpose", "work site" and "recreational".
It
is also common cause that the vehicle in question, for present
purposes, is the "general purpose" model. The vehicle
is
also described in the manual, and in the papers, as a "utility
vehicle".
[34]
On 4 March 2008, Ms Odendaal on behalf of the appellant, requested
the respondent's attorneys to furnish copies of invoices
relating to
the sale of the vehicle. These were furnished and constitute annexure
"LM17" to the answering affidavit.
The deponent to the
answering affidavit, Mr Millar, who is the Manager of the Tariff
Policy section of the appellant, describes
these invoices as follows:
"It
appears from the invoices that the applicant has sold a number of the
vehicles in this country to different entities (which
obviously use
them for various purposes). The purchasers include entities such as
Sishen Golf Club, Watersport & Marine, Clifford
Mining and
Tractor World. The names of these businesses indicate the nature of
their businesses and illustrate that the vehicle
is bought by
different people to be used for different purposes."
[35]
"LM17", which was not struck out, contains some eighty or
ninety entries of sales by the respondent to various customers
of the
vehicle, over the period August 2006 to March 2008. In reply, the
respondent states that it sold the vast majority of the
vehicles to
dealerships, and has no control over the persons or entities to which
the dealers sold the vehicles.
The
only evidence offered by the respondent about the use of the vehicle
at the locations mentioned in TH 87.09, consists of a few
photographs
attached to the founding affidavit, as annexure "J",
allegedly demonstrating the use of the vehicle at a
fruit processing
factory in the Western Cape, at Galway Airport in Ireland and at Cape
Town International Airport. Of course, the
fact that some of the
vehicles are used at a factory and airports, does not mean that it
cannot be used elsewhere, or, for that
matter, that the use of the
vehicle at the restricted locations mentioned in TH 87.09, represents
"the main purpose for which
the vehicle was constructed and
designed" as postulated by the learned judge of appeal in Thomas
Barlow & Sons, supra.
[36]
The appellant offered, before the court a quo, an affidavit by Roelof
Erasmus le Roux Viljoen, the industry liaison officer
employed by the
contractor for the Department of Transport maintaining the National
Traffic Information System (also known as "eNaTIS").

According to this witness, the respondent has introduced (as an
importer) hundred and forty one of the vehicles bearing the model

number 538168 (petrol) between September 2006 and January 2009 and
sixty one of the vehicles bearing the model number 539125 (diesel)

between July 2006 and July 2007. It is common cause that these are
the "general purpose" models forming the subject of
this
dispute. The gross vehicle mass ("G.V.M.") of the petrol
model is 1545 kg and of the diesel model 1590 kg. This
is well inside
the 2000 kg limit as intended by Tariff Sub Heading 8704.21.80
contended for by the appellant.
The
properties of these models, according to the eNaTIS system are: make
... "Kubota Off Road" series ... "RTV 900
Off Road"
category... "special vehicle" description ... "utility
vehicle"
[37]
In my view, these properties of the vehicle do not readily strike one
as belonging to a vehicle "constructed and designed"
only
for use at the restrictive locations mentioned in TH 87.09.
[38]
In a further effort to establish the "main purpose for which the
vehicle was constructed and designed", in the celebrated
words
of the learned judge of appeal in Thomas Barlow & Sons, and in
further consideration of the "nature and characteristics"

of the vehicle, as contemplated in Komatsu, supra, and other
decisions like The Baking Tin, supra, I turn to briefly consider the

manual, the Tariff Headings and the Explanatory Notes.
(I)
The manual
[39]
There is a sketch showing the driver and his passenger, both secured
with seatbelts. The "cab area" is fitted with
Roll-Over
Protective Structures and the reader of the manual is cautioned to
"always use the seatbelt". The vehicle imported
by the
respondent and photographed by the appellant's officials during their
inspection, contains a plate with the inscription
"warning, to
avoid personal injury: always fasten your seatbelt". I could not
see on the photos taken on behalf of the
appellant whether those
particular vehicles were fitted with seatbelts.
[40]
The vehicle photographed, contains the signage "4x4 diesel
Kubota". The Roll-Over Protective Structures ("ROPS")

are clearly visible on these photographs.
[41]
There is also the warning "to avoid roll-overs, slow down when
turning, on uneven ground, and before stopping". There
is also
the warning "do not operate near ditches, holes, embankments or
other ground surface features which may collapse under
the vehicle's
weight. The risk of vehicle upset is even higher when the ground is
loose or wet."
[42]
Under "operating on slopes" the driver is advised how to
negotiate these areas. It is stated that "Slopes are
a major
factor related to loss-of-control and tip-over accidents, which can
result in severe injury or death. All slopes require
extra caution."
The load should be reduced when operating on hilly or over rough
terrain. When riding on soft terrain, the
front wheels must be turned
slightly uphill to keep the vehicle on a straight line across the
hill.
[43]
The driver is cautioned never to "Drive exceeding the limit of
visibility. Slow down near crest of hill until getting
a clear view
of the other side ... Stay alert for holes, rocks and other hidden
hazards in the terrain."
[44]
It is clear from the specifications that the vehicle has four wheel
drive ("4wd") capacity and power steering. This
is common
cause.
[45]
Under "operating the vehicle" the driver is cautioned to
check for hidden obstacles or hazards before driving in
a new area,
to keep the speed down until "you know the area well" and
to "use existing trails and stay away from
hazardous areas such
as steep, rocky slopes or swamps". The driver must be cautious
when visibility is limited, "as you
may not be able to see
obstacles in your path".
[46]
There are a number of sketches depicting the vehicle being operated
on difficult terrain. The driver is instructed to "always
go
straight uphill or downhill" and "if the engine stalls on a
steep slope, roll slowly straight down, using the brake"
and to
"reduce vehicle's speed to prevent tipping or loss of control"
and "do not traverse hillsides that are slippery
or covered with
rocks or obstacles which may cause you to tip over". The driver
is also advised to "use 4wd and maintain
low speeds on areas
covered with clay, mud, ice or snow to prevent uncontrolled
skidding".
[47]
I see no sketch or illustration depicting the vehicle being used on
the relatively flat, and generally easily traversable surfaces
found
at factories, airports, docks and the like, not to mention railway
platforms.
[48]
There is an illustration of the "knobby" tyres which are a
standard fit to this particular general purpose vehicle,
forming the
subject of this dispute. These are for "hard packed surfaces,
wet turf, and general usage (standard on the general
purpose model)"
as stated in the appellant's tariff determination of 25 January 2007.
[49]
I return to what was said in Thomas Barlow & Sons, supra, at
677A-E that
"The
purpose for which the thing in question was constructed and designed
is of fundamental importance in determining whether
it is a vehicle,
and, if it is, whether it must be classified under heading 87.01,
87.02, or 87.03."
On
a general reading of the manual, and given the contents thereof,
parts of which I attempted to illustrate, I cannot see that
it can
fairly be concluded that the purpose for which the vehicle was
constructed and designed is for it to be used in
[76]
Against this background, I am not persuaded that the Explanatory
Notes to TH 87.09 militate in favour of a classification of
a vehicle
under that Sub Heading. On the contrary, and for the reasons
illustrated, I am of the view that the vehicle is more appropriately

and comfortably classified under TH 87.04, read with 8704.21.80.
Brief
remarks about the onus of proof
[77]
In Abbott Laboratories South Africa (Pty) Ltd v The Commissioner for
Customs and Excise, Transvaal Provincial Division case
no 10643/86,
STAFFORD, J, as he then was, says the following on p4 of the typed
judgment:
"As
briefly stated above the onus of proving that the respondent's
determination is incorrect and is to be substituted by the

determination claimed by the applicant rests on the applicant. That
is now trite law."
[78]
Before me, counsel for the respondent strongly argued that "the
importer does not bear an onus of proving the Commissioner's

determination to have been wrong". In their heads of argument,
counsel for the respondent also submitted
"It
follows then that an importer can never be required to adduce
evidence of the factual basis on which the Commissioner's

determination is premised and that an importer, like any other
litigant, is only required to adduce evidence to prove its own case."
In
this regard, respondent's counsel referred to Autoware (Ply) Ltd v
Secretary for Customs and Excise
1970 4 SA 318
(W) at 321 (A) and
Commissioner for Customs and Excise v CI Caravans (Pry) Ltd
1993 1 SA
138
(N) at 149A-C.
In
CI Caravans, at 149C-D, it was held that in that particular appeal,
"which is concerned in the main with questions of interpretation

which cannot, in their very nature, be decided by reference to an
onus of proof. However, it was also pointed out that "the
only
factual issue where the question of onus could arise relates to the
nature of the goods to be classified ..."
[79]
In the present instance, it was argued on behalf of the appellant
that the respondent, not relying on any expert evidence,
failed to
discharge the onus to prove details relating to the characteristics
of the vehicle such as the top speed, the turning
radius, its
suitability for the transport of goods over certain areas and related
subjects.
To
that extent, I am of the view that the question of onus does arise in
this particular case, and, for the reasons mentioned, I
have come to
the conclusion that the respondent failed to discharge that onus.
The
grounds of appeal
[80]
The grounds are concisely stated by the appellant in his notice of
appeal which is to be found in volume 6 of the record. I
find myself
in respectful agreement with the grounds of appeal relied upon and,
for the reasons I attempted to illustrate above,
I have come to the
respectful conclusion that the learned judge a quo erred in granting
the respondent's application which came
before him.
The
order
[81]
I make the following order:
1.
The appeal is upheld with costs including the costs flowing from the
employment of two counsel.
2.
The order granted by the court a quo on 3 July 2009 is set aside and
replaced with the following: "The application is dismissed
with
costs, which will include the costs of two counsel."
W
R C PRINSLOO
JUDGE
OF THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT
I
agree
R
G TOLMAY
JUDGE
OF THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT
I
agree
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT
A882-2009
HEARD
ON: 11 APRIL 2012
FOR
THE APPELLANT: C E PUCKRJN SC ASSISTED BY L G KILMARTIN
INSTRUCTED
BY: STATE ATTORNEY
FOR
THE RESPONDENT: A P JOUBERT SC ASSISTED BY C J McASLIN
INSTRUCTED
BY: SMITH TABATA BUCHANAN BOYES