About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha
>>
2013
>>
[2013] ZAECMHC 9
|
|
Nkubungu v S (CA04/2013 (119/07)) [2013] ZAECMHC 9; 2013 (2) SACR 388 (ECM) (4 July 2013)
NOT REPORTABLE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN CAPE, MTHATHA
Case No.:CA04/2013 (119/07)
Date Heard: 21 June 2013
Date Delivered: 4 July 2013
In the matter between:
FYLEMAN NKUBUNGU
....................................................................................
Appellant
and
THE STATE
...................................................................................................
Respondent
JUDGMENT
EKSTEEN J:
[1] The Appellant was convicted in the High Court in Mthatha of one
count of murder and a further offence of failing to produce
his
licenced firearm within seven days after being required to do so. He
was sentenced to life imprisonment on the charge of murder
and to two
years imprisonment for failing to produce his firearm. The appellant
appeals against his conviction and sentence with
leave of the Court
a
quo.
[2] At the commencement of the trial the appellant, who was
represented at the hearing, pleaded not guilty. He gave no plea
explanation.
At the close of the State’s case an application
was made for his discharge in terms of the provisions of section 174
of the
Criminal Procedure Act. When this application was refused the
defence case was closed and the appellant did not testify.
[3] The facts which emerge from the evidence are, for the greater
part, not contentious. The appellant was the Deputy Principal
of the
Qobo Junior Secondary School in Bizana. At some stage the position of
principal of the school fell vacant and the appellant
was appointed
to act in this position. He occupied this position in an acting
capacity for an extended period before the position
was advertised. A
shortlist of candidates was duly compiled and interviews were held
and an appointment was made to fill the position.
Although the
appellant had applied and was shortlisted and interviewed he was not
the successful candidate. This caused much unhappiness
and the
appellant resisted the introduction of the successful candidate to
the position. At this time the appellant stated that
it would be
wrong to proceed with the introduction and said that he did not wish
to have blood on his hands. In these circumstances
the introduction
did not initially proceed and it is apparent that there was division
in the school community which caused volatility.
The appellant sought
the involvement of the South African Police Services alleging that
positions were being corruptly “sold”
by some in the
Department of Education.
[4] At the time of the events Patrick Ngceke (the deceased) held the
position of District Manager in the Department of Education
at
Bizana. The evidence establishes, however, that he was not involved
in any manner in the short listing process, the interviewing
panel or
in the making of the recommendation in respect of the appointment of
the principal.
[5] On 4 November 2004 a meeting was held at the school attended by
Captain Fremantle of the South African Police, by the appellant
and
by the deceased. At this stage an investigation was to be instituted.
The evidence does not reveal what the terms of reference
of the
investigation were to be and whether it was to relate to the alleged
corruption in the appointment process or the cause
for the division
and volatility at the school or the conduct of the appellant.
Whatever the focus of the investigation was to be
the deceased
instructed the appellant to report for work during the investigation
period at the offices of the Department of Education
as opposed to
the Qobo Junior Secondary School. He further assured the appellant
that he would protect the appellant whilst the
investigation was
being conducted.
[6] During cross-examination Captain Fremantle testified that when
the appellant came to enlist the intervention of the police
he had
showed documents to Colonel Siyoyo, the then Station Commander at
Bizana, to emphasise the dissatisfaction at the school.
There was
written on the papers that there would be bloodshed at the Qobo
Junior Secondary School. The evidence does not suggest
who the author
of these documents was or where the threat of bloodshed was likely to
emanate from.
[7] The appellant duly complied with the instruction which the
deceased had given and reported for work the following morning at
the
office of the deceased at the Department of Education. Whilst the
appellant waited at the door of the office of the deceased
he was
seen to be holding an A4 sized envelope. When the deceased arrived
for work and as he approached his office a shooting occurred
and the
deceased was struck and killed.
[8] The witness Ndubeki was a Sports Officer stationed at the offices
of the Department of Education. She had arrived at work early
in the
morning and testified that she had seen the appellant sitting a bench
in the passage, which, it appears, is approximately
three to four
metres from the door of the office of the deceased. There were a
number of other members of the public also seated
on the bench
waiting to be attended to. Shortly thereafter as she was intending to
leave the building she noted the appellant standing
at the door of
the deceased’s office and she thereafter passed the deceased as
he was arriving for work. As she left the
building she heard the
shots being discharged and the deceased was shot. The trial Judge
found the witness Ndubeki to be a good
witness. The presence of this
bench and other members of the public in the immediate vicinity of
the shooting was raised later
with the witness Mseleni. Mseleni’s
evidence in respect of this bench was unsatisfactory. He initially
denied that such a
bench was present. Later he states that he could
not remember seeing the bench but he conceded that there is a bench
that is used
when people are going to be attended to. Still later he
sought to justify his uncertainty by stating that the bench is
sometimes
moved when people were cleaning. The Judge
a quo
found Mseleni too to be an impressive witness, however, he did
recognise the contradictions in his evidence relating to the bench.
Whilst the Judge
a quo
made no finding in respect of the bench
and the persons sitting on it I think that this is clearly
established.
[9] There were, save, to the extent set out below, no eyewitnesses to
the shooting, however, when persons emerged from the various
offices
very soon after the shots had been fired the deceased was seen lying
on the ground in the passage. The appellant stood
next him with his
shirt stained with blood. No one else was seen in the passage at this
time and the envelope which the appellant
had earlier held was lying
on the ground along with various papers with the handwriting of the
appellant on.
[10] On enquiry from the appellant he stated that he did not know who
had shot the deceased. He explained that the deceased had
staggered
towards him pleading for help and had fallen against him. He held the
deceased in order to prevent him from falling on
his face.
[11] The police arrived on the scene approximately ten minutes later.
On their arrival the appellant was standing next to the body
of the
deceased still with his bloodstained shirt. Inspector Mtshengu states
that he appeared confused. Captain Fremantle again
asked him what had
happened and again the appellant stated that he did not know neither
did he know who had shot the deceased.
[12] Inspector Mtshengu states that he was aware that the appellant
was a licenced owner of a firearm. He therefore advised the
appellant
that he was a suspect in the murder of the deceased and he demanded
that he hand over his firearm. The appellant responded
that he would
not provide his firearm as Mtshengu would then say that he had killed
the appellant.
[13] A spent cartridge was found on the scene near the rear entrance
to the building approximately eight metres from where the
deceased
lay. Forensic tests established that it was a 9mm long cartridge. The
appellant is licenced to own a 9mm pistol.
[14] Inspector Mtshengu searched the appellant there on the scene. He
found no weapon nor any ammunition on the appellant. None
of the
witnesses who testified to seeing the appellant in the passage at the
scene of the shooting either before or after the shooting
saw a
firearm in possession of the appellant. Nevertheless a search warrant
was obtained to search the home of the appellant. The
firearm of the
appellant was not found in his home. At the home of the appellant a
safe was found in one of the rooms. The safe
was removed and opened
but it did not contain the appellant’s firearm. The evidence
does not, however, disclose that the
safe removed from the
appellant’s home was the only safe in the house.
[15] The appellant was arrested at the scene of the shooting as a
result of a report made to the police by a bystander. Forensic
samples were taken from the hands of the appellant in order to test
for primary residue which could confirm that he had discharged
a
firearm. This was sent for analysis but the results were negative.
The absence of primary residue does not exclude the possibility
that
he may have discharged a firearm as such residue may have washed off.
It could, however, not confirm that he had discharged
a firearm.
[16] Two witnesses who were present at the scene of the shooting at
the time of the event died prior to the trial, namely one Nzekeni
and
one Nonzaliseko. Each had made a witness statement to the police in
respect of their knowledge of the events. At the trial
the State
applied to hand in these statements as evidence. The application was
strenuously opposed. The Judge
a quo
ruled that the statements
could be handed in provisionally and that a final ruling would be
made later. The statements were then
handed in in evidence and the
Judge
a quo
addressed the matter again in his judgment where
he ruled that the statements were admissible as evidence. In argument
before us
Mr
Shapiro
, for the appellant, attacked both
the procedure adopted by the Court
a quo
and the admissibility
of the statements. By virtue of the conclusion to which I have come
hereafter it is not necessary to resolve
this issue. I shall assume
for purposes of this judgment, without making any finding in this
regard, that the statements were correctly
admitted.
[17] The statement by Nzekeni adds nothing to the facts set out
above. The witness Nonzaliseko, however, states that she arrived
at
her work at the offices of the Department of Education that morning
and as she entered she saw the appellant standing in the
passage. She
proceeded to her office and commenced working when she heard a
gunshot. She initially tried to hide under the table
but clients in
the office proceeded to open the door. She went to the door and
states that she saw the appellant, who had earlier
been sitting at
the bench, struggling with the deceased. At about that stage a second
shot was heard and she retreated into the
office to phone the police
whilst the two persons remained struggling in the passage.
[18] Assuming, as I have, that the statement was admissible in
evidence I do no think that much weight can be attached to it. The
witness was not available for cross-examination. The probative value
of her statement depends on the reliability of her observation
and
the accuracy of her perception. These are issues which fall to be
tested under cross-examination. I do not think that her account
is
necessarily at variance with the explanation given by the appellant
to witnesses on the scene of the shooting. She confirms
that her
observation was made after the first shot had been discharged and it
may well be that the first shot had struck the deceased
causing him
to stagger forward and fall against the appellant. Whilst a statement
records that she heard a second shot being discharged
it does not
suggest where the shot emanated from and she does not say that the
appellant carried a firearm or discharged the second
shot. In the
circumstances, even accepting, as I have done, that the statement was
admissible in evidence, I do not think that
it takes the matter any
further.
[19] The Court
a quo
correctly recognised that it had no
direct evidence before it. The guilt of the appellant accordingly had
to be established by
way of inferential reasoning. In
R v Blom
1939 AD 188
at 202 and 203 Watermeyer JA referred to the two cardinal
rules of logic which govern the use of circumstantial evidence in
criminal
trials. He formulated them thus:
“
1. The
inference sought to be drawn must be consistent with all the proved
facts. If it is not, then the inference cannot be drawn.
2. The proved facts should be
such that they exclude every reasonable inference from them save the
one to be drawn. If they do not
exclude other reasonable inferences,
then there must be a doubt whether the inference sought to be drawn
is correct.”
[20] The
Court
a quo
found the following facts to be proved:
“
1.
That the deceased in this case, one Pathuzolo Patrick Ngceke, was
shot and killed on the date in question.
2. That the deceased was a
district manager stationed at the offices of the Department of
Education, Bizana.
3. That a firearm was used in
shooting and killing the deceased.
4. That the accused was a
teacher and deputy principal at Qobo Junior Secondary School, Bizana
during the time of the happening
of this incident.
5. That there was a vacant post
of principal at Qobo Junior Secondary School, Bizana during the time
of the happening of this incident.
6. That the accused had acted as
a principal at Qobo Junior Secondary School, Bizana for a long time
up to and before the happening
of this incident.
7. That the post of the
principal at Qobo Junior Secondary School, Bizana was advertised.
8. That the accused, one Mr
Vakele and others applied for the vacant post.
9. That Mr Vakele and not the
accused was approved by the interviewing panel to be the new
Principal of Qobo Junior Secondary School.
10. That there was some
dissatisfaction about this approval or nomination of the new
principal either by the accused or the school
governing body as both
parties alleged differently.
11. That the introduction of the
new principal was stopped.
12. That on the following day,
the day following the day on which the new principal was supposed to
be introduced, the accused visited
the building in which the offices
of the deceased in the Department of Education, Bizana was situated.
13. That the accused early in
the morning of the day of the incident was seen standing next to the
door of the office of the deceased
carrying an A4 sized brown
envelope. Later during that morning the deceased entered into that
building, that is the building in
which his offices were, and which
the accused was visiting or had gone to.
14. That while in the passage
going towards his office the deceased was shot with a firearm and
killed.
15. That the deceased was found
lying on the floor on his back, dead, full of blood and the accused
was found standing next to the
deceased, about four paces away from
him, with his shirt stained with blood. There was no person on the
scene of this incident
other than the accused who had clothing
bloodstained.”
[21] In addition to these facts the evidence clearly establishes that
the appellant himself was integral in preventing the introduction
of
the new principal and that he had stated that he did not wish to have
blood on his hands. This I think has been established
as a fact.
[22] I think that there are further facts which emerge from the
evidence. Firstly, as stated above, I think that it is established
as
a fact on the evidence that there was a bench situated in the passage
a few metres from the door of the deceased’s office.
There were
a number of unknown people seated on the bench shortly before the
deceased entered the passage. Secondly, moments after
the shooting
occurred a number of persons emerged from the offices and the
surrounding area into the passage where the appellant
and the
deceased were. At that stage there were no members of the public in
the passage. Thirdly, the police arrived on the scene
approximately
ten minutes after the event and searched the appellant. He had no
weapon in his possession nor any ammunition. Fourth,
forensic tests
to determine whether any primary residue was present on the hands of
the appellant proved negative.
[23] H C Nicholas discussed the two cardinal rules of logic in
R
v Blom
supra
in a useful article published in
Fait
Iustitia
: “
Essays in Memory of Oliver Deneys Schreiner”
(1983) p. 312. At 317 with reference to the first rule in
Blom
Nicholas states:
“
The
first rule was given striking expression by T H Huxley: ‘The
great tragedy of Science – the slaying of a beautiful
hypothesis by an ugly fact’. The rationale of the rule was
stated by Starkie:
‘
For as all things which have
happened were necessarily congruous and consistent, it follows, that
if any one established fact be
wholly irreconcilable with the
hypothesis, the latter cannot be true. Such an incongruity and
inconsistency is sufficient to negative
the hypothesis, even although
it coincide and agree with all the other facts and circumstances of
the case to the minutest extent
… [I]f the incongruity cannot
eventually be removed, the hypothesis must fall, although no other
can be suggested. …’
The case of
R v Hodge
has
been referred to above, in a quotation from Wills. According to the
report of that case contained in the English Reports, Alderson
B
referred in his address to the jury to
‘…
the proneness of the
human mind to look for – and often slightly to distort the
facts in order to establish such a proposition
– forgetting
that a single circumstance which is inconsistent with such a
conclusion, is of more importance than all the
rest, inasmuch as it
destroys the hypothesis of guilt.
’”
[24] It seems to me that the ugly fact in the present matter is the
fact that the appellant did not have a firearm in his possession.
As
I have stated earlier persons began to emerge from the offices upon
hearing the shots. The appellant could hardly have disposed
of a
firearm in that brief interlude. He immediately offered an
exculpatory explanation for the blood on his shirt and made no
attempt to flee from the scene. The evidence shows that numerous
people remained present in the passage whilst the police were
summoned. Nobody testified to seeing a firearm in his possession.
When the police arrived a body search revealed that he had no
weapon
in his possession. I think that this fact is of more importance than
all the rest. If this incongruity cannot be removed
the hypothesis of
the appellant’s guilt must fail even though no other could be
suggested. An attempt was made to remove
this incongruity by the
carrying out of forensic tests on samples lifted from the appellant’s
hand. The tests proved negative.
In these circumstances it seems to
me that the facts of this matter do not pass muster when weighed
against the test in the first
rule in
Blom.
For this reason
alone I would allow the appeal against the conviction on count 1.
[25] On behalf of the appellant it was further argued in the Court
a
quo
that the evidence establishes that there were a number of
other people present in the passage, notably those seated on the
bench,
and any one of them might have discharged the firearm. The
Court
a quo
dismissed this argument stating:
“
I have
already indicated that the argument that because there is a piece of
evidence (that) there were a number of other people
in the passage
there then there (
sic
)
is a possibility that someone from those other number of people might
have shot and killed the deceased, I have indicated and
stated
clearly that there is no evidence before this court which lays a
basis for that possibility to be inferred from. The argument
is
rather speculative, a widely speculative – or it is a
conjecture.”
[26] It seems to me that the Court
a quo
erred herein in
effectively placing the onus on the appellant to lead evidence and
lay a basis for the inference. In discussing
the second rule in
Blom
Nicholas states at 317-318:
“
In
Lejzor
Teper v The Queen
Lord
Normand said:
‘
It is
… necessary before drawing the inference of the accused’s
guilt from circumstantial evidence to be sure that
there are no other
co-existing circumstances which would weaken or destroy the
inference.’
A discussion by a logician of
the rule formulated as the second rule in
Blom
is contained in
Sidgwick. He says:
‘…
[I]f
we accept a conclusion without considering how far the facts will
support an opposite one, we do so at our peril. …[I]n
establishing an explanation, a law of nature, or a prediction not yet
verifiable by the event, the important point is to exclude
all
alternative theories … [B]efore we can consider any theory
proved, whether such theory be a sweeping law, like that
of
gravitation, or an explanation or prediction of some one actual
event, we must have sound reasons for excluding every possible
rival
theory.’”
[27] In the present case there is no evidence of the distance from
which the deceased was shot. There is uncontradicted evidence
(save
for the unsatisfactory and contradictory evidence of the witness
Mseleni to which I have referred earlier) that a number
of other
people were seated on the bench close to the door of the deceased’s
office where he was shot. These, I think, are
“other
co-existing circumstances” which certainly serve to weaken the
inference drawn. The question is not whether
there are sufficient
proven facts to draw an inference that one of these persons in fact
shot the deceased, but rather whether
it is reasonably possible that
one of them may have done so.
[28] I do not lose sight of the evidence that when the first
witnesses began to emerge from the offices the appellant and the
deceased were the only persons present in the passage. I do not,
however, think that this factor is destructive of the possibility
that the deceased might have been shot by one of the persons who had
been seated on the bench. It is a reasonable human reaction
for
unsuspecting persons to flee the scene immediately when gunfire
occurs in their immediate vicinity. This is borne out by the
evidence
of Mseleni that when the gunshots were fired he proceeded into the
office rather than to approach the scene. Similarly,
human experience
teaches us that where a criminal commits an offence of this nature he
frequently flees from the scene immediately
so as to escape
detection. I think therefore that the fact that these persons were
not seen in the passage immediately after the
shooting does not
detract from the validity of the evidence that they were present very
shortly before the shooting.
[29] I furthermore do not lose sight of the fact that a 9mm cartridge
was found at the scene and that the appellant is licenced
to own a
9mm pistol. Again experience in the criminal courts has shown that
the 9mm calibre is perhaps the most common calibre
for hand weapons
in South Africa. There is no evidence that the cartridge found was
discharged from the firearm owned by the appellant.
[30] On a consideration of all the evidence I think that the presence
of other members of the public in the immediate vicinity
is a factor
which, at the very least, weakens the inference of guilt (compare
Lejor Teper supra
). In these circumstances what is required is
to examine whether there is sound reason to exclude this “rival
theory”
(compare
Sidgwick supra
). This the Court
a
quo
did not explore. I think that it erred in this regard.
[31] In the present instance the appellant failed to testify in the
face of the evidence which I have set out earlier herein. Does
this
feature change the position? In
S v Boesak
[2000] ZACC 25
;
2001 (1) SA
912
(CC) at para
[24]
Langa DP stated:
“…
The
fact that an accused person is under no obligation to testify does
not mean that there are no consequences attaching to a decision
to
remain silent during the trial. If there is evidence calling for an
answer, and an accused person chooses to remain silent in
the face of
such evidence, a court may well be entitled to conclude that the
evidence is sufficient in the absence of an explanation
to prove
the guilt of the accused. Whether such a conclusion is justified will
depend on the weight of the evidence. What is stated
above is
consistent with the remarks of Madala J, writing for the Court, in
Osman
and Another v Attorney-General, Transvaal
,
when he said the following:
'Our legal system is an
adversarial one. Once the prosecution has produced evidence
sufficient to establish a
prima
facie
case,
an accused who fails to produce evidence to rebut that case is at
risk. The failure to testify does not relieve the prosecution
of its
duty to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. An accused, however,
always runs the risk that, absent any rebuttal, the prosecution's
case may be sufficient to prove the elements of the offence
.
…’”
[32] Two features emerge from this passage. Firstly, where there is
evidence against an accused calling for an answer an accused
who
chooses not to testify will be at risk. Secondly, whether the court
would be entitled to conclude that the evidence on behalf
of the
State is sufficient, in the absence of an explanation, to prove the
guilt of the accused will depend upon the weight of
the evidence. The
failure to testify does not relieve the prosecution of its duty to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
[33] In the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the same
matter, reported at
[2000] ZASCA 112
;
2000 (1) SACR 633
(SCA) at 646 Smalberger JA
stated:
“
[47]
Of course, a
prima facie
inference does not necessarily mean that if no rebuttal is
forthcoming, the
onus
will have been satisfied. But one of the main and acknowledged
instances where it can be said that a
prima
facie
case becomes conclusive in the
absence of rebuttal, is where it lies exclusively within the power of
the other party to show what
the true facts were and he or she fails
to give an acceptable explanation.”
[34]
S v Tandwa and Others
2008 (1) SACR 613
(SCA)
illustrates this kind of situation. In this matter the seven
appellants had been convicted of robbery arising out of an incident
in which a large sum of money had been taken from vaults of a bank.
The first and second appellants were employees of the bank
and the
circumstantial evidence led at the trial had indicated overwhelmingly
that when the robbery had taken place things had
been so profoundly
amiss at the bank as to point strongly to the guilty complicity of
the first and second appellants. The second
appellant testified at
the trial and was thoroughly discredited. The first appellant choose
not to testify. The court reasoned
that it was for the first
appellant who was in a position to explain the deviations from the
bank procedure and the failure to
complete the registers in question
to do so, and it was he who could have told the court whether the
second appellant had acted
alone, without his own complicity. In
these circumstances the court held that his failure to supply answers
on any of these matters
“inexorably strengthen[ed] the
[s]tate’s case, because in the absence of anything to gainsay
it, the circumstantial
web pointed overwhelmingly to his complicity”.
(See
D T Zeffertt and A P Paizes: The South African Law of
Evidence
(2
nd
ed p. 595.)
[35] I do not think that this is such a case. For the reasons which I
have set out above I do not think that the State has proved
its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The “circumstantial web” in the
present matter was equally consistent with the deceased
having been
killed by another person present in the passage at the time and could
be consistent with the explanation immediately
given by the appellant
at the scene. In all the circumstances I am of the view that the
appeal against the conviction for murder
must succeed.
[36] No argument was presented to us in respect of the appeal against
the conviction of count 2. The charge against the appellant
is that
he contravened the provisions of
section 106
of the
Firearms Control
Act 60 of 2000
.
Section 106(1)(c)
provides that:
“
Subject
to
section 107
, any holder of a licence, permit or authorisation
issue in terms of this Act must-
(a) …
(b) …
(c) produce the firearm in
respect of which the licence permit or authorisation is issued within
seven days of being required to
do so by any police official or by
any person authorised by the Registrar.”
[37]
Section 107
of the
Firearms Control Act provides
as follows:
“
(1)
Any person who carries with him or her a firearm must at the request
of a police official or any person authorised by the Registrar
produce the licence, permit or authorisation, as the case may be, in
respect of such firearm for inspection.
(2) A person referred to in
subsection (1) must-
(a) at the request and to the
satisfaction of a police official or any person authorised by the
Registrar, identify himself or herself
forthwith; and
(b) at the request of a police
official or any person authorised by the Registrar, produce such
firearm for inspection.
(3) If a person fails to comply
with subsection (1) or (2), the police official or authorised person
may seize the firearm without
a warrant and keep the firearm in
custody until the licence, permit or authorisation is produced or the
firearm is disposed of
in terms of this Act.”
[38] On the evidence set out earlier in this judgment the appellant
was not a person envisaged in
section 107
of the
Firearms Control Act
in
that it has not been established that he carried a firearm with
him. There is no evidence from any witness that the appellant was
requested to produce his firearm within seven days from the date of
his arrest. At best Inspector Mtshengu demanded that he should
hand
over his firearm. Inspector Mtshengu was, no doubt, of the view that
the appellant had a firearm in his possession. He was
incorrect. I do
not think that the demand made by Inspector Mtshengu could possibly
have alerted the appellant thereto that he
was required to produce
his firearm within the period of seven days. In the circumstances I
do not think that there is any evidence
to establish that he was ever
required to produce his firearm within seven days as envisaged in
section 106
of the
Firearms Control Act.
[39
] In the circumstances I would allow the appeal and set aside the
conviction and sentence in respect of both count 1 and count 2.
J W EKSTEEN
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
PAKADE ADJP:
I agree. The conviction and sentence in respect of count 1 and count
2 are set aside.
L P PAKADE
ACTING DEPUTY JUDGE PRESIDENT OF THE HIGH COURT
HARTLE J:
I agree.
B HARTLE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
For Appellant:
Mr P I Shapiro instructed by S Shapiro
Attorneys, Johannesburg c/o B Makade Incorporated, Mthatha
For Respondent:
Mr S Bera instructed by the National Director
of Public Prosecutions, Mthatha