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[2013] ZAKZDHC 70
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Georges Briere SA v Mthimunye Engineering Works CC and Others (2518/2011) [2013] ZAKZDHC 70 (15 May 2013)
IN
THE KWAZULU-NATAL HIGH COURT, DURBAN
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case
No: 2518/2011
In
the matter between:
GEORGES
BRIERE
SA
.....................................................................................................
Applicant
and
MTHIMUNYE
ENGINEERING WORKS
CC
...................................................
First
Respondent
CHURCH,
GARY
JOHN
..................................................................................
Second Respondent
CHURCH,
MICHAEL
DAVID
...........................................................................
Third
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Delivered:
15 May 2012
MBATHA
J
[1]
The Applicant is a French private limited liability company duly
incorporated in terms of the laws of France and having its
principal
place of business in France. The business of the Applicant is
the design, manufacture and marketing of industrial
pumps and
components throughout the world.
[2]
The Applicant manufactures pumps for industrial used named BROQUET
pumps, named for the inventor of the pumps, a certain Mr
Broquet, who
invented the pumps in the year 1880. Over the years the pumps had
been redesigned and the Applicant continued to use
the name BROQUET
in relation to its pumps and acquired the trade mark in the early
1970’s in France, but because of the time
that had passed these
patented designs have since expired. These pumps are called “gear
pumps” or “external gear
pumps” and were designed
in such a way that it was capable of pumping viscous sugar fluids
used in the sugar industry. This
application concerns the type of
Broquet pump called the BBMC type which has six (6) asymetrical lobes
and was available in seven
(7) different sizes. It is generally
referred to as massecuite pumps.
[3]
The deponent to the Applicant’s founding affidavit is a Mr O F
D Briere who explained that his great grandfather founded
the company
that was named after him in 1927. Both his grandfather and
father were also involved with the business of the
applicant and his
father, J F Briere, deposed to an affidavit in the application.
In this affidavit Mr Briere Sr explained
that during the 1980’s
he conducted extensive tests of each of the Brouquet pumps and was
able to prepare three (3) unique
performance graphs including the
curves/lines as described by his son in the founding affidavit and
that these graphs represented
original work carried out by him on
behalf of the Applicant. These graphs are depicted as annexures
“OB5 to OB8”
to the application papers and forms the
subject matter for the relief being sought in prayer 1 of the
applicant’s Notice
of Motion. The Respondents were accused of
infringing the copyright of the Applicant by reproducing and/or
copying and/or making
adaptations or distributing copies of annexures
“OB5-OB8”
[4]
In the main answering affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondents it
is conceded that the performance graphs depicted in annexure
“OB9”
to the papers are practically identical to those depicted in
annexures “OB5-OB8”. Annexure “OB9”
contains
the same graphs as those depicted in annexures “OB5-OB8”
except that it purports to emanate from the First
Respondent. In the
answering affidavit a breach of copyright was admitted and in
argument before me it was conceded on behalf of
the First Respondent
that the order in paragraph 1 of the Notice of Motion should be
granted. I will deal with this aspect at the
end of this judgment.
[5]
The First Respondent is a close corporation and the Second and Third
Respondents its members in equal shares. Third Respondent
deposed to
the main affidavit in opposition to the relief being sought.
According to him First Respondent provides professional
engineering
services to various industries including the sugar industry. In
the case of a pump the first respondent will
only manufacture a
specific pump to an order from a customer, which in the case of a
Broquet pump initially consisted of manufacturing
parts of the pump
from specifications supplied to it by for example the sugar industry
as the applicant did not have an active
after service sales to
readily supply spare parts to its pumps and it was sometimes just too
expensive for the imports of the parts
to be made. Third Respondent’s
father purchased an engineering workshop and conducted business under
the style D & D
Engineering in 1983. This business was the
predecessor to the First Respondent and commenced providing
replacement parts
for numerous fabrications of machinery that were
difficult to source during what was referred to in the affidavit as
“
the apartheid years”
.
During or about 1985 D & D Engineering were provided with
drawings made by the Illovo Sugar Group of various pinions
, shafts
and bushing for Broquet pumps and “reverse engineered”
these parts to produce replacement parts for the Broquet
pumps from
the drawings provided. Eventually other sugar mills followed
suit and by 1987 D & D Engineering had been approached
by a
foundry by the name of Rely Prescision Casting, a Johannesburg based
company, who made patterns of various parts of Broquet
pumps from
samples provided by sugar mills and D & D Engineering then
machined these parts to the specifications provided.
The First
Respondent alleged that at that stage the sugar mills were the
customers of Rely Precision Casting and D & D Engineering
merely
machined the parts on order from the latter. At a later stage
Rely Precision Castings were able to supply complete
pumps to the
local market, similar in nature to the Broquet pumps and called its
pumps RM pumps.
[6]
During 2001 the Applicant was formed and took over the business of D
& D Engineering as a going concern and continued to
provide
precision machining services to Rely Precision Castings including
complete RM pumps. During 2006 the driving force
behind the
pump business of Rely Precision Castings died and First Respondent
took over the business in supplying pumps to industries
similar to
the Broquet pumps but changed the name of the pump from an RM pump to
that of an MP pump and sold the first MP pump
during 2007.
[7]
It was disputed that the First Respondent slavishly copied the
Broquet pumps. Although the basis of the pump remained the same
this
is not due to any unique feature thereof as the pump in question has
been in the public domain for approximately 30 years
and its basic
mould and features can be accessed on the internet. The fact that the
mould resembles that of a Broquet pump is according
to the
Respondents entirely fortuitous as that is what an external gear pump
with rotor lobes looks like. It is also claimed that
the MP pumps had
undergone significant changes from the original Broquet pumps the
most notable of which is that stainless steel
is used in its
manufacture as opposed to ductile iron and mild steel, a wear plate
was introduced and the direction of flow was
configured to go both
clockwise and anti-clockwise. Respondents were adamant that it was
never the intention to pass its pumps
of as Broquet pumps and
resisted the relief sought in the Notice of Motion, apart from that
in paragraph 1 thereof.
[8]
The applicant sought the following relief in the Notice of Motion:
(a)
Interdicting and restraining the
Respondents from infringing the Applicant’s copyright
subsisting in its BBMC performance
graph and in its brochures for its
BROQUET BBMC pump indicated in annexure “OB 5” to
annexure “OB 8” to
the founding affidavit, by reproducing
and/or copying and/or marking adaptations of these works and/or
distributing copies thereof;
(b)
Interdicting and restraining the
Respondents from passing off their “MP” pumps or the
components of their pumps (the
“offending pumps”), as
being that of the Applicant, or as being connected or associated in
the course of trade with
the Applicant or made under its licence, by
(i)
Manufacturing or selling the offending
pumps in the form shown in annexure OB9 to the founding affidavit;
(ii)
Using the parts codes currently used by
them in relation to the offending pumps; or
(iii)
Using the performance graphs and other
works covered by the order in (a) in relation to the offending pumps;
(c)
Directing the Respondent to deliver up to
the Applicant or its agents all offending pumps, including the
components thereof, or
other articles including drawings, moulds
and/or computer programs or aids used for manufacturing the First
Respondent’s
pumps and components thereof, in the possession of
or under the control of the Respondents;
(d)
Ordering an enquiry into damages;
(e)
In the event of an enquiry in terms of
prayer (d) above being ordered and the parties being unable to reach
agreement as to the
future pleadings to be filed, discovery,
inspection or other matters of procedure relating to the enquiry, an
order authorising
either of or any party to make application to this
Honourable Court for directions in regard thereto; and
(f)
Granting the Applicant the costs of this
application.
[9]
Subsequently an amendment was sought to delete paragraph (c) and to
substitute for it a new paragraph (c) to read as follows:
“
Interdicting
and restraining the respondents from competing unlawfully with the
applicants by selling the offending pumps in the
form shown in
annexure ‘OB 9’ to the founding affidavit in conjunction
with the;
(i)
Parts codes currently used by them in
relation to the offending pumps; or
(ii)
The performance graphs and other works
covered by the order in (a) in relation to the offending pumps.”
[10]
The application for this amendment came about after it became
apparent that the Respondents admitted that annexure “OB9”
was a reproduction of the Applicant’s original documents
relating to the Broquet pumps and the application was opposed on
the
basis that the Applicant now seeks to build a case from its replying
affidavit which is impermissible in application proceedings.
It is
trite law that an application for an amendment should as a rule be
granted unless the prejudice to the other party is of
such a nature
that the proposed amendment should not be granted. The
amendment addressed facts that were fully canvassed
in the affidavits
and consist of an additional argument that may avail the Applicant
based on the papers filed. It is difficult
to imagine in what
respects the Respondents would have changed the contents of the
affidavits filed in opposition to the application
had the proposed
amendment been an order sought from the beginning. For these
reasons the amendment is granted.
[11]
The Applicant filed its replying affidavit out of time and also not
within the period that Respondents agreed that it may have
in
addition to the time period provided for in Rule 6. The Applicant
brought a substantive application for condonation for its
late filing
of this affidavit and this application was likewise opposed by the
Respondents. I have been informed by the parties
during
argument that this aspect of the case had been settled and by consent
the late filing of the Applicant’s replying
affidavit is to be
condoned with the Applicant to pay the costs of this application for
condonation.
[12]
The Respondents also filed an application to strike out certain
portions of the affidavits deposed to by Shaun Lawrence Ayliffe
and
Dominique Chevillard in support of the Applicant’s
application. The aim was to remove any references in these
affidavits to evidence of a hearsay nature and conclusions drawn by
the witness Chevillard. Hearsay evidence falls to be ignored
even in the absence of a formal objection thereto or an application
to strike out the contents that amounts to hearsay evidence
and the
same will apply to conclusions drawn by a witness not supported by
any facts and based on conjecture or idle speculation.
PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND OTHERS v SOUTH AFRICAN RUGBY
FOOTBALL UNION AND OTHERS
[1]
[13]
This was a fiercely contested piece of litigation and the Respondents
in particular took every conceivable objection that seemed
open to
them and added considerably to the volume of the record. On
behalf of the Respondents, by way of example, heads of
argument were
filed to cater for each of the objections taken. I fully intend to
deprive the Respondents of costs of these applications,
excluding the
application for condonation which became settled, that cluttered up
the record whatever the merits of the applications.
More about this
will follow in due course.
[14]
What this case comes down to in the end is about passing-off and
unlawful competition.
[15]
A passing-off action protects the goodwill or reputation of a
trader’s business, merchandise or services against a false
representation by a competitor that the business and so on of the
competitor is that of the Applicant or that it is associated
with
it. The onus of establishing the likelihood of confusion on a
balance of probability rests upon the Applicant; and inasmuch
as
these proceedings are by way of affidavit I must decide whether the
Applicant has succeeded in discharging that onus by virtue
only of
those facts that are admitted by the Respondents or which are not the
subject of a genuine dispute.
SOLMIKE
(PTY) LTD v WEST STREET TRADING CO (PTY) LTD
[2]
[16]
The test to be applied to determine whether a representation amounts
to a passing-off, is whether there is a reasonable likelihood
that
the members of the public may be confused into believing that the
business of the one is connected to the business of the
other
CAPITAL
ESTATE & GENERAL AGENCIES (PTY) LTD v HOLIDAY INN INC
[3]
[17]
The bulk of other case law that I was referred to deals with
merchandise on sale to the general public where it is a lot easier
for such a confusion to be stealthily and cunningly created as
the average shopper is not likely to spend time to give reflection
on
what he or she is purchasing and a body of shoppers may more easily
be deceived by a creative and alluring passing-off into
believing
that what they are buying is the product of the Applicant whilst they
would be buying the competitor’s product
instead.
[18]
I am mindful of the fact that it is virtually common cause that the
pumps called MP pumps by the Respondents is outwardly similar
to the
Broquet pumps and was admittedly virtually duplicated over a long
period of time. A passing-off can occur even if the name
of the
product does not have a similarly sounding brand name, as in this
case, but the external appearance has become the embodiment
of the
product and the consumer would be easily convinced that the product
is that of the Applicant despite the fact that the brand
name is
different and not capable of confusion with that of the Applicant.
Whether a passing-off had occurred in such circumstances
would depend
on the peculiar facts of a case. Counsel for the Respondents has
taken issue with what has been stated by me and I
quote extensively
from his heads of argument:
“
16.
Public policy is against protecting the shape and configuration of
functional or utilitarian articles (as opposed to an article
whose
shape is capricious or which incorporates capricious features or
shape as was the case in
Weber
Stephen
Products
Co. v Alrite Engineering (Pty) Ltd
1992 (2) (A) 496C-497B; 504 D-F). It is submitted that
the Applicant is seeking to acquire, by the relief that it is
asking
for, a monopoly in respect of functional and utilitarian pumps of a
particular shape and configuration and having particular
attributes.
It is submitted that as a matter of law it cannot do this. Its
clear intention in this regard appears from
its founding papers and
the relief sought (to which reference has been above).
Briere
7.3-7.7/24-26
17.
It is well established that the law pertaining to passing –off
(and indeed the law pertaining to trade marks) does not
create
monopolies.
18.
Competition is fundamental to our economic system. The
overriding principle was stated in
Premier
Hangers CC v Polyoak (Pty) Ltd
[1996] ZASCA 119
;
1997
(1) SA 416
(a) 423 D-E
‘
What
does see, in general, to be established in that the absence (or
expiration) of statutory protection is regarded as opening
the field
to competition by copying or imitating and that is quite legitimate.’
And at 424 H-I (with
reference to
Schultz v Butt
1986 (3) 667 (a)
‘
The
finding was that the copying per se was not unlawful. It was
only the existence of extraneous factors that rendered the
unsuccessful party’s conduct unlawful. Thus it appears to
me that in our law, as in many of the foreign systems to
which Ms
Fellner refers, where statutory protection can be claimed but is not
or where statutory protection expires or is lost,
anyone is free to
copy.’
See also:
Aruba
Construction (Pty) Ltd v Aruba Holdings (Pty) Ltd
2003 (2) SA 155
© 171 - 172
19. This principle
is reinforced particularly in the law relating to passing-off whereas
as a matter of policy passing-of relief
is excluded in the case of
the shape or configuration of functional or utilitarian articles or
components of functional or utilitarian
articles.
20. In John
Waddington Ltd v Arthur & Harris (Pty) Ltd
1968 (1) SA 38
(T),
(upheld on appeal
1968 (3) SA 405
(T) the Court stated (at 407H-408A)
‘
Once
the patent of, say a machine, has expired, the rights to the making
and selling of that machine became public property.
I conceive
the position to be that anyone can then go to the patents office and
get a copy of the specifications. I think
he is then entitled
to copy those and make a machine, line to line, angle for angle, also
as to the length, width, thickness and
quality of materials exactly
the same as the machine that had been patented… He is entitled
to make an exact replica.’
See also
Benchairs
Ltd v Chair Centre Ltd
[1974] RPC 429
435-436
21. In Agriplas
(Pty) Ltd v Andrag & Sons (Pty) Ltd
1981 (4) SA 973
(C) 881H, the
Court after reviewing the authorities stated:
‘
It
seems to me therefore that on purely logical grounds that reputation
and goodwill for which a trader can seek protection must
relate to
the non-functional elements only and that purely functional elements
of the article can in the absence of a statutory
or contractual
limitation be freely copied. It follows that the get-up which
the competing trader cannot relates to the non-functional
elements
only.’
In making these
comments the learned departed from the decision in
William
Lasar v Sabon Precision Machine Co (Pty) Ltd
1954 2 PHA 37
c/f
Daimler Chrysler Aktiengesellschaft v Afinta Motor Corporation (Pty)
Ltd
[2001] 2 All
SA 219
(T) 230a-231h
Weber-Stephen
Products Co v Alrite Engineering (Pty) Ltd
(supra)
22.
It is submitted that public policy has set its face against the
monopolisation of functional shapes in the absence of statutory
protection such as a design registration or patent protection.”
[19]
I do not think the passages and references to the case law leads to
the inevitable conclusion that a passing-of cannot be said
to have
occurred if the brand name of a product is not its essentially
recognisable feature, but its shape is.
[20]
It is common cause that the Respondents supplied the parts of pumps
and the MP Pumps with its own trade name affixed to the
pumps to
specific consumers such as the sugar industry and not to the general
public. The consumers of the Respondents’ pumps
could not
possibly have been under any misapprehension that what were sold to
them were not Broquet pumps but pumps manufactured
by the First
Respondent given the long history of the initial manufacture and
cloning of parts of the Broquet pumps by the predecessors
to the
First Respondent and later the manufacture of the MP pumps by the
First Respondent. The probabilities are simply overwhelmingly
in
favour of the fact that the specific consumers knew that they were
not purchasing Broquet pumps and any evidence in the affidavits
to
that effect was in any event based on inconclusive speculation and
hearsay.
[21]
I therefore conclude that the Applicant has failed to establish that
leg of its application.
[22]
I now consider the amended portion of the Applicant’s
application dealing with unlawful competition.
[23]
The deponent to the Applicant’s founding affidavit referred to
the turnover of its business in South Africa in Euros
which I was
invited to multiply by 10 to provide the South African equivalent in
Rands. The Applicant’s turnover in new pumps
was R221 500.00 in
1993 and peaked at R1 058 180.00 in 1998. Thereafter a downward trend
was noticeable with all sales terminating
by 2005 when the turnover
reached the zero mark with regard to new pumps and R6 400.00 in
respect of spare parts supplied. It is
this decline in business that
caused the Applicant to launch investigations and to determine,
probably correctly, that the decline
in business was due to the
activities of the First Respondent.
[24]
Competitive trading is unlawful if it involves a wrongful
interference with another trader’s rights and is actionable
in
terms of the
lex aquilia
if it directly results in loss.
The test for wrongfulness is one of fairness and honesty having
regard to the
boni mores
and the general sense of justice of
the community. Questions of public policy may be important in a
particular case, for
example the importance of a free market and
competition.
SCHULTZ
v BUTT
[4]
[24]
For this leg of the application the Applicant relied heavily on the
admission by the First Respondent that it used the Applicant’s
brochure and infringed the Applicant’s copyright. The
explanation advanced on behalf of the First Respondent that it did
not copy the performance graphs directly from material of the
Applicant but was given the material by Rely Precision Casting when
it purchased its business as a going concern did not sit well with
the deponent to the Applicant’s affidavit. He says
this
explanation lacks candour and should therefore be rejected as false.
Given the history of the First Respondent I do
not necessarily agree
that this infringement was based on the bad faith alleged on the
Applicant’s behalf. It had ceased
to be any kind of competitor
at all since 2005 and it was only during November 2009 that a letter
was addressed to the First Respondent
on behalf of the attorneys
acting on behalf the Applicant to address the issue of passing off.
The allegation of infringement
of copyright was not addressed in this
letter but in fairness to the Applicant it may not have known about
it at that stage.
Suffice it to say that I do not think that
the infringement of the Applicant’s copyright, which may occur
even if not done
in a direct and deliberate manner, ought to be given
the weight that the Applicant attaches to it.
[25]
On behalf of the Applicant considerable reliance was placed on the
facts and conclusions reached in the case of
Shultz v Butt
supra. I can do no better than quote the relevant argument from
the Applicant’s heads of argument:
“
17.
As noted in the
locus classicus
in the field,
Schultz v Butt
:
“
In
order to succeed in an action based on unfair competition, the
plaintiff must establish all the requisites of Aquilian liability,
including proof that the defendant has committed a wrongful act.
In such a case, the unlawfulness which is a requisite of
Aquilian
liability may fall into a category of clearly recognized illegality….
But it is not limited to unlawfulness of
that kind. In the Dun
and Bradstreet case supra at 218 CIRBETT J referred to the fact that
in the cases of Geary & Son
(Pty) Ltd v Gove (supra) and
Combrinck v De Kock
(1887) 5 SC 405
emphasis was placed upon criteria
such as fairness and honesty in competition and said:
“
Fairness
and honesty are themselves somewhat vague and elastic terms but,
while they may not provide a scientific or indeed infallible
guide in
all cases to the limits of lawful competition, they are relevant
criteria which have been used in the past and which,
in my view, may
be used in the future in the development of the law relating to
competition in trade.”
18.
The relief sought by the applicant in prayer (c) of its notice of
motion, as it is sought to be amended, is based on the law
as it is
stated
Schultz v Butt
.
The applicant does not contend that the reverse engineering (i.e.
duplication) of its valves is
per se
unlawful, but it is existence of extraneous factors – some
special unfairness in what has been done – that has rendered
the copying unlawful.
19.
The facts in
Schultz v Butt
are illustrative of the manner in which copying can be rendered
unlawful. It will be recalled that Schultz had, in that case,
reverse engineered a boat hull designed and developed by Butt and had
then spent some hours (600 in total) “re-working”
it.
Schultz then sold boats, including the copied hull, in competition
with Butt. In addition, Schultz registered a
design right in
respect of a boat including an identical hull to that which had been
developed by Butt.
20.
In that case, the court made it clear that the boat hull which had
been reversed engineered by Schultz was in the public domain
and that
there was nothing confidential about it. It added tlhat:
“
Anyone
may ordinarily make anything produced by another which is in the
public domain: One may freely and exactly copy it
without his
leave and without payment of compensation.”
21.
The court went on, however, to make clear that the question in that
case (as in this case) is:
“
Whether
one may lawfully copy the product of another but whether A, in making
a substantially identical copy, with the use of B’s
mould, of
an article made by B, and selling it in competition with B, is
engaging in unfair competition.”’
[26]
I do not consider that the facts in the
Shultz
v Butt
case compare favourably to the
facts in the present application. The use of the specifications of
the Brouquet pump was freely
available and there is an absence of the
contemporaneous and dishonest type of activity so apparent in the
Schultz v Butt
case. The Applicant could apparently not have cared less about its
pumps in South Africa for the period 2005 to November 2009 when
it
ought to have known that it had pumps working in the sugar industry
that will at least require replacement parts from time to
time.
[27]
As it is the duty of the court to assess the general sense of justice
of the community or
boni mores
in determining the aspect of unlawfulness of competition in the
trade, I should record that having regard to all the facts in this
case the actions of the First Respondent do not provoke in me any
sense of moral indignation. Such competition as there were has
therefore not been shown by the Applicant to warrant the label of
unfairness.
[28]
It follows that the application must fail on this leg as well.
[29]
In the answering affidavit on behalf of the First Respondent it was
immediately conceded that the performance graphs and its
publication
constituted an infringement of copyright and a tender was made to
refrain from continuing to do so. The fact that prayer
1 of the
Notice of Motion has to be granted does not necessarily mean that the
Applicant will be entitled to the costs of this
application. The
infringement of copyright formed part of the evidence for the other
and more material relief sought and in that
the Applicant was
singularly unsuccessful. It is not possible to separate the costs
incurred in respect of the copyright infringement
from the overall
costs of the application.
[30]
I intend to deprive the Respondents of the costs of the interlocutory
applications as the application for amendment of the
Notice of Motion
has been granted. The Applicant will not be awarded the costs of the
application for the amendment as it should
have asked for the relief
it subsequently sought at the stage when the application was
launched. Although there was some merit
in the First Respondent’s
application to strike out, I have mentioned elsewhere in this
judgment that this constituted an
unnecessary exercise and the
Applicant ought not to be burdened with the costs of this
application. To avoid any confusion
I intend to disallow all
the costs incurred in respect of the interlocutory applications
(excluding the opposed application for
condonation) including heads
of argument filed pursuant thereto.
[31]
I therefore make the following orders:
(a)
Interdicting and restraining the Respondents from infringing the
Applicant’s copyright subsisting in its BBMC performance
graph
and in its brochures for its BROQUET BBMC pump indicated in annexure
“OB 5” to annexure “OB 8” to
the founding
affidavit, by reproducing and/or copying and/or marking adaptations
of these works and/or distributing copies thereof
is granted.
(b)
The Applicant is ordered to pay the Respondents costs including the
costs consequent on the employment of two (2) counsel where
applicable, and the costs will include the Respondents costs incurred
in the application for condonation for the late filing by
the
Applicant of its replying affidavit.
(c)
There will be no orders of costs in respect of the interlocutory
applications.
MBATHA
J
Date
of hearing: 23 September 2011
Date
of Judgment: 15 May 2012
Counsel
for the Applicant: Adv G.D. Marriott SC
Instructed
by: D M KISCH ATTORNEYS
Locally
represented by:
SHEPTSTONE
& WYLIE
24
Richefond Circle
Ridgeside
Office Park, Umhlanga Rocks
c/o
35 Samora Machel Street (Aliwal Street)
DURBAN
Counsel
for the Respondents: Adv G.E. Morley SC
Instructed
by: ADAMS & ADAMS ATTORNEYS
3
rd
floor, Lincoln House
30
Dullah Omar Road (Masonic Grove)
DURBAN
[1]
2000
(1) SA 1
(CC)1 (para 105)
[2]
1981
(4) SA 706D
& CLD at 712 H
[3]
1977
(2) SA 916
AD
[4]
1986
(3) SA 667
AD