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[2013] ZAKZDHC 6
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Twelve Apostles Church in Church and Another v Twelve Apostles Church in Christ and Others (11249/2010) [2013] ZAKZDHC 6 (16 January 2013)
KWAZULU – NATAL HIGH COURT,
DURBAN
IN THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
REPORTABLE
Case no: 11249/2010
In the matter between:
THE TWELVE APOSTLES’ CHURCH IN
CHRIST .
...................................
First
Applicant
CAESAR NONGQUNGA
......................................................................
Second
Applicant
And
THE TWELVE APOSTLES’ CHURCH IN
CHRIST
...............................
First
Respondent
NAPHTALI VUSUMUZI MLANGENI
................................................
Second
Respondent
MMELELI JOCKONIA KHUMALO
.......................................................
Third
Respondent
JUDGMENT
MADONDO J
Introduction
[1] This is an application for an
order directing the respondents to deliver to the applicants` legal
representatives an adjustment
and reconciliation account pursuant to
paragraphs (iv) and (v) of Judge K Pillay’s order of 26
February 2009 under case number:
902/2000, paragraph (v) as amended
by paragraph 32 of the Full Bench of KwaZulu-Natal Provincial
Division appeal judgment handed
down by Govern J on 15 February 2010
under case number: 488/2009.
[2] In the alternative the applicants
seek an order directing the respondents to deliver an adjustment and
reconciliation audited
account alternatively account, which should
encompass and detail the following in respect of the period January
2000 to date of
compliance.
“
1(a)
a detailed analysis and breakdown of:
valuations
in respect of all properties;
proof
of all rates, taxes, water, electricity and sewerage charges levied
and proof of payment thereof;
all
leases in respect of such immovable properties including full
details of rentals received, deposits and invoices in respect
thereof;
proof
of all alleged improvements including payments made in respect
thereof together with all supporting vouchers and documents;
all
receipts of monies to be accounted for, in respect of the period
2000 to date;
a
list of all bank accounts of whatsoever nature held at whatever
institution, either in the Republic of South Africa and abroad;
bank
statements in respect of the accounts referred to in paragraph (vi)
supra from 2000 to date;
copies
of all cheque stubs that were issued for the same period above;
copies
of all and every deposit slip reflecting deposits into any bank
account of the same period above;
a
schedule of EFT transfers reflecting payments of the bank accounts
and copies of proof of such EFT transfers for the same period
above;
a
schedule of the above payments including the legal or factual basis
upon which such payments were made;
copies
of all tax returns prepared and submitted by the First and Second
Respondents for the same period above;
complete
disclosure of all stocks and shares held in all Public Companies
listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in the name
of the First
and Second Respondents or in the name of any person(s) acting for or
on behalf of the First and Second Respondent
for the same period
above;
complete
disclosure of all stocks and shares held in all Private Companies in
the name of the First and Second Respondents or
in the name of any
person(s) acting for or on behalf of the First and Second Respondent
for the same period above;
complete
disclosure of all monies removed from the First Respondent’s
bank account that was not related in the normal course
of business
for the same period above;
all
unused cheque books, deposit books, books of accounts, journals and
other books required for the continued administration
of the affairs
of the First and Second Respondents;
all
monies received by the First Respondent in respect of tithes;
all
monies paid out by or disbursed by either the First or Second
Respondents setting forth the date and amount of each payment,
the
name of the payee and the reason for each payment together with all
supporting vouchers and documentation;
all
the First Respondent’s books of account, statements and
records in the First and/or Second Respondent’s possession.”
[3] Further, the applicants seek an
order granting them leave to reinstate the matter for hearing on the
date to be arranged with
the Registrar for relief set out in
paragraph 2(a) – (e) of the Notice of Application. In the
aforesaid paragraphs the applicants
seek the following reliefs:
“
2 (a) an
order directing the first and second respondents to debate the said
account with the first and second applicants within
two weeks from
the date upon the accounted referred to in paragraph 1(b) of the
Notice of Application was rendered to the first
and second
applicants;
failing agreement thereupon by the
respective parties, one Konrad Buchner, an auditor in the firm of
accountants, namely, Price
Water House Cooper be and is hereby
appointed as referee to effect and finalise such account and to
debate same;
(c) determination of the account which
is due to the first applicant pursuant
thereto;
(d) judgment in the amount so
determined;
(e) costs of the proceedings on a
scale as between attorney and client.”
[4] Further, that an order that in the
event of the First and/or Second Respondent failing to comply with
the provisions of paragraph
1(a) and (b) of the Notice of
Application, applicants are granted leave on notice to the
respondents to amend their Notice of Application,
by filing a
supplementary affidavit in support thereto, setting forth the amount
which it contends to be due to it.
[5] Lastly, that in the event of the
respondents failing to comply with paragraph 1 of this order the
Sheriff shall be authorised
and directed to attach all records,
statements, accounts and documents pertaining to the applicants in
respondents’ possession
and to hand the same over to the
applicants’ attorneys of record.
[6] Paragraphs iv and v of Judge K
Pillay provides:
“
(iv)
The First and Second Defendants are directed to render to the First
Plaintiff within two months from the date of this judgment
a true and
proper statement of account together with sustaining documents
reflecting all transactions relating to First Plaintiff’s
income, assets, expenditure and liabilities that have been within
their possession or control since 1 December 1996.
(v)
The First and Second Defendants are directed to debate the said
account with the First Plaintiff within one month of the date
it was
rendered in terms of paragraph 1a above.”
[7] Paragraph 32 of Judge Gorven’s
order provides:
“
1.
The Appeal succeeds in respect of paragraph (v) of the order which is
amended to read as follows:
The
first plaintiff is given leave to set the account down for
debatement on notice to the defendants.
2.
Save for paragraph 1, hereof, the appeal is dismissed with costs.”
Parties
[8] The first applicant is the Twelve
Apostles’ Church in Christ, a religious association duly
registered as such in terms
of the laws of the Republic of South
Africa, and having its principal place of administration in East
London.
[9] The second applicant is Caesar
Nongqunga, a major male Chief Apostle and President of the first
applicant.
[10] The first respondent is the
Twelve Apostles Church in Christ, a religious association duly
registered as such in terms of the
laws of the Republic of South
Africa, having its principal place of administration at Umgababa
Headquarters and Mission, South
Africa.
[11] The second respondent is Naphtali
Vusumuzi Mlangeni, an major male chief apostle of the first
respondent.
[12] The third respondent is Mmeleli
Jockonia Khumalo, a major male treasurer of the first respondent and
the member of executive.
Background
[13] The Twelve Apostles Church in
Christ herein after referred to as the “mother church”
was founded during 1973 by
one Phakathi who became its first
President, and the Chief Apostle. He died on 6 September 1994. After
his death, four apostles
constituted themselves as a Board of
Apostles. The said apostles were Mlangeni,i Gelem, Khumalo and the
second applicant.
[14] The Board of Apostles was created
on 17 September 1994 as a temporary measure to step into the shoes of
the deceased pending
the appointment of the president. However, the
constitution of the church did not make provisions for such board.
[15] After the death of Phakathi the
assets of the mother church were sold by certain apostles without the
authority of the central
church and the Board of Trustees. In order
to prevent the dissipation of the church assets the second applicant
took a legal action.
However, the action was eventually settled by
the signing of the settlement agreement by the aforesaid functional
apostles. They
signed the agreement as the individuals of the church
and not in their respective capacities, this was also partly done in
order
to protect the wife of Phakathi (the deceased), who had
misappropriated church moneys from being prosecuted and possibly
thrown
into jail.
[16] The settlement agreement provided
inter alia for the dissolution of the mother church and the formation
of two separate churches
in its place under the leadership of the
second applicant and second respondent respectively, as well as the
division of the assets
owned by the mother church equally between the
two new churches. However, the assets were never transferred in terms
of the agreement,
and some of the bank accounts were operated and
used by the second respondent’s faction.
[17] At the Central Council meeting
held on 6 January 1996 the second applicant explained how the mother
church was dissolved and
the rationale for such dissolution. Members
of the church that attended the said meeting mandated the second
applicant to take
the settlement agreement to court for annulment.
The settlement agreement was according to the Central Council meeting
unconstitutional
and therefore not binding on the church. At no stage
did the Central Council, Board of Trustees or the mother Church
ratify or
adopt the settlement agreement. The four signatories
thereto had no authority to dissolve the church.
[18] At the Central Council meeting
held on 24 January 2000, it was resolved that the resolution taken on
6 January to institute
legal action with a view to having the
settlement annulled and the second applicant installed as the
president of the church should
be implemented. The result of the
settlement agreement had been that the church was divided into two
factions, one belonging to
the second applicant, named Twelve
Apostles; Church in Christ, and the other to Mlangeni bearing the
same name.
[19] The first applicant then
instituted application proceedings under case number: 902/2000 in
which it inter alia; sought an order
declaring the settlement
agreement to be null and void and of no force and effect and relief
consequent upon the order. The second
applicant sought an order
declaring him the true successor to Siqu David Phakathi (the
deceased) as Chief Apostle and President
of the first applicant. On
26 February 2009 the court granted the reliefs sought by the
applicants, and included in such reliefs
were paragraphs (iv) and
(v), which the respondents are presently required to comply with.
[20] The respondents appealed against
the judgment of K Pillay J to the Full Bench of KwaZulu-Natal, Natal
Provincial Division.
Save for amendment to paragraph (v) of the order
as contained in paragraph 32 of Gorven J’s order, the appeal
was dismissed
with costs on 15 February 2010.
[21] The respondents then appealed
against the Full Bench judgment to the Supreme Court of Appeal, and
the appeal was once again
dismissed with costs on 18 August 2010.
[22] In compliance with the order of K
Pillay J the first respondents’ attorneys addressed a letter to
the applicants on 23
March 2010 in which they confirmed the first
respondent’s intention to fully give effect to the aforesaid
judgment. They
stated that the first respondent undertook to return
to the mother church the properties listed in annexures “C”
and
“D” to the Particulars of Claim. Further, that
following the purported settlement, which the court declared to be
invalid,
the second respondent on 6 January 1996 formed a new church
with its own constitution and members and had collected tithes from
such members and otherwise accumulated funds and acquired assets.
Further, that during the course of the
bona fide
possession of
the aforesaid properties by the respondents numerous improvements
were effected to the said properties. According
to the respondents`
attorneys such improvements increased the value of the properties and
that therefore the respondents are entitled
to be compensated.
Lastly, they stated that, the settlement agreement having been
declared invalid, the properties allocated to
the second applicant
should similarly be reverted to the mother church.
[23] In a letter dated 16 April 2010
the applicants’ attorneys indicated to the respondents’
attorneys that the information
furnished was inadequate and
insufficient in the following respects:
(a) the respondents did not furnish a
list of all the applicant’s assets, except the Umgababa Mission
Head Office to which
they claimed improvements, and Shakas’
Kraal;
(b) no income and expenditure incurred
during the period under review was provided in as much as proof
thereof was not furnished;
(c) a list of assets acquired during
the period of existence of the nullified settlement agreement was not
furnished;
(d) liabilities incurred during the
period under review were not disclosed;
(e) no title deeds and/or permission
to occupy in terms of the applicants’ immovable assets were
provided;
(f) a true and proper account of
monies collected in the form of titles etc from the congregants
rendered; and
(g) banking statements were also not
provided.
According to the applicants no proper
account was ever received from the first and second respondents.
[24] On 22 September 2010 the
applicants instituted civil contempt of court proceedings under case
number: 11247/2010 in which they
sought an order in the following
terms:
“
1.
That is declared that the First and Second Respondents are in
contempt of the order of this Honourable Court granted on the 26
th
February
2009 and as amended by the Full Bench of the Natal Provincial
Division on the 15
th
February
2010, annexed hereto marked “CN3” and CN4”
respectively.
That
the First and Second Respondents are:
committed
to jail for contempt of court and for a period to be determined by
the above Honourable Court, alternatively fined
an amount of
R100.000,00 for such contempt or such other amount as this
Honourable Court in its discretion, may deem appropriate,
alternatively
directed
to comply within five (5) days with the terms and provisions of
annexure’s “CN3 “and “CN4”
hereto,
failing which the respondents are committed to jail for contempt
of court and for a period to be determined by the
above court,
alternatively fined an amount of R100 000.00 for such contempt or
such other amount as this court in its discretion,
may deem
appropriate.
That
the respondents pay the costs of this application on an attorney
and client scale.
3.
That the Applicants be granted such alternative relief as this above
Honourable Court may deem just “
This application has been referred for
oral evidence on 25 and 26 February 2013.
Issue
[25] The crisp question for decision
in this matter is whether the applicants are in law entitled to bring
an application for an
order directing the respondents to comply with
paragraphs (iv) and (v) of Judge K Pillay’s order, the latter
as amended by
the Full Bench of KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Division,
while the civil proceedings for contempt of court against the
respondents,
arising from their failure to comply with the aforesaid
order, are still pending before this court.
[26] All orders of court, whether
correctly or in correctly granted, have to be obeyed until set aside.
See Culverwell v Beira
1992 (4) SA 490(W)
494A; Jubhai v Minister of
Home Affairs [2007] 4 all SA 778(T) para 51. Thus, civil contempt
proceedings exist in order that court
orders stemming from civil
proceedings may be brought to a logical conclusion by the imposition
of a penalty in order to vindicate
the Court’s authority. See
also
Witham v Holloway
[1995] 131 ALR 40
(HC) of Australia at
407-408.
[27] The order in question is, in my
view, clear and unambiguous and capable of enforcement. See Thutha v
Thuta 2008(3) SA 494(TkH).
The existence of the respondents`
obligation to render proper account arises from K Pillay J’s
order, as amended. Secondly,
the respondents dealt with monies
belonging to the first applicant and income derived from its
properties. Therefore, they are
in law and in fact obliged to furnish
the first applicant with the statement of account. See
Musca v
Musca and another 1995(4) SA 814(T) 818B-C.
Millions of Rands
worth tithes that would have been paid to the mother church have been
paid to the first respondent. In the result,
the first applicant is
entitled to be furnished with an account which will enable it to
establish with certainty what has happened
to its assets and funds.
Also, without the required information it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for the applicants to
ascertain the amount due and
payable by the respondents. See
Doyle and another v Fleet Motors
PE (Pty) 1971(3) SA 760(A) at 767H; Krige v Van Dijk Executors 1918AD
110 and Mia v Cachalia 1934AD.
[28] The respondents concede that they
became obliged to render within two months after 18 August 2010 the
statement of account
and sustaining documents referred to in
paragraph (iv). It is trite that the account should be of sufficient
particularity in order
to enable the first and second applicants to
debate same. See
Doyle case, supra, at 763,767; Jones v Bailey
1974(2) SA 580(D).
[29] It is common cause that the
applicants have already received an account which they aver that it
is in sufficient in the following
respects:
(a) what the opening balances were in
respect of the account;
(b) what withdrawals or deposits had
been made into the account;
(c) what debits or credits had been
effected;
(d) how the interest earned had been
computed;
(e) when and how withdrawals were made
and what the amounts is in respect of such withdrawals were;
(f) there were no supporting documents
or vouchers, the limited documents annexed do not identify the cause
or basis for any payments
made out of the accounts and there was no
evidence as to what happened to fixed deposits and credit balances in
respect of closed
accounts.
[30] The general principle laid down
in Doyle case, supra at 767H is that a plaintiff, who is entitled to
an account and receives
one which he avers, is inadequate, is
entitled to press his claim for a due and proper account. See also
Krige v Van Dijk Executors 1918AD 110 at 121
and M
ia v
Cachalia
1934 AD 102.
[31] The plaintiff is entitled to
insist on his claim for the delivery of an account provided he can
establish a
prima facie
case for relief sought. See
Dale
Street Congregational Church v Hendrickse en ‘n ander 1992(1)
SA 133(Cka) 134F.
[32] The respondents state that the
statement of account with supporting documents as required by Madam
Justice Pillay’s order
was rendered on 21 December 2010. The
applicants aver that such account was inadequate and insufficient in
various respects, as
indicated above.
[33] If the applicants have received
all the required and available information, it would no longer be
proper and right for them
to seek an order directing the respondents
to render an account. In order to decide whether to order the
rendering of a proper
account, I have to inquire into and determine
the issue of sufficiency. See
Doyle case, supra, at 763B.
[34] Though the respondents are
adamant that an account was rendered to the applicants they are
silent on the adequacy and sufficiency
of such account. There is
nothing to suggest let alone to show that the issues complained of
have been addressed to such an extent
that the applicants are in a
position to determine what the true position of the first applicant’s
estate is, as a consequence,
there is nothing gainsaying the version
of the applicants in this regard. In my view, furnishing of
sufficient account and full
information will make it possible for the
applicants to make a full examination of the books and records and
determine whether
any funds have been siphoned out or embezzled. See
Zalow Mauer Berger Ltd
1936 CPD 205
at 208 per Jones J.
[35] It has been argued on behalf of
the applicants that they are entitled to approach this court for
relief sought. To the contrary,
the respondents contend that the
applicants’ remedy for failure to obey the order is to
institute contempt proceedings against
the respondents not by seeking
a fresh order in the same terms. The applicants have under case
number: 11247/2010 sought an order
to commit the respondents for
contempt of court for failure to obey paragraphs iv and v of K Pillay
J’s order and this application
has been referred for oral
evidence. The respondents contend, further, that the issue between
the parties is already before the
court in an earlier application and
that this application is vexatious. According to the respondents the
present application is
fatally misconceived in all respects and
should therefore be dismissed with costs. It is the respondents’
contention that
the applicants have sought the wrong remedy and that
they should have sought to enforce the order by contempt proceedings.
In the
applicants’ argument the order sought under case number:
11247/2010 only penalises the respondents for their failure to comply
with the court’s order.
[36] The respondents contend that
since the issue between the parties is before court in the
application referred to above the present
application is vexations.
In support of their contention in this regard, they rely on the
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal
in Nestle (South Africa)
(Pty) Ltd v Mars Inc
2001 (4) SA 542
(SCA) para 16. In the said case
the court held that once a suit has been commenced before a tribunal
that is competent to adjudicate
upon it, the suit must generally be
brought to its conclusion before that tribunal and should not be
replicated (
lis alibi pendens
). See also
Socratis v
Grindstone Investments 2011(6) SA 325 (SCA) para 13,
in this
regard.
[37] A court has a jurisdiction to
stay an action brought before it where a similar action is already
proceeding in another court.
When dealing with an exception of
lis
pendens
Smith J in Miclianelson v Lowestein
1905, TS 324
said the
following:
“
It
seems to me that this exception is not absolute bar, but that it is a
matter within the discretion of the court to decide whether
an action
brought before it should be stayed pending the decision of another
previously brought between the same parties, for the
same course and
in respect to the same subject matter, or whether it is more just and
equitable that it should be allowed to proceed.”
[38] However, the matter must have
been submitted for decision between the same parties, regarding the
same subject matter and arising
from the same cause of action because
when a law suit has been commenced it ought then and there also to be
brought to a finish.
See
Osman v Hector
1933 CPD 503
at 507.
[39] In Mc Henry v Lewis 22 ch.D397 at
400 Jesse MR said:
“
In
this country, where the two actions are by the same man in courts
governed by the same procedure, and where the judgments are
followed
by the same remedies it is prima facie vexatious to bring two actions
where one will do.”
This is in accordance with our law and
the same principle is applicable.
[40] In Painter v Strais
1951 (3) SA
307(T)
at 312, it was held that to bring two actions in one court in
regard to the same matter is prima facie vexatious, and the same
could be said where the actions are brought in different courts.
There is a room for the application of that principle only where
the
same dispute between the same parties, is sought to be placed before
the same tribunal (or two tribunals with equal competence
to end the
dispute authoritatively). In the absence of any of those elements
there is no potential for a duplication of actions.
[41] In Cape Times v Union Trades
Directories and others 1956(1) SA 105 (N) at 121E, it was held that
punishment for a civil contempt
per se, must always be for the
purpose of coercing the offender to do or refrain from doing
something in accordance with an order
obtained against him, and not
merely punitive. In Naidu v Naidoo 1993(4) SA 542(D) 544 the court
held:
“
a
litigant has no locus standi to seek an order for contempt arising
out of a breach of an order obtained in a civil proceedings
where the
punishment is not calculated to coerce compliance with the order.”
[42] However, civil proceedings for
contempt of court need not always have the object of compelling
performance of the court’s
order but may be brought for the
sole purpose of punishing the respondent. In Cape Times case, supra,
at 120D, it was held that
punishment by way of fine or imprisonment
for the civil contempt of an order of court made in civil proceedings
is only imposed
where it is inherent in the order made that
compliance with it can be enforced only by means of such punishment.
[43] The object of proceedings that
are concerned with the unlawful and intentional refusal or failure to
comply with an order of
court is the imposition of a penalty in order
to vindicate the courts’ honour. In this case the applicants
aver that the
contempt order sought is for punitive purposes. The
applicants sought an order declaring that the respondents are in
contempt of
the order granted by K Pillay J on 26 February 2009 as
amended by the Full Bench of KwaZulu-Natal on 15 February 2010, and
committing
them to jail or directing them to pay fine. I agree that
to this extent the order sought in this regard is punitive in nature.
However, seeking in the alternative an order directing the
respondents to comply with K Pillay J’s order within five (5)
days of the order, failing which the respondents will face
imprisonment or a fine changes the scenario. On the whole the order
sought is obviously calculated to ensure compliance with the order
referred to above. It could not therefore be true and correct
that
the order sought is only punitive, but it is also coercive. In
Dazius
v Dazius 2006(6) SA 395(T) at 398A,
the court held that the form
of committal is the imprisonment or a fine. Such punitive coercion is
intended to assist the complainant
to enforce his or her remedy.
Civil contempt of court provides the ultimate sanction against the
defaulter who refuses to comply
with an order of court.
[44] When the principal object of the
proceedings is to compel the performance of the court’s order
by means of personal attachment
and committal to gaol, the
imprisonment imposed is very often suspended pending fulfilment by
the defaulter of his obligations.
Naidu and others case, supra, at
544J. The court in its discretion may deem the coercive measure
appropriate in the circumstances
of this case.
[45] In Witham v Holloway
[1995] 131
ALR 40
(CHC) of Australia at 407 – 408 the following was said:
“
Proceedings
for breach of an order or undertaking have the effect of vindicating
judicial authority as well as remedial or coercive
effect.”
In Bannatyne v Bannatyne and another
2003(2) BCLR 111(CC) para 20, it was held that contempt of court
proceedings are recognised
method of putting pressure on a defaulter
to comply with an obligation, and was also thereby elevated to a
salutary constitutional
relief.
[46] Where the imprisonment is imposed
it is usually suspended or the order may take the form of a fine with
an alternative period
of imprisonment, with a further period of
imprisonment suspended on conditions. See
Singer’s Estate v
Kotze 1960(2) SA 304(C) and Protea Holdings Ltd v Wriwt and Another
19768(3) SA 865(W) 872 C-D.
[47] As I have indicated above in the
earlier application the contempt of court proceedings are mainly
intended to induce the respondents
to comply with the order, granting
the order sought in the present application will therefore have no
different consequence, save
to duplicate the application proceedings.
In essence, the respondents are in the present application sought to
do what they are
required to do in the earlier application.
[48] Though the respondents are in law
obliged to furnish the applicants with the statement of account of
sufficient particularity
in order to enable them to debate same, I am
not satisfied that the circumstances of this case so demand before
the decision of
the court on the earlier application. There is a
dispute of fact whether or not the respondents rendered the required
statement
of account, and if they did, whether it was of sufficient
particularity. The dispute of fact inherent in the earlier
application,
in my view, still continues to exist even in the present
application. By referring the earlier application for the hearing of
oral
evidence on 25 and 26 February 2013, it is intended to establish
the sufficiency of the account the respondents allegedly rendered
to
the applicants. In the premises, it is necessary, reasonable and
appropriate to allow the contempt of court proceedings between
the
parties in the earlier application to proceed to finish.
[49] In my view, the relief sought by
the applicants in the earlier application carries a sting with it in
the event of the respondents
failing to comply with their
obligations, which the present application does not instantly have.
If the respondents were to disobey
the order sought, if granted, the
applicants would once again institute the contempt of court
proceedings, and that will only serve
to replicate applications. In
the circumstances, the contempt of court proceedings in the earlier
application are more appropriate,
effective and provide an adequate
remedy as compared to the relief sough in the present application.
[50] In the result, I am not satisfied
that the applicants have made a case for the granting of the relief
sought before the court’s
decision on the earlier application.
The application is accordingly dismissed with costs.
Date reserved: 20 November 2012
Date delivered: 16 January 2013
Counsel for Applicants: Adv Lennard
Applicant attorneys: Magigaba
Incorporated
Counsel for Respondents: Adv Southwood
SC
Respondents attorneys: AP Shangase &
Associates
Ref: TM/C2057/nn