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[2013] ZAKZPHC 48
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Smith v Flans Motors CC t/a Flanagans Panel Beaters (AR455/2012) [2013] ZAKZPHC 48 (8 October 2013)
IN THE KWAZULU-NATAL HIGH COURT,
PIETERMARITZBURG
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No: AR455/2012
In the matter between:
JARED SMITH
...................................................................................................
Appellant
and
FLANS MOTORS CC
Trading as FLANAGANS PANEL BEATERS
..............................................
Respondent
APPEAL JUDGMENT
Delivered on 08 October 2013
Vahed J:
The appellant was sued by the respondent in the Magistrate’s
Court for the district of Durban for the balance of the cost
of
repairs to his motor vehicle effected by the respondent. The claim
was based on contract, and, in the alternative, on enrichment.
The
parties were agreed that the issues be separated and in terms of
Rule 29(4) of the Magistrate’s Court Rules the learned
magistrate
a quo
directed that the issue of liability be
determined first. At the conclusion of the trial on liability the
Court
a quo
found against the appellant and determined that
he was liable to compensate the respondent for the damages suffered
by it. He
was also ordered to pay the respondent’s costs. The
appellant appeals against that finding and order.
The relevant facts are briefly as set out hereunder.
The appellant was the owner of a Renault motor-vehicle which was
insured in terms of a short-term insurance policy underwritten
by
Santam Insurance (“Santam”). On a Friday during July
2007 (the appellant could not recall the date) the vehicle
was
involved in a collision which resulted in body and perhaps also
mechanical damage being sustained by it. It was not capable
of being
driven. The appellant described his vehicle as being “quite
badly damaged”.
At the instance of the insurers, or alternatively brokers
representing it, the vehicle was towed to the respondent’s
premises for a quotation setting out the necessary repairs to be
prepared,for assessment, and for it to be repaired thereafter
once
all the necessary administrative and other preliminaries had been
attended to. It is common cause that the appellant did
not accompany
the vehicle to the respondent’s premises and it is also common
cause that at no material time did he attend
at those premises.
In the court
a quo
the respondent tendered the evidence of
two witnesses. They were Shaun Flanagan and his father Patrick Shaun
Flanagan. I shall
refer to them as “Shaun” and “Patrick”
respectively.
Shaun testified that he was employed by the respondent as a service
advisor. He personally received the appellant’s vehicle
when
it was brought there by the tow truck and he attended to the
inspection of the vehicle and the preparation of the quotation
relevant to its repair. After the quotation had been prepared the
vehicle was inspected by an assessor appointed by the insurers
who
also examined the quotation prepared by Shaun. In that process the
quotation was reviewed. The assessor determined that the
amount of
R34165,15 would be acceptable to the insurer as the cost of repairs
but also indicated that that assessment had been
performed on a
“without prejudice” basis because the insurer still had
to furnish its authorisation in order for
the respondent to proceed
with repairs.
Shaun also testified that although in the ordinary course of
business the respondent would not proceed to repair a vehicle unless
and until the insurer had furnished its authorisation, in this case
he proceeded to permit the respondent to continue with repairs
pending the receipt of that authorisation. He said that he knew that
there was a problem between the appellant and the insurers
but was
confident that that problem would be resolved before long and that
authorisation would follow thereafter. There was a
suggestion made
by him during his evidence in chief that he had also furnished a
copy of the quotation to the appellant and that
he had also
discussed the matter with the appellant but that suggestion was soon
dispelled during his cross-examination. The
upshot of his evidence
was that he firmly believed that the problem between the appellant
and the insurer would be resolved and
that in due course
authorisation for the repairs would be received from the insurers.
After the vehicle had been repaired Shaun made contact with the
appellant, delivered the vehicle to him at his place of employment,
and obtained payment from him of an amount of R2 596,24 which
represented the first amount payable (the excess) by the appellant
in terms of the policy of assurance. I pause to mention that the
quantum of the excess had been determined by the assessor, when
he
examined the vehicle and assessed the quotation, as being 5% of the
repair cost.
Patrick testified that he was the respondent’s managing member
and that he only became involved after the vehicle had been
repaired. He dealt with administrative matters, which in the present
case involved him trying to recover the balance of the repair
cost
due to the respondent after payment by the appellant of the excess.
He discovered that the insurers had repudiated the claim
under the
policy of insurance due to non-payment of premiums and thereafter
sought to recover the balance due to the respondent
from the
appellant directly. Clearly he contributed nothing to the facts upon
which this case must be decided.
The appellant testified in his defence. He recounted the
introductory matters that I have dealt with above and confirmed that
apart from the time when the repaired vehicle was delivered to him
and when he made payment of the excess, he had no interaction
whatsoever with the respondent. When the collision occurred and when
he first made contact with the insurer there had been a
problem with
the debit order process by which his insurance premiums were
collected from him on a monthly basis. At the time
of the collision
his monthly insurance premium payments were one month in arrears
because a debit order had been rejected by
his bank, presumably due
to insufficient funds being available to meet that debit order.
Arrangements for a double debit to be
made at the end of that month
were not fulfilled, the reason therefor being irrelevant for present
purposes. In the final analysis,
the appellant’s insurance
premiums had not been paid with the result that his policy of
insurance had lapsed and the claim
lodged by him as a result of the
collision had been repudiated.
The appellant did not pay the repair costs demanded of him (apart
from the excess already paid) and in due course he was sued
by the
respondent. The respondent originally based its claim purely in
contract alleging that an agreement had been concluded
between
Shaun, representing the respondent, and the appellant acting in
person. It contended that an agreement had been concluded
the effect
of which the appellant would pay for the repair costs. By subsequent
amendment the respondent introduced an alternative
claim contending,
in the event of the claim in contract failing for any reason, that
the appellant was indebted to it because
he had become enriched at
the respondent’s expense.
In his judgment the learned magistrate
a quo
apparently found
for the respondent as claimed, and went further to find that
enrichment was alsoestablished. He found both Shaun
and Patrick to
be impressive witnesses and accepted their evidence. He found the
appellant’s evidence to be improbable.
On appeal the appellant contended that the learned magistrate was
wrong when he found that a contract had been proved and was
also
wrong in finding that a claim based on enrichment had been
established by the respondent. I will deal with both these
contentions later in this judgment.
In the resisting the appeal Mr
Camp
, who appeared for the
respondent, contended that the decision of the court a quo was not
appealable at this stage. In doing so
he relied principally on the
decision in
Steenkampvs South African Broadcasting Corporation
2002 (1) SA 625
(SCA). There it was held as follows:
‘
[7]
Counsel who argued the appeal in this Court were requested beforehand
to prepare argument on the question of appealability. Additional
heads of argument were then delivered and on the day of the appeal
counsel were afforded an opportunity also to argue the merits
of the
appeal.
[8]
Appeals from magistrates' courts are governed by the provisions of
s
83
of the
Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944
.
Section 83
(b)
provides that a party to any civil suit or proceeding in the
magistrate's court may appeal to a Provincial or Local Division
of
the High Court having jurisdiction against 'any rule or order made in
such suit or proceeding and having the effect of a final
judgment . .
.'. To be appealable then, a magistrate's ruling or order must have
the effect of a final judgment.
[9]
In considering this issue the Court
a
quo
was
faced with two conflicting decisions,
SantamBpk
v Van Niekerk
1998
(2) SA 342
(C)
,
where Conradie J (Ngcobo J concurring) held that the magistrate's
finding on liability alone is not appealable, and
Raubex
Construction h/a Raumix v Armist Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd
1998
(3) SA 116 (O)
,
where Van Coppenhagen J (with whom Cillié J concurred)
held that such a finding is appealable. The Court
a
quo
aligned
itself with the decision in the
Raubex
Construction
case.
[10]
Two more judgments on the issue have since appeared. In
Keet
v De Klerk
2000
(1) SA 927
(T)
,
Southwood J (Kruger J concurring) came to the same conclusion as
Conradie J in the
Santam
case,
while in
Hendrikus
Erasmus Cloete v MbaleCladwin Botha
,
an as yet unreported judgment of the Orange Free State Division
(appeal no 137/2000 delivered on 29 March 2001), the Full Court
effectively overruled the decision in
Raubex
Construction
.
[11]
Both Southwood J in
Keet
v De Klerk
and
Malherbe JP in
Cloete
v Botha
referred
in their respective judgments to
Durban's
Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another
1999
(1) SA 982 (A)
,
a decision of this Court of which the Court
a
quo
and
counsel who appeared before it were obviously unaware. In that case
the following was said (at 992G - I):
“
In
terms of
s 83
(b)
of
the
Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944
any ''rule'' or ''order'', to
be appealable, has to have ''the effect of a final judgment''.
The difficulty that arises in
relation to the kind of order
considered in the
Santam
and
Raubex
Construction
cases
is that it does not finally dispose of any portion of the relief
claimed (cf
Van
Streepen& Germs (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial
Administration
1987
(4) SA 569 (A)
at
585F - G); nor can an order of this kind be regarded as a declaratory
order since a magistrate has no jurisdiction to make such an
order. (Compare
SA
Eagle VersekeringsmaatskappyBpk v Harford
[1992] ZASCA 42
;
1992
(2) SA 786
(A)
at
792H.)”
[12]
Counsel for the respondent contended that what was said in the
Durban's Water Wonderland
case about the appealability of the magistrate's finding was
obiter
and that
Raubex Construction
was
correctly decided. Counsel conceded that the magistrate's
finding in favour of the plaintiff on the issue of liability
only
cannot be a declaratory order since a magistrate has no competence to
issue a declaratory order. He argued accordingly that
the emphasis
should be on the effect of such an order and because the order is
final in its effect, in the sense that it cannot
be altered by the
magistrate, it is appealable. It is true that what was said in
Durban's Water Wonderland
concerning the appealability of a magistrate's order on the
issue of liability only is an
obiter
dictum
, but this Court will not
lightly depart from a view previously expressed by it, particularly
by five of its members sitting together,
even if expressed
obiter
.
As will appear below I am not persuaded that this Court should depart
from that view.
[13]
In the course of his judgment in the
Raubex
Construction
case
Van Coppenhagen J refers to a number of decisions of this Court which
deal with the appealability of orders or rulings of the
High Court in
terms of s 20(1) of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. A comprehensive
re-examination of those decisions will serve
no purpose. But one
of them is
Zweni
v Minister of Law and Order
1993
(1) SA 523
(A)
,
where the following was said (at 532J - 533A):
“
8.
A ''judgment or order'' is a decision which, as a general principle,
has three attributes, first, the decision must be final
in effect and
not susceptible of alteration by the Court of first instance;
second, it must be definitive of the rights of
the parties; and,
third, it must have the effect of disposing of at least a substantial
portion of the relief claimed in the main
proceedings (
Van
Streepen& Germs (Pty) Ltd
case
supra
at
586I - 587B;
Marsay
v Dilley
[1992] ZASCA 114
;
1992
(3) SA 944
(A)
at
962C - F).”
Van Coppenhagen J then says (in
Raubex Construction
at 123G - 124B):
“
Ditkomvir my
as logiesvoordat die woorde ''order'' en ''judgment'' soosdit in art
83
(b)
van die Wet op Landdroshowe
32 van 1944 voorkom, dieselfdebetekenis het as diédeur Harms
AR in die
Zweni
saak
supra
aan
die woorde in art 20(1) van die Hooggeregshofwet 59 van 1959
toegeskryf. Daar is moontlik 'n enkeleverskil en wel in dermatedat
art 1 van die Wet op Landdroshowe 'n ''bevel'' of ''order''
gelykstelaan 'n vonnis.
Die
bevindingwatdeur die landdrosgeboekstaaf is ten opsigte van die
geskilpuntwatvirberegtinggedien het is in effekfinaal en
nieonderhewigaanveranderingdeur die landdrosnie. Die bevinding het
ook die effekdat finale uitsluitselgegee is ten aansien van
die
applikant se aanspreeklikheidomskadevoergoeding, sonderom die
bedragdaarvantekwantifiseer, tebetaal. Dat die bevindingook 'n
substansiëledeel van die aansprake van die eiser - in die sin
dat die eiseraanspreeklikheid van verweerder as deel van
syskuldgrondmoesbewys het - in die aksieafgehandel het,
spreekfeitlikvanself. Die bevinding van die landdros, alhoewelnie
elegant
geformuleernie, behoortmynsinsiens as 'n bevel wat die effek
van 'n finale vonnis het, soosbedoel in art 83
(b)
van die Wet op Landdroshowe 32
van 1944 aangemerkte word. As sulks kan teen die bevel van die
landdrosgeappelleer word.”
This
reasoning was followed by the Court
a
quo
in the present matter.
[14]
The fundamental flaw in the reasoning of Van Coppenhagen J in the
Raubex
Construction
case
is this. This Court did not hold in
Zweni
that
a finding by a Superior Court in favour of a plaintiff on the
question of liability, where the merits and
quantum
were
separated, is a 'judgment or order' as envisaged by s 20(1) of the
Supreme Court Act. Quite to the contrary, this Court
held in
SA
Eagle VersekeringsmaatskappyBpk v Harford
[1992] ZASCA 42
;
1992
(2) SA 786
(A)
at
792H that such a finding 'in wese 'n verklarende bevel is en datdit
'n appelleerbareuitspraak of bevel daarstelomdat die bevinding
'n
finale en beslissendeeffek op die gedingtussen die partyegehad het'.
What makes the finding appealable is not merely the fact
that it is
final and definitive of the issue of liability, but also because
it is in essence a declaratory order. At 791D
- E of the
Harford
judgment
the following was said:
“
Die
Verhoorhof het bevinddat die appellant aanspreeklik was, en, hoewel
die skadenogniebepaal was nie, ''gave judgment for plaintiff
with
costs''. Watvermoedelikgebeurhet, is dat 'n bevel met die effek van
'n verklarende bevel dat die appellant aanspreeklik
was, gemaak
is. Immers, 'n bevel watvireksekusievatbaar was, kondit, in die
afwesigheid van 'n bepaling van die skade, nieweesnie.”
And (at 792C - D):
“
Die
stellingdat die eiser se eis op die merietetoegestaan is, maaknie sin
nieaangesiendaarnie 'n eis ten aansien van die meriete
was nie,
maar 'n eisterbetaling van skadevergoeding. . . . Die bevel is die
operatiewedeel van die uitspraak; dit is waarteengeappelleerkan
word
en ditis waaropeksekusiegehef word.”
[15] The third attribute of a
decision, for it to be a 'judgment or order' as envisaged in s 20(1)
of the Supreme Court Act,
is that 'it must have the effect of
disposing of at least a substantial portion
of the relief claimed
in the main proceedings' (
Zweni (supra
at 532J - 533A)). (My
emphasis.) The relief claimed in the main action
in casu
is
for payment of damages in the sum of R56 751,15 and interest thereon,
with costs (compare the
Harford
case
supra
at 792C
- D). No substantial portion of that relief has been disposed of. The
appellant cannot execute on the magistrate's finding.
Consequently,
such finding cannot be said to be ''n bevel wat die effek van 'n
finale vonnis het'. And, as was said in the
Santam
and
Durban's Water Wonderland
cases, a magistrate's order in
favour of a plaintiff in respect of the issue of liability cannot be
viewed as a declaratory order
since the magistrate has no
jurisdiction to issue a declaratory order.
[16] It follows that the
Raubex
Construction
case (and consequently the present matter in the
Court
a quo
) was wrongly decided. A magistrate's order in
favour of a plaintiff on the issue of liability where that issue and
the issue of
quantum
have been separated in terms of Rule
29(4) of the Magistrates' Courts Rules is not appealable.’
Ms
Northmore
, who appeared for the appellant in the appeal,
argued that that point was bad. She said so because, so she
contended, the magistrate
had made a positive finding that the
contract contended for had been proved. That being the case there
was nothing more to be
achieved at the so-called quantum leg of the
trial, and accordingly the learned magistrate delivered a final
judgment which was
appealable.
It is so that during the course of his judgment the learned
magistrate said the following:
“
I
conclude therefore, based on the conclusion and made with regards to
the telephonic conversation between [Shaun] and the [appellant]
immediately before the repairs were done, that the probability is
that the [respondent] did give the [appellant] the mandate to
proceed
with the repairs, favour the [respondent].”
However, upon a careful consideration of the learned magistrate’s
judgment, I cannot find an instance where it can be said
that he
arrived at a firm conclusion concerning the telephone call he
referred to. Admittedly, he did say that he was “...
extremely
impressed with [Shaun] and [Patrick] as witnesses”. In
addition, he did go on to say the following:
“
I am
of the view that it is highly improbable, given the circumstances of
this case, that the [respondent] would have assumed the
repairs on
the [appellant’s] motor vehicle, knowing that the insurer had
not given it authority to do so, without first consulting
with the
[appellant].”
Against that, the learned magistrate concluded his judgment with the
following order (I repeat it verbatim below):
“
The
defendant is liable to the plaintiff for damages it [the plaintiff]
incurred as a result of effecting repairs to the motor vehicle
prescribed (sic) as Renault Clio 1.4 RT with registration letters and
numbers ND 440 775 duelling July/August 2007.”
In my view, a finding of liability for DAMAGES, as against a
background where no specific finding with regard to the crucial
telephone conversation was made, points conclusively to the fact
that the learned magistrate did not find the contract to have
been
proved.
In the result it is my view that the point
in limine
with
regard to appealability is good.
In any event, and if there remains any merit in Ms
Northmore’s
point, I would still hold that the matter is not appealable. In
Jordaan v Bloemfontein Transitional Local Council
2004 (3) SA
371
(SCA) the court was dealing with an appeal concerning
appealability in similar circumstances. However in that matter there
was
first an appeal to a Full Bench of the Provincial Division.
Prior to the Full Bench appeal, in correspondence, and in heads or
argument in that Court
quantum
was conceded. The Supreme
Court of Appeal held:
‘
[15]
On the appealability point [counsel] referred to the decision of this
Court in
Steenkamp
v South African Broadcasting Corporation
2002
(1) SA 625 (SCA)
,
in which it was held that a magistrate's order on the issue of
liability only, where that issue has been separated from the
issue of
quantum
in
terms of Rule 29(4) of the Magistrates' Courts Rules, was not
appealable. He submitted that the principle laid down in that case
still applies in this matter, despite the first defendant's
concession by letter and in its counsel's heads of argument before
the Court
a
quo
,
and that the first defendant should have waited until the magistrate
gave judgment against it before appealing.
[16] In my view this contention
is correct. Section 83
(b)
, the provisions of which were
considered by this Court in
Steenkamp v South African Broadcasting
Corporation
(
supra
), provides that a party to any
civil suit or proceeding in a magistrate's court may appeal to the
Provincial or Local Division
of the High Court having jurisdiction
against 'any rule or order made in such suit or proceedings and
having the effect of a final
judgment'. The finding made by the
magistrate in this case was, on the authority of the
Steenkamp
decision, not a rule or order having the effect of a final judgment
and the first defendant's concession regarding the
quantum
of the plaintiff's claim did not convert it into such a rule or
order. The Court
a quo's
reliance on the decision in
Durban
City Council v Kistan (supra
) was misplaced. In my view it
misread the judgment in that case because the abandonment of the
costs order under consideration
there was by notice and was held at
(469H) to be one made under s 83 of the Act. Reference was made
(at 469D - G) to
Scrooby v Engelbrecht
1940 TPD 100
where it
was pointed out that abandonments can take place under s 83 as well
as outside the section. Where an abandonment of a
judgment takes
place outside the section and the party so abandoning undertakes not
to take the objection of
res judicata
in further
proceedings on the same cause of action it was envisaged that an
appeal against the judgment so abandoned could proceed,
but it was
said (at 105) that the Court in the exercise of its discretion would
probably refuse the appellant his costs of appeal.
In other words an
abandonment of a judgment 'outside the section' does not render the
judgment non-appealable as the Court
a quo
appears to
have thought. I also do not think that the power conferred on the
Court of appeal by s 87
(d)
of the Act 'to take any other
course which may lead to the just, speedy and as much as may be
inexpensive settlement of the case'
extends to doing something to a
non-appealable order to make it appealable. In the circumstances
I am of the view that the
Court
a quo's
decision that the
magistrate's finding in this case was appealable was incorrect and
that it should have made no order in the case
save for an order that
the first defendant should pay the costs.’
It will be appreciated that in
Jordaan’s
case,
notwithstanding the concession on
quantum
, something more was
still required before the magistrate’s judgment could be
considered to be appealable. That “something
more” was
the magistrate making a specific order on the
quantum
. Once
that was done finality would be achieved. That also would make the
judgment one in respect of which execution could be
levied, which is
also one of the hallmarks of a final judgment.
In the present matter the Order made by the learned magistrate was
not capable of being the subject of execution. Here too something
more was needed before the respondent could levy execution; ie.
judgment on the
quantum
.
On that authority, the present appellant ought to have waited until
the court
a quo
granted final judgment against it on the
quantum
before lodging his appeal.
If I am wrong in that regard I, in any event, proceed to consider
the question of enrichment.
There is no doubt in my mind that during the evidence led in the
court below it was clear that Shaun proceeded to allow the
respondent to undertake the repairs to the appellant’s vehicle
because he assumed that the problem between the appellant
and his
insurer would be resolved. In no uncertain terms he indicated that
he was confident that ultimately he would get payment
from the
insurer. More than once during cross-examination he indicated that
he believed that the insurance company would effect
payment.
That Shaun was mistaken in that regard is clear. The only question
is whether his mistake is excusable in the circumstances.
In the
court
a quo
reliance was placed on the case of
McCarthy
Retail Ltd vsShortdistance Carriers CC
2001 (3) SA 482
(SCA)
which found favour with the learned magistrate.
Very recently enrichment has again received the attention of the
Supreme Court of Appeal in
Capricorn Home Owners vsPotgieter
(752/2012)
[2013] ZASCA 116
(19 September 2013) where the following
was said:
‘
[20]
This brings me to the question of enrichment which was said by
counsel for the first respondent to be the ground upon which
reliance
is placed by his client for the recovery of the erroneous payment.
The general requirements underlying all enrichment
actions are that
(a) the defendant must be enriched; (b) the plaintiff must be
impoverished; (c) the defendant’s enrichment
must be at the
expense of the plaintiff and (d) the enrichment must be without cause
(
sine
causa)
ie unjustified. See
McCarthy
Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC
2001
(3) SA 482
(SCA)
at 496E. There can be no question that the appellant in this case has
been enriched. The first respondent has been impoverished.
The
appellant’s estate has been increased by the amount erroneously
transferred and this increase has been at the expense
of the first
respondent. No justification for it has been established. Someone who
has paid a sum of money or transferred property
to another
erroneously believing that it was due to that person, when in fact it
was not due, is entitled to recover the sum of
money or the property,
see
Wille’s
Principles of South African Law
9
ed (2007) at 1058.
[21]
The
condictioindebiti
is
available provided that the mistake (whether of fact or law) was
excusable. (See
Willis
Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue
[1991]
ZASCA 163
[1991] ZASCA 163
; ;
1992
(4) SA 202
(A)
at 203H;
ABSA
Bank Ltd v Leech & others NNO
2001
(4) SA 132
(SCA)
para 8.)...’
Only requirement (d) is in issue in this case and Ms
Northmore
argues that Shaun’s conduct was not excusable. I do not agree.
It is true that the respondent did not have authorisation.
It is
true also that Shaun was misguided when he thought that the insurer
would pay in due course. However, in my view his conduct
is
excusable. The vehicle was brought to the respondent’s
premises as a result of the intervention of the insurer and,
at the
behest of the insurer, an assessor attended upon the respondent’s
premises and assessed the vehicle on a without
prejudice basis, the
only formality outstanding being the insurers authorisation of
repairs. While Shaun’s conduct was
foolish it was not such
that it can be contended that it non-suits a plaintiff in an
enrichment action.
I accordingly find also that the respondent has established all the
requirements for enrichment against the appellant.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
________________
Vahed J
I agree:
________________
Nkosi J
It is so ordered:
________________
Vahed J
CASE
INFORMATION
Date of
Hearing: 02 September 2013
Date of
Judgment: 08 October 2013
Appellant’s
Attorney: Ms K J Northmore
Appellant’s
Attorneys: BiccariBollo Mariano Inc
Durban
Tel:
031 566 6769
Ref: K
Northmore/DS1079
Locally
represented by:
Tatham
Wilkes Inc
200
HoosenHaffajee Street
Pietermaritzburg
Tel:
033 345 3501
Ref: HM
Drummond/Nadia/A1059
Respondent’s
Counsel: A C Camp
Respondent’s
Attorneys: Beall Chaplin &Hathorn
Durban
Tel:
031 309 1177
Ref: A
Chaplin/vn/16/F064/003
Locally
represented by:
RandlesInc
Level
2, Mahogany Court
Redlands
Estate
1
George MacFarlane Lane
Pietermaritzburg
Tel:
033 392 8051
Ref: A
van Lingen/AM/07427 028