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[2013] ZAFSHC 223
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Congress of the People v Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality (4706/2013) [2013] ZAFSHC 223 (6 December 2013)
IN THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
No: 4706/2013
In
the matter between:-
CONGRESS
OF THE PEOPLE
…................................................................................
Applicant
and
MANGAUNG
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
…..........................................
Respondent
JUDGMENT
BY:
POHL,
AJ
HEARD
ON:
28
NOVEMBER 2013 and 2 DECEMBER 2013
DELIVERED
ON:
6
December 2013
INTRODUCTION
[1]
In this matter, the applicant, a political party known as The
Congress of the People (“COPE”) brought an urgent
application to court in which it seeks an order from the court,
ordering the respondent, the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality
to
make available to the applicant the Kaizer Sebothelo Stadium,
Botshabello, on 16 December 2013 in accordance with an agreement
between the parties.
BACKGROUND
[2]
According to the applicant, it annually hosts a rally for its members
at which rally it commemorates the “birthday celebrations”
of the applicant. This year’s annual rally is to be held
on 16 December 2013, on the Public Holiday known as Reconciliation
Day.
[3]
Initially however, during the month of February 2013, the applicant
and the defendant entered into an oral agreement in terms
of which
the respondent would make available to the applicant, the Free State
Rugby Stadium, as venue for this purpose.
[4]
On 26 July 2013, the respondent informed the applicant that the Free
State Rugby Stadium was no longer available as a consequence
of a
prior booking of the venue by FIFA (The International Football
Association). When the respondent informed the applicant
of
this prior booking of the Free State Stadium, it offered the
applicant the stadium known and described as the Kaizer Sebothelo
Stadium, Botshabello, for the purpose of holding its annual rally on
16 December 2013. The applicant then accepted this offer.
[5]
The undisputed evidence of the applicant on the papers is that:
(1)
The respondent would prepare a quotation for the use of the
facilities at the Kaizer Sebothelo Stadium situated in Botshabello
for the use on 16 December 2013.
(2)
The applicant would, if it accepted the quotation, pay the quoted
amount.
(3)
With payment an agreement was entered and concluded between the
parties in terms whereof the applicant is entitled to the use
of the
facilities known as the Kaizer Sebothelo Stadium situated in
Botshabello on 16 December 2013 for its annual celebrations.
(4)
It was an implied term of the agreement that the respondent would
take such reasonable steps to assist the applicant where necessary
with the peremptory provisions of The Safety at Sports and
Recreational Events Act, Act 2 of 2010, in so far as more than the
threshold of 2 000 people will attend the rally.
[6]
On or about 19 August 2013 the respondent then furnished the
applicant with a quotation in the amount of R10 692,00. As
part
and parcel of this quotation the respondent furnished its bank
details, to wit Absa Bank as well the relevant account number,
reference number and branch code for payment of the quotation, if
accepted.
[7]
The applicant accepted the quote and on 29 August 2013 the applicant
then duly paid the amount into the bank account of the
respondent.
[8]
It needs to be emphasized that in its opposing papers, the respondent
did not dispute any of the above-mentioned terms of the
contract
between the parties, as alleged by the applicant.
[9]
After the payment of the quoted amount, and in order to attend to the
hosting of a safe and secure rally which are,
inter
alia
, prescribed by the Safety at
Sports and Recreational Events Act, Act 2 of 2010, two meetings
were held with,
inter alia
,
with representatives of the respondent and other relevant parties on
18 September 2013 and 30 October 2013.
[10]
The applicant also completed a comprehensive application form which
was presented to the National Commissioner of The South
African
Police Services. This was a requirement the applicant had to
comply with in terms of the Safety at Sports and Recreational
Events
Act, Act 2 of 2010.
[11]
It was also agreed that a further meeting would be held between all
relevant parties on the 27 November 2013 so as to finalise
the last
outstanding issues. The applicant also contracted with a
security firm for the provision of security services at
the venue in
order to comply with Act 2 of 2010.
[12]
On
4 November 2013
the applicant received a letter of cancellation of the contract from
the respondent. This letter which was written on a letterhead
of the respondent and signed by a Mr Teboho Maine, the regional
manager, Botshabello, was addressed to the Provincial Secretary,
Congress of the People (COPE), Mr Hleko. It has the heading:
“CANCELLATION OF THE BOOKING OF COPE CELEBRATION EVENT
AT
KAIZER SEBOTHELO STADIUM, BOTSHABELLO”. For purposes of this
judgement it is extremely important to have regard to what
is said in
this letter of cancellation, or rather what is not said in this
letter. The body of the letter reads as follows:
“
This
letter is to regretfully inform you that the booking COPE celebration
event at Kaizer Sebothelo Stadium, Botshabello is being
cancelled.
We were very much on track regarding the preparations but
unfortunately
due
to unavoidable circumstances
we had to cancel the booking of this event. (My emphasis)
Please
accept our sincere apologies for the inconvenience you may have
experienced.
We
hope that you will understand and co-operate.”
[13]
On 11 November 2013 the respondent’s attorneys, Messrs Moroka
Attorneys, wrote a letter to the applicant’s attorneys
Messrs
Blair Attorneys. It once again important to have regard to the
contents of this letter, in comparison with the cancellation
letter
referred to in paragraph 12, supra. It reads as follows:
“
2.
We confirm that we have consulted with our client and have been
advised as follows:
2.1
Your client was furnished with the necessary forms to complete for
purposes of complying with the provisions of Safety at Sports
and
Recreation Events Act which forms were to be submitted to the SAPS;
2.2
There were no further forms submitted by your client confirming the
venue;
2.3
Further thereto, we are advised that your client has, up to date, not
made any payments regarding the venue and therefore since
no payment
has been received by our client, nor any prove thereon, the booking
had to be cancelled;
2.4
Should your client have conflicting view in respect herein, kindly
furnish us with prove of payment if same was made.
3.
Be advised that, the meetings allegedly held by your client and the
SAPS do not guarantee nor serves as security for the venue
and
confirmation of same can only be made when payment is received and a
lease agreement is signed.
4.
Your client was advised of the above timeously.”
[14]
What is of extreme importance in this matter is the conspicuous
absence of any of these allegations contained in the letter
of Mr
Moroka Attorneys dated 11 November 2013, in the letter of
cancellation by the respondent dated 4 November 2013, quoted above.
It is also important to have regard to the fact that when the
letter of Messrs Moroka Attorneys was written on 11 November
2013,
the money paid in lieu of the respondent’s quotation had been
sitting in the account of the respondent since 29 August
2013,
drawing interest.
[15]
It is furthermore important to have regard to the fact that in the
opposing affidavit filed by the respondent on 26 November
2013, it
does not in any way attempt to deal
ad
seriatim
with the allegations made by
the applicant in its founding affidavit, paragraph per paragraph.
It chose to attack the applicant’s
papers based on alleged lack
of urgency, lack of authority, it then briefly dealt with the merits
and the sequence of events as
it saw it and lastly it dealt with the
questions of balance of convenience and prejudice.
[16]
With regards to the alleged
lack of
authority
, the respondent’s
deponent said the following in the opposing affidavit in paragraphs
9, 11, 12 and 14 thereof:
“
9.
Mr Mzwandile indicates at paragraph 1.2 of the founding affidavit
that he is duly authorised to depose to the affidavit.
…
11.
However, Mr Mzawandile fails to attach a resolution authorising him
to prosecute the application on behalf of the applicant.
He
does not indicate which faction he comes from within the applicant
and he does not attach a resolution authorising him to act
in the
manner that he purports to.
12.
In fact, the application is brought not by a branch of the Congress
of the People but it is brought by the Congress of the People.
My understanding is that this is a national body and that the
applicant and more particularly Mr Mzwandile would have to get the
necessary resolution from the national body.
…
14.
The fact that the application is not brought by a provincial body but
by the national body means that there has to be a national
resolution
for the applicant to have brought this application.”
[17]
It is furthermore important to have regard to the fact that it is
common cause that the respondent, in its challenge of the
authority, did not make use of the procedures as contemplated by rule
7(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court. The only way it
chose to
challenge the authority of the applicant and/or the deponent of the
applicant was by the allegations alluded to above
in its opposing
affidavit.
[18]
With regards to the aspect of
urgency
the respondent alleged in its opposing affidavit that the urgency was
self-created by the applicant. The crux of these allegations
amount to the allegation that the applicant knew of the cancellation
of the booking from the 4
th
of November. The respondent then alleges that on the 11
November 2013 further correspondence was exchanged and only a further
week later, on the 18
th
November 2013 the founding affidavit was signed and the application
brought. The respondent alleges that the application
could have
been brought as far back as the period between 4 and 11 November
2013.
[19]
With regards to the merits, the respondent in his opposing affidavit
says the following:
“
THE
MERITS
18.
The hiring out of venues by the respondent is a function that is
undertaken by the respondent in order to manage and facilitate
the
use of the venues within the jurisdiction of the Mangaung
Metropolitan Municipality.
19.
The venue that is currently the subject-matter of the application is
the Kaiser Sebothelo Stadium which is situated in Botshabelo.
20.
This is one of the venues that will be used as a training ground for
the 2014 CHAN Tournament. The countries that will
be hosted by
the Respondent are the following, Ghana, Ethiopia, Libya and Congo
Brazzaville. The stadium will be used by
one of the above
mentioned four countries.
21.
The use of the venue by 22 000 members of the applicant will
cause damage to the pitch to such an extent that it will become
unusable. This will mean that one of the countries that is to
take part in the CHAN soccer tournament will not be able to
train.
Apart from the fact that this will affect the finances and the
reputation of Mangaung as a city, it will also have national
and
international repercussions as far as South Africa is concerned.
With 22 000 people attending the event it is therefore
reasonably anticipated that there will be a use of the pitch or
evading of same. In the September meeting it was also noted
and
discussed that the pitch was going to be used.”
[20]
The respondent also alleges that the CHAN tournament, being an
international football tournament, will take place
on 13
January 2014. It is thus almost a month after 16 December
2013. The respondent does not say which of the countries
will
use the relevant facility. The respondent also does not say
from when and for what length of time the football team
will make use
of this particular facility
[21]
On 27 November 2013 the applicant filed a replying affidavit.
With regards to the alleged lack of urgency the applicant’s
deponent declared as follows in paragraphs 25.2 to 25.5 thereof:
“
25.2
On 5 November 2013 Annexure “FA6” was sent recording the
salient facts, the confirmation that the Applicant can
proceed with
its arrangements as the Respondent’s conduct was and is
unlawful and constituting a
bona fide
attempt to aver to this matter and to resolve it
extra
curiae.
25.3
On the 11
th
November 2013 Annexure “FA7” was
received stating that the Respondent would have a consultation on
that day and would
reply to the content of the letter dated the 5
th
of November 2013 in due course. Then followed Annexure “FA5”
with an invitation if there is a conflicting view
to furnish proof of
payment if it was made.
25.4
The Applicant did not simply rush to Court, but also gave abridged
time frames to enable the Respondent to file answering affidavits
which they have now done, and even though not complying with the
prescribed time periods.
25.5
There can be absolutely no question of self created urgency.”
[22]
There was also a supporting affidavit annexed to the replying
affidavit by Mr Diratsagae “Papi” Kganare.
In this
affidavit he declares
inter alia
as
follows:
“
1.
I am the chairperson of the Applicant in the Free State.
2.
I confirm that the acting provincial secretary of the Applicant, Mr
Hleko Mzwandile, has been mandated to sign all legal documents
with
regards to the action the Applicant had resolved to take against the
Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality relating to the hiring
of and use
of the Kaizer Sebothelo Stadium in Botshabelo.
…
4.
With regards to the respondent’s contentions that this
application must be authorised by the National Executive of the
Applicant, the same is nonsensical and devoid of any merit. The
Provincial Executive Committee has resolved as it is duly
authorised
to institute this said application.”
[23]
Another annexure, annexed to the replying affidavit is a letter,
which on the face of it appears to be signed by Mr Kganare
and dated
11 November 2013 and which reads as follows:
“
DECEMBER
16 RALLY
COPE
received a letter from Mangaung Municipality on 4 November 2013
stating that the booking of the Kaizer Sebothelo Stadium has
been
cancelled due to unavoidable circumstances. The stadium was
paid in full.
On
5 November 2013, COPE approached Blair Attorneys to act on behalf of
the Party in writing to the Mangaung Metro Municipality.
The
Mangaung Metro Municipality was to respond within three (3) days.
The
PEC, of 11 November 2013, resolved that:
Instruction
is to be given to Blair Attorneys to continue to represent COPE in
the matter and that the matter be referred to the
High Court with
costs against the Mangaung Metro Municipality. The PEC hereby
mandates Mr. I.M. Hleko, Acting Provincial
Secretary to act on behalf
of the Party in the matter.
”
[24]
A portion, containing 5 pages of the Constitution of the applicant
was also annexed to the replying affidavit.
[25]
When the matter first came before me as an urgent application on
Thursday, 28 November 2013, the applicant was represented
by Mr
Coetzer and the respondent by Mr Bava. During the course of
argument the complete constitution of the applicant, as
opposed to
the mere 5 pages annexed to the replying affidavit, became an issue.
I then made a ruling that in the interest
of justice I should be
furnished with the complete constitution if the parties want me to
rely on same in determining the issues
.The application was then by
agreement postponed to Monday 2 December 2013.
[26]
When the matter was called on Monday, 2 December 2013 Mr Fischer
appeared for the applicant with Mr Snellenburg and the respondent
was
once again represented by Mr Bava. In was then furnished with
the complete constitution and the matter was duly argued.
THE
LEGAL POSITION WITH REGARDS TO MOTION PROCEEDINGS
[27]
It is trite law that in motion proceedings, unless concerned with
interim relief, are all about the resolution of legal issues
on
common cause facts. Unless the circumstances are special, they
cannot be used to resolve factual issues, because they
are not
designed to determine probabilities. It is well established
under the
Plascon-Evens
rule that where in motion proceedings, disputes of fact arise on
affidavits, a final order can be granted only if the facts averred
by
the applicant have been admitted by the respondent, together with the
facts alleged by the respondent, justify such an order.
It may
be different if the respondent’s version consists of bald or
uncreditworthy denials, raised fictitious disputes of
fact, is
palpably implausible, farfetched or so clearly untenable that the
court is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers
(compare
Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van
Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3)
SA 623
(A); and
National Director of
Public Prosecutions v Zuma
[2009] ZASCA 1
;
2009 (2)
SA 277
(SCA).
URGENCY
[28]
The first important factor to have regards to is the fact that it was
the respondent who cancelled the agreement on 4 November
2013, i.e. a
mere month and 12 days prior to the event of 16 December 2013.
It was thus the respondents conduct that necessitated
these
proceedings.
[29]
It is furthermore clear from the papers and common cause that there
were attempts after 4 November 2013 to try and resolve
this matter
without going to court. In this regard important to have regard
to the decision of
Transnet Limited v
Rubenstein
2006 (1) SA 591
(SCA) at
599, para [21]:
“
The
judgment deals with the fact that Rubenstein, in his replying
affidavit, explained the reasons for delay, which related largely
to
attempts to settle the matter and to enter into a new contract. It
was not essential for Rubenstein to deal fully with the question
of
delay in the founding affidavit given that much of it was
attributable to on going discussions with Transnet about the
conclusion
of a new contract.”
[30]
It is furthermore clear from the papers that the applicant could not,
even on respondent’s version, follow the prescribed
periods set
out in rule 6. The matter could not have been right for
hearing; much less would it have been heard before the
16
th
of December 2013.
[31]
The respondent was also afforded sufficient time to answer to the
applicant’s averments in its founding affidavit, which
it did
by way of the opposing affidavit. The applicant also filed a
replying affidavit before the matter came before me the
first time.
It is therefore abundantly clear that all the issues have been
ventilated and I cannot find that in all the circumstances,
the
applicant is to blame in the sense it created the urgency itself.
[32]
In the premises I take the matter onto the roll as an urgent
application in accordance with the provisions of Uniform Rule
of
Court 6(12) and thus grant the applicant the relief sought in the
first two prayers of the notice of motion.
AUTHORITY
[33]
Before dealing with the facts of this matter with regards to the
alleged lack of authority, it is apposite to refer to the
decision of
ANC Umvoti Council v Umvoti
Municipality
2010 (3) SA 31
(KZP),
and more in particular to paragraphs [22], [27] and [28] thereof at
pages 41-43, where the court
inter alia
found as follows:
“
[22]
…It seems to me, therefore, that the legislature intended the
authority of 'anyone' who claimed to be acting on behalf
of another
in initiating proceedings, and not only attorneys, to be dealt with
under rule 7(1), and not by way of the application
papers. However,
since this appeal deals with the authority to represent an artificial
person, I refrain from further comment on
the situation applying
where one litigant purports to represent another in applications.
…
[27]
… Whether or not the litigation has been properly authorised
by the artificial person named as the litigant should not
be dealt
with by means of evidence led in the application. If clarity is
required, it should be obtained by means of rule 7(1),
since this is
a procedure which safeguards the interests of both parties. It frees
the applicant from having to produce proof of
what may not be in
issue, thus saving an inordinate waste of time and expense in 'the
many resolutions, delegations and substitutions
still attached to
applications'. It protects a respondent in that, once the
challenge is made in terms of rule 7(1), no further
steps may be
taken by the applicant unless the attorney satisfies the court that
he or she is so authorised. …
[28]
It is further my view that the application papers are not the correct
context in which to determine whether an applicant which
is an
artificial person has authorised the initiation of application
proceedings. Rule 7(1) must be used. This means that I disagree
with
Mr Gajoo's submission that rule 7(1) provides only one possible
procedure and that, if a respondent elects to challenge the
matter of
authority on the application papers, the applicant is required to
prove such authority on the papers.”
(Compare
also
Eskom v Soweto City Council
1992 (2) SA 703
(W); and
Ganes and
Another v Telecom Namibia Ltd
2004
(3) SA 615
(SCA); and
Unlawful
Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg
2005 (4) SA 199
(SCA).)
[34]
As mentioned earlier, in this case before me, the respondent also did
not use the procedures of rule 7(1) of the Uniform Rules
of Court.
I am in respectful agreement with the full bench decision of
ANC
Umvoti Council Council,
supra
and thus find that the respondent’s attack on the applicant’s
lack of authority in this way is not the way to do it
and without
merit. The absence of use of Rule 7(1), makes it unnecessary
for me to deal with the different provisions of
the applicant`s
constitution. I thus find that the application and the
prosecution thereof and the applicant`s deponent was
duly authorised
by the applicant.
THE
MERITS
[35]
Mr Bava submitted the applicant is not entitled to the main relief
sought as contained in the paragraph 3 of the notice of
motion, which
reads as follows:
“
That
the respondent be ordered to make available to the applicant the
Kaizer Sebothelo Stadium, Botshabelo, Free State Province
on 16
December 2013 in accordance with the agreement between the parties.”
His
submission was that the essence of the relief thus sought by the
applicant is in the nature of a specific performance.
Because
of the fact that there are outstanding issues, even on the
applicant’s own papers, with regards to further meetings
etc.,
meant that the court could not order specific performance.
Mr Fischer however submitted that these further meetings
had to do
with the compliance with the Safety at Sports and Recreational Events
Act, Act 2 of 2010 and thus had nothing to do with
the contract
between the applicant and the respondent. It would thus not
preclude the applicant from obtaining an order for
specific
performance as prayed for.
The
problem with Mr Bava’s submission is that the respondent chose
not to attack the terms of the contract as alleged by the
applicant
in its founding papers. I must therefore apply the
Plascon-Evans
principle to which I have alluded above. This means that I must
accept the terms of the contract as alleged by the applicant
in this
case before me, as it stands uncontroverted. In
principal, the applicant might therefore be entitled
to the
relief sought.
[36]
If one has regard to the letter of cancellation of the agreement of 4
November 2013, it merely states that due to unavoidable
circumstances
respondent had to cancel the booking of the event. If one
compares this letter of cancellation which came directly
from the
respondent, and compares it to the letter of Mr Moroka attorneys
dated 11 November 2013, it clearly does not say that
the contract is
being cancelled because of non-payment. It clearly does not say
that there were further conditions attached
to the agreement which
were not fulfilled, hence the cancellation. It clearly
does not say that there was a lease agreement
that had to be signed
which was not done and therefore the contract is cancelled. To
my mind the letter of 4 November 2013
amounts to a clear
repudiation of the contract without just cause, which entitled
the applicant to approach the court
for a specific performance.
[37]
The respondent’s allegation that the pitch of the stadium would
be damaged by the attendance of 22 000 people, is
not
substantiated by any proof. The fallacy in this argument, to my
mind, is that by the very nature of sports stadiums,
the visitors to
these stadiums sit on the stands made available for such visitors.
There is thus no evidence before me that
the visitors to the stadium
on the 16
th
of December 2013 would damage
the
pitch
. Even if the pitch is so
damaged, there is also no evidence before me as to what time it
would take to repair the pitch.
There is also no evidence
placed before me by the respondent as to what team would use the
pitch, from when and for what duration.
It is thus conceivable
that, if the pitch was damaged, it could have been repaired by
the time the team starts to train on
it.
[38]
The essence of the relief sought by the applicant in this matter
before me is for specific performance in the form of a final
interdict. It is trite law that an interdict is an order of
court enjoining a respondent to refrain from doing something
or
ordering a respondent to do something. (Compare
CF
Jafta v Minister of Law and Order
[1991] ZASCA 1
;
1991 (2) SA 286
(A) at 295.)
[39]
In the premises I find that the applicant has established that it has
a clear right stemming from the contract to be afforded the
use of
the venue. The second requisite for a final interdict is an
injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended.
A
reasonable apprehension of injury is one that a reasonable man might
entertain on being faced with the facts; the test is thus
objective
and the applicant need not establish on a balance of probabilities
that injury will follow.
To
my mind the applicant, on the facts of this case before me, also
succeeded in proving that there is at the very least a reasonable
apprehension of injury if it is not afforded the use of the venue in
question. (See paragraph 40, infra)
The
third requisite for a final interdict is the absence of another
adequate remedy. The alternative remedy must be adequate
in the
circumstances, be ordinary and reasonable, be a legal remedy and
grant similar protection. Once again, if one has
regard to the
totality of the facts before me I find that the applicant has
succeeded in proving this final requisite for an interdict.
[40]
To my mind the applicant will suffer irreparable harm if the relief
sought by the applicant is not granted by the court.
It must be
borne in mind that the applicant in its papers clearly states that,
inter alia
,
it is an annual event that usually takes place on the 16
th
of December of each year, being a Public Holiday. This annual
rally is attended by leaders of the applicant, its members
and
invited delegates from all over the country, which includes
dignitaries. The rally is attended by thousands of people.
(22
thousand is expected) In accordance with its established
practise the applicant timeously sought to secure a venue for
this
year’s rally which it intends to hold on the 16
th
of December 2013. Bloemfontein is centrally situated in the
Republic of South Africa and is most often used as a venue as
a
consequence of its conveniently centralised location. There
appears to be no other suitable venues which are available
in the
district of Bloemfontein which can host more than 20 000
people. The applicant also declared in its founding
affidavit
that with the upcoming national election to be held next year, the
importance of such rallies requires no further elaboration.
The
applicant and its voters stand to suffer irreparable harm if the
venue is not made available to the applicant. Furthermore
all
invitations to the rally have already been sent out since August
2013.
COSTS
[41]
The notice of motion does not have a prayer for costs. It does
however have a prayer for further and/or alternative relief.
Mr
Fischer requested the court to make an order as to costs in favour of
the applicant, including the costs of two counsel, where
employed,
should the applicant be successful. Mr Bava did not make any
submission to the contrary.
CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
[42]
In the premises and in all the circumstances of this case I am
satisfied that the applicant has made out a proper case for
the
relief sought in prayer 3 of the notice of motion.
[42]
I thus make the following orders:
1.
The
respondent is ordered to make available to the applicant the Kaizer
Sebothelo Stadium, Botshabelo, Free State Province on the
16 December
2013 in accordance with the agreement between the parties.
2.
The
respondent is ordered to pay the applicant’s costs, which costs
will include the costs of two counsel, where employed.
________________
L.
le R. POHL, AJ
On
behalf of the applicant: Adv. P. U. Fischer SC
With
Adv. N. Snellenburg
Instructed
by:
Blair
Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
On
behalf of the respondent: Adv. Bava SC
Instructed
by:
Moroka
Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN