Easypay (Pty) Ltd v Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality and Others (1111/2013) [2013] ZAFSHC 44 (4 April 2013)

80 Reportability
Public Procurement

Brief Summary

Tender — Disqualification of bidder — Applicant disqualified from tender process for pre-paid electricity vending services due to failure to present technical demonstration — Applicant contended it was not provided with necessary technical specifications in time to prepare — Urgency of application for interdict against further evaluation and adjudication process considered — Court found no undue delay in launching application and granted interim interdict pending review of disqualification decision.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings concerned an urgent application for an interim interdict sought as a precursor to Part B review proceedings. The interim relief aimed to halt the continuation of a public procurement process relating to Bid Number RFP12/2012 for pre-paid electricity vending services.


The applicant was Easypay (Pty) Ltd, a private company that had been shortlisted as a bidder in the tender process. The principal opposing party was the second respondent, Centlec (SOC) Ltd, described in the tender documentation as a municipal entity distributing electricity in Mangaung and other municipalities. The first respondent was the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality, and the third respondent was its Municipal Manager. The fourth to eighth respondents were private companies that had also been shortlisted as bidders, but they did not oppose the application.


The application followed Centlec’s decision, communicated on 22 February 2013, to disqualify Easypay from the tender process on the basis of its absence from a scheduled presentation. Easypay launched the urgent application on 19 March 2013. The matter was heard on 28 March 2013 and judgment was delivered on 4 April 2013.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether Easypay had established the requirements for interim interdictory relief to prevent further evaluation and adjudication of the tender, pending the determination of a review in which Easypay intended to challenge its disqualification on grounds linked to procedural fairness within the tender process.


2. Material Facts


Centlec issued a request for proposals during October 2012 for the provision of pre-paid electricity vending services. Easypay submitted a proposal and was shortlisted, along with the fourth to eighth respondents.


On 15 February 2013, Centlec invited Easypay by email to make a presentation on 22 February 2013 at 09h30. The invitation stated that the presentation should cover the evaluation criteria, and indicated that bidders were expected to demonstrate their systems and channels. Subsequent email communications between 18 and 21 February 2013 reflected ongoing exchanges about what would be required for the presentation and demonstration, including references to technical interfacing information and documentation for demonstrations.


It was common cause that Centlec supplied certain technical information, including documentation headed “PowerNet Vending System: Third-party Interfaces”, and certain meter numbers. It was also common cause that further communications continued on 21 February 2013, including requests from Easypay for additional technical specifications and assistance, and that certain information (including an IP link) was only provided on the morning of 22 February 2013, shortly before the scheduled presentation.


Easypay’s position was that it could not reasonably prepare to present and demonstrate its solution without receiving the necessary technical detail timeously, and that it requested that the presentation be postponed to the following week to enable proper participation. Easypay did not attend the presentation at 09h30 on 22 February 2013.


Centlec’s evaluation committee chairperson, Mr Pobe, informed Easypay by email at 12h50 on 22 February 2013 that no special arrangements would be made for Easypay and that Easypay’s absence from the presentation disqualified it. Centlec also asserted that it had a telephonic discussion with Easypay (through Mr Ndidi) on 21 February 2013 in which Centlec allegedly conveyed that although the interface specifications were provided late, the demonstration could be presented the following week while the presentation would proceed as scheduled.


A factual dispute existed on whether Centlec had indeed communicated that demonstrations could stand over to the following week, and whether Easypay was therefore aware that it could attend for a presentation without being ready to demonstrate. The court evaluated that dispute only to the extent necessary for interim interdictory relief, with reference to the email record and the inherent probabilities, and noted that the objective documentary material did not support Centlec’s version in that regard.


Following the disqualification, Easypay pursued correspondence through its attorneys. A letter of demand was sent on 7 March 2013, and Centlec’s attorneys replied on 11 March 2013. Easypay then sought details of the other shortlisted bidders for citation, and thereafter launched the present urgent proceedings on 19 March 2013.


At the hearing, it was established that Centlec’s adjudication committee had not yet finally dealt with the matter, and that no tender award had been made at that stage.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions concerned whether Easypay had satisfied the requirements for an interim interdict pending review proceedings, and whether the procurement process should be halted to preserve the effectiveness of the proposed review.


The dispute required determinations involving a combination of law, the application of law to fact, and evaluative judgment. The court had to decide whether Easypay had established at least a prima facie right (though open to some doubt), particularly a right to procedural fairness in the tender process. The court also had to decide whether there was a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm, whether the balance of convenience favoured interim relief, and whether Easypay had an alternative satisfactory remedy.


Preliminary issues also arose regarding urgency, including whether Easypay created its own urgency by delaying approximately a month before instituting proceedings, and whether the matter should be entertained under the urgent procedure. A further preliminary issue concerned non-joinder, namely whether the evaluation committee or its chairperson should have been joined given that the disqualification decision was taken at that level.


An additional legal question, relevant to the existence of a prima facie right for interim relief, was whether Centlec’s disqualification decision—characterised as part of an ongoing tender process—was capable of being reviewable administrative action even if it was a preliminary step rather than a final award decision.


4. Court’s Reasoning


On urgency, the court accepted that although Easypay instituted proceedings about a month after the disqualification, the chronology of attorney correspondence, Easypay’s need to identify and cite the shortlisted bidders, and the practical time frames associated with Centlec’s need for finality (including the stated requirement that a new service provider be appointed effectively from 1 July 2013) supported a conclusion that Easypay had not unduly delayed. The court also noted that Centlec had early warning of intended litigation, and that the merits had been fully canvassed in affidavits and argument, reducing any alleged prejudice caused by abbreviated time periods.


On non-joinder, the court rejected Centlec’s contention that the evaluation committee or its chairperson needed to be joined for the purposes of the interim interdict. The court reasoned that the interim relief sought was aimed at halting the procurement process pending review, that the evaluation committee’s work had apparently been done, and that Centlec was in charge of procurement processes and the further steps. As a result, Centlec was considered the relevant party for the interim relief at this stage.


Turning to the interim interdict requirements, the court restated the established elements: a clear right or a prima facie right (though open to some doubt), apprehension of irreparable harm, balance of convenience, and absence of an adequate alternative remedy. The court emphasised the approach applicable to factual disputes in interim interdict proceedings, namely that material conflicts of fact do not necessarily bar interim relief, but the applicant should fail if serious doubt (not merely some doubt) is cast upon its case, assessed with reference to the applicant’s version, undisputed respondent facts, and inherent probabilities.


In assessing the prima facie right, the court treated the dispute about whether Easypay was told that demonstrations could be postponed as relevant but not determinative in the manner of final fact-finding. Having regard to the email correspondence and the highlighted portions of the communications, the court considered that the objective facts did not support Centlec’s stance. The court accordingly was not prepared to find that serious doubt had been cast on Easypay’s asserted right to procedural fairness in the procurement process.


The court then addressed whether the disqualification decision was reviewable, relying on authority recognising that preliminary decisions in multi-stage administrative processes can have serious consequences and can attract the audi alteram partem principle. On this reasoning, Easypay was not required to await a final tender award before seeking review relief in respect of a disqualifying step that could determine its participation and prospects in the process.


While recognising that not every administrative “slip” in tender administration necessarily warrants judicial intervention, the court considered that questions of public interest, pragmatism, and practicality inform the exercise of discretion in administrative law remedies. Against that background, the court considered the likelihood that a review court might find Centlec’s immediate disqualification for non-attendance (without clear advance warning of automatic disqualification) to be procedurally unfair, particularly where the tender documentation did not clearly establish non-attendance at a presentation as a disqualification criterion, and where Centlec itself had been supplying technical information and assistance close to the presentation date.


On irreparable harm, the court accepted that Easypay would suffer harm if the process continued and was finalised, but Easypay later succeeded on review, as the practical effect would be that the opportunity to compete in the tender would already have been lost and meaningful relief could be undermined.


On the balance of convenience, the court attached weight to the fact that no tender award had yet been made. From a practical perspective, the court considered it preferable and more cost-effective to halt the process before an award rather than permit an award and implementation to proceed, only for it potentially to be set aside much later. The court also took account of the fact that the other shortlisted bidders did not oppose the relief or assert prejudice. The court concluded that the prejudice to Easypay if relief were refused would outweigh the prejudice to Centlec if the process were paused.


On the absence of an alternative satisfactory remedy, the court considered authority dealing with tender challenges and remedies and concluded that Easypay lacked an adequate alternative remedy if the process were allowed to proceed, especially given the practical difficulty of restoring meaningful participation once the “horse has bolted” in procurement processes.


Finally, in framing relief, the court expressed doubt as to the extent of control exercised by the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality over Centlec, but concluded that granting relief also against the first and third respondents would not cause harm. To address unnecessary expense arising from service and copies relating to those parties, the court directed the taxing master to disallow costs linked to extra copies and service on the first and third respondents.


On costs, although the court initially considered reserving costs for determination in the review, it concluded that Easypay should receive costs of the interim application. The court took into account Easypay’s earlier stance that it would not seek costs if Centlec permitted an opportunity for a proper presentation, and the fact that Centlec opposed the urgent application, resulting in an opposed urgent hearing.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court ordered that the matter be heard as an urgent application in terms of Rule 6(12) and condoned Easypay’s non-compliance with the usual forms and service requirements.


Pending finalisation of Part B (the contemplated review), the court granted an interim interdict restraining the first, second, and third respondents from furthering the evaluation and/or adjudication process in respect of Bid Number RFP12/2012, and from executing, fulfilling, or giving effect to any award made in relation to the tender or any agreement concluded pursuant to such award.


The court ordered the second respondent (Centlec (SOC) Ltd) to pay the costs of the application, with a direction that the taxing master tax off costs relating to extra copies and service on the first and third respondents.


Cases Cited


Spur Steak Ranches Ltd v Saddles Steak Ranch 1996 (3) SA 706 (C).


Ladychin Investments v South African National Roads Agency 2001 (3) SA 344 (N).


Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region and Another v Save the Vaal Environment and Others 1999 (2) SA 709 (SCA).


Earthlife Africa (CT) v Director-General: Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism [2005] ZAWCHC 7; 2005 (3) SA 156 (C).


Moseme Road Construction and Others v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd and Another 2010 (4) SA 359 (SCA).


Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security Agency v Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 216 (SCA).


Associated Institutions Pension Fund and Others v Van Zyl and Others 2005 (2) SA 302 (SCA).


Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Others 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA).


Olitzki Property Holdings v State Tender Board and Another 2001 (3) SA 1247 (SCA).


Darson Construction (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Another 2007 (4) SA 488 (C).


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (right to just administrative action as referenced).


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 6(12).


Held


The court held that Easypay had established the requirements for an interim interdict pending review, including a prima facie right grounded in procedural fairness, a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm, a balance of convenience favouring interim relief (particularly because no tender award had yet been made), and the absence of a satisfactory alternative remedy.


The court held further that urgency was established for purposes of Rule 6(12), and that the non-joinder point raised by Centlec did not bar the interim relief sought against Centlec in its capacity as the entity responsible for procurement processes and further steps in the tender.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


An applicant seeking an interim interdict must establish a clear right or a prima facie right (though open to some doubt), a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm, a balance of convenience favouring the grant of relief, and the absence of a satisfactory alternative remedy. In motion proceedings for interim relief, material factual disputes do not automatically defeat the claim, but the applicant should not succeed where serious doubt (as opposed to some doubt) is cast on its asserted right, assessed against the papers and inherent probabilities.


A preliminary administrative decision in a multi-stage process may be reviewable, and the audi alteram partem principle may apply to such preliminary steps where they lay the foundation for later decisions with serious consequences. An aggrieved party is not necessarily required to wait for the final step in an administrative process before seeking review, where the preliminary step itself materially affects rights or participation.


In tender and procurement matters, courts recognise that not every administrative defect warrants judicial sanction, and that remedial discretion is informed by public interest, pragmatism, and practicality. Where the procurement process has not yet culminated in an award, halting the process pending review may be considered practically preferable to allowing implementation to proceed and later attempting to undo the consequences, given the difficulties of providing effective relief after the fact.

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[2013] ZAFSHC 44
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Easypay (Pty) Ltd v Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality and Others (1111/2013) [2013] ZAFSHC 44 (4 April 2013)

FREE STATE HIGH
COURT, BLOEMFONTEIN
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
Case No : 1111/2013
In
the matter between:
EASYPAY (PTY) LTD
..............................................................
Applicant
and
MANGAUNG
METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
............................................................
First
Respondent
CENTLEC (SOC) LTD
............................................
Second
Respondent
(Registration Number:
2003/011612/07)
MUNICIPAL MANAGER
OF THE MANGAUNG
........
Third
Respondent
METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
ITRON METERING
SOLUTION SOUTH
AFRICA (PTY) LTD
..................................................
Fourth
Respondent
(Registration Number:
1999/017764/07)
SMARTECH TECHNOLOGY
(PTY) LTD
....................
Fifth
Respondent
(Registration Number:
1969/002835/07)
ROBS INVESTMENT
HOLDING (PTY) LTD
..............
Sixth
Respondent
(Registration Number:
2004/019370/07)
CIGICELL (PTY) LTD
............................................
Seventh
Respondent
(Registration Number:
1998/023249/07)
DAJO TECHNOLOGIES
(PTY) LTD
........................
Eighth
Respondent
(Registration Number:
2009/018258/07)
_____________________________________________________
JUDGMENT:
DAFFUE, J
HEARD ON:
28 MARCH 2013
_____________________________________________________
DELIVERED ON:
4 APRIL 2013
_____________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
[1] Applicant seeks an
interim
interdict as a precursor to review proceedings in the
following terms:

Pending
finalisation of Part B of this application, interdicting and/or
restraining the first, second and third respondents from
any
furtherance of the evaluation and/or adjudication process in respect
of bid number RFP12/2012 for pre-paid electricity vending
services
(the “Tender”), or executing and/or fulfilling and/or
giving effect to any award made in relation to the Tender
or any
agreement concluded pursuant to such award.”
[2] Costs are also sought
against such respondent or respondents that may oppose the
application.
THE PARTIES
[3] Applicant is Easypay
(Pty) Ltd, a private company with registered address in Johannesburg,
Gauteng. First and third respondents
are the Mangaung Metropolitan
Municipality and its municipal manager respectively. Second
respondent is Centlec (SOC) Ltd (“Centlec”),
cited as a
state owned company, registered in terms of the laws of the Republic
of South Africa with registered address situated
at 30 Rhodes Avenue,
Oranjesig, Bloemfontein. The fourth to eighth respondents are private
companies and shortlisted bidders in
respect of the tender under Bid
number RFP 12/2012.
THE BACKGROUND TO
THE PRESENT APPLICATION
[4] During October 2012
Centlec who describes itself in its call for bids as a municipal
entity distributing electricity in Mangaung
and other Municipalities,
invited suitably qualified service providers to submit proposals for
pre-paid electricity vending services.
The invitation is referred to
as a request for proposal (“RFP”).
[5] Applicant and others
submitted proposals whereupon it and fourth to eight respondents were
shortlisted.
[6] On 15 February 2013
Centlec invited applicant via e-mail to make a presentation at 09h30
on the 22
nd
February 2013. It appears from Centlec’s
answering affidavit that similar presentations were scheduled for 21
and 22 February
2013 in respect of the other shortlisted bidders. The
relevant parts of the invitation e-mailed to applicant reads as
follows:

Please note
that the presentation must cover the attached evaluation criteria, it
must be structured in such a way that its (sic)
guided by the
evaluation forms attached. The presentation should cover every
channel you proposed on.
NB. Please note that
you will be
expected to
demonstrate
your system
and each
channel you are bidding for. Centlec would ideall (sic) like to
exchange a token with your system and your system prints
it and is
tested in a meter, you will be notified in time if this is going to
be done. …
The presentation allocation time is 1
to 1.5 hrs depending on the demos.
Your presence will be highly
appreciated.” (
emphasis added)
[7] Between 18 February
2013 and 21 February 2013, both dates included, a number of e-mails
were sent between applicant and Centlec.
On 18 February 2013 Centlec
communicated certain details to applicant and presumably other
shortlisted bidders to deal with “…
a couple
of questions (that) cropped up on our email send (sic) to the
bidders
.” It was
inter
alia
clearly stated that bidders were
expected to “…
demo
all
the channels they have proposed on
.” (emphasis
added) On 20 February 2013 Centlec reported to applicant that
information on “interfacing” which
was required for
demonstrations
would
be sent later that day. The same day applicant received documentation
under the heading “PowerNet Vending System: Third-party

Interfaces” as promised as well as certain meter numbers on the
21
st
. On 21
February 2013 several more e-mails were sent out, the majority on
behalf of applicant to Centlec. In short, applicant complained
that
it was not provided with the necessary technical specifications
required by it to prepare for the presentation. At 17h28,
after
normal office hours, applicant’s Me Sanna sent an e-mail to Mr
Ben Tseka of Centlec as a follow-up to their telephonic
conversation,
the material portion which reads as follows:

Our
operational manager will provide you with a list of questions which
we would appreciate your response to.
As discussed we have not received the
technical assistance which we have tried on numerous occasions to
obtain. We have contacted
your offices, left messages and send (sic)
numerous emails relevant to the presentation tomorrow.
You have confirmed telephonically that
we need to ensure the development is done as without this we will not
be in able (sic) to
present as this is an integral part of the
presentation tomorrow.
As you are aware we have not done the
development as we have not had the opportunity to discuss the
technical solution with you
due to unavailability. We will forward
you our questions however we are unable to do the development without
the assistance required.
It is imperative a (sic) extension is
granted in order for us to deliver a solution.
This is putting us in a very
unfortunate position and we urgently require feedback. You have
advised that you will assist via email
after hours tonight however
you are unable to assist telephonically.
Unfortunately as per our discussion
attending the presentation tomorrow will not be to our advantage as
we are unable to
demonstrate
the technical
solution
.
Please could you advise if you could
assist us with this matter” (
emphasis added)
That night Mr Tseka
responded in two further e-mails and
inter alia
commented as
follows by half past seven, without informing Me Sanna that it was
agreed with Mr Ndidi that no
demonstration
was expected the
next day:

We provided
the web-service for the vending interface. The first step in the
exchange is to login, then you can vend. The interface
document and
example code already provided can teach you how to use interface. By
the way, what programme language do you use,
we can test with both.
C# and java, all is welcome.”
The morning of 22
February 2013 and fifty one minutes before the presentation was meant
to take place, Centlec provided Me Sanna
with the IP link required by
the applicant. As applicant felt that it had absolutely no chance to
be ready for a presentation (and
demonstration) at 09H30 that morning
Me Sanna wrote to Centlec stating that applicant wished to take part
in the process and present
its solution, but that it became a matter
of impossibility as it was not furnished with the necessary technical
detail. Centlec
was asked to postpone the presentation scheduled for
that morning until the next week to afford applicant the opportunity
to participate.
At 12H50 that afternoon
the chairperson of Centlec’s evaluation committee, Mr Pobe,
sent an e-mail to applicant in terms whereof
the following was
communicated:

We therefore are not going to make
special arrangements for EasyPay and hence your absence for (sic) the
presentation today disqualifies
you.”
He
indicated that all shortlisted service providers had been forwarded
the technical interface spec (sic) and numbers. He also confirmed
an
alleged telephonic conversation with Mr Ndidi of applicant on the
21
st
to the effect
that Centlec was aware that the technical specifications for
interface had been forwarded late, and consequently,
that the
demonstration
could be
presented the next week, although the presentation was to be
proceeded with the next day as scheduled. The allegation that
the
demonstration
would
stand over till the next week is not denied in reply, but it appears
to be improbable insofar as such an important aspect
was never
confirmed in any email. Also, applicant requested time to the
following week to present its presentation, but this was
not adhered
to. The several e-mails on the 21
st
and applicant’s endeavour to receive further
information do not support Centlec’s version. Mr Pobe’s
letter of
the 22
nd
is
further proof that Centlec was not willing to agree to any special
arrangements for applicant. There is thus a serious dispute
between
the parties whether Centlec’s Mr Pobe informed applicant’s
Mr Ndidi telephonically that the
demonstration
could be presented the following week. This will again
be considered
infra.
[8] Centlec’s
decision to disqualify applicant as a short-listed bidder led to the
present application.
URGENCY
[9] Notwithstanding the
decision to disqualify applicant communicated to it by Centlec on 22
February 2013, applicant issued this
application on the 19
th
of March only, thus about a month later. Centlec denies any urgency
and alleges that applicant is guilty of creating its own urgency
and
should not be accommodated. It is alleged that applicant took
seventeen working days to prepare and launch its application,
but
afforded Centlec only three working days to prepare its response. It
is furthermore alleged that Centlec is severely prejudiced
and could
have prepared a more comprehensive answer if afforded a reasonable
opportunity.
[10] There is no
indication what further investigations Centlec could have done and/or
what further evidence could have been placed
before the court in
support of its opposition of the application. On 7 March 2013
applicant’s attorneys sent a letter of
demand to Centlec which
was replied to in detail by Centlec’s attorneys on the 11
th
.
Applicant responded thereto, requiring the names and details of the
other shortlisted bidders as these had to be cited as respondents
in
the proposed application. On receipt of the information the
application was instituted. In my view Centlec received early warning

of the intended litigation. In any event the merits were fully
canvassed, both in the affidavits and the arguments on behalf of
the
parties, i.e. the written as well as oral argument.
[11] Bearing in mind the
time frames and the fact that Centlec itself needs urgent finality as
a new service provider has to be
appointed effectively from 1 July
2013, I am satisfied that applicant has not dragged its feet and that
there was no undue delay
in launching the application. In any event,
as stated earlier, the parties have dealt with the merits fully and
extensively. Prayer
1 of Part A of the Notice of Motion should
therefore be granted.
NON-JOINDER
[12] It is Centlec’s
case in the answering affidavit that although the decision to
disqualify applicant was made by its evaluation
committee, neither
that committee, nor its chairperson has been cited as a party to the
proceedings. Its counsel, adv Snyman, did
not make any submissions in
this regard in either his written heads of argument, or during his
oral address.
[13] Mr Pobe, the
chairperson of the evaluation committee, filed a confirmatory
affidavit and is obviously fully aware of the litigation.
I am not
dealing with the review application at this stage and it is
unnecessary to make any finding as to whether the evaluation

committee or its chairperson should be joined for purposes of the
review proceedings. Applicant seeks an order in terms whereof
the
procurement process is placed on halt pending finalisation of the
review application. The evaluation committee’s work
has
apparently been done. Centlec is in charge of its procurement
processes and the further steps to be undertaken in this regard.
At
this stage I am requested to adjudicate the application for an
interim interdict only and it is Centlec and Centlec only who
is a
relevant party pertaining to the nature of the relief sought herein.
There is no merit in the non-joinder defence.
HAS APPLICANT MET
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN
INTERIM
INTERDICT?
[14] The requirements for
an interim interdict are well-known, to wit:
14.1. a clear right, or a
right
prima facie
established, though open to some doubt;
14.2. a well-grounded
apprehension of irreparable harm if the
interim
relief is not
granted and the ultimate relief is granted;
14.3. a balance of
convenience in favour of the granting of interim relief; and
14.4 the absence of any
other satisfactory remedy.
[15] In order to
determine whether or not applicant crossed the threshold in
establishing the first requirement, the right relied
upon for an
interim
interdict need not have to be shown on a balance of
probabilities as it is enough if it is
prima facie
established, though open to some doubt.
[16] In adjudicating this
application for an
interim
interdict the facts set out by
applicant, together with any facts set out by respondent which
applicant cannot dispute are taken
into consideration together with
the inherent probabilities in order to establish whether applicant
should, not could, on those
facts obtain final relief eventually. See
Erasmus,
Superior Court Practice
at E8-10 and
Spur
Steak Ranches Ltd v Saddles Steak Ranch
1996 (3) SA 706C
at
714E – H. Material conflicts of fact should not prevent the
grant of
interim
relief, but applicant should not succeed if
serious doubt, and not some doubt only, is cast upon its case. See
also
Ladychin Investments v South African National Roads Agency
2001 (3) SA 344
(N) at 353E – 354C. There is a dispute
between the parties as to whether applicant was informed on the 21
st
February 2013 that it would be required to do a presentation only the
following day, whilst the
demonstrations
would have to be
presented the following week. As indicated
supra
with
reference to the email communication and especially those portions
highlighted, the objective facts do not support Centlec’s

version. In the circumstances and bearing in mind the nature of the
proceedings before me, I am not prepared to find that serious
doubt
was cast on applicant’s right to procedural fairness.
[17] Applicant was
disqualified by Centlec’s evaluation committee. The question to
be asked is whether this decision to disqualify
is indeed reviewable.
This has a direct bearing on the first requirement of
interim
interdicts, i.e. whether applicant has shown at least a
prima
facie
right, though open to some doubt. In
Director:
Mineral Development, Gauteng Region and Another v Safe the Vaal
Environment and Others
1999 (2) SA 709
(SCA) at para [17] the
Supreme Court of Appeal set the record straight:

[17] …
It is settled law that a mere preliminary decision can have serious
consequences in particular cases,
inter
alia
where
it lays '. . . the necessary foundation for a possible decision . .
.' which may have grave results. In such a case the
audi
rule
applies to the consideration of the preliminary decision.”
In
Earthlife Africa
(CT) v DG: Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
[2005] ZAWCHC 7
;
2005 (3) SA 156
(C) 167, at paras [35] – [37] Griesel J relied
on the SCA judgment
supra
as well as Hoexter,
The New
Constitutional and Administrative Law
, vol 2 (2002) at 222
for the following conclusion:

The fact
that the DG’s approval is but the first step in a multi-stage
process does not mean that the
audi
rule
is inapplicable, nor does it mean that an aggrieved party must await
the
final
step before it can take legal action for review.”
[18] Mr Grobler for
applicant referred in argument to Bolton,
The Law of Government
Procurement in South Africa
at p 185 and 186 where the author
deals with pre-disclosure of tender adjudication criteria as follows:

It is always
open to a tenderer who has doubts about the information supplied in a
call for tenders, even though reasonably sufficient
information was
arguably provided, to ask for further clarification from the organ of
state. Such information may then not be withheld
unless the request
for further information is unreasonable.”
It must immediately be
pointed out that Bolton specifically dealt with information
reasonably required by tenderers before submitting
their tenders
which is not the case in
casu
. I am of the view that the
review court may well find that this principle should also apply in
the event of uncertainty during
the procurement process, e.g. when
shortlisted bidders are requested to make presentations or perform
demonstrations. It is clear
from the papers that Centlec held a
similar view insofar as it was prepared to provide further
information to the shortlisted bidders
prior to the presentations.
The issue is whether sufficient and reasonable information was
timeously presented to applicant.
[19] Although this is not
a review application it is apposite to deal to a certain extent with
applicant’s prospects in the
review application in order to
ascertain whether at least a
prima facie
right, though open to
some doubt, has been established. I am mindful of the fact that
“(n)ot every slip in the administration
of tenders is
necessarily to be visited by judicial sanction”. See
Moseme
Road Construction and Others v King Civil Engineering Contractors
(Pty) Ltd and Another
2010 (4) SA 359
(SCA) at para [21].
Considerations of public interest, pragmatism and practicality play a
role as well and should inform the exercise
of a judicial discretion
whether to set aside administrative action or not. See
Ceo,
SASSA v Cash Paymaster
2012 (1) SA 216
(SCA) at para [29]
with reference to
Associated Institutions Pension Fund and
Others v Van Zyl and Others
2005 (2) SA 302
(SCA) at para
[46] and
Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and
Others
2004 (6) SA 222
(SCA) at para [36].
[20] Centlec is of the
view that the applicant had sufficient information pertaining to
technical data to prepare for its presentation
and that there was no
reason why it failed to attend the presentation as scheduled.
According to it, applicant has to date failed
to state to what extent
the technical data supplied by Centlec was inadequate. However the
email correspondence and Centlec’s
willingness to provide
further assistance and information during the night of the 21
st
contradict this viewpoint. Furthermore it is Centlec’s case
that applicant was fully aware of the fact that it and the other

shortlisted bidders were no longer required to give a
demonstration
of their systems during the presentations scheduled for the 21
st
and 22
nd
February 2013 and that in the circumstances there
was no reason for applicant’s absence. Again and as mentioned
the objective
facts indicate the fallacy of this stance.
Reliance was also placed
on the tender document to the effect that bidders would be expected,
on request, to present their proposals
to the evaluation committee
which would be compulsory and the note at the end of the special
conditions in the document which reads
as follows:

Note:
Failure to adhere to the subjective special conditions will
invalidate your bid proposal.”
I could not find any
proof that the non-appearance before the evaluation committee
in
casu
was such a special condition. I have considered the
disqualification criteria in the tender document and also in this
regard, no
provision is made for disqualification in the event of
non-appearance before the evaluation committee. Logic dictates that
shortlisted
bidders may from time to time be called upon to make
presentations or to give demonstrations, especially in a technical
field as
in casu,
but it is different matter to, without clear
warning, disqualify a non-compliant bidder forthwith. It is
reiterated that the invitation
to applicant to make a presentation
did not specify that in the event of failure to attend as invited, it
would automatically be
disqualified. The mere fact that Centlec was
prepared to reschedule demonstrations for the following week supports
applicant’s
assertion that it was not fully briefed. It is
unnecessary to embark on a journey to consider the technical aspects
referred to
by the parties in their papers.
[21] Centlec is of the
view that applicant was really on a fishing expedition and that the
various e-mails are proof thereof. There
may be some doubt as to
whether applicant really needed further information for purposes of
attending the presentation, but as
indicated, it is unnecessary to
analise this any further. I am satisfied that it cannot be found, as
Centlec wants the court to
do, that applicant misled the court, that
it had ulterior motives and that it sought undue preference.
Furthermore I cannot draw
an inference that applicant was merely
toying with process, or seeking to thwart a propitious development
for the ultimate benefit
of the general public.
[22] I am loath to
dismiss applicant’s application for an
interim
interdict
where a
prima facie
right has been shown to exist, especially
insofar as serious prejudice on the part of Centlec is absent.
Applicant’s potential
prejudice needs to be considered as well.
Having regard to the case law
supra,
I am satisfied that
applicant will suffer irreparable harm if this application is
dismissed and it ultimately succeeds with the
review application.
[23] I ascertained from
Mr Snyman during his oral argument that Centlec’s adjudication
committee has not finally dealt with
the matter and consequently, no
tender has been awarded yet. From a pragmatic and practical point of
view it would be better to
stop the process at this stage than to
allow the tender to be awarded, only for that award to be reviewed
and possibly set aside
a year or two later. It would also be cost
effective and any prejudice that Centlec might suffer as a result of
granting
interim
relief might be much less that the prejudice
to be suffered if an award has to be set aside at a stage when the
contract with the
successful tenderer has already been implemented.
The balance of convenience favours the granting of an
interim
interdict. Mr Grobler submitted, correctly in my view, that courts do
not and cannot unscramble the egg, meaning that by the time
the
administrative right of the wronged tenderer is asserted, the horse
has bolted figuratively speaking and such right is minimised
to no
more than an impotent solecism. Applicant has a constitutional right
to just administrative action, but such right may become
meaningless
if an interdict is not granted at this stage and applicant eventually
in a year or two’s time finds out that
although it should have
been successful with the review, it is left without an effective
remedy. Harms DP summed this up as follows:

Tendering
has become a risky business and courts are often placed in an
invidious position in exercising their administrative law
discretion
– a discretion that may be academic in a particular case,
leaving a wronged tenderer without any effective remedy.”
Moseme
loc
cit
at 361E.
[24] I have reason to
believe that the prejudice applicant will suffer if no order is
granted, will automatically far outweigh the
prejudice that Centlec
would suffer if the parties’ rights
vis-a-vis
each other
are kept on ice. This is even more so where the other shortlisted
bidders, the 4
th
to the 8
th
respondents, chose
not to oppose the application and to seek to advance any prejudice of
their own.
[25] I am of the view
that applicant does not have any suitable alternative remedy in light
of the SCA judgment in
Moseme
loc cit
,
Olitzki
Property Holdings v State Tender Board and another
2001 (3)
SA 1247
(SCA) at paras [37] and [38] and
Darson Construction
(Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and Another
2007 (4) SA 488
(C)
at 506E – H.
[26] Consequently I am of
the view that a sufficient case has been made out for the grant of an
interim
interdict and the relief claimed in para [2] of Part A
of the Notice of Motion. It does not appear from the papers what
influence
the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality has over Centlec. I
doubt that a case has been made out why 1
st
and 3
rd
respondents should be interdicted together with Centlec. First
respondent may be a shareholder of Centlec, and even the sole or

majority shareholder, but it has not been shown that it controls
Centlec, directly or indirectly. These two respondents did not
oppose
the application and Centlec did not object to their joinder. Having
said this, it cannot do any harm if the relief as claimed
is granted.
However the taxing master is directed to tax off any costs that might
be claimed by applicant pertaining to extra copies
and service of the
papers on 1
st
and 3
rd
respondents.
COSTS
[27] My initial
inclination was not to grant costs to the successful applicant, but
to order that costs be costs in the review application.
However and
after reconsidering the issue, especially pertaining to applicant’s
initial stance not to ask for costs if Centlec
would be prepared to
allow it an opportunity to present a proper presentation, which would
be as far as I am concerned the most
cost effective and pragmatic and
practical approach, I came to the conclusion that applicant should be
allowed its costs. I say
this especially in light of the fact that
Centlec eventually opposed the application and caused me to hear an
opposed application
on an urgent basis.
ORDER
[28] The following orders
are made:
It is directed that the
application be considered as an urgent application in terms of Rule
6(12) of the Rules of this Court and
that applicant’s
non-compliance with the forms and service be condoned;
Pending finalisation of
Part B of this application, the First, Second and Third Respondents
are interdicted and restrained from
any furtherance of the
evaluation and/or adjudication process in respect of Bid Number:
RFP12/2012, for pre-paid electricity
vending services (“the
Tender”), or executing and/or fulfilling and/or giving effect
to any award made in relation
to the Tender or any agreement
concluded pursuant to such award.
The second respondent is
ordered to pay the costs of the application.
______________
J.P. DAFFUE, J
On behalf of applicant:
Adv. S. Grobler
Instructed by:
Peyper Sesele Attorneys
Inc
BLOEMFONTEIN
On behalf of 2nd
respondent: Adv. C. Snyman
Instructed by:
Phatsoane Henney Inc.
BLOEMFONTEIN
/eb