Vries v Ali (3684/2012) [2013] ZAFSHC 38 (7 March 2013)

80 Reportability
Contract Law

Brief Summary

Contract — Rental agreement — Validity of rental agreement for operating permit — Applicant sought return of operating permit from Respondent, who failed to pay rental as per agreement — Respondent denied existence of rental agreement and claimed ownership through purchase — Court found rental agreement invalid under Section 77(1) of the National Land Transport Act, rendering Respondent's claims without legal force — Specific performance not granted due to the invalidity of the agreement.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter was an application (motion proceedings) in the Free State High Court, Bloemfontein, in which the applicant sought specific performance and ancillary relief directing the respondent to deliver and co-operate in the transfer of a taxi operating permit (operating permit number LFSLB12030/06) back into the applicant’s name, failing which the sheriff and registrar were to be authorised to act in the respondent’s stead.


The parties were Tyaleni Lawrence Vries (applicant) and Ndleleni Abel Ali (respondent). The judgment was delivered by Mhlambi AJ on 7 March 2013, after the matter was heard on 22 January 2013.


Procedurally, the application was decided on the papers. A key procedural question was whether alleged disputes of fact required a referral to oral evidence, which the respondent sought. The court ultimately determined that the matter could be resolved on affidavit evidence without oral testimony.


The general subject-matter concerned competing claims to entitlement in relation to a taxi operating permit and the respondent’s alleged refusal to return the permit and to sign transfer documentation. A further dimension was the legal effect of section 77(1) of the National Land Transport Act 5 of 2009, which prohibits the hiring out of operating licences/permits and renders transactions concluded in contravention invalid.


2. Material Facts


The court accepted that on 28 August 2008 the applicant purchased the operating permit from Ntselene Constancia Desemele for R15 000. This was treated as the foundational transaction from which the applicant’s entitlement flowed.


It was alleged that on 15 December 2008 the applicant and respondent concluded a written agreement in terms of which the respondent would rent the permit from the applicant for R2 000 per month, with an express term that the permit would be changed back into the applicant’s name if the applicant required it or if the respondent failed to pay. It was further alleged that the respondent failed to pay as agreed. The court, however, ultimately treated the rental arrangement as legally problematic (given section 77(1) of the Act), and did not grant relief on the basis that such hiring out could be enforced.


During July 2011, the applicant, respondent, and Alwyn Mtwazi allegedly entered into a verbal arrangement relating to rental payments flowing through to Mtwazi. The respondent allegedly underpaid (paying R1 000 for August, September, and October 2011). The applicant stated that he required the permit in order to have his taxi scrapped and that despite requests the respondent failed to return the permit.


The respondent’s central factual stance in answer to the application was that he denied the rental agreement(s) and contended instead that Desemele sold the permit to him on 25 November 2008, relying on an affidavit by Desemele dated 25 November 2008 stating: “I declare that I willingly transfer my permit to: Ali Ndleleni Abel”. He further asserted that he applied for transfer into his name and that the licence was issued to him on 26 March 2009. He also denied that he had signed the written annexures relied on by the applicant, alleging falsification.


In reply, the applicant produced confirmatory affidavits from the other parties and witnesses. Crucially, Desemele confirmed that she had sold the permit to the applicant for R15 000, denied having sold it to the respondent, and explained that her affidavit of 25 November 2008 was signed during negotiations leading to the arrangement reflected in the documents relied upon by the applicant, rather than evidencing a sale to the respondent. The court treated Desemele’s evidence as materially undermining the respondent’s version.


A decisive development occurred in oral argument when respondent’s counsel conceded that the respondent no longer relied on a sale agreement, but rather on a purported donation or some other form of alienation. The court treated this concession as fatal to the respondent’s pleaded defence, and as undermining any genuine dispute requiring oral evidence.


3. Legal Issues


The court was required to determine, in substance, whether the respondent was obliged to return the operating permit to the applicant and to sign the transfer documentation, and whether the applicant had established an entitlement to specific performance compelling those acts (with substitutionary authority for the sheriff and registrar in case of non-compliance).


A central legal question concerned the effect of section 77(1) of the National Land Transport Act 5 of 2009, namely whether agreements amounting to the hiring out of an operating permit could found enforceable rights, and whether a court could grant relief premised on such a transaction.


The dispute also raised a procedural issue: whether a real, genuine dispute of fact existed on the affidavits such that the matter should be referred to oral evidence, or whether the court could determine the application on the papers, including by rejecting denials considered far-fetched or untenable in accordance with motion-proceedings principles.


In character, the dispute involved both questions of fact (who acquired rights to the permit, whether the respondent signed the relevant documents, and whether he paid Desemele) and the application of law to fact (the impact of statutory invalidity under section 77(1), and whether the applicant could nonetheless obtain specific performance based on other legally cognisable grounds, including transfer under section 58).


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter by first assessing the basis on which the applicant sought specific performance. It expressed difficulty with reliance on the alleged rental arrangement because section 77(1) prohibits the hiring out of an operating licence/permit, and section 77(1) read with section 77(4) (as quoted in the judgment) renders transactions concluded in contravention invalid and of no legal force. The court reasoned that enforcing the rental agreement would amount to endorsing a nullity. On this footing, the court held that specific performance could not be granted on the rental-agreement ground alone.


In dealing with the applicant’s reliance on Khokho v Makgetla and Others (3049/2012) [2012] ZAFSHC 139 (8 August 2012), the court distinguished that matter. It noted that the learned judge there did not pronounce on the effect of section 77(1) on hiring-type transactions and that the issues in Khokho concerned acceptance of an offer to cancel a sale agreement. The present case, by contrast, required direct engagement with section 77(1) and the enforceability of a rental arrangement.


The court then evaluated the respondent’s defence that Desemele had sold (or transferred) the permit to him, and his denial that he signed the documents relied upon by the applicant. The court placed weight on the confirmatory affidavit by Desemele, which (as summarised by the court) confirmed the sale to the applicant, denied any payment by the respondent, denied any sale to the respondent, and explained the context of her 25 November 2008 affidavit. The court regarded this evidence as dispelling doubts about the applicant’s purchase and as undermining the respondent’s claim to have acquired rights.


A significant evaluative step in the court’s reasoning was its treatment of the respondent’s counsel’s concession that the respondent no longer relied on a sale, but on an uncertain notion of donation or other alienation. The court agreed with the applicant’s submission that the respondent’s defence had “fallen away” in consequence, and considered the remaining position insufficient to generate a genuine factual contest.


On the procedural question of referral to oral evidence, the court applied the established motion-proceedings approach. It reiterated that courts must scrutinise alleged disputes of fact to prevent fictitious disputes from delaying relief, and that denials which do not raise a real, genuine and bona fide dispute may be rejected on the papers, particularly where the respondent’s version is far-fetched or untenable. Applying these principles, the court held that the matter could be determined without oral evidence.


Finally, having rejected enforcement based on the rental agreement, the court nonetheless concluded that the applicant had shown entitlement to relief grounded in the applicant’s purchase from Desemele and the respondent’s participation in subsequent arrangements, and that the applicant was entitled to have the permit transferred into his name in terms of section 58 of the National Land Transport Act 5 of 2009. The court held that, on the strength of Desemele’s evidence and the contents of annexure “C”, the applicant was entitled to succeed on specific performance on that basis.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted the application. It ordered the respondent to deliver the operating permit (number LFSLB12030/06) to the applicant within 10 days, and to sign all documents necessary to transfer the permit back into the applicant’s name within 10 days of request by the applicant’s attorney. It further authorised the sheriff to attach and return the permit should the respondent fail to comply, and authorised the registrar to sign transfer documents should the respondent fail to do so.


The court also ordered the respondent to pay the costs of the application, by granting prayers 1 to 5 of the notice of motion.


Cases Cited


Peterson v Cuthbert & Co, Ltd 1945 AD 420


Mahomed v Malk 1930 TPD 615


Hilleke v Levy 1946 AD 214 at 219


Wiese v Joubert 1983 (4) SA 182 (O)


Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd [1984] ZASCA 51; 1984 (3) SA 623 (A)


Khokho v Makgetla and Others (3049/2012) [2012] ZAFSHC 139 (8 August 2012)


Legislation Cited


National Land Transport Act 5 of 2009 (sections 58 and 77(1))


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that an agreement amounting to the hiring out of an operating permit is invalid and unenforceable in light of section 77(1) of the National Land Transport Act 5 of 2009, and that specific performance could not be granted on the basis of such a rental agreement alone.


It further held that the respondent’s opposition did not raise a real, genuine dispute of fact requiring referral to oral evidence, particularly in light of the confirmatory affidavits (including Desemele’s) and the concession abandoning reliance on an alleged sale to the respondent.


On the accepted facts and affidavits, the court held that the applicant had purchased the permit from Desemele and was entitled to relief compelling the respondent to deliver the permit and sign documents required to effect transfer in terms of section 58 of the Act, with substitutionary authority granted to the sheriff and registrar in the event of non-compliance, and with costs awarded against the respondent.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Section 77(1) of the National Land Transport Act 5 of 2009 prohibits the ceding or alienation of operating licences or permits except through a statutory transfer mechanism (including transfer under section 58) and expressly prohibits the hiring out of such operating authority; a transaction concluded in contravention is invalid and has no legal force, and a court will not enforce it through specific performance.


In motion proceedings, a court must determine whether an alleged dispute of fact is real, genuine and bona fide and incapable of fair resolution on affidavit; a referral to oral evidence is not warranted where denials are not genuine or where the respondent’s version is far-fetched or clearly untenable, in which event the court may decide the matter on the papers applying the established principles associated with Plascon-Evans and related authorities.


Where an applicant establishes entitlement to performance on a legally cognisable basis, and the statutory framework contemplates transfer through prescribed procedures (such as transfer under section 58), a court may grant specific performance compelling co-operation in the transfer process, including authorising substitute signature or attachment mechanisms to ensure efficacy of the order if the respondent refuses to comply.

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[2013] ZAFSHC 38
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Vries v Ali (3684/2012) [2013] ZAFSHC 38 (7 March 2013)

FREE STATE HIGH
COURT, BLOEMFONTEIN
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
Case No: 3684/2012
In the matter between:
TYALENI LAWRENCE
VRIES
......................................................
Applicant
and
NDLELENI ABEL ALI
..............................................................
Respondent
________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT BY:
MHLAMBI, AJ
________________________________________________________
HEARD ON:
22 JANUARY 2013
________________________________________________________
DELIVERED ON:
7 MARCH 2013
________________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION:
[1] This is an
application for an order on the following terms:
That the Respondent be
ordered to deliver the operating permit with number LFSLB12030/06 to
the Applicant within TEN (10) DAYS from
date of this order.
[2] That the Respondent
be ordered to sign all the required documents to transfer the permit
back into the name of the Applicant
within TEN (10) DAYS after he is
requested to do so by the Applicant’s attorney of record.
[3] That the sheriff of
the Honourable Court be authorised and directed to attach the permit
and to return same to the Applicant
in the event of the Respondent
failing to comply with prayer 1
supra.
[4] That the Registrar of
the Honourable Court be authorised to sign all the required documents
to transfer the permit back into
the name of the Applicant in the
event of the Respondent failing to comply with prayer 2
supra.
[5] That the Respondent
be ordered to pay the costs of this application.
[6] Further and/or
alternative relief.
BACKGROUND
[7] On 28 August 2008 the
Applicant purchased the operating permit from NTSELENO CONSTANCIA
DESEMELE for a purchase price of R15 000,00.
[8] On 15 December 2008
the Applicant and the Respondent entered into a written agreement in
terms of which the Respondent rented
the permit from the Applicant
for an amount of R2000.00 per month. It was an express term of the
agreement that the permit must
be changed into the Applicant’s
name in the event of the Applicant requiring the permit or in the
event of the Respondent
failing to make payment of the monthly
rental.
[9] The Respondent failed
to perform in terms of the agreement by failing to make payment of
the agreed monthly rental.
[10] During July 2011 the
Applicant, the Respondent and ALWYN MTWAZI entered into a verbal
agreement in terms of which the Applicant
would rent an operating
permit from the said Mtwazi. The Respondent would pay the R2000.00
due to the Applicant in terms of the
rental agreement between the
Applicant and Respondent over to Mtwazi on a monthly basis.
[11] The Respondent
failed to perform in terms of the agreement by paying an amount of
R1000.00 to the said Mtwazi for the month
of August 2011, September
2011 and October 2011.
[12] The Applicant
required the permit in order to have his taxi scrapped.
[13] Despite several
requests the Respondent failed to return the permit to the Applicant.
[14] The Respondent
denied the rental agreement and alleged that Constancia Desemele sold
the permit to him on 25 November 2008.
[15] The Respondent
furthermore denied that he entered into the other two agreements as
set out in the founding affidavit and alleged
that his signature was
falsified.
[16] In the replying
affidavit the Applicant annexed confirmatory affidavits of the other
parties and witnesses to the agreement,
which confirmed that the
Respondent did in fact enter into the agreement and that his
signature appeared on the written documents.
ISSUES:
[17] Whether the
Respondent entered into the agreements as set out in the founding
affidavit;
[18] Whether there is a
duty on the Respondent to return the permit to the Applicant;
[19] Whether a factual
dispute had arisen.
EVALUATION:
[20] In argument, Counsel
for Appellant argued strongly that this matter should not be referred
for the hearing of oral evidence
as the Respondent had not raised a
real dispute of fact which could not be determined from the
affidavits.
[21] He argued further
that despite
Section 77(1)
of the
National Land Transport Act, No 5
of 2009
, this Court granted an order in terms of which the Respondent
in that case was ordered to take the necessary steps to effect the

transfer of the authority under that permit to the Applicant in terms
of
Section 58
of the Act.
[22] I have difficulty
with this line of reasoning. Firstly,
Section 77(1)
of the Act
provides as follows:
[23] The authority
conferred by an operating Licence or permit may not:-
Be ceded or otherwise
alienated by the holder, except in terms of a transfer under
Section
58
and no person may be a party to such a cession or alienation, or
Be hired out by the
holder or be hired out by any other person
[24] A transaction
concluded in contravention of subsection (1) is invalid and has no
legal force.
[25] It is therefore
evident that the agreement of 5 December 2008, embodied in
Annexure
“B”
of the founding Affidavit, being the rental
agreement of the operating licence, and the cause of Respondent’s
action cannot
hold water as the agreement has no legal force. To
endorse this agreement would be endorsing a nullity.
[26] In
Khokho v
Makgetla and Others
(3049/2012)
[2012] ZAFSHC 139
(8 August
2012) the learned Moloi J never pronounced himself on the effect of
Section 77(1)
on transactions of this nature.
[27]
In that case the Applicant, who had bought a taxi operating permit
from the First Respondent, had learned that the First Respondent
had
sold it to the Second Respondent and that the Third Respondent, the
Road and Transport Licencing Board, was in the process
of
transferring the said operating permit into the name of the Second
Respondent. He launched an application to stop the transfer
process.
[28] It was alleged that
the Appellant had cancelled the agreement by way of an SMS message
sent to the First Respondent. The crucial
issue to be decided by the
Learned Judge was whether or not the First Respondent accepted the
offer to cancel the agreement of
sale by the Applicant.
[29] It is therefore
clear to me that this case is distinguishable from the present one
and that Counsel for Respondent cannot rely
on it as supporting his
case based on a rental agreement.
[30] I therefore find
that specific performance based on this ground alone, cannot be
granted.
[31] Respondent on the
other hand maintained that a certain Constancia Desemele, the
previous holder of the permit with number LFSLB
12030/06, sold it to
him on 25 November 2008; and in proof thereof relied on Annexure
“01”, the latter to be marked
“TV 2” which
happened to be an affidavit attested to by the said Constancia on 25
November 2008 which reads as follows:
“I declare that
I
willingly
transfer my permit to: Ali Ndleleni Abel”.
[32] Subsequent to the
purchasing of the permit, he immediately applied for the transfer of
the Licence into his name which was
issued to him on 26 March 2009.
He also denied that he appended his signature on annexures “B”
and “C”
of the founding affidavit. Annexure “B”
being the lease agreement of the 15
th
of December 2008 and
annexure “C” being a memorandum of understanding between
the Applicant and the Respondent dated
16 December; (no year
indicated). However, in the founding affidavit it was alleged as
having been signed on 16 December 2011.
[33] In terms of this
agreement, the Applicant would register his Toyota Hi-Ace vehicle
into the name of the Respondent so that
the scrapping process could
be done; the Respondent transferring all the proceeds resulting from
such scrapping into the Applicant’s
account as soon as the
money was paid into the Respondent’s account.
[34] Lastly he contended
that he knew that the Applicant and Constancia Desemele, had a
romantic relationship and found it strange
that the Applicant failed
to attach a confirmatory affidavit by the said Desemele in support of
the allegations he made about her.
[35] Confirmatory
affidavits of all the parties and witnesses to the transactions were
attached to the replying affidavit.
[36] Ms Desemele
confirmed in her affidavit the sale agreement of her operating
licence to the Applicant for R15 000.00 and
denied having sold
such licence to the Respondent as alleged. She confirmed her
affidavit of 25 November 2008 and that it was signed
during the
negotiations leading up to the conclusion of the agreement between
the Applicant and the Respondent as indicated in
annexure “B”.
She also denied that she signed annexure “TV 2” as a
result of a sale agreement between herself
and the Respondent.
[37] She confirmed that
she signed annexure “B” as a witness in the presence of
the Applicant, Respondent and Alwyn
Mtwazi. The Respondent also
signed the annexure.
[38] In oral argument,
like a bolt from the blue, Respondent’s Counsel conceded that
the Respondent no longer relied on a
sale agreement to advance his
cause but on either a donation or some other form of alienation which
he was at pains to describe.
[39] This jolted Counsel
for Applicant to argue in replication that Respondent’s defence
had fallen away and that his evidence
should be disregarded. I agree
with him.
[40] Respondent’s
Heads of Argument were drafted on 8 February 2013 and filed with the
Registrar on 11 February 2013. I found
strange the contention of
Respondent’s Counsel that the matter be referred for oral
evidence to determine:

4.2(a)
whether Me. Constancia Desemele signed the affidavit on 25 November
2008 in support of the agreement that she concluded with
the
Applicant during August 2008 or in support of the agreement with the
Respondent on 25 November 2008.”
[41] I agree with the
contention of applicant’s Counsel that Respondent’s
defence bottomed out when the fatal concession
was made on his
behalf.
[42] Desemele’s
affidavit is important in the following respects:
[1] It dispels any doubts
that she sold her permit to the Applicant.
[2] It confirms that she
never received any money from the Respondent for the purchasing of
the operating licence and consequently
no sale agreement was entered
into.
[3] She neither donated
nor alienated the permit to him in any form that would have, as
consequence, the transfer of rights.
[4] The whole scheme of
things or negotiations were aimed at benefitting the Applicant.
[5] It addresses the
Respondent’s enquiries and/or doubts as to the person she
supported when she signed the affidavit of
25 November 2008.
[6] It annihilates any
dispute raised by the Respondent.
REFERRAL TO ORAL
EVIDENCE
[43] In every case the
court must examine the alleged dispute of fact and see whether there
is a real dispute of fact which cannot
be satisfactorily determined
without the aid of oral evidence, if this is not done the person
against whom relief is sought, might
be able to raise fictitious
issues of fact and thus delay the matter to the prejudice of the
claimant:
Peterson v Cuthbert & Co, Ltd
1945 AD
420.
It is not sufficient that on the affidavits the balance of
probabilities is in favour of the applicant’s version. The
court
must be satisfied that a viva voce examination and
cross-examination will not disturb this balance of probabilities:
Mahomed v Malk
1930 TPD 615
;
Hilleke v Levy
1946 AD 214
at 219;
Wiese v Joubert
1983 (4) SA 182
(0).

In
certain instances the denial by the respondent of a fact alleged by
the applicant may not be such as to raise a real genuine
or bona fide
dispute of fact… and the Court is satisfied as to the inherent
credibility of the applicant’s factual
averment, it may proceed
on the basis of the correctness thereof… which it determines
whether the applicant is entitled
to the final relief which he seeks.
Moreover, there may be exceptions to this general rule, as, where the
allegations or denials
of the respondent are so far-fetched or
clearly untenable that the Court is justified in rejecting them
merely on the paper.”
See
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A).
[44] I am therefore of
the view that this matter can be determined on the papers without
resort to oral evidence.
FINDINGS
[45] In view of the
concession made on behalf of the Respondent, it is therefore clear
that he did not pay any money to Ms Desemele
for the operating
licence. It is further more clear that the applicant did purchase the
said licence from Ms Desemele and therefore
entitled to its being
transferred into his name in terms of
Section 58
of the
National Land
Transport Act, 5 of 2009
.
[46] It is unclear why
the Applicant failed to have the operating licence registered into
his name after the agreement of sale;
however this speculation does
not take the case any further. What is evident is that the Respondent
was at all times aware of the
Applicant’s right and was an
active participant in the scheme and negotiations that ensued after
Applicant’s purchase
of the operating licence from Ms Desemele
and that he attached his signature on both annexures “B”
and “C”
to the founding affidavit.
[47] I therefore find
that, on the strength of Disemele’s evidence and the contents
of annexure “C”, Applicant
is entitled to succeed in his
request for relief based on specific performance. See
Khokho v
Makgetla
, supra.
The application therefore succeeds on
this ground.
ORDER
[48]
In the result the
following order is made:
The application succeeds
and prayers 1 to 5 are granted.
_____________________
J .J. MHLAMBI, AJ
On behalf of the
applicant: Adv. H. Els
Instructed by:
Peyper Sesele Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
On behalf of the
respondent: Adv. J. S. Rautenbach
Instructed by:
Bahlekazi Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
/eb