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[2013] ZAGPPHC 394
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Van Der Merwe and Another v Sheriff of the High Court Germiston and Others (24084/12) [2013] ZAGPPHC 394 (14 November 2013)
NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTH GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE NO: 24084/12
DATE: 14 NOVEMBER 2013
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES
CHRISTIAAN PAULAS VAN DER MERWE
..............................
1
st
APPLICANT
WANNETTE GERALDINE VAN DER MERWE
.........................
2
nd
APPLICANT
(NEE COETZEE)
and
THE SHERIFF OF THE HIGH COURT GERMISTON
............
1
st
RESPONDENT
BLACK PEARL LIQUIDATORS CC N.O.
...............................
2
nd
RESPONDENT
SCHOONRAAD
ATTORNEYS
.................................................
3
rd
RESPONDENT
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS JOHANNESBURG
..........................
4
th
RESPONDENT
THE MASTER OF THE HIGH
COURT
.....................................
5
th
RESPONDENT
STANDARD BANK
LIMITED
.................................................
6
th
RESPONDENT
ANDRIES JOHANNES VAN DER MERWE
............................
7
th
RESPONDENT
ANNA JOHANNA HELENA VAN DER
MERWE
...................
8
th
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Kooverjie
AJ:
A.
NATURE OF THE
APPLICATION
1.
The Applicants seek relief on the
following basis:
1.1
To
rescind the voluntary winding up order of the estate of Andries
Johannes van der Merwe and to further compel the Sheriff (first
respondent) to proceed with the sale of the property in question. The
property in question is located at Erf 186, Elspark, Germiston.
1.2
Alternatively,
to rescind the aforesaid order and to order the First Respondent to
repay to the Applicants the sum of R136 142,86
plus interest.
B.
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
2
.
Having
heard both counsel, the issues for this court to essentially
determine are the following:
•
whether
the applicant has locus standi to launch the rescission application
and;
•
whether
the winding-up order can be rescinded by virtue of Rule 42(1) of the
Uniform Rules of Court, alternatively the common law,
further
alternatively s149(2) of the Insolvency Act (“Insolvency Act”);
and
•
whether
this Court can compel the Sheriff to proceed with the sale of the
property alternatively order the Applicants to refund
the amounts
paid the Applicants. It is noted that only the Sixth Respondent had
defended this application.
C. BACKGROUND
3
.
The
Applicants purchased the property at a Sheriff’s sale of
execution on the 4 March 2011. The Applicants successfully bidded
at
the auction and purchased same for R298 000,00. In addition to the
purchase price, a deposit of R29 800,00 was paid as well
as the
Sheriff’s commission of R8 750,00 plus VAT of R1 225,00. A
total amount of R39 975,00 was paid to the Sheriff. In
addition
rates, taxes and municipal arrears was settled by the Applicants in
the amount of R49 347,96 in order to obtain the clearance
certificate. The Applicants
alleged that at the time this application was launched they had
already paid a total amount of R136
142,87.
4
.
The
sixth respondent was the execution creditor in relation to the
aforesaid sale by virtue of non-payment of the debtors, Mr and
Mrs
van der Merwe (cited herein as the Seventh and Eight Respondents).
5.Subsequent to the Applicants purchasing the
property, an application was brought before this Court where the
estate of the Seventh
Respondent was sequestrated.
6
.
The
Third Respondent, Schoonraad Attorneys were the attorneys performing
the winding up on behalf of the Seventh and Eighth Respondents.
7
.
The
Second Respondent were the appointed trustees.
8.
Subsequently on
28 November 2011, the Second Respondent held an auction of the
property, without advising the Applicants thereof
and appeared to
have sold the property to a third party for the sum of R520 000.00.
9.
The Applicants
contend that they had not been informed at any stage of such auction
and the sale to the third party. The Applicants
learnt of the auction
when they saw the board on the said property and proceeded to contact
their instructing attorney to resolve
this issue. It was alleged by
the Sixth Respondent that the property was sold for R520 000,00 to
the third party.
10. The Applicants’ attorney then
requested their attorney to contact the Respondents. On 13 June
2012, the Second
Respondent sent a letter to the Applicants’
attorney advising that neither the Second Respondent nor the Third
Respondent
had any objection to ratifying the sale of the property to
the Applicants.
11.
Further on 19
June 2012 the nominated trustee, Cornemari Viljoen sent an e-mail to
the Applicant’s attorneys advising that
they will not proceed
with the sale of the property to any other party, and are prepared to
ratify the sale to the Applicant provided
consent is obtained from
the Fifth and Sixth Respondents.
D.
APPLICANTS’ CASE
12.The Applicants contend that they are
entitled to a rescission order on the following basis:
13.1
In terms of Section 149 (2) of the
Insolvency Act:
“
A Court may resort or
vary an order made by it under the provision of this Act”
OR
13.2
In
terms of the common law provided that sufficient cause for rescission
is shown -namely:
•
The
Applicants must give a reasonable (and obvious acceptable)
explanation for their default.
•
The
Applicants must show that their application is bona fide.
•
The
Applicants must show that on the merits they has a bona fide defence
which prima facie carry some prospect that is:
13.3
In terms
of Rule 42(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court where:
“
A court may, in addition
to any other powers it may have, mero motu or upon the application of
any effected party rescind or vary
an order or judgement erroneously
sought or granted the absence of any party effected thereby”.
The
Applicants contend that they should have been notified of the
aforesaid winding up as they were interested parties thereto.
Moreover a material fact - that the property had been sold to the
Applicants prior to the Winding Up order for a sum of R290 000.00
(two hundred and ninety thousand rand) should have been disclosed to
the above Court granting the winding-up order.
13. The disclosure was material as
the court would have
inter alia
considered:
13.1
whether the Applicants were indeed interested parties;
14.2
what the true
value of the property would be. The court would consider the sale
price obtained at the sale and execution open to
the public and
determine whether the property was sold for the value as allegedly
set out in the winding up application;
14.3
whether the application was merely a sham in an attempt to allow the
Applicants to stay on the property for a longer period
of time with
no real benefit to any of the creditors and to the prejudice of
the Applicants.
14 .
The
Applicants contend that the Third Respondent colluded with the Second
Respondent in obtaining the winding-up order. Counsel
for the
Applicants requested this Court to have particular regard to a very
similar matter previously before this Court. (Naidoo
matter).
[1]
15
.
In
such matter the Court sanctioned and granted punitive order against
the Third Respondent and reported their conduct to the Law
Society.
16.
It
was submitted by counsel for the Applicants that the modus operandi
in the previous matter had been adopted in this matter. The
scheme is
similar and essentially followed a pattern namely:
17.1
Application
for the winding up of the Seventh and Eight Respondents was brought
after the date of the Sheriff’s auction and
the sale of the
property to the Applicants.
17.2
Schoonraad
published a notice of the purported winding up of the Seventh and
Eight Respondents in the Government Gazette and posted
copies of
Notice of Surrender to their creditors but did not post copies of the
notices to the Applicants.
17.3
The
Third Respondent applied to Court for the winding up of the estate of
the Seventh and Eight Respondents without advising this
Court of the
fact that the property had been sold to Applicants in execution prior
to such application and the Court granted the
aforesaid winding up of
the estate, unaware of such facts.
17.4
The
Third Respondent failed to respond to correspondence and attempts to
obtain information requested by the Applicants’ attorney.
17.5
Neither
the Second nor the Third Respondents responded to the Applicants’
attorney regarding the status of the property, as
well as details of
a potential third party purchase.
17.6 The
conduct of the Second and Third Respondents in indicating a
ratification of the
sale in favour of the Applicants was
merely as sham.
17.7
In
this matter, there appears no clear documentary evidence supporting
the allegations that the property has been sold for a higher
amount
to a third party, nor that su
ch sale has been proceeded with.
17.8
Neither is there evidence as to who has
in fact proved claims against the said insolvent estate.
17.9
The very same firm of attorneys had
consulted with the execution debtors prior to the Sheriff’s
sale and execution with the
view of trying to set up a liquidation.
17
However,
in the
Naidoo
matter the Court found that the actual value of the property amounted
to substantially less than what was eventually referred to
in the
application for winding-up of the estate in which a higher value was
apparently obtained by a so called valuator.
18
The valuation of the property were
therefore questioned by the Honourable court. The court made the
following findings:
19.1
Schoonraad Attorneys and the Liquidators
had deliberately concealed the details of the sale by the Sheriff.
19.2
such deliberate concealment of the
information pertaining to the sale and execution was fraudulent and
clearly induced the court
to grant the winding-up order.
that
the execution debtors obviously wanted to use the sequestration
process to negate the sale of the property to the purchasers.
Had
the property been transferred, they would have been no better off
financially and would have had to vacate the property.
20.
In this matter counsel for the
Applicants specifically requested special cost orders not only
against the sixth respondent but also
against the Third and the
Second Respondents on the attorney client scale in light of the
modus operandi demonstrated in the
Naidoo
matter and adopted in this matter.
21.
The Applicants sought further relief
that the Court compel the Sheriff to perform in terms of the sale
agreement.
22
.
In the support of such relief counsel
relied on the legal submissions extracted from
Warricker
N.O. & Another v Senekal (2006) SZG PHC 134(13 October 2006)
set out below.
23
.
Horwitz AJ was of the view that
S20(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act, was distinguishable to those in
relation to the winding-up of companies
as provided in the Companies
Act, and held that the trustee did not step into the shoes of the
Sheriff. He held the following:
"I have difficulty... with the
notion that upon the winding-up of a company whose property the
Sheriff has sold in execution
but not yet transferred to the
Purchaser, the Liquidator takes the place of the Sheriff in the
execution of the agreement of sale.
Granted, control with the
property passes to the liquidator but I don’t follow why that
leads to the conclusion that the
liquidator takes the place of the
Sheriff in the contract in which the latter acted as principal. But
even if I am incorrect on
this score in relation to the liquidation
of companies in my view that certainly is not the position in
relation to the sequestration
of an individual's estate, because in
such an instance, the provisions of sub section 20 (1) (C) of the
Insolvency Act supervene...”
“
...As I have said the logic
behind the trustee stepping into the shoes of the insolvent is clear
but into the shoes of the Sheriff?
I cannot see why in Law or logic
that should be so. There is no statutory endorsement for accepting
this. The Sheriff had an obligation
to recover the purchase price of
the property from the execution purchaser. Upon sequestration of the
debtor's estate, Section
20 of the Insolvency Act obliges him to then
pay the amount to the
trustee.
I cannot accept that the right of the trustee to review this amount
for the Sheriff somehow vests them with the right,
which the Sheriff
otherwise had to enforce provisions of the sale against the execution
purchaser".
[2]
“
I
conclude that the
trustees did not succeed to the rights of the Sheriff under the
agreement of sale. It follows that the trustees
likewise do not
acquire the Sheriff’s
rights
to claim payment from the defendant, the surety and co-principal
debtor with the execution purchaser for payment of the purchase
price"
.
[3]
"It seems to me that the
Trustees invoked incorrect provisions of the Insolvency Act for the
purposes of implementing and enforcing
the sale by the Sheriff to the
execution purchaser thereof: the Sheriff had concluded that agreement
with the fullest authority
of law. Because insolvency then
intervened, the Sheriff was precluded by operation of the provisions
sub section 20(1)(C) of the
Insolvency Act from performing under the
agreement which he had concluded, unless the court directed
otherwise. The trustee or
the sheriff or the execution purchaser
could have applied to court for the latter's authority but I cannot
grasp how the trustees
could invoke Section 80 bis and sub Section
18(3) to obtain authority to enforce an agreement which they did not
even conclude.”
[4]
"’The authority under
Section 80 bis and Sub-section 18(3), are on the one hand and that
under sub Section 20 (1) (C)
on the other hand’ serve different
purposes. The former serves to enable the trustee to sell property of
the insolvent for
the benefit of all his creditors. The latter
provision, on the other hand, although it might hold benefit for the
Insolvent estate
and therefore creditors, also benefit someone in the
position of the purchaser, who, having paid a deposit prior to the
Sequestration
of the Insolvent estate and ordinarily should therefore
only be a concurrent creditor for a payment of that amount can
receive
the full benefit of payment. Whilst the Master can give
authority for the former, only the court can give authority for the
latter”
.
[5]
E. THE
RESPONDENTS’ CASE:
24
.
The
Respondents contended that the trustees had the right to terminate
the sale to the Applicants and correctly did so. Counsel
relied on
Glen Anil Finance (Pty) Ltd v
Joint Liquidators, Glen Anil Development Corporation Ltd (in
liquidation) 1981(1) SA 171A at 182D-H
(Glen Anil matter).
25
.
Counsel
submitted that the so-called “agreement to ratify the sale”
referred to by the Applicants as “settlement”
is an
attempt to introduce new matter (as set out in their reply). It
amounts to an abandonment of the existing claim and the substitution
therefore of a fresh and completely different claim based on a
different cause of action.
26.
Even if consideration is given to such
“settlement” it was conditional to the Fifth and Sixth
Respondents’ approval.
27.
It
was further contended that the Applicants need not had been informed
as they are not affected by the insolvent estate. They effectively
have no locus standi
[6]
28
.
The
Applicants in effect only possess a concurrent claim against the
insolvent estate and therefore have no right to reclaim performance.
29
.
Consequently
therefore a trustee cannot be compelled by the purchaser to perform
in terms of the contract. A trustee may elect to
enforce or to
repudiate the contract.
[7]
30.
Hence the liquidators elected to repudiate the agreement since it was
satisfied that it obtained a better selling price than
that tendered
by the Applicants. The property was sold for R520 000,00.
31
.
The Applicants do not possess any rights
to enforce the contract which they had entered into with Sheriff on
14 March 2011.
32
.
The voluntary winding-up of the estate
of the Seventh and Eighth Respondents cannot be rescinded. It was
submitted that they are
in fact insolvent and the order be stayed.
The main intention behind this rescission application was to enforce
the sale which
the Applicants concluded with the First Respondent.
This has no bearing on the solvency aspect of the Seventh and Eighth
Respondents.
33
.
It was further submitted that a judgment
to which a party is procedurally entitled cannot be considered to
have been granted erroneously
as contemplated by Rule 42 due to a
fact not disclosed to the Court granting the winding-up order.
[8]
34
.
The Applicants can furthermore not be
entitled to an order for repayment of the amount of R136 142,86 as
they only possess a concurrent
claim for damages for non-performance
of the insolvent’s contractual obligations against the
insolvent estate.
35.
The Respondents contended that the Applicants reference to the Naidoo
matter is inappropriate as not only are the facts distinguishable
but
fraud was not pleaded by the Applicants in their papers.
36
.
Moreover in this matter there is no
evidence reflecting that there was an intention to defraud the
Applicants.
F
.ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
37
.
This Court is requested to determine if
the Applicants have made out a case for rescission. In order to
succeed in such application,
they would have to establish they have
locus standi. The Respondents contend that the Applicants cannot be
considered to be interested
parties as they do not have a direct and
substantial interest.
38
.
This Court has been cautious in having
regard to the Naidoo matter in considering this matter. However, it
cannot be disputed that
the facts are similar.
39
.
The distinguishable facts pointed out by
counsel for the Respondent were namely:
(I)
Fraud has not been pleaded in this matter.
(ii)
The
sale price at the second sale was less than was obtained at the first
sale. This was deliberately concealed from the Court.
In this
instance the sale price at the second sale was much more than what
was offered by the Applicants.
Locus standi
40
This
Court finds that the Applicants have
locus standi.
The
Naidoo
matter
is instructive - where Southwood J referred to
Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949(3)
SA 673A at 651 and United
Diamond
Watch and Diamond Co (Pty) Ltd and Others v Disa Hotels Ltd and
Another 1972(4) SA 41OC at 414D-G
which
held:
‘‘
Whether
the application be founded upon Rule of Court 42(1 )(a)... common law
relating to the non-disclosure of material facts...
it is clear that
it is only a limited class of persons who are entitled to bring an
application of this nature. The Rule of Court
specifically speaks of
the application being brought by any party affected...”
”
An
Applicant for an order setting aside or varying a judgment or order
of Court must show in order to establish locus standi, that
he has an
interest in the subject matter of the judgment or order sufficiently
direct and substantial to have entitled him to intervene
in the
original application upon which the judgments were given...”.
41.
Southwood
J found that the Applicants had a direct and substantial interest in
the sequestration proceedings. They had purchased
the property and
were entitled to demand transfer from the Sheriff. If they had
received notice for the winding-up they could have
intervened to
oppose the application.
42.
At
this juncture it should be pointed out that the winding-up
application and order was not before this Court. Both parties were
also not in possession of such application. This Court was thus
unable to have regard to what was placed before that Court.
43.
Nevertheless
what is certain is that the Applicants as interested parties to the
winding-up proceedings were not informed thereof.
44.
Consequently
issue following whether this was a concealment of a material fact
which the Court should have considered in the sequestration
proceedings.
(I)
S149Í2)
of
the Insolvency Act: Grounds for Rescission
45.A
sequestration order may be set aside in terms of Section 149(2) of
the Insolvency Act. Section 149(2) may be invoked both where
the
order should not have been granted and where it was properly made but
supervening factors made its rescission necessary or
desirable.
46.Southwood
J referred to
Storti v Nugent and
Others 2001(3) SA 783 W at 806D-G
which set out the relevant principles the Court should consider
namely:
“
(1) The Court’s
discretionary power confirmed by this section is not limited to
rescission on common law grounds”.
(2)
Unusual or special
exceptional circumstances must exist to justify such relief.
(3)
This
section cannot be invoked to obtain a rehearing of the merits of the
sequestration proceedings.
(4)
Where it is alleged that
the order should not have been granted, the facts should at least
support a cause of action for common
law rescission.
(5)
Where reliance is placed
on supervening events, it should for some reason involve unnecessary
hardship...
(6)
A Court will not
exercise its discretion in favour of such an application if
undesirable consequences follow”.
(ii)
Common Law Grounds
47.
A
sequestration order may be set aside at common law if the Applicants
satisfy the requirement - that there is
sufficient cause. This involves three
essential
elements:
(I)
A
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the default must be given;
(ii)
The application is made bona fide;
(iii)
On
the merits there is a bona fide defence which prima facie carries
some prospect of success.
(iii)
Rule 42(1)
48.
A
sequestration order may also be set aside on the basis that the order
was erroneously sought or erroneously granted in the absence
of any
party affected thereby.
49.
Southwood
J found that a judgment is erroneously granted if there existed at
the time of its issue a fact of which the Judge was
unaware, which
would have precluded the granting of the judgment and which would
have included the Judge if aware of it, not to
grant the judgment.
50.
It
follows then that if material facts are not disclosed or if a fraud
is committed, the order will be erroneously granted.
51.
In
Clegg v Priestly 1983(3) SA 950W at
9531 to 9541
it was held that an
order granted in an application brought ex parte without notice to a
party who has a direct and substantial
interest in a matter is an
order is erroneously granted.
52.
Having
regard to the aforesaid this Court finds that the Applicants have
made out a case for rescission on the basis that they were
interested
parties who were not given the notice of the ex parte winding up
application.
53.
Moreso
the sale of the property to the Applicants was a material fact which
should have been disclosed to the Court granting the
winding-up
order. That Court was required to determine whether the sale to the
Applicants or the sale to the third party was more
advantageous to
creditors in the sequestration of the two Respondents.
54.
Even
if, as the Respondent contended - the purchase price was much more
than
what the Applicants paid for, it
remains a material fact which the court seized with the winding-up
application should have considered.
55.
In
light of the above, a case for rescission has been made and this
Court need not make a finding whether fraud was committed.
Compel the sale of the property
56.
Can
the Court authorize the Sheriff to proceed with the sale of the
property to the Applicants?
57.
This
Court was informed that there has been a hold on the sale of the
property to the third party as a result of the pending litigation.
58.
Insofar
as the further relief sought by the Applicants, counsel relied on
Horwitz JA’s reasoning in the
Warricker
matter. The gist of their argument is that the trustees in an
insolvent estate cannot step into the shoes of the Sheriff by taking
control of the sale in execution which was administered by the
Sheriff and which took place prior to the insolvent estate having
been sequestrated. It is the Sheriff, as the principal, who has to
enforce the provisions of the sale against the purchaser.
59.
Horwitz
JA in his reasoning drew a distinction between liquidation and
insolvency. With regard to the sequestration of an individual’s
estate, the provision
s of s20 (1) (
c) of
the Insolvency Act applies.
Section 20(
1)
(
c) states:
“
The effect of the
sequestrations of the estate of an insolvent shall be as soon as any
Sheriff
or messenger, whose
duty is to execute any judgments given against an insolvent
becomes
aware of the sequestration of the insolvent's estate, to stay
that execution, unless the court otherwise directs”.
60.
Horwitz
JA went on to reason that since section 20 obliged the Sheriff to pay
over the amounts made to the trustees, it does not
vest the trustees
with the right to enforce the prov
isions of the sale against
the execution
purchaser.
61.
This
case is distinguishable from the
Warricker
matter. In that matter the trustees intended to acquire the Sheriff’s
right to claim payments from the Defendant, the surety
and
co-principal debtor from the execution purchaser for the payments of
the purchase price.
62.
In
this matter, the issue whether the trustee could repudiate the sale
to the Applicants and proceed with the sale to the third
party.
63.
It
is appreciated and Horwitz JA correctly referred to the various
authorities which endorses the Sheriff as an executive of the
law,
who concludes the agreement with the fullest authority of the law.
[9]
64.
It
is trite law that once insolvency intervenes, the Sheriff in terms of
s20 (
1
) (
c)
is prohibited from proceeding with the execution, in this case the
transfer of the property to the Applicants, unless the court
otherwise directs.
65.
It
is also accepted procedure that in terms of the common law, on
sequestration an immovable property sold by an insolvent but not
transferred, passes to the trustee.
[10]
66.
The
contract of sale is not terminated, modified or in any way affected
by the sequestration of the estate, with the exception that
the
trustee cannot be compelled by any party to perform the contract.
67.
The
general principle is that a trustee may either enforce or repudiate
the contract. A purchaser can therefore not claim transfer
of the
land even if he had paid the full purchase price. He thus only has a
concurrent claim for damages for non-performance of
the insolvent’s
contractual obligations.
[11]
68.
The
facts reflects that substantial payment was made in respect of the
property and the Applicants now request this court to order
the sale
with the Sheriff to proceed. The trustee was aware of the sale to the
Applicants and there is correspondence reflecting
her undertaking to
proceed with such sale.
69.
However,
the objective behind a sequestration order is to ensure that there is
an advantage to creditors.
[12]
70.
The
advantage to creditors must be demonstrated with sufficient
clarity
and the expected dividend must be calculated. The primary
consideration in deciding the question of benefits of creditors is
whether
all the creditors will receive a dividend.
71.
A
court would be inclined to refuse a sequestration if the application
is not a genuine attempt to benefit the general body of creditors
but
that its real objects is to award payment of debt, or to interfere
with, impede or evade the rights of a creditor.
[13]
72.
It
is further a negative indication that the debtor intentionally fails
to make a full and frank disclosure of his affairs.
[14]
73.
It
is not disputed that the property was once again sold for almost
double the value that the Applicants paid. The Respondent contended
that the trustee could repudiate the sale if it was not to the
advantage of creditors.
74.
This
Court however cannot make a finding whether the R520 000,00 sale was
genuine or merely a sham. This Court was has not had sight
of the
merits in the sequestration application and therefore is not in a
position to make a finding of fraud.
75.
By
granting the relief sought by the Applicants i.e. to order the
Sheriff to proceed with the sale, would be against the very objective
of the insolvency legislation and the Court’s discretion namely
that there must be an advantage to the creditors.
76.
It
is obvious that such Court was not au fait with all the material
facts. Full disclosure was certainly not made regarding the
debtor’s
affairs.
77.
It
is only once full disclosure is made can the Court exercise its
discretion and determine if the sequestration is favourable for
the
estate. It would therefore be premature for this Court to accede to
the Applicants’ request. All the circumstances of
the affairs
of the debtor the Applicants and the third party has to be properly
considered in respect of sequestrating the estate
of the Seventh
Respondent.
ORDER
:
In light of the
findings aforesaid, the following order is made:
1.the
order sequestrating the Seventh and Eighth Respondents’ estate
under case number 6470/2011 is set aside.
2.
the Sixth Respondent is ordered to pay
the costs of this application.
H KOOVERJIE
Acting Judge
of the High Court
[1]
Siva Prakash Naidoo and Another v Nana Abram Matlala N.O. and others
2012(1) SA 143 (GNP)
[2]
Warricker case, paragraphs 17-18
[3]
Warricker case, paragraph 24
[4]
Warricker case - paragraph 26
[5]
Warricker case - paragraphs 27
[6]
Parkview Properties (Pty) Ltd v Haven Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1981(2) SA
52T
[7]
Glen Anil matter supra at pl82D-H
[8]
Lodhi 2 Properties Investments CC v Bondev Developments (Pty) Ltd
2007(6) SA 87 SCA at 94C
[9]
Sedibe and Another v United Building Society and Another 1993(3) SA
671T; Hiralal v Naicker and Another
2009(1) SA 636D
[10]
Harris v Trustee of Buissine 2 Menz 105
[11]
Glen Anil matter at 182D-H
[12]
S6(l) of the Insolvency Act, ex parte Vane 1956(4) SA 616 0
[13]
Fesi v ABSA Bank 2000(1) SA 499C
[14]
Ex parte Swart 193(5) NLR 432