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[2013] ZAGPPHC 268
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L.W v L.W (52148/2007) [2013] ZAGPPHC 268 (22 June 2013)
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Certain
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NOT
REPORTABLE
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH
GAUTENG, PRETORIA
CASE NO.: 52148/2007
DATE:22/06/2009
In
the matter between:
L
W
................................................................................................
Plaintiff
And
L
W
................................................................................................
Defendant
JUDGMENT
Ismail
AJ:
[1]
The plaintiff instituted an action for a decree of divorce together
with
ancillary relief such
as the control and care of the major children; 50% of the childrens
tertiary and secondary schooling expenses
be paid by
him; that he tenders to keep the major children on his medical aid
scheme and furthermore he tenders to pay maintenance in the
sum of
R1000,00 per month in respect of each child.
[2]
The defendant pleaded to the plaintiffs particulars of claim and in
turn she counter- claimed a higher amount for maintenance
for the
children and she also claimed maintenance for herself.
At
paragraph 5 of the counter claim the defendant pleaded as follows
"
Inaggenome
die duur van die huwelik. die feite wat aanleiding gegee het tot die
verbrokketiing daarvan. die wesentike wangedraag
van die Eiser, die
ouderdom van die verweerderes. die verdien vermoe van die Eiser,
vergeleke met die van die verweerderes. die
iewensstandaard wat die
parfye gehandhaaf het gedurende die bestaan van die huwelik en die
Verweerderes se redelike onderhoudsbehoeftes
sal ditreg en biliik
tvees
indien
die Eiser geias sou word om by fe dra tot die onderhoud van die
Verweerderes en wel soos volg:
5.1.
deur die betaling van
'n
bedrag
van R25 000.00 per maand:
5.2.
Die Eiser om die Verweerderes geregistreer te hou
as 'n
lid
op
sy
mediesefonds
en alle redelike mediese uitgawes te betaai wat namens die
Verweerderes aangegaan mag word,
5.3.
Herverstingskostes om Verweerderes in staat te stel om
'
n
woonhuis aan te hoop vergeleke met dit wat die partye bewoon het
dedurende die bestaan van die huwelik en die vervanging van die
Verweerderes se motorvoertuig met n soorigelyke nil we
motorvoerttJig."
[3]
Paragraph 5 of the counter-claim was amended as follows :
3.
deur
die deurhaling van die syfer "R5 000.00 waar dit voorkom in
paragraaf 3.4.4 en vervang daarvan met die syfer “R10
000.00"
4.
Deur die deurhaling van die syfer ‘
:
R25
000.00" waar dit verskyn in paragraaf 5 1 en die vervanging
ddarvan met die syfer '‘RB5 000.00“
[4]
The plaintiff and defendant were married to each other out of
community of property on 8 January 1988 Initially the acrual system
applied to the marriage, however, this was done away with in terms of
section 21 of the Matrimonial Properties Act, 88 of 1984
[the Act],
They changed the proprietary consequences of their marriage to
exclude the accrual system.
[5]
Three children were born of the marriage, they are all majors. The
eldest two are twins who are studying towards a B.Com degree
at
Pretoria University whilst the youngest, a son is presently
a
student in grade 12 at Crawford College. The parties are living apart
since April 2006. The defendant and the children live at
the
matrimonial home at Weavindpark,
This
house is a 6 bedroom house with three garages and a swimming pool.
The servants quarters comprise of 3 bedrooms, toilet; bathroom
and
storeroom. The house is situated on land in excess of 3000 sq metres.
This property is registered in the plaintiffs name.
[6]
The plaintiff is a medical doctor who practises as a general
practitioner in Tshwane. He has built a considerable practice over
the years. He has an in-house dispensary which the defendant ran and
supervised. Since 2005 the plaintiff opened an account referred
to as
the
“Praktyk
2 rekening"
wherein all cheques: medical aid payments; electronic transfers and
alf monies apart from cash were deposited After paying the
expenses
of the practice and dispensary he and the defendant shared the
proceeds. This method of sharing monies continued up to
the 23
October 2008.
On
behalf of the plaintiff it was submitted that the defendant lacked
the tocos
standi
to claim mantenace on behalf of the major children. The plaintiff
relied on the matter of
Butcher
v Butcher
2009
(2) SA 421
( C) as authority for this view.
[7]
As a consequence of the plaintiffs reliance on the
Butcher
decision this resulted in the three children bringing an application
to intervene as codefendants in this matter, Eventually
the
matter stood down from Friday afternoon when the court adjourned for
it to deliver its judgment on Monday morning on the application,
On
Monday as the court was about to deliver its judgment on this
application 1 was told that the plaintiff agreed to pay over
maintenance to the children on a monthly basis as follows:
to
each of the twins: R3 000,00 per month;
L: R
2 500,00 per month
In
addition to the aforementioned amounts, the plaintiff agreed to pay
to the children directly the expenses set out in at para
[41]
hereunder.
[8]
I was requested by counsel that notwithstanding the plaintiff
agreeing to pay over maintenance as agreed for the major children,
I
nevertheless incorporate the intervening application in my judgment
as there appears to be scant authority an this aspect I accede
to
counsels request hereunder
The
Intervening application brought by the major children
[9]
The three major children seek to intervene in this action which the
plaintiff instituted against the defendant. They seek to
be cited in
this action as the second, third and fourth defendants in
recortventian
[10]
The applicants in their papers submitted that they have an interest
in these proceedings because there is a legal duty upon
the plaintiff
and the defendant to support them.
[11]
The plaintiff in his particulars of claim at paragraph 9 stated;
"Dit
sal in diB afhanklike kinders se bests belange wees indien beheer en
toesig oor die kmders
aan
die
verweerderes toegeken word, onderhawig aan eiser se redelike reg tot
kontak en besoekregle'
”
In
the order which the plaintiff seeks, the plaintiff at prayers
2
.
1
;
2.2
and
2.3
stated
the following;
"
2.1.
Bebeer en toesig oor die afhanlike kmders aan die verwerderes
toegeken te word, onmderhawig aan eiser se reg tot redelike kontak
en
besoek:
2.2.
Die eiser get as word om 50% van die kinders se secondere en tersiere
opleidmg te beiaal:
2.3.
Die eiser gelas word om die afhanlike
tonders
geregistreerd
te bou
as
afhanlikes
op
sy med/ese
fonds.
[12]
The summons was issued through the Registrar's offices of the 8
November 2007.
[13]
The plaintiffs attorneys addressed a letter to the defendant's
attorneys dated 30 April 2009 to the following effect:-
"
Vervolgens
is u klient nie geragtig om bede 3, saamgelees met paragraaf 3.4
van
u
klient se teeneis, voigens dte nuutste gesag synde die saak van
Butcher v Butcher
2000
(sic) (2) SA en die kinderwet. af te dwing nie, van wee 'r gebrek aan
locus Standi., e/7
kan
sy
nie
onderhou (sic) namens meerdejarige persone vrae nie. U klient moet
dus die deel van haar eis abandoneer en moet die drie hinders
self
ons klient nader om fmasieie bystand/onderhoud''
[14]
The letter referred to above was written less than three weeks
preceedmg the trial date
;
namely the 19 May 2009 This set in motion a train of events resulting
in this application being brought by the applicants.
[15]
On behalf of the plaintiff, Ms Veldman submitted that the defendant
did not provide the plaintiff with a schedule of expenses
she
incurred for the living expenses in respect of the children. She also
submitted that the plaintiff at no stage expressed the
intent not to
pay such expenses.
On
the other hand Mr Smith SC submitted that the plaintiff only asked
for these expenses during May 2009.
[16]
Mr Smith submitted that the plaintiff in his papers agreed to pay the
childrens' expenses subject to him agreeing with them
on the
expenses. He argued that it was conditional and it was not an
unequivocal commitment to pay those expenses He also submitted
that
the plaintiff's attitude was that the children should negotiate and
agree with him on the expenses alternatively they should
seek to
resolve their maintenance dispute against him in the maintenance
court-
[17]
The plaintiff was of the view that the defendant is entitled to claim
the maintenance she incurred for the children in respect
of their
living expenses under the head of her maintenance claim against him.
In the light of Butcher matter she had no right to
claim maintenance
for expenses such as education, travelling and medical expenses for
major children. They should pursue their
own claims.
[18]
For this reason the applicants sought an order to intervene in these
proceedings. Mr Smith submitted that the 'piece meal'
approach to the
maintenance issue of the children, namely that the defendant could
pursue her claim in this court whereas the children
must prove their
claim in the maintenance court should not be enterntained.
The
plaintiff in his opposing affidavit at para 6.3.3 and 6.3.6, stated:
"
6.3.3.
nie
enige van applikants sal deur die bestande teoedrag van sake benadeel
word nie.
6.3.6.
Dit is onnodig dat enige van die applikante by die
Egskeidingaksie
betrek word, indien bulle van voornome is om na die egskeidingaksie
die onderhoudshof te nader, word ek geadviseer,
vjeike advre
s
ek
aanvaar, dat die onderhoudshof na beide my en die verweerderes se
vermoens sal kyk ten einde te bepaai hoeweel en tot waiter
mate die
onderskeoe partye
ivaf
bydrae
tot die applicants se onderhpud
Mr
Smith submitted that the court should not permit this dicotomy or
piece meal approach whereby the defendant could pursue her
claim in
this court whereas the children must prove their claim in the
maintenance court. He submitted that it was unacceptable
and should
not be entertained as there would be no prejudice to the plaintiff if
the application were to succeed
[19]
The plaintiff raised this issue in the light of the
Butcher
decision.
Gassner
AJ al para J14J thereof stated:
“
regrettably,
neither the Divorce Act nor the Children's Act expressly authorise a
parent
with
whom an adult dependant child
reside
to
claim maintenance on his/her behalf from the other parent. Placing
the burden on an adult dependant child who stilt lives at
home in
most circumstances puts him/tier in an invidious
posit/on.
Also
where an adult dependant child still lives at home and the primary
residence parent requires
a
contribution
in respect of his living costs, it is undesirable that such a parent
should look towards the adult child to pay over
a contribution from
the amount received as maintenance from the other parent. This
difficulty was recognised by Ward LJ in the
case
of
G v G (periodical payment jurisdiction) [1997] 1FCR
3SS
(CA)
at 381H-3823, an English authority to which
Gordon
-Turner
referred:
it
is not uncommon for older children, and especially undergraduate
children, to operate their own bank accounts and to manage an
allowance provided for them. That is money which should be paid to
them. It may be wholly appropriate that children learn from
having
personal control over a modest allowance, but it is not appropriate
that there should be a relationship between parent and
child which
requires contribution towards the costs of maintaining the home and
all that goes with it for the benefit of the child.
This is what
happened in this case, and it proved embarrassing for both mother and
daughter Management of the
household
budget should be left for the adult That dichotomy is properly
reflected in the order made by the judge. I reject the
submission
that there was no jurisdiction to make them. As Mrs Mullaly pointed
out, it is now common practice to make orders for
payment partly to
the child (or the parent of the child) and directly to the fee paying
school. There is in my judgment power to
make an order to the child
as well as to the parent for the child,
Inasmuch
as the English legislative framework governing the payment of
Children's maintenance differs substantially from the relevant
South
African statutes, this English case is not authority that I have the
power to make a maintenance order in respect of an adult
dependant
child at the instance of the child's parent."
[20]
Rule 12 of the uniform rules of Court reads:
Any
person
entitled to join
as a
plaintiff
or liable to be joined
as a
defendant
in any action may. on notice to all
parties,
at
any stage of the proceedings apply for leave
(o
intervene
as
a
plaintiff
or a
defendant.
The
court may
upon
such application make such order, including any order as
to costs,
and
give such directions as to further procedure in the action as to it
may
seem meet.
The
question
“entitled
to be joined es plaintiff"
was dealt
with
in
the
matter of
Shapiro
v
SA Recording
Rights
Association Ltd
2008 (4) SA 145
at 150 D where A Gautsehi AJ dealt with the view
expressed by authors of Erasmus Superior Court Practice.
In
Ex
Parte Moos a: In re Hassim v Hariop-Allin
1974 (4) SA 412
at 416 D
-
Bliss AJ staled :
"
In my opinion Moosa's application for leave to intervene is seriously
and not frivolously made, and sufficient prima facie
case has been
made out by him.
In
Mgobozi
and others v The Administrator of Natal,
supra at p.7S0D,
the
teamed
judge
also emphasised the fact that, when application is made for joinder
of a party
as
a
co-defendant, the
purpose
is
clearly to avoid multiplicity of actions and to save costs by
bringing before the court at one and the same time all those parties
who have an interest in and are materially affected by the
litigation. ...
In
my opinion, at the leave to intervene stage, it is sufficient for the
party seeking leave to intervene. So rely on allegations
which, if
they can be proved in the main action, would entitle him to
succeed
[21]
In determining whether to grant a party permission to intervene in
terms of Rule 12 the court has a discretion. In my view
the
applicants have shown that they have a clear interest and that they
have a prima facie case and that their application is bona
fide and
not frivolously made.
[22]
I am of the view that the application to intervene should have
succeeded in the absence of the plaintiff agreeing to settle
the
childrens claim for maintenance.
The
issue of the defendant's claim for maintaince
[23]
The defendant gave evidence to the effect that she required a sum of
R116 717,81 per month as reflected on a schedule of expenses
listed
on pages 126-130 of bundle C Mrs W was cross-examined on these
expenses and it appeared that although her monthly bond repayment
in
respect of the Heroldsbaai property amounted to R6 203 28 she was
claiming an amount of R10 000 00 as she intended to pay the
outstanding bond off quicker. It was put to her that she was claiming
an excessive amount which she expected Dr W to pay for. It
was also
put to Mrs W that the plaintiff was prepared to settle her credit
card expenses which she listed under item 2.7 on page
127, as well as
the amount for the medicine expenses for which she took an overdraft
with Nedbank. The Plaintiff also agreed to
pay the car premiums
fisted under item 2.13 until the vehicle was fully paid. The
plaintiff underetook to have the vehicle registered
into Mrs W name
upon payment of the final instalment.
[24]
An amended list of expenses contained additional items which were not
on the original list of expenses (pages 126-130) was
handed in as
exhibit M. The new items appear as items 2,26 up to 2,30 on exhibit M
Mrs W could not produce any independent vouchers
to justify item 2,26
; 2-27. She stated that these expenses were paid by using her credit
cards.
[25]
Mrs W owned Old Mutual shares amounting to approximately R100 000.00
and she also owned unit trust to the value of R 295 613.89.
It
was suggested that she should pay an amount of R300 000.00 towards
reducing the outstanding bond on the Heralds Bay property.
If an
amount of R300 000.00 were to be paid the monthly bond repayment on
the property would be R1 200,00 as opposed to R6 203,28,
Mrs W’s
was initially opposed to this idea however she ultimately relented to
this suggestion.
[26]
Mrs W testified that she enjoyed three local holidays annually. She
spent a week at Sun City as she owned a time share there;
a week at
Kruger Lodge and she also spent time with the children at Herolds
Bay. In addition to these holidays they also went a
few times abroad.
They went as a family to Disney world in Florida, Or W paid for the
airline tickets whilst Mrs W paid for the
accomodation. They also
went twice to the Far East and two of three times to England during
the marriage.
[27]
An amendment sought by the defendant was granted to the effect that
the defendant was claiming an amount of R85 000.00 per
month as
permanent maintenance (until she died). This view persisted well into
cross-examination of Mrs W until a tender was made
on her behalf to
the effect that she would settle her claim for the sum of R50 000,00
per month maintenance fora period of five
(5) years.
[28]
I do not propose to deal with ail the aspects on which the defendant
was cross-examined. As a consequence of the tender made
by the
defendant referred to supra the cross-examination of Mrs W was
reduced to a great extent.
[29]
The defendant closed her case. Ms Veldsman handed in a tender on
behalf of the plaintiff. This tender was marked as exhibit.
The
plaintiff thereafter closed his case without testifying The long and
short of the plaintiff s tender amounted to him agreeing
to pay an
amount of R45 000.00 per month to the defendant for a period of 54
months. In addition thereto he agreed to pay the defendant's
motor
vehicle premiums until it was fully paid and the vehicle is
registered into her name. He also agreed to pay an amount of
R2
000.00 per month towards for Johannes Magope salary. He agreed that
the defenadant could live in the Weavind Park property and
undertook
to pay the bond premium in respect of the property, the rates and
taxes as well as the maintenance in respect of the
property. Although
the defendant would receive R45 000.00 per month she would receive
additional benefits to the tune of R5 266
02 per month. This amount
does not include the rates and taxes and maintenance for .the
property.
[30]
The issues between the parties had been substantially narrowed in
that the plaintiff tenders an amount of R45 000,00 per month
towards
the defendant as maintenance for a period of 54 months, whereas the
defendant seeks a sum of R50 000,00 per month as maintenance
for 5
years,
[31]
Mr Smith submitted that the plaintiff generated an income of R4 373
008.61 over a ten month period between January 2006 and
October 2008.
The defendant would have received half of that total during that
period. On average an amount totalling R218 650,30
per month, If one
were to take into account what the plaintiff's attorney in a letter
dated 27 October 2008 [marked LWS 7 in the
urgent application in case
number 325058/08 ] at para 7 thereof stated:
"
u
klient het deurentyd ‘n inkomste verdien vanuit haar
bestuurfunsie van apteek. gebaseer op die wins van die apteek.
bgreken
teen 35% van die omset (omset wisset tussen R140 000- R180
000)"
The
profit would would amount to R76 527 .65 namely 35% of R218 650.43.
He submitted that at the worst the average income generated
in the
chemist in terms of plaintiffs letter referred to above would
therefore be R160 000.00. and the profit at 35% amounts to
R56
000,00.
He
submitted that the amount of R50 000,00 which Mrs W claimed was
therefore a fair and reasonable amount
[31]
Mr Smith in his heads of argument relied upon the matter of Gassso
v
Gasso
1967 (1) SA 48
( C) at 56 C-E Berman J stated that:-
it
may well be. and it has been stated (see example Hahlo (op cit at
361) that a divorced wife cannot expect to enjoy the same standard
of
living which
s
he
had before divorce., because the divorced husband has two homes to
maintain where formerly he had only one. Where, however,
as
here,
no economy need be practised by the divorced husband (for- as will be
shown later in this judgment- defendant is a man of
sub stance who
can well afford to maintain two homes to the same standard
af
which
he previously maintained the common home). There is no
reason
why
plaintiff and the minor children should not continue to live every
bit as welt they have done in recent years. As will be seen,
there is
no good resaon why plaintiff should not keep her house (and her car)
and enjoy in the future the same high standard of
living
as that
for
which she and Defendant has striven from the inception of the
marriage and had latterly achieved"
[32]
Gasso's
case is relevant to this matter. It was submitted on behalf of the
plaintiff that he was not the type of person who was not prepared
to
pay maintenance which would allow the defendant to maintain a
standard that she is accustomed to. or to put it diffrently that
the
plaintiff wants the defendant to lead a parsimonous lifestyle
different from that which they enjoyed during the subsistence
of
their marriage Notwithstanding the Plaintiff not testifying I did not
gain the impression that he was trying to do the defendant
in or
trying to undermine the payment of maintenance to the defendant Clear
examples of this are that he agreed that the defendant
could live in
the Weavind Park property for 5 years or even a longer period at her
election. Wheareas the defendant claimed an
amount of R17 000 per
month to hire a home similar to that which they were accustomed to.
Defendant reflected a monthly amount
of R10 600 in respect of monies
she owed to various banks for her credit card expenses (see 2.7 on
page 127). The plaintiff immediately
tendered to pay all the
defendant's credit expenses A further example being in respect of the
overdraft facility which the defendant
took out with the bank to
procure medicines for the pharmacy which she owed and was paying off.
He
agreed to immediately take over the debt and free the defendant from
that obligation (see 2.7 the amounts of R6 520 and R2187).
[33]
The defendant initially claimed an amount of R25 000,00 per month for
life. This amount was amended to R85 000.00 maintenance
per month for
life During cross-examination when the plaintiff agreed to pay
certain expenses such as the credit card payments;
permit the
defendant to live in the Weavindpark house, pay the amount owing in
respect of the overdraft facility the defendants
claim invariably was
reduced to R54 456,15 per month (see exh M). Ultimately the defendant
was prepared to settle this matter on
the basis that she receives a
sum of R50 000.00 per month as maintence for fve (5) years and that
the plaintiff permits her to
live in the house as he tendered and to
pay for certain expenses such as the maintenance of the property and
swimming pool and
that he pays the gardener's salary When one takes
into account the package which the defendant will receive in terms of
the plaintiff's
tender on a monthly basis, it equates to -
maintenace R45
000,00
accomodation
(rental value) 17 000,00
gardener’s
salary 2 000,00
R64
000.00
This
figure does not include expenses such as payment for the vehicle and
maintening the property which the palintiff agreed to
pay.
[34]
Section 7 (2) of the Act states:
In
the absence of an
order made
in
terms of sub-section (1) with regard to the payment of maintenace by
the one party to the other
;
the
court may. having regard to the existing or prospective means of each
of the parties, their respective earning capacities, financial
needs
and obligations, the age of each of the parties, the duration of the
marriage, the standard of living of the parties prior
to the divorce,
their conduct insofar
as
it
may be relevant to the breakdown of the marriage, an order
In
terms of sub-section 3 and any other factor which in the opinion of
the court should be taken into court, make an order which
the court
finds just in respect of the payment of maintenace by the one party
to the other for any period until the death or re-marriage
of the
party in whose favour the order is given, whichever event may first
occur
The
parties have lived together for the past 18 years and they are
married for 22 years. It is clear that the plaintiff and defendant
enjoyed a high standard of living. The question which needs to be
asked is whether an amount of R45 OO0.OO per month would permit
the
defendant to maintain that standard which she was accustomed to.
The
plaintiff is 66 years old whilst Mrs W is 62 years old, Mrs W has
acquired a property in Herolds Bay valued between R4million
and R5
million on which a very small bond is outstanding. In addition she
has two properties which are fully paid valued at R900
000 00 (erf
378 216 Glenniqua Drive, Outeniqua Strand) and erf 354 Wapadrand
valued at approximately R600 000.00
Her
assets are valued conservatively between R5.5 m to R6.5 m. She also
has certain investments and she is of the view that in 5
years time
she would be able to retire and maintain herself.
[35]
The amount of R45 000,00 per month relatively speaking is a
considerable amount of money. Mrs W's was prepared to settle on
maintenance for R50 000.00 per month. She is a benevolent and
charitable person by nature and she is concerned about the well being
of others. She pays towards the studies of the "swart
student
”
(item 2.19 on page 128); towards her church; support towards her aged
mother; gives gifts to friends and family. This in itself
is an
admirable quality, however, her philantrophy cannot be incurred at
the expense of her husband. If she wants to give charity
and be
benevolent than it would only be proper and fitting if those expenses
were paid from her proceeds. It would be unfair and
unreasonable for
Dr W's to pay for those expenses, If he were to pay for those
expenses than he would be the benefactor and not
the defendant.
[36]
When the court makes an award for maintenance in terms of section
7(2) of the Act it must make an order which is
"just".
This implies that the court should be fair to both parties bearing in
mind those factors enumerated in the section.
The
question of costs
[37]
The parties each argued that the opposite party should pay the costs
of the action. Ms Veldsman submitted that the defendant
initially
sought R85 000 per month for life as maintenance, Eventually she
agreed to settle for the sum of R50 000 per month for
a period of 60
months. She submitted that the plaintiff should be awarded costs as
the defendant’s case was substantially
reduced, namely from one
of permenant maintenance to one of temporary maintenance, She
referred to the matter of
Botha
v Botha
2009 (3) SA 89
(W) where Satchwell J ordered Mrs Botha to pay the
cost of the matter,
[38]
Mr Smith on the other hand submitted that the plaintiff was not
prepared to settle on the initial amount of R25 000 claimed,
prior to
the amendment, and that the defendant was compelled to proceed with
trial Only as a consequence of the defendant proceeding
with the
matter was a tender ultimately made. He argued that the defendant was
not prepared to pay maintenance to the children
which necessitated an
application being brought by them.
He
argued that a proper costs order would be that the court orders the
plaintiff to pay the cost of this trial and that the taxed
costs
awarded to him in respect of the urgent application be deducted from
this amount.
[39]
I am of the view that the defendant has succeeded substantially in
her claim and that there is no reason why I should deviate
from the
rule that costs usually follow the result. Having said that
:
I am inclined to award costs to the defendant, however only up to the
point of the plaintiff having made the tender.
[40]
It is impossible to award an amount that would be precise to the
point of absolute accuracy I am of the view that Mrs W's would
adequately be able to maintain herself to the standard that she is
accustomed to by making the following order.
[41]
In the circumstances I make the following order:
1.
A decree of divorce is granted;
2.
The plaintiff will pay maintenance for the children born out of the
marriage as follows:
2.1.
S and N's university
I
tertiary tuition fees In the case of Simone until the end of 2010 and
in Nicole's case until 2011;
2.2.
L's school fees at Crawford College for the year 2009. The said fee
would be paid directly by the plaintiff to the school concerned
on
demand;
2.3.
Ls tertiary education for his first undergraduate degree to any
university / tertiary institution within the Republic of South
Africa
alternatively the equivalent amount for the costs of his study should
he study at a university abroad;
2.4.
The following payments would be made by the plaintiff directly to the
children alternatively to the service providers :
2.4.1.
L's school books and text book expenses on demand;
2.4.2.
L’s text book expenses in respect of his tertiary education on
demand up to the completion of his first degree (with
referance to
prayer 2.3);
2.4.3.
Nicole and Simone's text book fees in respect of their tertiary
education on demand, These expenses will be paid by the plaintiff
until they achieve their first degrees:
2.4.4.
The plaintiff will pay for the childrens extra mural activities until
each child in turn obtains his / her first degree;
2.4.5.
The childrens gym fees on demand until each in turn obtains his/her
first degree ;
2.4.6.
plaintiff will pay the monthly instalments in respect of L's Peugeot
207 motor vehicle to wesbank until the vehicle is settled
in full,
whereafter the plaintiff will ensure that the vehicle is registered
in L's name. The plaintiff will pay the costs for
the transfer of the
vehicle into L's name;
2.4.7.
Plaintiff will pay for the insurance and maintenace of L's Peugot 207
which shall include:
2.4.7.1.
scheduled services;
2.4.7.2.
2 change of tyres:
2.4.7.3.
change and repairs to brakes, switches and shock breakers upon
request and the plaintiff will pay the relevant service
providers
until the vehicle is registeredc into L's name:
2.4.8.
The plaintiff will provide t with a sum of R2 500 per month in
respect of pocket money. He will give the sum of R3 000 per
month to
S and similarly the sum of R3 000 per month to N. The amounts
stipulated will be paid to them on or before the 3
rd
of each month The payments referred to herein will be paid to them
until he/she attains his/her first degree
3.
The defendant will reside in the property situated at Charles Jackson
street, Weavindpark for a period of five (5) years from
the date of
this order or until L obtains his first degree at the University of
Pretoria, whichever period is the longer.
4.
The plaintiff wilt continue with paying the bond premiums in respect
of the property referred to in para 3 above;
5.
Plaintiff will pay the monthly instalments in respect of the Ford
Territory vehicle which the defendant uses until the vehicle
is
settled in full with the finance company, Once the vehicle is fully
paid the plaintiff will at his costs have the vehicle transferred
into the defendant's name (defendant will acquire ownership thereof).
6.
Plaintiff will pay the salary of Johannes Mogapa in the sum of R2000
per month directly to Johannes Mogapa until the sevices
of the latter
ends. This payment will commence from the
1
June
2009 and will continue on the 1
st
of each succeeding month until Johannes Mogopa services ends;
7.
The defendant will pay the monthly water and electricity account in
respect of the property at Charles Jackson street from the
1 June
2009;
8.
the Plaintiff will pay the monthly rates and taxes in respect of the
property situated at Charles Jackson Street from 1 June
2009;
9.
the plaintiff will pay for the maintenance costs relating to the
property situated at Charles jackson Street, which costs shall
include the costs of borehole, swimming pool and garden on demand and
directly to the service providers concerned:
10.
The plaintiff is directed to register the children as dependants on
his Hospital plan with the medical scheme. He will pay for
all
reasonable medical expenses not covered in terms of the scheme
directly to the service providers upon demand;
11.
Plaintiff will retain Simon and Nicole on his medical scheme as
dependants until end of 2010 alternatively for a further period
as
agreed between him and Simon
I
Nicole;
12.
Plaintiff will retain L on his medical sceme as a dependant until L
completes his studies in South Africa. Should L study overseas
the
plaintiff will arrange to obtain some cover for L until he completes
his first degree abroad;
13.
Plaintiff is directed to pay the amounts owing by the defendant in
respect of the following credit cards.
13.1.
ABSA Credit Card
(Account
NO: …..) R21 586-32
13.2.
NEDBANK Credit Card
(Acount
No : …..) R26 232-08
13.3.
NEDBANK Amex Credit Card
(account
No: ….) R7 780-98
13.4.
STANDARD BANK Credit card
(Account
no:....) R12 317-20
The
plaintiff is given three months from 1 June 2009 within which he will
settle the debt in respect of the credit cards amounts
owing.
14.
The plaintiff is ordered to settle the overdraft facility which is
registered against the defendant's property situated at Wapadrgnd
in
the amount of R 148 380,12 within one month of the decree of divorce
being granted. The plaintiff will settle this amount owing
by the
defendant to Nedbank in order to cancel the overdraft facility.
15.
The defendant retain the proceeds of the insurance policy in the
amount R121 696,00 which matured or 1 April 2009. In addition
thereto
the defendant will retain an amount of R299 101,89 in respect of the
Old Mutual Shares, as welt as Sanlam Shares in the
amount of R96
604,20 as her sole and exclusive property.
16.
The plaintiff is ordered to pay rehabilitative maintenance to the
defendant in the amount of R45 000,00 per month for a period
of 54
months. The first payment to be paid by the plaintiff to the
defendant on/or before the 7
th
June 2009. Each subsequent payment to be paid not later than the 7
th
of each month until expiration of the 54 months.
17.
Neither the plaintiff not the defendant will approach this court
alternatively any other court with competence jurisdiction
for an
Order either increasing or decreasing the maintenance.
18.
On termination of the five (5) year period and after three months of
vacating the premises situated at Charles Jackson Street,
Weavind
Park, plaintiff will pay the sum of R1 000 000
:
0D
to the defendant.
19.
The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendant's costs up to the date
of the tender made by the plaintiff. Such costs to include
the costs
of senior counsel
For
the Plaintiff: Adv Veldsman- instructed by Labuscgane Attorneys
Pretoria
For
the Defendant: Adv. D Smith SC - Instructed by Schoeman &
Associates, Pretoria
Judgment
delivered: 22 June; 2009