Trencon (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd and Another (58961/2012, 70100/2012) [2013] ZAGPPHC 147 (3 June 2013)

78 Reportability
Public Procurement

Brief Summary

Tender — Review of tender award — Applicant sought to review and set aside the decision of the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to award a tender to Basil Reed, arguing that the late submission of Basil Reed's proposal was improperly condoned and that the IDC's reasons for rejecting Trencon's bid were based on a material error of law. The IDC contended that Trencon's tender was non-responsive due to its failure to keep its price fixed for the evaluation period. The court held that the IDC's decision was procedurally flawed, and the late acceptance of Basil Reed's proposal constituted an irregularity that warranted the review and setting aside of the tender award.

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[2013] ZAGPPHC 147
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Trencon (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd and Another (58961/2012, 70100/2012) [2013] ZAGPPHC 147 (3 June 2013)

NOT
REPORTABLE
IN
THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT, PRETORIA /ES
(REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA)
CASE
NO: 58961/2012, 70100/2012
DATE:
31 May 2013
DATE:3
June 2013
In
the matter between:
TRENCON
(PTY)
LTD
.................................................................................
Applicant
and
THE
INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT
.........................................................
First
Respondent
CORPORATION
OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED
BASIL
REED (PTY)
LIMITED
....................................................................
Second
Respondent
JUDGMENT
MOTHLE
J:
1.
This application concerns a review of a decision to award a tender.
The Applicant (“Trencon”) seeks an order reviewing
and
setting aside a decision by the First Respondent (“IDC”)
to award a tender to the Second Respondent (“Basil
Reed”).
Trencon further prays that in reviewing and setting aside the
decision to award the tender, this Court should instead
award the
tender to it as provided for in Section 8 of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”).
2.
IDC opposes the application, while Basil Reed filed a notice to abide
the decision of this Court.
BACKGROUND:
3.
During or about 18 May 2012, IDC issued a public invitation under
reference number:T27/07/12 to prospective building contractors,

requesting for proposals (“RFP”’), from
construction entities to prequalify for the principal building
contract
of the IDC head office external upgrade, Sandton,
Johannesburg. The RFP contained, amongst others, a provision that any
application
received after the closing date shall not be evaluated or
assessed. The closing date was set as Monday, 4 June 2012 at 12H00.
4.
The tender for these works was a two-phased process. The first phase
concerned the request for proposals and short listing of
companies
that prepared the best proposals. These proposals were basically the
profile and suitability of companies to tender for
the work. The
second phase was the bidding itself, which had to follow several
stages of evaluation and reporting, with the necessary

recommendations by various procurement committees, until the final
stage, before the Executive Committee of the IDC (“Exco”),

which then took the decision to award the tender.
5.
Trencon and other construction companies submitted their RFP on time.
Basil Reed on the other hand submitted their RFP on the
closing date
but after the closing time. Snow Consultants, an independent
consulting company whose services were engaged to assist
IDC with
evaluation of the RFPs and tenders, referred the matter of the late
submission of Basil Reed’s RFP to the IDC Procurement

Committee. The Procurement Committee condoned the late submission of
Basil Reed’s RFP, and this construction company was
shortlisted
to participate in the bidding process.
6.
Snow Consultants then shortlisted seven (7) construction companies
which had presented acceptable RFPs. Trencon was Number: 3
on the
list and Basil Reed was Number 4: behind Trencon. The 7 companies
were allowed to proceed to the next stage of submission
of tenders.
7.
On the 12th July 2012, the IDC issued the tender document where only
the 7 contractors that have been approved in terms of the
RFP
procedure were invited to tender. The deadline for the tender
submission was initially the 7th August 2012 and later extended
to
the 14th August 2012 at IDC’s instance.
8.
The tender document stated, amongst others, that the site handover
date is 6 September 2012. Trencon contends that they determined
their
tender price on the basis of this scheduled date of site handover. On
the 20th August 2012, during the evaluation of the
tenders, De Leeuw
Group Quantity Surveyors ("the Quantity Surveyors”),
engaged to advise IDC during the evaluation of
the tenders, sent a
letter to Trencon requesting the latter to advise on the implication
to its tendered price, should the site
handover be delayed to 1
October 2012.
9.
This letter from the Quantity Surveyors was directed to all bidders
with the same inquiry. In response, to this enquiry, Trencon

indicated that if the handover of the site is delayed from the 6
th
September to 1 October, they would require .6% per month escalation
amount, which is in the region of R315 000.00. At the same
time Basil
Reed indicated that their price will remain fixed, even if the site
handover is delayed.
10.
On the 30th August 2012 Snow Consultants prepared their first
evaluation report. This was followed by an e-mail from IDC to

Trencon, attaching a letter from the Quantity Surveyors who were
still requesting clarification in regard to the escalation suggested.

Trencon was requested to keep its price fixed and firm until 1
October 2012. Trencon responded by stating that their price remained

fixed but calculated on the site handover date of the 6th September
2012 as indicated in the tender. On the 7th September 2012
Snow
Consultants submitted its evaluation report in which it recommended
that the tender be awarded to Trencon for an amount of

R110,948,822.71 excluding VAT but including the approximately
R315,000.00 for the escalation.
11.
The Snow Consultants’ report reflected that before and after
making adjustments for site handover, Trencon scored most
points in
both instances. The Support Services of the IDC also prepared and
submitted a report to the Procurement Committee in
which they also
recommended that the contract be awarded to Trencon subject to two
conditions stipulated by Snow Consultants. The
two conditions were
that Trencon was to remove conditional acceptance of revised contract
award value and secondly, that an agreement
be reached with the
Quantity Surveyors in regard to the use of BOQ Sunscreens.
12.
The Procurement Committee met on the 12th September 2012 to consider
the recommendation of the Support Services and that of
Snow
Consulting. This Committee also recommended appointment of Trencon,
subject to the stated conditions.
13.
It needs to be stated that IDC, in particular the Quantity Surveyors,
had not decided on a final date for site handover. They
were sending
out feelers to test the waters on the attitude of the bidders
regarding their bid prices, in the event the site handover
is delayed
beyond the date stated in the tender. They regarded the possible
escalation of the bid price raised by Trencon in response
to the
possible shift of the site handover date, as a refusal to keep the
bid price firm.
14.
On the 13th September 2012 Trencon received another e-mail from IDC
informing of three possible new dates of handover as being
15
October; 1 November or 15 November 2012. Trencon was once more
requested to indicate what its position will be in the event
the site
is handed over on those dates. Trencon wrote back to indicate the
price implication for each of the revised scheduled
dates. In the
meantime, the Procurement Committee also made a recommendation to
Exco, that the tender be awarded to Trencon for
R111,739,422.28
excluding VAT, but subject to the stated conditions concerning the
late site handover and concerns over the purchase
of new sunscreens.
15.
On the 14th September 2012 being the same day the recommendation of
the Procurement Committee was made, Grant Orlando Augustine

(“Augustine”), Manager of the IDC Procurement Committee,
in consultation with other managers of IDC, sought an opinion
from an
Attorney on the issue of the implication of the proposed escalation
of the bid price by Trencon.
16.
The appointed attorney, TGR was instructed to urgently opine on two
issues, namely; an under-quoting of an element of its bill
by “the
First Bidder", and whether the conduct of “the Second
Bidder” in providing a price escalation during
the
consideration of the bids, is standard practice and proper. Even
though the “First” and “Second” bidders
were
not identified by name, it is clear that reference to the Second
Bidder meant Trencon. The content of the opinion shows that
Augustine
communicated the instructions by memorandum and later telephonically.
The opinion was to be provided on the 17th September
2012.
17.
On the 19th September 2012 the Exco of IDC met to consider the award
of the tender. It was at this meeting that Exco decided
to award the
tender to Basil Reed. Trencon was advised on the 26th September 2012
that it was not the successful party.
18.
It is common cause that correspondence was exchanged between Trencon
and IDC following the award of the tender to Basil Reed.
On the very
day, the 26th September 2012 after being informed that they were not
the successful bidder, Trencon requested reasons
for the decision
from the IDC. There was a delay in providing the reasons which became
available only on the 26th October exactly
a month after they were
requested and after Trencon had brought an application to the High
Court which was set down for the 16th
October 2012. Trencon contends
that further records that were requested from IDC were provided in
drips and drabs, initially in
a redacted form, and later
comprehensively. The opinion, for example, which was secured by
Augustine prior to the Exco meeting,
was made available to Trencon
only on 19 March 2013.
19.
The reasons for the decision came from I DC’s attorneys, Edward
Nathan Sonnenbergs Inc. (“ENS”). These reasons,
described
as “actual reasons”, were that Trencon’s tender
became non- responsive because Trencon failed to keep
their price
fixed for 120 days of the period of evaluation of the tender by
adding an escalation on its price, as a result of the
anticipated
delay in the site handover date.
GROUNDS OF REVIEW
20.
The essence of Trencon’s grounds of review, is that IDC’s
reasons for the decision to award the tender to Basil
Reed, was based
on a material error of law. There are also further allegations of
procedural irregularity in allowing Basil Reed’s
RFP to be
accepted even though it was filed late as well as an attack on the
grounds that the conduct of Augustine showed bias.
I will therefore
deal with these grounds of review in the order in which I have just
stated them. Before doing so, I need to deal
with a side issue which
was brought to bear on the proceedings.
21.
Counsel for IDC in his heads of argument as well as in Court raised,
in the strongest terms, an objection against manner in
which the
Applicant (Trencon) presented its case. IDC submits that Trencon in
its affidavit and heads of argument has presented
a case “replete
with serious and unsubstantiated allegations of bias, improper
conduct and at times dishonesty, perpetrated
by IDC “. It is
further submitted that the target of this attack is Augustine.
22.
I need to state upfront, however, that I did not find any evidence
that IDC acted mala fide or was dishonest or improper in
its conduct
in this matter. The attack by innuendo on ENS as a law firm in
particular is unwarranted as there is no evidence to
suggest that
they did anything other than represent a client. It seems to me,
however that Trencon was aggrieved by the role of
Augustine in the
RFP and tender process; the manner in which the tender was considered
by Exco and the subsequent delay in receiving
reasons for the
decision, which reasons came from a law firm and not from the
decision-maker. These circumstances, and perhaps
others, viewed
cumulatively, seem to have fuelled the suspicion of foul play.
However this cannot be an excuse for the unwarranted
attack of a
party in the course of litigation. I deal with the perception of bias
as it relates to the role of Augustine, in detail
later in this
judgment.
23.
Having stated the above, I am however of the view that the
circumstances of this case are not comparable to the allegations
by
innuendo, implying fraudulent conduct on the part of one of the
parties in the Supreme Court of Appeal matter of AHPay Consolidated

Investment Holding & Others v Chief Executive Officer of the
South African Social Security Agency & Others
(2013) ZASCA 29.
LEGAL
PRINCIPLES
24.
Trencon submits, correctly so in my opinion, that IDC is;
23.1
A Major Public Entity listed in Schedule 2 of the Public Finance
Management Act 1 of 1999 (“the PFMA”); and
23.2
An Organ of State as provided in section 239 of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”)

and PAJA.
25.
It is also trite that tender processes are reviewable as
administrative action under PAJA. Also of relevance is the foundation

of the law relating to government procurement of goods and services
stated in Section 217 of the Constitution, which provides:

(1)
When an Organ of State in the national, provincial or local sphere of
government, or any other institution identified in national

legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so in
accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent,

competitive and cost-effective. ”
26.
One of the objects of PFMA, the provisions of which also applies to
IDC, is to ensure transparency, accountability and sound
management
of the revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities of the
institutions to which it applies, see Chief Executive, South
Africa
Social Services Agency v Cash Pay Masters (Pty) Limited SA 2012 (1)
(SCA).
MATERIAL ERROR OF LAW
27.
Trencon contends that the IDC’s decision that its bid
submission was invalid, was materially influenced by an error of
law
and consequently such decision is reviewable in terms of section
6(2)(d) of PAJA. The actual reasons for the decision as communicated

by ENS allege that Exco relied on allegations of shortcomings in the
Trencon bid, which resulted in such bid being declared invalid
and
being in contravention of the tender conditions.
28.
The essence of the error of law is that the IDC misunderstood the
provisions of its own tender documents as relates to adjustment
of
the contract price. They failed to differentiate between the CPAP
Adjustments for increases in the costs of labour, materials,
plant
and goods on the one hand and Default Adjustments of contract prices
that result from delays such as those concerning site
handover, on
the other hand. These differences are found in the provisions of the
Contract Data and the JBCC Series 2000 Principal
Building Agreement
(“the JBCC 2000”), both of which applied to this tender.
The JBCC 2000 is a publication by the Joint
Building Contracts
Committee Inc.
29.
The nub of the error lies in misreading and misunderstanding of these
provisions of the Contract Data of this tender with cross
reference
to the JBCC 2000 on price adjustments. Both documents provide for
CPAP Adjustments as well as Default Adjustments. The
CPAP adjustment,
on which the decision of Exco was based, prohibits, in this tender,
any adjustment of bid price as a result of
costs in labour, plants
and materials. However, the adjustment of the bid price consequent to
Default Adjustment such as delays
in site handover, are not
prohibited. The Exco concluded, erroneously so, that Trencon’s
proposed escalation of price, in
response to possible delays in site
handover, was prohibited, and as such, the Trencon bid was invalid.
30.
Further, the IDC contends that Trencon refused to keep their price
fixed for the 120 days of consideration and evaluation of
the tender.
This contention is not correct. The undertaking that Trencon made in
the tender, was to keep their price fixed and
firm not for 120 days
of consideration of the tender, but for the planned duration of the
contract; “provided the work starts
as per the date as
indicated in the tender document.”. There is no evidence that
they changed their bid price for the duration
of the evaluation of
the tender or at any other time. They indicated that the change of
site handover date will lead to additional
escalation fee as
permitted by the tender documents. The possible escalation of the
price was disclosed in response to an enquiry
as to what would be its
position on the bid price, in the event the handover of the site is
delayed from the 6 September 2012,
a date stated in the tender
document. The suggested dates of site handover were raised
unilaterally by IDC after it received the
tenders. Trencon was
therefore responding to a speculative question, which was not even a
decision by IDC to amend the tender document
to reflect a new site
handover date.
31.
The IDC made an error of law when it contended that the terms of the
tender documents prohibited any charge of escalation fees
for delays
in handing over the site. This error was conceded by IDC’s
counsel in his heads of argument as well as in Court.
30.
Trencon kept their bid price fixed and its bid was therefore
compliant and responsive. IDC Exco erred in holding the view that

Trencon’s bid was non-responsive and consequently it should
therefore not be accepted and the award not made as recommended.
This
material error of law on its own is a sufficient ground to review and
set aside the decision of the Exco.
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS:
31.
The RFP instructions stated categorically that any application
received after the stipulated closing date shall not be evaluated
or
assessed. IDC accepted Basil Reed's late RFP to be evaluated and
assessed, when all other potential bidders kept within the
time
frames for submission of the RFP. Trencon contends that IDC should
not have evaluated and assessed Basil Read’s late
RFP nor
allowed Basil Read to participate in the tender process.
32.
I DC’s contention is that based on the policy read in
conjunction with the Guidelines, it was entitled to evaluate the

Basil Read proposal. It is further contended that the information
furnished in the RFP contains only the profiles of the bidders
and
was thus not sensitive.
35.
The Procurement Policy of IDC provides in clause 19.3.2 that: ’’Where
no bid or no acceptable bid has been received
on time, the IDC
reserves the right to admit late bids for consideration”.
36.
It is Trencon’s contention that there were at least five other
acceptable bids which, on the terms of the policy as quoted
above,
made it unnecessary for IDC to accept Basil Read's late RFP for
evaluation and assessment.
37.
Trencon argues that the policy clearly stipulates that the receipt of
a late RFP, according to the policy of IDC, is only allowable
where
there are no other competitive RFPs that have been submitted and it
will be in the interest of IDC and the public to accept
that RFP. In
this particular case, there were already reputable companies that had
submitted RFPs and there was therefore no need
for the acceptance of
the late RFP of Basil Reed.
38. The reliance on the Procurement
Procedure Guidelines in this instance is flawed, in that these cannot
override the Procurement
Policy. The RFP invitation instructions
expressly stated that late submissions shall not be evaluated or
assessed. These were the
rules set by IDC itself. It is bound by
these rules. See Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO And Others
2003
(2) SA 460
(SCA) at paragraph 5 p465.
39.
It is clear that the procedure followed by IDC in considering the RFP
that was submitted late, went against their own stated
rules and was
therefore flawed and unfair to other tenderers. In terms of section
6(2)(b) of PAJA, IDC failed to comply with its
own mandatory
condition prescribed in the RFP invitation instructions. In my view,
this procedural irregularity is material and
sufficient to warrant
the decision of the Exco being reviewed and set aside.
ALLEGATION OF BIAS
40.
Trencon contends that the conduct, in particular of Augustine,
manifested a perception of bias against its bid. In support of
this
contention, Trencon referred to the role which Augustine played
firstly in advising the Procurement Committee to admit a late

submission of RFP by Basil Reed; secondly, requesting a legal opinion
on Trencon’s bid, with telephonic prejudicial views

communicated to the attorney and presenting the opinion to Exco
during its deliberations.
41.
I do not find any evidence supporting the contention that by advising
the Procurement Committee on the policy of IDC or deciding
to obtain
a legal opinion on the implications of price escalation were
instances of manifestation of bias. However, from the opinion
itself,
it appears that Augustine expressed certain views to the attorneys
concerning Trencon’s bid, which views appear to
be intended to
exert an influence on the conclusion to be reached in the opinion. In
this regard, paragraph four of the opinion
states thus: “One of
the bidders ("Second BidderJ) has submitted a bid which provides
for escalation of the quoted price
in the event of a delay in site
handover. This Augustine contends, is against the tender conditions
that the bidders must submit
a firm price." This was Augustine’s
personal view and comment concerning Trencon’s tender. He had
clearly formulated
an opinion which was based on an error of law and
one wonders why he had to disclose his view to the attorney, after
instructing
the attorney to opine on the same question.
42.
Before and after receiving the opinion, Augustine, failed to put the
question of the need for this opinion for consideration
by the
Procurement Committee, of which he was a member. He appears to have
harboured some doubts concerning Trencon’s bid
and decided to
deal with these concerns outside the committee processes, albeit in
consultation with other IDC officials.
43.
Trencon believed that Augustine was biased. However, it should also
be accepted firstly that in seeking the opinion itself,
he consulted
other officials in IDC and it cannot thus be said he was acting on a
frolic of his own. Secondly, as a member of the
Procurement
Committee, Augustine supported the recommendation that Trencon be
awarded the tender. Therefore on a balance of probabilities,
one
cannot conclude that Augustine’s expressed opinion and his
overall conduct was an indication of bias against Trencon.
THE COURT’S FINDING
44.
Considering the conspectus of the evidence I find that the decision
of the executive committee of IDC, taken on the 1Sth September
2012
to award the tender to Basil Reed and viewed in terms of Section 217
of the Constitution, must be reviewed and set aside on
the following
grounds:
44.1
The decision to award the tender to Basil Read was influenced by a
material error of law as contemplated in Section 6 of PAJA;
and
44.2
The acceptance, evaluation and assessment of Basil Read’s RFP
was procedurally unfair as provided for in Section 6 of
PAJA.
SUBSTITUTION
45.
Trencon submits that if I find that the decision of the executive
committee of the IDC should be reviewed and set aside I should
then
award the tender to it. This is provided for in terms of Section 8 of
PAJA. IDC on the other hand submits that in the event
I find that its
decision should be reviewed and set aside, I should cancel the tender
and order that the process of tendering should
start de novo.
46.
It is trite that the general rule in review proceedings is that a
Court would, in the event it reviews and sets aside an administrative

decision; remit it to the decision-maker for reconsideration, in some
instances, subject to conditions. The provisions of Section

8(1)(c)(ii)(aa) of PAJA that the Court, instead of remitting the
decision, may itself decide, should only occur in exceptional

circumstances. See Gauteng Gambling Board v Silver Star Development
Limited
2005 (4) SA 67
(SCA). Are there exceptional circumstances in
this case?
47.
The underlying test to be applied by the Court in terms of its
departure from the general practice of remitting the matter back
to
the administrator, has its roots in the common law principles stated
in the seminal case of Johannesburg City Council v The
Administrator,
Transvaal
1969 (2) SA 72
(T) at 76. This case, decided before the
advent of the present constitutional dispensation, established the
common law principles
that a Court will be prepared to substitute an
administrative decision where:
47.1
the end result is a foregone conclusion and it would be a waste of
time to remit the decision to the original decision-maker;
47.2
any further delay would cause unjustifiable prejudice to the
Applicant; and
47.3
the original decision maker has exhibited bias or incompetence to
such a degree that it would be unfair to ask the Applicant
to submit
to its jurisdiction again.
48.
In Gauteng Gambling Board supra, the Court added a further principle
that such decision may be taken where the court is as well
qualified
to make that decision.
49.
It is common cause that from the moment the building contractors were
invited to submit the RFPs and later the bids, Trencon
performed
better than Basil Reed in terms of scoring. It is also a matter of
record that during the evaluation of the tender, Trencon’s
bid
scored the highest points.
50.
It is also significant to notice that even after Trencon, in response
to an enquiry from IDC, indicated that they would request
an
escalation and price adjustment on their fixed price in the event
there is a delay in the site handover date, the price of Trencon
for
the entire tender remained lower than that of Basil Reed. It is
further significant that an independent consultant, in this
case Snow
Consultants, the Support Services of IDC as well as the Procurement
Committee of IDC, all recommended Trencon as the
successful bidder.
51.
I have found that the reasons forwarded by ENS on behalf of IDC, as
to why Trencon was not awarded the tender as recommended,
were
influenced by a material error of law. This aside, the IDC is unable
to present any evidence on the record as to firstly why
the tender
should not be awarded to Trencon and secondly why it would be
necessary for this Court to cancel the contract and order
that the
process should start de novo.
52.
This is not a case where there are grounds upon which a court would
consider cancelling the tender. Similarly, it would not
be in
anybody’s interest including that of the IDC, to delay the
implementation of the project.
53.
Counsel for IDC submitted, in the alternative, that I should consider
remitting the matter to IDC with instructions to award
the tender to
Trencon. I am of the view that this is an instance where it would
make no difference if the Court, as authorised
by Section 8 of PAJA,
would itself take that decision. This Court is qualified to do so.
According to the evidence, the decision
was, barring the material
error of law, a foregone conclusion, considering the recommendations
by the staff of IDC in the Support
Services and Procurement
Committee. This tender involves quiet a substantial amount of public
funds and any further delay of the
project would cause unjustifiable
prejudice to Trencon, the IDC and National Treasury. A case has been
made out that it will be
just and equitable to award the tender to
Trencon and I am unable to see no reason, given the urgency of the
matter, why I should
refer this decision to IDC to award the tender
to Trencon.
54.
In regard to the costs, it is the general practice that these should
follow the result. Trencon is also entitled to the costs
of Part A of
the notice of motion whose proceedings came earlier by way of urgency
before the Court.
55.
In the premises I therefore make the following order, as proposed in
the draft order handed to me by Trencon, which I amended.
1.
The decision of the First Respondent to declare the tender submission
of the Applicant non-responsive and to award the tender
T27/07/12:
Tender Enquiry for the Principal Building Contract for the I DC Head
Office External Upgrade Sandton, Johannesburg (the
"Tender"’)
to the Second Respondent (the “decision”) is reviewed,
set aside and substituted with an
award of the Tender to the
Applicant in terms of
section 8(1)(c)(ii)(aa)
of the
Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act No. 3 of 2000
on the following terms:
1.1
The contract sum shall be in the amount of R110,633,822.28 (one
hundred and ten million six hundred and thirty three thousand
eight
hundred and twenty two rand and twenty eight cents) plus VAT of
R15,488,735.12 (fifteen million four hundred and eighty eight

thousand seven hundred and thirty five rand and twelve cents) (RP 658
read with 623);
1.2
The First Respondent shall negotiate in good faith the terms of any
final contract and service level agreement with the Applicant;
1.3
The Applicant shall have the right to submit claims in terms of
clause 9.2.1 read with clause 32.12; and/or clause 32.5 of the
JBCC
Series 2000 Principal Building Agreement - Edition 4.1 Code 2101
March 2005 prepared by the Joint Building Contracts Committee
Inc.
2.
The First Respondent is ordered to pay the Applicant’s costs,
including the costs of 2 (two) counsel (where employed) in
respect
of:
2.1
The application under case number 2012/58961;
2.2
The costs in respect of Part A of this application (under case
number: 2012/70100);
2.3
The costs in respect of Part B of this application (under case
number: 2012/70100).
MOTHLE
J
For
the Applicant: Adv. A Nelson SC
Instructed
by: Joubert Gulpin Searley
Applicant’s
Attorneys
c/o
Couzyn Hertzog & Horak
321
Middle Street
Brooklyn
Pretoria
Ref:
M Steenkamp
And
for First Respondent: Adv. D Fine SC
Assisted
by : Adv. M Sikhakhane
Instructed
by: Edward Nathan Sonnebergs
First
Respondent’s Attorneys c/o Eloff Brink Attorneys Lord Charles
Office Park Building A, 1st Floor North Wing 337 Brooklyn
Road
Brooklyn
Ref:
Annie van der Merwe