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[2013] ZAGPPHC 559
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Mogalakwena Local Municipality v Semmogo Property Development (Pty) Ltd and Others (18585/2013) [2013] ZAGPPHC 559 (6 May 2013)
IN THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT, PRETORIA
(REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
(1)
REPORTABLE
(2)
NOT OF INTEREST TO
OTHER JUDGES
(3)
REVISED
DATE: 6 May 2013
CASE
NO: 18585/2013
In the matter between:
MOGALAKWENA LOCAL MUNCIPALITY
Applicant
and
SEMMOGO
PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT (PTY) LTD
First Respondent
LAFATA
INVESTMENT(PTY) LTD
Second Respondent
LIMPOPO
DEVELOPMENT
TRIBUNAL
Third Respondent
MEC
FOR CO-OPERATIVE GOVERNANCE HUMAN SETTLEMENT
AND
TRADITIONAL AFFAIRS, LIMPOPO PROVINCE
Fourth
Respondent
PREMIER,
LIMPOPO
PROVINCE
Fifth Respondent
MINISTER OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAND
REFORM
Sixth Respondent
JUDGMENT
MOTHLE
J
INTRODUCTION:
1. This
application came by way of urgency in terms of Rule 6(12) of
the
Uniform Rules of Court in the Motion Court for urgent applications.
The Applicants seek a final interdict prohibiting the Third
Respondent
(“the Tribunal”)
from conducting a
hearing scheduled for the 9
th
May, 2013 or at any other
date ...thereafter, to· consider an application for the
establishment of land development in the
area of jurisdiction of the
Applicant. Further relief is sought in the form of a declarator that
the Tribunal was, as from midnight
on 17 June 2012, divested of its
powers and functions provided for in Chapter V of the Development
Facilitation Act, 67 of 1995
(
"the
DFA") and
consequently, it should be interdicted from performing any functions
or exercising any of the powers provided for
in that Chapter. It is
contended that these powers were divested by the order of the
Constitutional Court in the matter of
Johannesburg Metropolitan
Municipality v The Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others,
2010 (6)
SA 182
(CC).
2. The
First and Second Respondents
("the Respondents")
who
submitted an application for the establishment of land development
before the Tribunal, oppose this application. The Tribunal
as well as
the Fourth to
the
Sixth Respondents (organs of state), chose
not participate in these proceedings.
3. The
Respondents oppose this application on various grounds, including
in·limine,
· that the application is not urgent;
and the deponent to the .founding affidavit of the Applicant and its
attorneys -lack
authority to bring this application. On the merits,
and in the event this Court does not uphold the points .raised
in
limine,.
the respondents contend that the order of the
,Constitutional Court declaring Chapter . V of the-,DFA invalid, did
not affect
the ·applications for land development that were
.submitted· during the period·-of suspension of that
order:
The order of the Constitutional Court was suspended for a
period of twenty four (24) months when it was granted, to enable
Parliament
to correct the affected Chapters in DFA.
BACKGROUND:
4. In
1995, the DFA was enacted, with the stated object of the Act being
amongst others to
"facilitate and speed up the implementation
of reconstruction and development programmes and project in relation
to land".
Chapter Iii of DFA established tribunals for each
of the nine provinces, with their functions outlined in section 16
thereof as
being to deal with
«any matter brought before it
in terms of section 30(1), 33, 34, 40, 42, 51, 48(1), 57 or 61 or any
matter arising therefrom".
These sections, with exception of
section 61, fall under Chapters V and VI of OFA. Chapters V and VI
contain sections that provide
for land development procedures,
including the submission and consideration of applications·
for land use and development..
5. It is
common cause between the parties that during or about 2009
the
Johannesburg· Metropolitan Municipality launched a court·
attack against the Constitutional validity of Chapters
V. and VI of
the DFA, which-came before · the Supreme Court of Appeal
("SCA").
The reason for the attack was...that the
functions of the. Tribunals, in this case the Gauteng Development
Tribunal, as provided
for in Chapters V and VI of the DFA;·encroaches
:on-
the Constitutional· powers of development by the
municipalities in whose area the affected land would fall.
Municipalities
derive their powers from section 152 of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996
("the
Constitution''.),
read with Part D of schedule 4 thereof.
6. The SCA
in its judgment, reported as
Johannesburg Metropolitan
Municipality v The Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others,
2010 (2)
SA 554
(SCA),
declared Chapters V and VI of the DFA invalid in
terms of the Constitution and referred the matter to the
Constitutional Court.
7. This order of
invalidity was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in the
same case
between the same parties, as reported in
2010 (6) SA 182
(CC). In
declaring these sections invalid, the Constitutional Court suspended
its order of invalidity on 18 June 2010 for a period
of 24 months.
The period of suspension expired on 17 Ju·ne.2012.
8. It is
significant to point out that prior to the expiry of the suspension
period, an unsuccessful attempt was made in another application to
request the Constitutional court to extend the period. of suspension.
It was apparent at that time
that
Parliament would not be able
to timeously pass the necessary legislation in order to·
address the effects of the declaration
of invalidity of the affected
Chapters.
9.
The
Respondents· contend that they :filed their application for
land development with. the Tribunal during the period of
suspension
and therefore have a
"legitimate expectation"
to
have their application heard by this Tribunal after the expiry of the
suspension period. The meeting of the Tribunal to consider
this
application is scheduled for the 9
th
May 2013. This
application before me is amongst others, a request for an order to
prohibit this pending hearing.
POINTS
IN LIM!NE:
10. The Respondents contend
two grounds
in limine,
firstly that this application is not
urgent and secondly that the deponent to the founding affidavit of
the Applicant and their
attorney lack the necessary authority to
bring this application.
Urgency
11. The Respondents
submits that. the
matter
is not urgent in that .the Applicant
can obtain "substantial ·.relief in due course. The
.reason advanced in support
of this submission is that it is open to
the Applicant to attend the hearing··scheduled for the
9
th
May 2013 to raise their objections in that hearing.
12. It is trite that
to make out a case for urgency, the Applicant must give reasons
why
the matter is urgent and satisfy the Court why he will not be
afforded substantial redress at the hearing in due course. See
Rule
6(12)(b)
and the degrees of urgency as set out
in
Republikeinse Publikasies (edms) Bpk v Afrikaanse Pers
Pubiikasies (Edms) Bpk
1972 (1) SA 773
(A) and Luna
Meubelvervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin (t/a Makin1s Furniture
Manufacturers)
1977 (4) SA 135
(W).
The Applicant has
complied with the Practice Directives of this Court in regard to
setting the matter down for hearing.
13. It seems to me
that this matter presents one of those instances where in order
to
determine urgency, it is necessary to have regard to the nature of
the relief sought arid decide, on the merits, whether “the
Applicant may not obtain substantial” redress in due course.
The relief sought is basically twofold, first, in the form of
a
declarator (in fact a confirmatory order) that as a matter of law,
the Tribunal's functions to consider applications for land
development have been declared invalid by the order of the
Constitutional Court. Secondly, as a consequence of this .declaration
of invalidity, the Tribunal must be prohibited from considering
applications for land. development lodged in ,terms of the expunged
sections in Chapters V and VI of the DFA, in its meeting scheduled
for 9 May 2013. or at any other time thereafter.
14. It is clear that
.what the Applicant seeks as relief is a final interdict, aimed
at
prohibiting the Tribunal permanently, from exercising the functions
of which it has been divested by order of the Constitutional
Court.
Thus the attendance of this Tribunal meeting to raise this issue as
advocated by the Respondents .would not assist the Applicant
to
obtain this final interdict. The Tribunal has no basis in law to
adjudicate on the question whether it has or has not been divested
of
the functions provided for in the expunged chapters of the DFA. It
cannot be a judge in its course and the principle of
nemo eudex
sua
causa
applies.
15. If this Court
finds on the merits that the Tribunal has indeed been divested
of its
functions by the order of the Constitutional Court, then it will be
apposite to grant the interdict before the meeting of
9 May 2013, and
not in due course. It will be futile and moot to prohibit the
Tribunal from exercising the expunged functions
after
the
meeting has been held. If would make no sense for any Court where·
a case is made out justifying such relief, to consider
and grant an
interdict prohibiting a meeting already held. I am therefore of the
view: that this is a case where substantial relief
for the interdict
would not be granted at a hearing in due course and that this
application is indeed urgent.
Lack
of authority.
16. The Respondents allege
·in ··the answering affidavit that firstly,
the
municipal manager failed to allege in the Founding Affidavit that he
was
duly authorised
to make the affidavit and secondly that he
did not have a resolution by the council of the Applicant,
authorising the launching
of this application. A further attack was
launched
in
the form of a formal notice issued in terms of
Rule 7 of the Uniform Rules of Court, challenging the authority of
attorneys Mohale
Incorporated, to act on behalf of the Applicant.
17. At the outset, I
am of the view that the Rule 7 challenge has no merit, in that
there
is correspondence on record from Messrs Mohale Inc. Attorneys,
addressed to the Respondents' former attorneys, Messrs Couzyn
Hertzog
& Horak of Brooklyn, Pretoria, preceding this application.
wherein it is stated clearly by Messrs Mohale Inc that they
act on
instructions of the Applicant. Further, as it will appear hereunder,
the municipal manager, who is the deponent to the Founding
Affidavit
of the Applicant, is authorised to appoint attorneys to act on behalf
of the municipality.
18.
In
reply to the Respondents' challenge, the municipal manager contends
that his authority to launch these proceedings and depose
ta the
affidavits derives from the system of delegation of powers adopted by
the municipality., in which he is also authorised
to appoint'
attorneys to litigate on behalf of the municipality.
19.
The
structure· of governance as it appears in the national and
provincial spheres of government generally reflects adherence
to the
doctrine of separation of powers between the legislature and
executive. This is not the case with the municipalities. Section
11
(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000
(“the
Systems Act”)
provides:
"(1) The executive and
legislative authority of
a
municipality is exercised by the
council of the municipality, and the council takes all the decisions
of the municipality subject
to section 59."
20. Section 59
of
the Systems Act provides that a municipality must develop a
system of delegation of powers to the executive functionaries. This
delegation is intended to facilitate governance and provide an
efficient administration. It would not be practical for the council
to exercise the day to day functions. The Applicant's municipal
manager, under council resolution of 27 November 2012, item A27,
has
been delegated certain powers under this system. One such power is to
authorise the appointment of an attorney after consultation
with the
manager: corporate support services, in respect of actions or claims
'by or against the municipality, as well as an advocate
where the
appointed attorney deems it necessary to do so.
21. In Gaines v Telekom
Namibia
2003 (3) SA 615
(SCA) at 624B, the Court established the
principle that the institution of proceedings must be authorised but
not the authority
to depose to an affidavit. The Court stated the
principle thus:
"The deponent to an affidavit in motion
proceedings need not be authorised by a party concerned ·to
depose to the affidavit...In
the present case the proceeding were·
instituted and prosecuted by
a
firm of attorneys purporting to
act on behalf of the Respondent...and such firm of attorneys was duly
authorised to represent the
Respondent."
22. In the instance
such as in this case where the council of a municipality has
delegated to the municipal manager, administrative powers to engage
the services of legal representatives to act on its behalf
in
instituting or defending litigation, such manager does not require
another resolution of council in every instance he or she
is engaged
in litigation. To expect such resolution in every case would lead to
practical difficulties as council cannot be expected
to meet daily to
be at hand when the exigencies of urgent applications, for or
against, descend on the municipality
23.
I
therefore find that the municipal manager and Messrs Mohale inc
attorneys were duly authorised to launch this application and
the
attack by the Respondents to the contrary
in limine
has no
merit.
24. The Respondents
also introduced arguments that the application is premature
in the
sense that the tribunal still had the powers in terms of Chapter lII
of the DFA which it can exercise. This, allegation
does not qualify
as a point
in limine·
within the context of his
application, as it raises the ·very issue that is at the heart
of this application.··Ideal
with it· hereunder.
ON
THE MERITS:
25. The essence of the
dispute between the parties is the interpretation of the
order of the
Constitutional Court in which the affected chapters of the DFA were
declared invalid. On the one hand the Respondents
contend that this
order by the Constitutional Court has left the door open for the
extension of the lives of Chapter V and VI of
the DFA, beyond the
period of suspension, in regard to any applications for land
development received by the Tribunals in terms
of the affected
Chapters, before and during the period of suspension. The contention
of the Applicant on the other hand, is that
the correct
interpretation of
the
order means that all applications,
including those of the Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality or
Ethekwini Municipality, received
before or during the "period of
'suspension, ·could only. be accepted and adjudicated upon or
determined by the Tribunal
within the period of suspension. What
exactly was. the order of the Constitutional Court in the matter of
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development
Tribunal and Others supra?
To answer this question one needs to
backtrack to the SCA decision.
26. In declaring the
invalidity of Chapters V and VI of the DFA the SCA, amongst others,
decided thus;
"1. Chapters V and VI of
the
Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995
are declared to be
invalid.
2.
This
declaration of invalidity is suspended for 18 months from the date of
this order subject to the following:
(a)
No
development tribunal established under the Act may accept for
consideration or consider any application for the grant or alteration
of land use rights in the municipal area.
(b)
No
development tribunal established under the Act may on its own
initiative amend any measure that regulates or controls land use
within a municipal area."
27.
When
the matter came before the Constitutional Court, paragraph 2 of the
SCA order relating to the suspension of the order of invalidity,
as
quoted above, was set aside. In its place, the Constitutional Court
formulated its own period of suspension of the order as
follows:
"5. The o/der of
constitutional invalidity made by the Supreme court of Appeal in
respect of Chs V
and VI of the
Development Facilitation Act 67 of
1995
is-confirmed.
6. Paragraph 2 of that
order relating to the suspension of the order of invalidity is set
aside.
7. The declaration of
invalidity is suspended for 24 months from the date of this order to
enable
Parliament to correct the defects or enact new legislation.
8.
The suspension is subject to the following conditions:
(a)
Development
tribunals must consider the applicable integrated development plans,
including special development frameworks and urban
development
boundaries, when determining applications for the grant or alteration
of land use rights.
(b)
No development
tribunal established under the Act may exclude any by-law· or
act of Parliament from applying to land forming
the subject matter of
an application submitted to it.
(c)
No
development tribunal established under the Act
may
accept and
determine any application for the grant or alteration of land use
rights within the jurisdiction of the City of Johannesburg
Metropolitan Municipality or Ethekwini Municipality after the date of
this order.
(d)
The relevant
development tribunals
·
may determine applications in
respect of land falling within the jurisdiction of the City of
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality
or Ethekwini Municipality only
if these applications were submitted to it before the date of this
order."
28.
The
Respondents' contentions are based primarily on Chapter Ill of the
DFA which establishes and empowers the Tribunals to exercise
functions which are referred to in section 16 of the DFA. In their
view, a development tribunal established in terms of Chapter
Ill of
the DFA may continue performing such powers as are contained in
Section 16 of the DFA The argument continue
to
state that since section 16 falls under
Chapter Ill of the DFA and is unaffected by the constitutional
invalidity, the functions
contained therein may still be executed.
29
This argument attempts to bring to bear a strained interpretation on
the order of the Constitutional
Court and is, in my view, misplaced.
As stated·
in the
Background
part of this
judgment, section 16 of DFA provides for functions which the
Tribunals are empowered to exercise in regard to considering
land
development applications. In terms of the provisions of Section
16(a)- 0f the DFA, the Tribunal is empowered to deal with
any matter
brought before it in terms of ·various· sections which
includes Section 30(1), 33, 34,.40, 42, 51, 48(1),
57 or.61.or any
.matter arising there from. It makes this provision by reference to
these specific .sections of the DFA, where
the content of these
functions are to.be found: These sections; which contain
the··functions· are;::with-the·
exception
of section 61, all located in the expunged Chapters V and VI. Section
61 is located in Chapter VII and has thus survived
the order of
Constitutional invalidity. In other words, of the initial functions
in section 16 which the Tribunals were initially
empowered to
exercise, only those located in section 61 may now be exercised.
Presently, a Tribunal can therefore only “
grant”
or
decline approval, or impose conditions to its approval, of any.
application made to it in terms of the Act concerning Section
61
applications.
30. The application for land
development brought by the Respondents to the Tribunal is
based on
the provisions of Section 31 of the DFA. This section is one of those
affected by the declaration of invalidity of the
order of the
Constitutional Court, as it is part of Chapter V of the DFA.
31. As already stated, an
attempt was made early in 2012, to extend the life of the period
of
suspension when it was realised that Parliament would not be able,
timeously to introduce legislative measures to correct the
anomaly.
An application was brought on urgency before the Constitutional
Court. under case number: CCT 30/2012 in the matter between
South
African Council for Consulting Professional Planners and Others v The
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and.
Others.
The Applicants requested direct access in order to have the
period of suspension of the declaration of invalidity of the Chapters
V and VI of the DFA to be extended.· In that application,
a··-· statement dated 22 March 2012, issued
by
the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform was referred to
and attached. This statement stated that
applications
(for
land development in terms of Chapters V and VI of the DFA)
received
before 17 June 2012
(the date of expiry of the suspension of the
order of the Constitutional Court)
"will continue to be heard
and determined by the Tribunals even after 17 June
as
if the
Constitutional Court had not declared invalid Chapters V and VI of
the DFA...
'' The Respondents' interpretation of the order of the
Constitutional Court is precisely a repeat of this view as expressed
by the
Department.
32. The Constitutional
Court then issued an order dated 30 May 2012 on this urgent
application,
which stated as follows:
"The Constitutional Court has considered the
applications. It
·
has
concluded that the application .by Napa J Properly Investments and
Development (Pty) Ltd to intervene in these proceedings must
be
granted but that the application for direct access must be dismissed,
as it bears no reasonable prospects of success.
Order:
1.
Napa J
Property Investments .and Development (Pty) Ltd admitted as a party
to these proceedings.
2.
The application for direct access is dismissed.
3.
There
is
no order as to costs."
33. A belated application
by the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality to intervene
in the
urgent application for access, met with the same fate, in a further
order by the Constitutional Court expressed thus:
"Since the main application for direct
access
to have the period of suspension of the
declaration of invalidity of certain chapters of the
Development
Facilitation Act, 67 of 1995
further suspended has been dismissed,
the application by the City of Tshwane- Metropolitan Municipality for
leave to intervene
is hereby also dismissed. The order
was
that:
1.
The
application by the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality for
leave to intervene,
is
dismissed.
2.
There
is no order
as
to costs."
34.
This latest order of the Constitutional Court is
unambiguous. The life ··of the period of suspension of
the order
of the Constitutional Court terminated on 17 June 2012. The
Constitutional Court dearly has' no intention to extend it. It
is relevant for the purposes of this application that the very issue
raised by the Respondents, was before the Constitutional Court
in the
form of the statement of the Department, when it considered and
rejected the urgent application. As it stands,
no
Tribunal in the country is authorised, with
effect from the 17
th
June 2012 {the date of expiry of the 24 months of the period of
suspension) to consider an application brought in terms of any
of the
sections falling within Chapters V and VI of the DFA, whether lodged
during or before the period of suspension.
35.
The
Respondents, however, argue that by submitting their application
during the period of suspension, a
legitimate
expectation
arose for
their application to be heard and that the Tribunal is enjoined to
adjudicate on their application even outside the expiry
date of the
period of suspension. I do not agree. A legitimate expectation
,
no matter how justified, cannot confer statutory functions on an
organ of state, where· such functions have been declared
invalid. The sections are still in the statute but have been declared
invalid by the order of the Constitutional Court and as such
they
cannot be exercised. I am inclined to agree with the Applicant's
submission that Tribunals were expected to accept and deal
with any
application in terms of the expunged Chapters V and VI. of the DFA
during the period of suspension. This door of opportunity
now appears
to be ·firmly· shut by the 30 May 2012 order of the
Constitutional Court, pronouncing on the urgent application
lodged in
an attempt to extend the life of the expunged chapters.
36. The Respondents
also referred me to Sections 11 and 12 of the Interpretation
Act, 33
of 1957 dealing with repeal and substitution as well as effect of
repeal of a law. Section 11 of the Interpretation Act
states that
when a law repeals wholly or partially any formal law and substitutes
provisions for the law so repealed, the repealed
law shall remain in
force until the substituted provisions come into operation. In
particular, Section 12(2) (c) thereof states
that where a law repeals
any other law, then unless the contrary intention appears, the repeal
shall not:
"(c) Affect any
right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or
incurred under
any law
so
repealed;
or
(e)
Affect
any investigation, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of ·any
such right, privilege, ..obligation, ·liability,
forfeiture or
punishment
as
it is in this subsection mentioned, in any such
investigation,·1egal proceedings or remedy may be instituted,·
continued
or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment
may be imposed:
as
if the repealed law had not been passed."-·
37. The Applicant, correctly
so, in reply submits that Section 11 of the Interpretation
Act only
pertains to instances where a law repeals any formal law. “Law
is
defined in Section 1 of the Interpretation Act
to
mean
any law, proclamation, ordinance, act of Parliament or other
enactment having the force of Law”.
The declaration of
constitutional invalidity is not covered by this definition. The
declaration of invalidity did not come as a
result of an amendment or
repeal by Parliament but rather through the order of the
Constitutional Court. The power of the Constitutional
Court to
declare statutes or statutory provisions invalid derive from the
Constitution.
38. It seems to me
therefore that the Tribunal cannot, outside the period of suspension
of the declaration of invalidity of Chapters V and VI of the DFA,
exercise any functions contained in the sections located in those
chapters, to consider the Respondents' application, even if it was
lodged before the expiry of the period of suspension of the
order of
the Constitutional Court. The Respondents' application should have
been validly considered during the period of suspension.
This
application to prohibit the Tribunal from considering the
Respondents' application on 9 May 2013 or on any date thereafter'
should therefore succeed.
39. In regard to the
question of costs, counsel for the Respondents submitted that
this
being a matter affecting the Constitution, the Court should not in
its decision order any payment of costs· by the
Respondents in
the event the application succeeds. I do not agree that this matter
raises a constitutional issue. It simply raises
the question of
interpretation of an order by the Constitutional Court. I. am mindful
of the fact that the Respondents participated
in this application in
order to protect their application for land development, which the
Tribunal failed to consider before the
expiry of the period of
suspension. It became necessary for them to do so realising that the
Tribunal as well as other organs of
state cited as Respondents in the
proceedings, abstained from participation. l also accept that the
Respondent's grounds of opposing
this application were not frivolous.
I am therefore of the view that this is one such matter where an
order of costs against the
Respondents would not be just and
reasonable.
40.
In
the premises! make the following order:
1. The application is urgent
within the provisions of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules
of Court and
condonation is granted to the Applicant for non-compliance with the
prescribed time limits, forms and service in relation
to this
application.
2.
The'
points
in /imine
raised by the Respondents in regard to the
alleged absence of authority on the part of the deponent to the
founding affidavit and
the Applicant's attorneys, is dismissed.
3. It .is declared that the
Third Respondent was, as from midnight on 17 June 2012, divested
of
those powers and functions provided for in Chapters V and VI of the
Development Facilitation Act, 67 of 1995
by virtue of the order of
the Constitutional Court in the matter of
Johannesburg
Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others
2010 (6) SA 182
(CC).
4. The Third Respondent is
interdicted from performing any of the functions or exercising
any of
the powers provided for in Chapter V of the
Development Facilitation
Act, 67 of 1995
in respect of an application for the establishment of
a land development area submitted to it by the First and Second
Respondents.
Concerning Portions 14, 15, 16 and 18 of the farm Lisbon
No. 288, Registration Division KR, Limpopo Province.
5. The Third Respondent is
prohibited from conducting a hearing to consider the application
for
the establishment of a land development area in respect of the
property referred to in 4 above on the 9
th
May 2013 at
10H00 or at any other date and time after the said date.
6. There is no order as to
costs.
MOTHLE
J
For
the Applicant
Adv: A. Liversage
Instructed by:
Mohale
Incorporated
Attorneys
for Applicant
c/o
Malan & Mohale
462-Julius Jeppe Street
Waterkloof
Pretoria
Ref: MP Mchale/ MM 003135 For
First and Second Respondents:·
Mr M G Pathudi
Instructed
by
:
M
G Pathudi Incorporated
c/o Lingenvelder and Baloyi Inc
Building 7, Atterbury Estate
19
Frikkie De Beer Street
Menlyn
Pretoria.
Date of
Judgment: 6 May 2013.