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[2013] ZAGPPHC 84
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Radebe Obo TD v Road Accident Fund (77426/2009) [2013] ZAGPPHC 84 (18 March 2013)
REPORTABLE
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTH
GAUTENG, PRETORIA)
CASE NO:77426/2009
DATE:18/03/2013
In
the matter between:
RADEBE,
JULIA obo
TD
............................................................................
PLAINTIFF
and
ROAD
ACCIDENT FUND
…......................................................................
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
KUBUSHI,
J
[1]
This is a personal injury claim of a minor child (T) against the Road
Accident Fund. At the time of the accident T was thirteen
years old.
He is now seventeen years old.
[2]
T was injured in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on 7
February 2009 in Qwaqwa. At the time of the accident he was a
passenger in the insured motor vehicle.
[3]
At the hearing of the case I was informed that the merits of the case
have been resolved between the parties. The defendant
has conceded
100% of the liability for the damages sustained by T and agreed to
pay the proven or agreed quantum. The defendant
has also undertaken
to provide the plaintiff with a certificate in terms of
section 17
(4) (a) of the
Road Accident Fund Act, No. 56 of 1996
, as amended, in
respect of future medical costs for T.
[4]
What this court must now determine is the quantum. The outstanding
damages which require quantification are in respect of general
damages and prospective loss of income/ loss of earning capacity. The
parties agreed that no evidence would be led in respect of
these
claims and that the evidence and opinions contained in the bundle of
the experts’ reports be placed on record as evidence.
The
agreed bundles of documents were handed in and admitted into the
record as exhibit “A”, “B” and “C”
respectively. Exhibit “A” is the Index to Plaintiff’s
Expert Bundle; Exhibit “B” is the Index to
Defendant’s
Expert Bundle; and Exhibit “C” consisted of the
experts’joint minute bundle of:
a.
Minute between Ms Mattheus and Ms van der Ryst
b.
Minute between Ms Du Toit and Mr Wessels
The
parties were agreed that the contents of exhibit “C” will
be used for the purpose of arguing quantum. The actuarial
report,
which was based on exhibit “C”, was also handed in and
admitted into the record as exhibit “D”.
GENERAL
DAMAGES
[5]
The plaintiff’s counsel contends that T suffered severe brain
damage which resulted in neurological injuries and should
as such be
awarded general damages in the amount of R1 000 000. She referred me
in this respect to the unreported judgment of Masipa
J in WEBB v RAF
2007 103/13786, wherein a claim was for a minor child with severe
brain injury. According to her, as per the report
of Dr Edeling, the
neurosurgeon who examined T, T continues to suffer recurrent
headaches and since the accident he exhibits mood
swings and
aggressive behaviour.
[6]
The defendant’s counsel conceded in argument that it is clear T
sustained head injuries. He however, contended that T
had previous
learning difficulties and that his history showed that he failed and
repeated grade 1. He argued that from the report
of Dr Edeling it is
clear that the injury to the head was not serious as he recovered
fully two days after the accident. He referred
me to the report of Dr
Brink, the neuro-psychologist, whose formulation was that the adverse
effects of the brain injury were mild
to moderate. In this regard he
referred me to the judgment in COMBRINK v RAF 2001 (5) C & B
B4/81 (W) wherein a girl aged fourteen
years sustained head injuries
and was awarded an amount of R180 000 which translates in 2013 to
R365 000. He also referred me to
the judgment in ROAD ACCIDENT FUND v
MARUNGA
2003 (5) SA 164
(SCA) in respect of the proper process of
determining general damages in present times. He submitted that an
amount of R400 000
will suffice in the circumstances of this case.
[7]
The parties’ counsel are in agreement about the injuries
sustained by the claimant. They differ as to the sequalae of
the
injuries and about the amount of quantum. The plaintiffs counsel is
praying for an amount of R1 000 000 whilst the defendant’s
counsel says an award of R400 000 will be appropriate.
[8]
The opinions of the various experts who examined T show that he
sustained severe brain injury with the following sequelae:
a.
the narrative test done by the psychiatrist, Dr Shovel, show that T
is as a result of the accident suffering from an Organic
Brain
Syndrome which is permanent and irreversible. This Organic brain
Syndrome is assessed as constituting serious long term mental
disorder as well as serious long term behavioural disturbances;
b.
the prognosis of Dr Edeling, the neurosurgeon, is that the
neurological sequelae of his brain injury have stabilised and become
permanent and has resulted in an increased risk of late
post-traumatic epilepsy;
c.
Mr Stipinouich, a speech - language therapist, is of the opinion that
T’s cognitive-communicative difficulties have consequences
which are serious with regard to enjoyment of life.
This
evidence is undisputed as the defendant did not tender evidence to
the contrary and I am thus inclined to accept it for purposes
of
quantifying the damages.
[9]
A claim for general damages comprise of pain and suffering,
disfigurement, permanent disability and loss of amenities of life.
See PROTEA INSURANCE COMPANY v LAMB
1971 (1) SA 530
(A) at 534H and
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND v MARUNGA above at para [23],
[10]
It is evident from the reports of the experts that T has suffered and
will continue to suffer loss of amenities of life. The
sequelae of
T’s injuries are considered by the Educational Psychologists,
in their joint minute to have resulted in significant
degrees of
permanent educational and employment disability as well as loss of
amenities, independence and enjoyment of life. He
is also at risk of
developing a variety of underlying organically based psychiatric
conditions because of the diagnosed organic
brain syndrome. According
to the psychiatrist there has been devastating loss of amenities and
T’s general enjoyment of life
has very markedly diminished.
According to the neurologist’s opinion it is expected that the
neurological sequelae of his
brain injury will result in more
significant losses of general amenities and enjoyment of life in
adulthood. It is unlikely that
he will develop the mental capacity
for fully independent living or for fully independent management of
his personal-, financial-
or legal affairs.
[11]
It is also undisputed that T suffered pain at the time of the
accident. He is still in pain and shall continue to suffer pain
even
in the future. It is undisputed that he continues to suffer recurrent
headaches. The neurosurgeon’s opinion, which I
accept, is that
the organic neurological sequelae of T’s brain injury have
stabilised and become permanent. His post-traumatic
headaches have
become chronic, and are expected to persist in variable degrees in
the long term. The brain injury has also resulted
in increased risk
of late post-traumatic epilepsy.
[12]
On the issue of the awarding of quantum, a court has a wide
discretion to award what it considers to be fair and adequate
compensation to the injured party. It has been said that there is no
hard and fast rule of general application requiring a court
to
consider past awards. It is generally accepted that it would be
difficult to find a case on all fours with the one being heard
and
that awards in decided cases should be considered only as a guide of
how other courts arrived at an award. See PROTEA INSURANCE
COMPANY v
LAMB above at 535H and ROAD ACCIDENT FUND v MARUNGA above at para
[24].
[13]
Having considered the various judgments I was referred to by counsel
and other comparable awards from previous decisions, which
I
considered only as a guide,, my view is that a fair and just amount
in the circumstances of this case would be R800 000.
PROSPECTIVE
LOSS OF INCOME
[14]
The parties are agreed that T is entitled to be awarded damages for
future loss of income. What is in dispute is the contingency
percentage applicable.
[15]
The plaintiff’s counsel is of the view that the percentage
applicable should be 10% or at most 15% and not higher. She
argued
that T had no pre-existing learning difficulties before the accident.
He had a stable upbringing and the experts are agreed
that he would
have completed matric and entered the job market. According to her,
if the 10% is applied to the amount of the total
of the gross future
loss of R2 520 127 as actuarially determined in exhibit “D”,
T will be entitled to an amount of
R2 268 114.
[16]
The defendant’s counsel on the other hand, contends that T had
previous difficulties with his school work and doubts
that he would
have completed grade 12. He submitted that his family is not employed
and not educated and as such nothing would
have motivated him to
complete grade 12. He prayed that the court must deviate and use a
higher percentage. He submitted that an
appropriate percentage should
be 45%. He further submitted that when a contingency of 45% is
applied to the total of the gross
future loss of R2 520 127 T must be
awarded an amount of R1 000 850-80 as damages for prospective loss of
income. He referred me
to the judgments in GOODALL v PRESIDENT
INSURANCE CO
1978 (1) SA 389
(W) and SOUTHERN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
LTD v BAILEY NO
1984 (1) SA 98
(A).
[17]
It is trite that contingency deductions are within the discretion of
the court and depends upon the judge’s impression
of the case.
Contingencies are normally calculated at 5% for past loss and 15% for
future loss. See SOUTHERN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
V BAILEY NO above at
113 (G) and Robert Kock: IHE QUANTUM YEARBOOK 2011 at p104.
[18]
No contingency deductions have been made in this instance. The
actuary, rightly so, did not make any contingency deductions
in the
calculation with a view that the deductions fall within the purview
of the court. Factors which the court must take into
consideration,
when determining contingencies, are: the possibility that the
plaintiff may eventually have less than a normal expectation
of life;
and that he or she may experience periods of unemployment by reason
of incapacity due to illness or accident, or to labour
unrest or
general economic conditions. The amount of the discount may therefore
vary, depending upon the circumstances of each
case. See SOUTHERN
INSURANCE ASSOCIATION v BAILEY NO above at 116G -H.
[19]
In this instance, as per the joint minute of the Educational
Psychologists, the opinion of the expert, which opinion I am inclined
to accept, is that T presented with pre-existing learning
difficulties, which would have impacted on his performance throughout
high school as he was probably of below average intellectual
abilities. However, the experts are agreed that he would most
probably
have been able to complete grade 12 (without university
exemption). He would have probably attempted to enter into the open
labour
market, and would not have progressed to tertiary training.
[20]
It is common cause that, due to the accident, T’s chances of
employment have been destroyed. He will never be able to
earn an
income.
Dr
Edeling’s opinion is that he will never work. The opinion of
the industrial psychologists in their joint minute is that
should T
obtain some form of employment it would be of a highly intermittent
nature reaching a stage where extended unemployment
would become a
reality. These circumstances, in my view, should serve to
tremendously lower the contingency deductions in favour
of T.
[21]
Under these circumstances my view is that a fair, just and reasonable
contingency of 15% should be deducted from the plaintiff’s
earnings post morbid. The calculations are therefore as follows:
Value
of income uninjured
....................................
R
2 520 127-00
Value
of income injured
.........................................
R_______
-
Gross
future loss
....................................................
R
2 520 127-00
Less:
15% deduction
.............................................
378 019-05
Total gross
loss.
.......................................................
R
2 142 107-95
The
plaintiff is therefore entitled to R2 142 108-00 in respect of her
claim for damages for future loss of earnings of T.
[22]
In the premises I make the following order:
a.
The draft order as amended marked with an “X” and
initialled by me is made an order of this court.
EM KUBUSHI
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
HEARD
ON THE : 05 FEBRUARY 2013
DATE
OF JUDGMENT : 18 MARCH 2013
PLAINTIFF’S
COUNSEL : ADV N. ENGELBRECHT
PLAINTIFF’S
ATTORNEY : MOKODUO INCORPORATED
C/O
VAN STADE VAN DER ENDE
DEFENDANT’S
COUNSEL : ADV J. SCHERMAN
DEFENDANT’S
ATTORNEY: FOURIE FISMER INC
“
x”
IN
THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT. PRETORIA
(REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA)
CASE
NO: 2009/77426
PRETORIA
_5_ FEBRUARY2013
BEFORE
THE HONOURABLE
KUBUSHI
J.
In
the matter between;-
RAPEBE
.
JULIA obo
TD
.......................................................................................
PLAINTIFF
and
ROAD
ACCIDENT FUND
…...............................................................................
DEFENDANT
DRAFT ORDER
Having
heard counsel / By agreement between the parties, the following order
is made:-
1.
The Defendant is ordered to pay the sum of R 1 3 to the Plaintiff in
full and final settlement of the Plaintiffs claim. Payment
shall be
made into the trust account of the Plaintiffs attorneys, details as
follows:
Mokoduo
Incorporated Trust Account First National Bank, Rosebank Branch
Account Number:...8290 Branch Code: ..3305
2.
The Defendant is ordered to furnish the Plaintiff with an Undertaking
in terms of
Section 17(4)(a)
of the
Road Accident Fund Act, 56 Of
1996
, for the costs of the future accommodation of TDR (hereinafter
referred to as “the minor”) in a hospital or nursing
home
or treatment of or rendering of a service or supplying of goods to
the minor arising out of the injuries sustained by him
in the motor
vehicle collision of 7 February 2009, after such costs have been
incurred and upon proof thereof.
2.1
In terms of the statutory undertaking referred to in paragraph 2
above, the Defendant shall pay:-
2.1.1
the reasonable costs of the creation of the Trust referred to in
paragraph 4 below and the appointment of the Trustee;
2.1.2
the reasonable costs of the furnishing of security by the Trustee;
2.1.3
the costs of the Trustee in administering the minor’s estate,
as determined by
Section 84(1
)(b) of the
Administration of Estates
Act 66 of 1965
, as amended, according to the prescribed tariff
applicable to curators.
3.
The Defendant will pay the agreed or taxed party and party High Court
costs of the action to E) February 2013, such costs to
include:
3.1
the costs attendant upon the obtaining of payment of the capital
amount referred to in paragraph 1 above;
3.2
the preparation and reservation costs of the Plaintiffs experts Dr.
D. A. Shevel, Dr. H. J. Edeling, M. Gibson, A. Stipinovich,
A.
Mattheus, A. Greeff, C. Du Toit and G. Whittaker, if any and as
agreed or allowed by the Taxing Master;
3.3
the costs of counsel; and I
3.4
the Plaintiff’s attorneys shall serve the notice of taxation on
the Defendant’s attorneys and shall allow the Defendant
7
(seven) court days within which to make payment of such costs.
4.
The requisite steps shall be taken by the Plaintiff with a view to
forming a trust to, inter alia, administer and/or manage the
financial affairs of the minor and that such trust shall be formed
within 3 (three) months of the date of this order.
4.1
The Trustee shall be required to furnish security to the satisfaction
of the Master in terms of Section 6(2)(a) of the Trust
Property
Control Act 57 of 1988, as amended.
5.
The trust instrument shall provide for the following:-
5.1
The separation of the property of the trustee/s from the trust
property;
5.2
Ownership of the trust property vests in the trustee/s in their
capacity as trustee/s;
5.3
The trustee/s shall provide security to the satisfaction of The
Master in terms of Section 6(2)(a) of the Trust Property Control
Act,
57 of 1988;
5.4
Procedures to resolve any disputes shall be subject to the review of
any decision made in accordance therewith by the above
Honourable
Court;
5.5
Amendment of the trust instrument shall be subject to the leave of
the above Honourable Court;
5.6
The trustee/s is authorised to recover the remuneration of and cost
incurred by the trustee/s in administering the undertaking
in
accordance with the undertaking;
5.7
The minor shall be the sole income and capital beneficiary;
5.8
The trust property is excluded from any community of property in the
event of the marriage of the minor;
5.9
The trust shall terminate on the death of the minor whereafter the
trust assets shall devolve on his estate;
5.10
The trust property and administration thereof is subject to annual
reporting by an accountant;
6.
The capital amount referred to in paragraph 1 above, shall be paid by
the Defendant directly into the trust account of the Plaintiffs
Attorneys of record, Mokoduo Incorporated, for the benefit of the
minor.
7.
The statutory undertaking referred to in paragraph 2 above shall be
delivered by the Defendant to the aforesaid Mokoduo Incorporated
within 14 (fourteen) days of the date of this Order.
8.
Mokoduo Incorporated will invest the capital amount less attorney and
client fees and disbursements in terms of Section 78(2)(A)
of the
Attorneys Act, 53 of 1979, with First National Bank, Rosebank, for
the benefit of the minor, the interest thereon, likewise
accruing for
the benefit of the minor which investment shall be utilized as may be
directed by the Trustee of the Trust, when created.
9.
Mokoduo Incorporated shall render an attorney and client statement of
account to the Trustee, of the trust to be formed, in terms
of the
fees contract entered into between the Plaintiff and Mokoduo
Incorporated.
10.
The party and party costs referred to in paragraph 3 above, as taxed
or agreed, shall be paid by the Defendant directly into
the trust
account of Mokoduo Incorporated for the benefit of the minor. After
deduction of the legal costs consultant’s fee
for drawing the
bill and attending to its settlement or taxation, the balance shall
be paid into the trust unless same has not
yet been created, in which
event, such balance shall be invested in terms of Section 78(2)(A) of
the Attorneys Act, 53 of 1979,
with First National Bank, Rosebank,
for the benefit of the minor, the interest thereon, likewise accruing
for the benefit of the
minor and shall be utilized as may be directed
by the Trustee of the Trust, when created.
BY THE REGISTRAR