Radebe Obo TD v Road Accident Fund (77426/2009) [2013] ZAGPPHC 84 (18 March 2013)

80 Reportability
Personal Injury Law - Road Accident Fund

Brief Summary

Personal Injury — Road Accident Fund — Quantum of damages — Minor child injured in motor vehicle accident — Defendant conceded liability and agreed to pay proven quantum — Dispute over general damages and prospective loss of income — Expert evidence presented regarding severity of injuries and long-term effects — Court awarded R800 000 for general damages and determined a 15% contingency deduction for future loss of income, resulting in a total award of R2 268 114 for loss of earnings.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter concerned a personal injury damages claim brought on behalf of a minor child against the Road Accident Fund arising from a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff, Radebe, Julia obo TD (acting on behalf of the minor child, “T”), instituted proceedings against the defendant, the Road Accident Fund, as the statutory insurer under the Road Accident Fund scheme.


Procedurally, by the time the matter came before the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, the parties had settled the merits. The defendant had conceded 100% liability for the damages sustained by T and had agreed to pay the proven or agreed quantum. The defendant also undertook to furnish an undertaking under section 17(4)(a) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 in respect of future medical costs.


The dispute remaining for determination by the court was the quantum of damages, specifically the appropriate amounts to be awarded for general damages and prospective loss of income/loss of earning capacity. The parties further agreed that no oral evidence would be led on these remaining issues, and that the court would decide quantum on the basis of the expert reports, joint minutes, and an actuarial report admitted as exhibits.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause that a motor vehicle accident occurred on 7 February 2009 in Qwaqwa, and that at the time T (then aged 13, later 17 at the time of judgment) was a passenger in the insured motor vehicle. It was also common cause that T sustained head/brain injuries in the collision and that the defendant bore full liability for proven damages.


On the quantification of general damages, the parties were aligned on the occurrence of injury but differed on the nature and extent of the sequelae and on the appropriate monetary award. The court recorded that the expert opinions before it indicated that T had sustained a severe brain injury with sequelae described in the expert material, including the psychiatrist’s view that T suffered from an Organic Brain Syndrome that was permanent and irreversible, with serious long-term mental disorder and behavioural disturbances. The neurosurgeon’s prognosis recorded that neurological sequelae had stabilised and become permanent, with an increased risk of late post-traumatic epilepsy, and that the claimant’s post-traumatic headaches had become chronic and were expected to persist in the long term. A speech-language therapist expressed the view that T’s cognitive-communicative difficulties had serious consequences for T’s enjoyment of life. The court treated this expert evidence on the sequelae as undisputed, as the defendant tendered no evidence to the contrary on those aspects.


On prospective loss of income, it was common cause that T was entitled to an award for future loss of earnings. The principal factual dispute relevant to contingencies concerned whether T had pre-existing learning difficulties and the likely trajectory of his education and employability absent the accident. The court noted the educational psychologists’ joint minute reflecting that T presented with pre-existing learning difficulties and was probably of below average intellectual abilities, which would likely have affected his performance throughout high school. At the same time, the experts were recorded as agreeing that he would most probably have been able to complete Grade 12 (without university exemption), would probably have attempted to enter the open labour market, and would probably not have progressed to tertiary training.


It was further treated as common cause, on the accepted expert material, that because of the accident T’s employment prospects were effectively destroyed, including opinions to the effect that he would never work or that any employment would be highly intermittent and deteriorate into extended unemployment.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions for determination were concerned with quantum, namely the proper amounts to be awarded for general damages and for prospective loss of income/loss of earning capacity, including the appropriate contingency deduction to apply to the actuarially calculated future loss.


The issues were primarily questions of the application of law to facts and of judicial discretion/value judgment. In relation to general damages, the task required the court to exercise a discretion to award fair and adequate compensation, guided (but not bound) by previous awards. In relation to future loss, the dispute centred on the appropriate contingency percentage, a discretionary assessment informed by the probabilities emerging from the accepted expert evidence and the circumstances of the minor.


4. Court’s Reasoning


In addressing general damages, the court approached the matter on the basis that the parties had agreed to place the expert reports and joint minutes before the court as evidence, and that the defendant had not adduced contrary evidence on the material sequelae described. The court expressly accepted the undisputed expert evidence for purposes of quantification, including that T suffered permanent neuropsychological and behavioural consequences, chronic headaches, an increased risk of epilepsy, and substantial impairment of amenities of life, independence, and enjoyment of life.


The court restated the recognised components of a general damages claim, namely compensation for pain and suffering, disfigurement, permanent disability, and loss of amenities of life, with reference to Protea Insurance Company v Lamb 1971 (1) SA 530 (A) and Road Accident Fund v Marunga 2003 (5) SA 164 (SCA). It further applied the principle that a court has a wide discretion to award what is fair and adequate in the circumstances, and that there is no inflexible rule requiring reliance on past awards. Prior awards serve as a guide, acknowledging that close factual matches are rare and that earlier awards cannot be mechanically transplanted.


Applying these principles, the court evaluated the competing submissions on amount. The plaintiff contended for a substantially higher award on the footing of severe brain injury and enduring behavioural and neurological impairment. The defendant argued for a lower award, relying on the proposition that the head injury effects were mild to moderate and pointing to pre-existing educational difficulties and comparative case law. After considering the authorities and comparable awards referred to in argument, the court arrived at a figure it considered fair in light of the accepted sequelae and their permanency, awarding R800 000 for general damages.


In addressing prospective loss of income, the court noted that the parties agreed on entitlement and that the dispute was confined to the contingency deduction. The court treated contingency deductions as a matter within judicial discretion, depending upon the judge’s impression of the case, and recorded the conventional point of departure that contingencies are often calculated at 5% for past loss and 15% for future loss, citing Southern Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey NO 1984 (1) SA 98 (A) and referencing Robert Koch’s The Quantum Yearbook 2011 on typical rates.


The court accepted that the actuary had correctly made no contingency deductions in the actuarial calculation, since contingencies are for the court. It identified the type of factors relevant to contingencies (including life expectancy and potential unemployment due to illness, accident, labour unrest, or economic conditions) as drawn from Southern Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey NO.


Turning to the particular facts, the court accepted the educational psychologists’ joint minute indicating pre-existing learning difficulties and below-average intellectual abilities, but also accepted that T would most probably have completed Grade 12 (without university exemption) and entered the open labour market. Importantly, the court treated the post-accident position as one in which T’s chances of employment had been destroyed, with expert opinion indicating he would never work or would at best obtain intermittent employment that would deteriorate into extended unemployment. On this basis, the court concluded that these circumstances justified lowering contingencies in favour of T, rather than increasing them.


The court ultimately selected a 15% contingency deduction, and applied it to the actuarially determined gross future loss figure (which, on the court’s accepted approach, was based on income uninjured less income injured, with injured earnings effectively treated as nil). This produced an award for future loss of earnings of R2 142 108.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court made an order in terms of a draft order as amended and initialled by the judge. On the amounts determined in the reasons, the court awarded general damages of R800 000 and future loss of earnings of R2 142 108, with the defendant’s liability having been conceded at 100%.


The court order further recorded that the defendant was to furnish the plaintiff with an undertaking under section 17(4)(a) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 in respect of future costs arising from the injuries, after such costs were incurred and proven. The order also regulated the establishment of a trust to administer the minor’s financial affairs, including requirements regarding security, reporting, and provisions to be contained in the trust deed.


The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff’s party-and-party High Court costs up to the relevant date, including specified costs related to the engagement of experts and the costs of counsel, with provision for taxation or agreement and for notice of taxation. The order also dealt with payment mechanics, including payment into the plaintiff attorneys’ trust account and investment of monies in terms of section 78(2)(A) of the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979, pending establishment of the trust.


Cases Cited


Webb v Road Accident Fund 2007 103/13786 (unreported judgment of Masipa J)


Combrink v Road Accident Fund 2001 (5) C & B B4/81 (W)


Road Accident Fund v Marunga 2003 (5) SA 164 (SCA)


Protea Insurance Company v Lamb 1971 (1) SA 530 (A)


Goodall v President Insurance Co 1978 (1) SA 389 (W)


Southern Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey NO 1984 (1) SA 98 (A)


Legislation Cited


Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, section 17(4)(a)


Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965, section 84(1)(b)


Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988, section 6(2)(a)


Attorneys Act 53 of 1979, section 78(2)(A)


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were expressly cited in the judgment text provided.


Held


The court held that, with merits settled at 100% liability, the remaining task was to determine quantum for general damages and future loss of earnings on the basis of the agreed expert evidence and actuarial calculations. It accepted the undisputed expert evidence describing permanent neurocognitive, behavioural, neurological, and quality-of-life sequelae.


For general damages, applying the established approach that such awards are discretionary and that previous awards provide guidance only, the court awarded R800 000 as fair and adequate compensation for pain, suffering, and loss of amenities of life in light of the severity and permanency of the sequelae.


For prospective loss of income, the court held that while pre-existing learning difficulties were present, the accident had destroyed T’s employability, justifying a contingency approach favourable to the plaintiff. It applied a 15% contingency deduction to the actuarial gross future loss and awarded R2 142 108 for future loss of earnings. It further ordered the statutory undertaking under section 17(4)(a), the establishment of a trust, and payment of costs as set out in the order.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that an award of general damages is a matter of judicial discretion aimed at fair and adequate compensation for non-patrimonial loss, including pain and suffering, permanent disability/disfigurement, and loss of amenities of life, as reflected in Protea Insurance Company v Lamb 1971 (1) SA 530 (A) and Road Accident Fund v Marunga 2003 (5) SA 164 (SCA). It reaffirmed that prior awards do not create a binding tariff; they serve only as comparative guidance, since cases rarely align on all material facts.


The judgment further applied the principle that contingency deductions in claims for loss of earnings are also discretionary and depend on the circumstances of the individual case. While conventional or commonly used percentages (including 15% for future loss) may serve as a point of departure, the proper contingency deduction must reflect relevant probabilities such as life expectancy and employment risks, as discussed in Southern Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey NO 1984 (1) SA 98 (A).


On the facts accepted, the court applied these principles by selecting a general damages figure informed by the permanence and seriousness of the sequelae described in the expert evidence, and by fixing the contingency deduction for future loss at a level it considered fair in circumstances where the minor’s employment prospects were found to be effectively eliminated by the accident.

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[2013] ZAGPPHC 84
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Radebe Obo TD v Road Accident Fund (77426/2009) [2013] ZAGPPHC 84 (18 March 2013)

REPORTABLE
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTH
GAUTENG, PRETORIA)
CASE NO:77426/2009
DATE:18/03/2013
In
the matter between:
RADEBE,
JULIA obo
TD
............................................................................
PLAINTIFF
and
ROAD
ACCIDENT FUND
…......................................................................
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
KUBUSHI,
J
[1]
This is a personal injury claim of a minor child (T) against the Road
Accident Fund. At the time of the accident T was thirteen
years old.
He is now seventeen years old.
[2]
T was injured in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on 7
February 2009 in Qwaqwa. At the time of the accident he was a

passenger in the insured motor vehicle.
[3]
At the hearing of the case I was informed that the merits of the case
have been resolved between the parties. The defendant
has conceded
100% of the liability for the damages sustained by T and agreed to
pay the proven or agreed quantum. The defendant
has also undertaken
to provide the plaintiff with a certificate in terms of
section 17
(4) (a) of the
Road Accident Fund Act, No. 56 of 1996
, as amended, in
respect of future medical costs for T.
[4]
What this court must now determine is the quantum. The outstanding
damages which require quantification are in respect of general

damages and prospective loss of income/ loss of earning capacity. The
parties agreed that no evidence would be led in respect of
these
claims and that the evidence and opinions contained in the bundle of
the experts’ reports be placed on record as evidence.
The
agreed bundles of documents were handed in and admitted into the
record as exhibit “A”, “B” and “C”

respectively. Exhibit “A” is the Index to Plaintiff’s
Expert Bundle; Exhibit “B” is the Index to
Defendant’s
Expert Bundle; and Exhibit “C” consisted of the
experts’joint minute bundle of:
a.
Minute between Ms Mattheus and Ms van der Ryst
b.
Minute between Ms Du Toit and Mr Wessels
The
parties were agreed that the contents of exhibit “C” will
be used for the purpose of arguing quantum. The actuarial
report,
which was based on exhibit “C”, was also handed in and
admitted into the record as exhibit “D”.
GENERAL
DAMAGES
[5]
The plaintiff’s counsel contends that T suffered severe brain
damage which resulted in neurological injuries and should
as such be
awarded general damages in the amount of R1 000 000. She referred me
in this respect to the unreported judgment of Masipa
J in WEBB v RAF
2007 103/13786, wherein a claim was for a minor child with severe
brain injury. According to her, as per the report
of Dr Edeling, the
neurosurgeon who examined T, T continues to suffer recurrent
headaches and since the accident he exhibits mood
swings and
aggressive behaviour.
[6]
The defendant’s counsel conceded in argument that it is clear T
sustained head injuries. He however, contended that T
had previous
learning difficulties and that his history showed that he failed and
repeated grade 1. He argued that from the report
of Dr Edeling it is
clear that the injury to the head was not serious as he recovered
fully two days after the accident. He referred
me to the report of Dr
Brink, the neuro-psychologist, whose formulation was that the adverse
effects of the brain injury were mild
to moderate. In this regard he
referred me to the judgment in COMBRINK v RAF 2001 (5) C & B
B4/81 (W) wherein a girl aged fourteen
years sustained head injuries
and was awarded an amount of R180 000 which translates in 2013 to
R365 000. He also referred me to
the judgment in ROAD ACCIDENT FUND v
MARUNGA
2003 (5) SA 164
(SCA) in respect of the proper process of
determining general damages in present times. He submitted that an
amount of R400 000
will suffice in the circumstances of this case.
[7]
The parties’ counsel are in agreement about the injuries
sustained by the claimant. They differ as to the sequalae of
the
injuries and about the amount of quantum. The plaintiffs counsel is
praying for an amount of R1 000 000 whilst the defendant’s

counsel says an award of R400 000 will be appropriate.
[8]
The opinions of the various experts who examined T show that he
sustained severe brain injury with the following sequelae:
a.
the narrative test done by the psychiatrist, Dr Shovel, show that T
is as a result of the accident suffering from an Organic
Brain
Syndrome which is permanent and irreversible. This Organic brain
Syndrome is assessed as constituting serious long term mental

disorder as well as serious long term behavioural disturbances;
b.
the prognosis of Dr Edeling, the neurosurgeon, is that the
neurological sequelae of his brain injury have stabilised and become

permanent and has resulted in an increased risk of late
post-traumatic epilepsy;
c.
Mr Stipinouich, a speech - language therapist, is of the opinion that
T’s cognitive-communicative difficulties have consequences

which are serious with regard to enjoyment of life.
This
evidence is undisputed as the defendant did not tender evidence to
the contrary and I am thus inclined to accept it for purposes
of
quantifying the damages.
[9]
A claim for general damages comprise of pain and suffering,
disfigurement, permanent disability and loss of amenities of life.

See PROTEA INSURANCE COMPANY v LAMB
1971 (1) SA 530
(A) at 534H and
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND v MARUNGA above at para [23],
[10]
It is evident from the reports of the experts that T has suffered and
will continue to suffer loss of amenities of life. The
sequelae of
T’s injuries are considered by the Educational Psychologists,
in their joint minute to have resulted in significant
degrees of
permanent educational and employment disability as well as loss of
amenities, independence and enjoyment of life. He
is also at risk of
developing a variety of underlying organically based psychiatric
conditions because of the diagnosed organic
brain syndrome. According
to the psychiatrist there has been devastating loss of amenities and
T’s general enjoyment of life
has very markedly diminished.
According to the neurologist’s opinion it is expected that the
neurological sequelae of his
brain injury will result in more
significant losses of general amenities and enjoyment of life in
adulthood. It is unlikely that
he will develop the mental capacity
for fully independent living or for fully independent management of
his personal-, financial-
or legal affairs.
[11]
It is also undisputed that T suffered pain at the time of the
accident. He is still in pain and shall continue to suffer pain
even
in the future. It is undisputed that he continues to suffer recurrent
headaches. The neurosurgeon’s opinion, which I
accept, is that
the organic neurological sequelae of T’s brain injury have
stabilised and become permanent. His post-traumatic
headaches have
become chronic, and are expected to persist in variable degrees in
the long term. The brain injury has also resulted
in increased risk
of late post-traumatic epilepsy.
[12]
On the issue of the awarding of quantum, a court has a wide
discretion to award what it considers to be fair and adequate
compensation to the injured party. It has been said that there is no
hard and fast rule of general application requiring a court
to
consider past awards. It is generally accepted that it would be
difficult to find a case on all fours with the one being heard
and
that awards in decided cases should be considered only as a guide of
how other courts arrived at an award. See PROTEA INSURANCE
COMPANY v
LAMB above at 535H and ROAD ACCIDENT FUND v MARUNGA above at para
[24].
[13]
Having considered the various judgments I was referred to by counsel
and other comparable awards from previous decisions, which
I
considered only as a guide,, my view is that a fair and just amount
in the circumstances of this case would be R800 000.
PROSPECTIVE
LOSS OF INCOME
[14]
The parties are agreed that T is entitled to be awarded damages for
future loss of income. What is in dispute is the contingency

percentage applicable.
[15]
The plaintiff’s counsel is of the view that the percentage
applicable should be 10% or at most 15% and not higher. She
argued
that T had no pre-existing learning difficulties before the accident.
He had a stable upbringing and the experts are agreed
that he would
have completed matric and entered the job market. According to her,
if the 10% is applied to the amount of the total
of the gross future
loss of R2 520 127 as actuarially determined in exhibit “D”,
T will be entitled to an amount of
R2 268 114.
[16]
The defendant’s counsel on the other hand, contends that T had
previous difficulties with his school work and doubts
that he would
have completed grade 12. He submitted that his family is not employed
and not educated and as such nothing would
have motivated him to
complete grade 12. He prayed that the court must deviate and use a
higher percentage. He submitted that an
appropriate percentage should
be 45%. He further submitted that when a contingency of 45% is
applied to the total of the gross
future loss of R2 520 127 T must be
awarded an amount of R1 000 850-80 as damages for prospective loss of
income. He referred me
to the judgments in GOODALL v PRESIDENT
INSURANCE CO
1978 (1) SA 389
(W) and SOUTHERN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
LTD v BAILEY NO
1984 (1) SA 98
(A).
[17]
It is trite that contingency deductions are within the discretion of
the court and depends upon the judge’s impression
of the case.
Contingencies are normally calculated at 5% for past loss and 15% for
future loss. See SOUTHERN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
V BAILEY NO above at
113 (G) and Robert Kock: IHE QUANTUM YEARBOOK 2011 at p104.
[18]
No contingency deductions have been made in this instance. The
actuary, rightly so, did not make any contingency deductions
in the
calculation with a view that the deductions fall within the purview
of the court. Factors which the court must take into
consideration,
when determining contingencies, are: the possibility that the
plaintiff may eventually have less than a normal expectation
of life;
and that he or she may experience periods of unemployment by reason
of incapacity due to illness or accident, or to labour
unrest or
general economic conditions. The amount of the discount may therefore
vary, depending upon the circumstances of each
case. See SOUTHERN
INSURANCE ASSOCIATION v BAILEY NO above at 116G -H.
[19]
In this instance, as per the joint minute of the Educational
Psychologists, the opinion of the expert, which opinion I am inclined

to accept, is that T presented with pre-existing learning
difficulties, which would have impacted on his performance throughout

high school as he was probably of below average intellectual
abilities. However, the experts are agreed that he would most
probably
have been able to complete grade 12 (without university
exemption). He would have probably attempted to enter into the open
labour
market, and would not have progressed to tertiary training.
[20]
It is common cause that, due to the accident, T’s chances of
employment have been destroyed. He will never be able to
earn an
income.
Dr
Edeling’s opinion is that he will never work. The opinion of
the industrial psychologists in their joint minute is that
should T
obtain some form of employment it would be of a highly intermittent
nature reaching a stage where extended unemployment
would become a
reality. These circumstances, in my view, should serve to
tremendously lower the contingency deductions in favour
of T.
[21]
Under these circumstances my view is that a fair, just and reasonable
contingency of 15% should be deducted from the plaintiff’s

earnings post morbid. The calculations are therefore as follows:
Value
of income uninjured
....................................
R
2 520 127-00
Value
of income injured
.........................................
R_______
-
Gross
future loss
....................................................
R
2 520 127-00
Less:
15% deduction
.............................................
378 019-05
Total gross
loss.
.......................................................
R
2 142 107-95
The
plaintiff is therefore entitled to R2 142 108-00 in respect of her
claim for damages for future loss of earnings of T.
[22]
In the premises I make the following order:
a.
The draft order as amended marked with an “X” and
initialled by me is made an order of this court.
EM KUBUSHI
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
HEARD
ON THE : 05 FEBRUARY 2013
DATE
OF JUDGMENT : 18 MARCH 2013
PLAINTIFF’S
COUNSEL : ADV N. ENGELBRECHT
PLAINTIFF’S
ATTORNEY : MOKODUO INCORPORATED
C/O
VAN STADE VAN DER ENDE
DEFENDANT’S
COUNSEL : ADV J. SCHERMAN
DEFENDANT’S
ATTORNEY: FOURIE FISMER INC

x”
IN
THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT. PRETORIA
(REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA)
CASE
NO: 2009/77426
PRETORIA
_5_ FEBRUARY2013
BEFORE
THE HONOURABLE
KUBUSHI
J.
In
the matter between;-
RAPEBE
.
JULIA obo
TD
.......................................................................................
PLAINTIFF
and
ROAD
ACCIDENT FUND
…...............................................................................
DEFENDANT
DRAFT ORDER
Having
heard counsel / By agreement between the parties, the following order
is made:-
1.
The Defendant is ordered to pay the sum of R 1 3 to the Plaintiff in
full and final settlement of the Plaintiffs claim. Payment
shall be
made into the trust account of the Plaintiffs attorneys, details as
follows:
Mokoduo
Incorporated Trust Account First National Bank, Rosebank Branch
Account Number:...8290 Branch Code: ..3305
2.
The Defendant is ordered to furnish the Plaintiff with an Undertaking
in terms of
Section 17(4)(a)
of the
Road Accident Fund Act, 56 Of
1996
, for the costs of the future accommodation of TDR (hereinafter
referred to as “the minor”) in a hospital or nursing
home
or treatment of or rendering of a service or supplying of goods to
the minor arising out of the injuries sustained by him
in the motor
vehicle collision of 7 February 2009, after such costs have been
incurred and upon proof thereof.
2.1
In terms of the statutory undertaking referred to in paragraph 2
above, the Defendant shall pay:-
2.1.1
the reasonable costs of the creation of the Trust referred to in
paragraph 4 below and the appointment of the Trustee;
2.1.2
the reasonable costs of the furnishing of security by the Trustee;
2.1.3
the costs of the Trustee in administering the minor’s estate,
as determined by
Section 84(1
)(b) of the
Administration of Estates
Act 66 of 1965
, as amended, according to the prescribed tariff
applicable to curators.
3.
The Defendant will pay the agreed or taxed party and party High Court
costs of the action to E) February 2013, such costs to
include:
3.1
the costs attendant upon the obtaining of payment of the capital
amount referred to in paragraph 1 above;
3.2
the preparation and reservation costs of the Plaintiffs experts Dr.
D. A. Shevel, Dr. H. J. Edeling, M. Gibson, A. Stipinovich,
A.
Mattheus, A. Greeff, C. Du Toit and G. Whittaker, if any and as
agreed or allowed by the Taxing Master;
3.3
the costs of counsel; and I
3.4
the Plaintiff’s attorneys shall serve the notice of taxation on
the Defendant’s attorneys and shall allow the Defendant
7
(seven) court days within which to make payment of such costs.
4.
The requisite steps shall be taken by the Plaintiff with a view to
forming a trust to, inter alia, administer and/or manage the

financial affairs of the minor and that such trust shall be formed
within 3 (three) months of the date of this order.
4.1
The Trustee shall be required to furnish security to the satisfaction
of the Master in terms of Section 6(2)(a) of the Trust
Property
Control Act 57 of 1988, as amended.
5.
The trust instrument shall provide for the following:-
5.1
The separation of the property of the trustee/s from the trust
property;
5.2
Ownership of the trust property vests in the trustee/s in their
capacity as trustee/s;
5.3
The trustee/s shall provide security to the satisfaction of The
Master in terms of Section 6(2)(a) of the Trust Property Control
Act,
57 of 1988;
5.4
Procedures to resolve any disputes shall be subject to the review of
any decision made in accordance therewith by the above
Honourable
Court;
5.5
Amendment of the trust instrument shall be subject to the leave of
the above Honourable Court;
5.6
The trustee/s is authorised to recover the remuneration of and cost
incurred by the trustee/s in administering the undertaking
in
accordance with the undertaking;
5.7
The minor shall be the sole income and capital beneficiary;
5.8
The trust property is excluded from any community of property in the
event of the marriage of the minor;
5.9
The trust shall terminate on the death of the minor whereafter the
trust assets shall devolve on his estate;
5.10
The trust property and administration thereof is subject to annual
reporting by an accountant;
6.
The capital amount referred to in paragraph 1 above, shall be paid by
the Defendant directly into the trust account of the Plaintiffs

Attorneys of record, Mokoduo Incorporated, for the benefit of the
minor.
7.
The statutory undertaking referred to in paragraph 2 above shall be
delivered by the Defendant to the aforesaid Mokoduo Incorporated

within 14 (fourteen) days of the date of this Order.
8.
Mokoduo Incorporated will invest the capital amount less attorney and
client fees and disbursements in terms of Section 78(2)(A)
of the
Attorneys Act, 53 of 1979, with First National Bank, Rosebank, for
the benefit of the minor, the interest thereon, likewise
accruing for
the benefit of the minor which investment shall be utilized as may be
directed by the Trustee of the Trust, when created.
9.
Mokoduo Incorporated shall render an attorney and client statement of
account to the Trustee, of the trust to be formed, in terms
of the
fees contract entered into between the Plaintiff and Mokoduo
Incorporated.
10.
The party and party costs referred to in paragraph 3 above, as taxed
or agreed, shall be paid by the Defendant directly into
the trust
account of Mokoduo Incorporated for the benefit of the minor. After
deduction of the legal costs consultant’s fee
for drawing the
bill and attending to its settlement or taxation, the balance shall
be paid into the trust unless same has not
yet been created, in which
event, such balance shall be invested in terms of Section 78(2)(A) of
the Attorneys Act, 53 of 1979,
with First National Bank, Rosebank,
for the benefit of the minor, the interest thereon, likewise accruing
for the benefit of the
minor and shall be utilized as may be directed
by the Trustee of the Trust, when created.
BY THE REGISTRAR