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[2013] ZAGPPHC 2
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Lanseria International Airport (Pty) Ltd v Imperial Bank (15860/2006) [2013] ZAGPPHC 2 (9 January 2013)
NOT
REPORTABLE
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTH
GAUTENG HIGH COURT)
Case
number: 15860/2006
Date:
9 January 2013
In
the matter between:
LANSERIA
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (PTY)
LTD
.............................................
Applicant
And
IMPERIAL
BANK
.......................................................................................................
Respondent
JUDGMENT
PRETORIUS
J.
[1]
This is an application that was referred to oral evidence in
accordance with an order granted by Ebersohn AJ on 13 April 2007,
as
read with the record of the Full Bench Appeal Court which aditionally
referred the issue of the applicant’s locus standi
to oral
evidence on 13 April 2007.
Oral
evidence was heard in this court on the issues of locus standi;
whether the applicant had waived its rights to rely on the
notice of
cancellation dated 3 October 2005 and whether the applicant is
estopped from cancelling the notarial deed of lease. In
Lekup Prop Co
No 4 (Pty) Ltd v Wright
2012 (5) SA 246
SCA Cloete JA found at
paragraph 32:
“
A
referral to trial is different to a referral to evidence, on limited
issues. In the latter case the affidavits stand as evidence,
save to
the extent that they deal with dispute(s) of fact; and once the
dispute(s) have been resolved by oral evidence, the matter
is decided
on the basis of that finding together with the affidavit evidence
that is not in dispute. ”
Counsel
for the respondent indicated that the main issue that the court has
to decide is that of locus standi. Should the court
decide the matter
in favour of the respondent regarding locus standi, then that would
be the end of the matter, according to counsel
for the respondent.
The
respondent occupies certain premises described as lease area number
11, also referred to as Hangar site 4 or Erf 57, which is
situated on
the remaining extent of Portion 12 of the Farm Zwartkop of Rooiwal
530, Registration Division JQ (the premises). This
is a hangar
situated at Lanseria Airport.
[5]
The repondent occupies the premises in terms of a notarial deed of
lease which was registered on 24 November 1994 and which
commenced on
1 June 1993. The notarial deed of tease was registered between
Southern Life Association Ltd (SL) and Avfin Marketing
Propietary
Limited (Avfin).
[6]
It is common cause that the respondent is the successor in title to
Avfin in terms of the notarial deed of lease, as Avfin ceded
its
rights in and the notarial deed of lease by a notarial cession to
Transafrican Aviation (Pty) Ltd on 18 March 1998. On that
date the
respondent registered a mortgage bond in respect of al! Transafrican
Aviation’s right, title and interest in and
to the said
notarial deed of lease. When Transafrican was liquidated the
respondent purchased at auction the rights of Transafrican
to the
notarial deed of lease from the liquidators.
[7]
The applicant seeks the eviction of the respondent from the premises
of Hangar 4 at Lanseria International Airport, on the basis
that the
applicant is the tenant of the premises and there existed an
agreement of sublease between the applicant and the respondent,
which
had duly been cancelled by the applicant.
[8]
The undisputed evidence is that Lanseria Airport 1993 (Pty) Ltd is
the registered owner of the property comprising the premises
of the
Lanseria Airport. The premises which are the subject matter of the
present application are situated on the property comprising
Lanseria
International Airport and is identified as Hangar site 4.
[9]
The chronological ownership of the properties in question is that
Lanseria Airport Properties (Pty) Ltd purchased the properties
from
the former Transvaal Provincial Administration and Krugersdorp- and
Roodepoort municipalities.
[10]
Southern Life Association Ltd was the owner of the premises during
the period 9 December 1993 to 17 August 1998 when Lanseria
Airport
1993 (Pty) Ltd became the registered owner when buying the property
from Southern Life on 17 August 1998.
[11]
Southern Life leased these properties to the applicant in terms of a
written agreement of lease concluded in October 1993.
The applicant
avers that the applicant has been the lessee of the properties since
9 December 1993, as on 9 December 1993 the headlease
came into
effect, when the registration of the transfer of the property in the
name of Southern Life took place on 9 December 1993.
[5]
According to the applicant when Southern Life transferred the
properties to Lanseria Airport 1993 (Pty) Ltd on 17 August 1998
Lanseria Airport 1993 (Pty) Ltd stepped into the shoes of Southern
Life as lessor of the applicant by operation of law.
[6]
The applicant argues that if that is the case then the court must
accept that at all relevant times the applicant has been and
is the
lessee of the properties, including Hangar Site 4, since 9 December
1993.
[7]
Afvin concluded a written agreement of lease on 1 October 1993 with
Lanseria Airport Properties (Pty) Ltd in respect of the
said
premises. This lease was subsequently notarially registered. Clause
18 (a) and (b) of the Avfin lease provides:
“
It
is hereby recorded that -
a)
the lessor (landlord) had sold the properties on which the premises
are situated to a new owner (‘new owner”) in
terms of a
written agreement of sale (“sale agreement”) and the new
owner has leased the properties to Lanseria Airport
(Pty) Limited
(“Airport”) in terms of a written agreement of lease
(“head-lease”), all with effect from
the date upon which
the properties are registered in the name of the new owner
(“effective date”)
b) in terms of the sale agreement and
the head-lease, the LESSOR (landlord), Airport and the new owner have
agreed that, with effect
from the effective date, this lease will be
ceded by the LESSOR (landlord) to the new owner and thereafter be
ceded by the new
owner to Airport;” {Court’s emphasis)
[15]
The applicant interprets these clauses to indicate that the parties’
intention was that Southern Life would be the owner
of the properties
and that Southern Life would lease the properties to the applicant as
head tenant, where the applicant as sublessor
would lease the leased
premises to Avfin as sublessee.
[16]
The parties are ad idem that when Southern Life became the registered
owner of the properties on 9 December 1993 Southern Life,
as a matter
of law, stepped into the shoes of Lanseria Airport Properties (Pty)
Ltd as the lessor in terms of the lease with Avfin
and that it was
unnecessary to cede the lease to Southern Life.
[17]
The respondent argues that the applicant is not privy to the contract
upon which the applicant relies and has no right to cancel
the
contract.
[18]
The applicant contends that in terms of clause 18 (6) the cession of
the Avfin lease to the applicant by Southern Life was
done tacitly.
The period it encompasses is 9 December 1993 to February 2004. During
this period the respondent had no involvement
or knowledge of the
leased premises at all, as admitted by Mr Crous, for the defendant,
under oath.
[8]
Avfin ceded their lease to Transafrican Aviation (Pty) Ltd
(Transafrica) by way of a notarial cession of lease which was
registered
in the Deeds Office on 18 March 1998.
[9]
From 18 March 1998 until 17 August 1998 the parties concerned acted
on the basis that Southern Life was the lessor and the applicant
was
the lessee of the leased premises in terms of the head lease. From 17
August 1998 all concerned acted on the basis that the
Lanseria
Airport 1993 (Pty) Ltd was the lessor in terms of the head lease and
Transafrican was the sublessee of the premises in
terms of the lease
agreement between Lanseria Airport Properties (Pty) Ltd and Avfin.
[10]
The applicant made payments as lessee to Southern Life, until the
property was sold to Lanseria Airport 1993 (Pty) Ltd on 14
April
1998. Invoices were first addressed to Avfin and thereafter to
Transafrican’s liquidators who all paid the rental amounts
according to the relevant invoices supplied by the applicant. There
was never any query from the respondent as to why payments
had to be
made throughout into the applicant’s bank account.
[11]
The right, title and interest in and to and arising from the notarial
deed of lease was sold to the respondent by public auction
on 9 March
2004. As a result of this the respondent became the lessee of the
premises in terms of the notarial deed of lease. The
period of the
lease would expire on 31 May 2013, twenty years after it had been
concluded.
[12]
It is common cause that the applicant was not initially a party to
the notarial deed of lease, but the applicant argues that
it became a
party to the notarial deed of lease by tacit cession on 9 December
1993. It is common cause that the applicant relies
on the notarial
deed of lease for the relief sought. The applicant must thus prove
that the respondent had a right to possess the
premises and had a
valid right to terminate the right to possess.
[13]
The applicant started invoicing the respondent for rental of the
leased property in July 2004. This leased property was referred
to as
Hangar Site 4. The respondent admitted making payments on these
invoices, albeit on an irregular basis, but always into the
applicant’s bank account.
[14]The
respondent’s case is based on the fact that the applicant has
no locus standi based on the absence of privity of contract.
[26]
The existence of a cession is a matter of fact. The court must
consider all the evidence before it is to decide whether the
cession
has been proved on a balance of probabilities.
[27]
To be able to do so the court has to consider the oral evidence lead
by both parties as well as the affidavits in the application.
It must
be noted that Mr Henwood, for the applicant, testified to actions
which had taken place 19 years previously. Both Mr Rippon
and Mr
Henwood gave oral evidence on behalf of the applicant.
[28]
Mr Rippon was the group property investment manager of Southern Life
who had signed the head lease agreement in respect of
Lanseria
Airport between Southern Life and Lanseria Airport Properties (Pty)
Ltd. He confirmed that from the time Southern Life
became the
registered owner of the property, both Southern Life and the
applicant treated the head lease as valid. The applicant
received all
the rentals from the sublessees. The applicant paid rent in terms of
the head lease to Southern Life. The applicant
contends that Southern
Life had ceded its rights in terms of the lease to the applicant by
its conduct. This evidence was confirmed
by Mr Opperman. There was
never any contracts between Southern Life and the tenants on the
premises and no rental was ever paid
by the sublessees to Southern
Life. This evidence was confirmed by Mr Rippon, as Southern Life
never invoiced the tenants.
[15]
It is clear from the evidence, the relevant invoices and the payments
that the applicant invoiced Avfin who paid the applicant
directly.
According to the financial statements at 31 March 1998 the applicant
received a rental income of R6,256,830.00 for the
financial year
ending 31 March 1998. Mr Opperman was clear that the amount
represented all the rental income paid to the applicant
by the
sublessees for the subleases, including that of Hangar 4. The
applicant paid Southern Life rental in the amount of R5,833,116.00
during the same period. According to all the evidence this payment to
Southern Life was not linked or subject to the payment of
the
subleases in any way.
[16]
The parties throughout acted on the basis that Southern Life was the
lessor and the applicant was the lessee of the leased
premises in
terms of the head lease. From 17 August 1998 all parties acted on the
basis that Lanseria Airport 1993 (Pty) Ltd was
the lessor in terms of
the head lease and Transafrican the sublessee of Hangar site 4.
Transafrican paid the rent to the applicant
after the applicant had
invoiced Transafrican.
[17]
Mr Rippon confirmed, whilst testifying, that there was never any
written or formal cessions, as they did not believe it to
be
necessary. There was a tacit acceptance by all parties that the
applicant had an agreement with all the tenants regarding all
the
subleases. The evidence is that Southern Life never had any intention
of managing the airport. Southern Life, according to
the evidence,
had no intention of getting involved with the day to day management
of the airport in any manner what so ever. Mr
Rippon confirmed
several times during cross- examination that the subleases were held
by the applicant and not by Southern Life.
Southern Life was only
interested in collecting the agreed rental amount each month from the
applicant. The payment by the applicant
to Southern Life was not
subject to the payments by the sublessees to the applicant.
[18]
Mr Henwood, who has been the director of the Lanseria International
Airport since 1993, gave evidence that Southern Life never
had any
direct dealings with the tenants. It was never contemplated at any
stage that Southern Life would be involved with the
tenants. The
tenants were invoiced directly by the applicant and never by Southern
Life and the tenants paid the applicant - never
Southern Life.
[19]
Mr Opperman, the assistant manager of the airport, gave evidence that
at all times, since he had been involved with the airport
since 1991,
all tenants paid the amount of rental into the applicant’s bank
account. He confirmed that Erf 57 was Hangar
4, which is the subject
matter of this application. He recalls the specific events when the
respondent's lease was cancelled due
to non-payment of the rent. He
and the airport manager decided to cancel the lease at the end of
September 2005. On 3 October 2005
Mr le Roux, the applicant’s
attorney, wrote a letter to the respondent cancelling the lease
agreement. According to Mr Crous,
for the respondent, he only
received the original invoices on 3 October 2005, the same day that
the lease agreement was cancelled.
Answering a question, under
cross-examination, Mr Rippon declared that the tacit cession was
effected on the same date on which
Southern Life became the owner of
the properties on 9 December 1993 and the head lease became effective
on the same date.
[20] The dictum in Landmark Real
Estate (Pty) Ltd v Brand
1992 (3) SA 983
(W) cannot be used to argue
the respondent’s case that the parties were under a mistaken
perception that the cession had
been effected, as Mr Rippon’s
evidence was clear that no formal cessions were envisaged at any
stage.
[21] In Christie, The Law of Contract
in South Africa, 6th edition the learned author confirms at p89 that
it is possible to use
both the “no other reasonable
interpretation test" and “the balance of probabilities
test” and that it could
be stated as follows:
“
in
order to establish a tacit contract it is necessary to prove, by
preponderance of probabilities, conduct and circumstances which
are
so unequivocal that the parties must have been satisfied that they
were in agreement. If the court concludes on the preponderance
of
probabilities that the parties reached agreement in that manner it
may find the tacit contract established. ”
[36]
Both cases decided in the former Transvaal Provincial Division Samcor
Manufacturers v Berger
2000 (3) SA 454
(T) at 461 G-l and Kropman &
Others N.N.O. v Nysschen
1999 (2) SA 567
(T) at 575 E- G dealt with
these tests. Although in the latter case the court referred to the
test as requiring unequivocal conduct
which is capable of no other
reasonable interpretation than that the parties intended to and did
in fact agree upon, the court,
nevertheless, applied the test of
probabilities to establish whether a cession had been concluded.
[37]
The reason as to why the applicant had to be the party dealing with
tenants was explained by Mr Henwood. The applicant received
different
sources of revenue and some tenants, who purchased substantial
amounts of fuel from the applicant, got more favourable
terms for
(easing of their particular property. This stands to reason and would
have had no bearing on the rental payable to Southern
Life.
[38]
There is no explanation on the pleadings or during oral evidence as
to why the respondent continued to pay the rental to the
applicant
even after the cancellation of the contract, despite not receiving
any invoices. This, in contrast to Mr Crous’s
evidence, that
the respondent only made payment for rentai to the applicant on
receiving original invoices. The respondent complied
with clause 10.
[39]
Mr Crous insisted that no payments were made if the respondent had
not received the original invoices. This, in spite of the
fact that
the respondent could not point to any clause or provision in the
notarial deed of lease setting out that payment by the
respondent
would only be effected once an original invoice had been received.
[40]
It is quite clear that at the time of cancellation and prior to
cancellation Lanprop invoiced the tenants, who then paid the
rental
into the same bank account which had been utilized throughout, since
1991. The statement by Mr Crous that:
“
As
is evident from the headings to the statements and invoices
themselves, LANPROP carries on business effectively as a managing
agent It is not clear from the documents what kind of entity LANPROP
is. ” must be untrue as it is set out on each invoice
that
Lanprop is a division of Lanseria Airport Properties (Pty) Ltd. The
court disregards the respondent’s contention that
it did not
know that payment was effected to the applicant as the documentary
evidence confirms the applicant’s case. It
must be reiterated
that Mr Crous had no personal knowledge of the agreement of the lease
between Lanseria Airport Properties and
Avfin as he was not involved
at the time. He testified that it is not the same notarial lease as
between Southern Life and Afvin.
Mr Rippon stated in the answering
affidavit and confirmed during evidence:
“
The
contention is incorrect. The correct position is that the previously
existing lease between LANSERIA AIRPORT PROPERTIES LTD
and Avfin was
subsequently notarially executed and registered after the initial
lessor, being LANSERIA AIRPORT PROPERTIES (PTY)
LTD, was replaced as
lessor by SOUTHERN LIFE as the new owner of the property. ”
(Court1 s emphasis)
[39]
The court compared both documents and can come to no other conclusion
but that it is the same lease which had subsequently
been registered.
[40]
In Johnson v Incorporated General Insurances Ltd
1983 (1) SA 318
AD
Joubert JA found at p 331 G - H:
“
Sessie
kan gesien word as ‘n oordragshandeling (act of transfer) om
die oordrag van ‘n vorderingsreg (translatio juris)
te laat
plaasvind. Dit geskied deur middel van ‘n oordragooreenkoms
(agreement of transfer) tussen die sedent en die sessionaris
uit
hoofde van ‘n justa causa waaruit die bedoeling van die sedent
om die vorderingsreg op die sessionaris oor te dra (animus
transferendi) en die bedoeling van die sessionaris om die reghebbende
van die vorderingsreg te word (animus acquirendi), blyk of
afgelei
kan word.’’ (Court’s emphasis)
[41]
The court cannot agree that the parties operated on the understanding
that the cession intended to be concluded had been concluded.
Mr
Henwood’s evidence was clear that the tacit cessions took place
on 9 December 1993. The evidence confirms that all the
parties from
that date onwards conducted themselves in a way which made it
abundantly clear that all the facts supported the tacit
cession.
[42]
The court was referred to Govan v Skidmore
1952 (1) SA 732
N where
Selke J held at p734:
“
Rex
v Blom, supra, was a criminal case, and, in my opinion, it is a
fallacy to suppose that the second principle of Blom’s
case
represents the minimum degree of proof required in civil case, for,
in finding facts or making inferences in a civil case,
it seems to me
that one may... by balancing probabilities select a conclusion which
seems to be the more natural, or plausible,
conclusion from amongst
several conceivable ones, even though that conclusion be not only
reasonable one. "(Court’s
emphasis)
[43]
Having considered all the evidence, all the affidavits and all the
authorities that both counsel for the applicant and the
respondent
had referred the court to, the court finds unequivocally that on the
probabilities, the conduct of the parties and the
circumstances which
existed that the parties were in agreement and that the applicant has
established that there was a tacit cession
at all times.
[46]
The defence of estoppel is raised as a result of the invoice which
the respondent, according to Mr Crous, only received on
3 October
2005 and which had a sticker affixed stating "unless this
account is paid within 7 days proceedings will be taken."
This
invoice was received on the same date as the letter of cancellation,
that is 3 October 2005.
[47]
Although Mr Crous referred to the letter of 3 October 2005 as a
“letter of demand” it is quite clear from a proper
reading of the letter that it is a cancellation letter as it sets out
quite clearly:
“
As
a result of your breach to pay your monthly rentals on due date you
are herewith notified that your lease agreement is cancelled
forthwith and you must accordingly vacate the leased premises
immediately and arrange for all improvements to be removed in terms
of the provisions of your lease. ” (Court’s emphasis)
[48]
There can be thus no doubt in anybody’s mind that the letter of
3 October 2005 was a letter of cancellation of the lease
agreement.
[49]
Mr Crous conceded during cross examination that he was confused by
the mixed signals of 3 October 2005, that is the original
invoices
that he had received with the sticker and the letter of cancellation
of the lease agreement. He refrained from calling
the applicant or
any representative of the applicant at any stage to clarify the
matter or to make any enquiries. In Southern Life
Association Ltd v
Byleveld NO
1989 (1) SA 496
(AD) the court found that for a
representation to constitute an estoppel it must be unambiguous.
[50]
Mr Crous7 concession that he was confused as to the applicant’s
intention can never be that an unambiguous representation
had been
made.
[51]
Mr Opperman disputed that he had agreed that he would send the latest
invoice and that the respondent could pay one lump sum
for Hangars 3
and 4 upon receipt of the invoice. It is clear from all the evidence
that the payment by the respondent for Hangar
3 had nothing to do
with the present dispute and the court is not dealing with payment
for Hangar 3. Mr Opperman was adamant that
he had not given the
respondent any extension of time to pay the rental for Hangar 4. The
court cannot find that on a balance of
probabilities the extension
was granted as testified by Mr Crous. Clause 8 of the lease provides
inter alia:
“
Variation
Except
as specified herein, no variation of the Agreement shall be of any
force or effect unless reduced in writing and signed by
the LESSOR
and LESSEE or their agents acting under written authority. ’’
(Court’s emphasis)
[52]
The respondent did not prove which representation was made on which
the respondent acted to its’ prejudice. Mr Crous
did not
testify that the applicant made a misrepresentation fraudulently and
the court finds that no such misrepresentation was
made. The
extension of time was given at the end of September 2005 according to
the respondent, before the applicant decided to
cancel the contract
on 3 October 2005 - there could thus be no mispresentation by the
applicant at the end of September 2005.
[53]
In Concor Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a Concor Technicrete v Potgieter
2004
(6) SA 491
SCA Cloete JA found at:
“
Nevertheless
if a representation by conduct is plainly ambiguous, the representee
would not be acting reasonably if he chose to
rely on one of the
possible meanings without making further enquiries to clarify the
position(Court’s emphasis)
[54]
In this instance the court does not hesitate to find that Mr Crous
did not act reasonably as he made no attempt to clarify
the position
by making enquiries from the applicant. He was obliged to find out
the true set of circumstances, but chose not do
so. Therefore the
defence of estoppel cannot succeed.
[55]
If the defence of waiver is to succeed there should be clear evidence
in this regard, as waiver is a question of fact. In this
instance the
respondent has to prove waiver on a balance of probabilities. A party
is not lightly deemed to have waived his or
her rights.
[56]
In Feinstein v Niggli and Another
1981 (2) SA 684
(AD) Trollip JA
found at 698 F - G:
“
The
party alleging a waiver of a contractual right retains throughout the
proceedings the overall onus of proving that the other
party had full
knowledge of the right when he allegedly abandoned it. ’’
(Court s emphasis)
[57]
The respondent does not rely on a direct waiver, but relies on an •
implied waiver.
[58]
The respondent relies on waiver by the applicant on the letter dated
on 16 May 2006, which was sent to the respondent. Mr Crous’
evidence under cross-examination was that it was his impression that
the applicant had perhaps decided to carry on with the lease.
If that
is the case the respondent can no longer rely on the defence of
waiver, as there was no waiver at all, but according to
Mr Crous the
applicant decided to honour the lease agreement. Mr Crous made no
effort at all to ascertain whether he had interpreted
the
circumstances correctly, where a reasonable person would have made
enquiries.
[59]
According to the applicant’s replying affidavit, by Mr
Opperman, the respondent’s attorney and the applicant’s
attorney held a meeting to explore possibilities of settlement. At
the meeting the applicant’s attorney indicated in no uncertain
terms that the applicant intended launching a fresh application to
cancel the notarial lease and to have the respondent evicted
from
Hangar 4. Mr Crous denied these allegations by Mr Opperman in his
answering affidavit, but during cross-examination he conceded
that it
was possible that the applicant’s attorney had informed the
respondent’s attorney that such an application
would be
launched afresh. The respondent did not call any witnesses to rebut
this evidence, even though Mr Haasbroek, the respondent’s
attorney, was present at the meeting and was present at court during
the hearing of oral evidence. It would have been expedient
to call Mr
Haasbroek as a witness to rebutt the evidence of Mr Opperman as the
onus to establish waiver rests on the respondent.
[60]
As found earlier it is clear that the applicant had sent no further
invoices after 3 October 2005, to the respondent but that
the
respondent kept on paying the monthly rental as it was obliged to do
according to the provisions of clause 10 of the lease:
“
In
the event of the LESSOR cancelling this lease and the LESSEE
disputing the right to cancel and remaining in occupation of the
Premises, the LESSEE shall, pending the determination of such dispute
by litigation or otherwise,
continue
to pay the LESSOR an amount equivalent to the monthly rental and
other sums payable hereunder on the date or dates when
such rental
and other sums would have been due but for the cancellation, and the
LESSOR shall be entitled to accept and recover
such payment. ”
(Court’s emphasis)
[61]
The respondent thus treated the deed of lease as binding whilst
occupying the premises and kept on paying the applicant as
the
lessor.
[62]
This conduct by the applicant is consistent with a possible
cancellation and inconsistent with a defence of waiver. The court
cannot find that the respondent had established waiver. Therefore
this defence cannot succeed.
[63]
The following order is made:
1.
An order confirming the cancellation of notarial deed of lease
registered by the Registrar of Deeds, Pretoria under reference
number
K6754/94L;
2.
An order directing the respondent to vacate the premises forming
subject matter of the aforesaid lease, being lease area number
11
(also known as hangar site no. 4 or Erf 57), situated on the
remaining extent of Portion 12 (a portion of Portion 9), of the
Farm
Zwartkop or Rooiwai 530, Registration Division J.Q. Gauteng;
3.
An order directing the Respondent to pay the costs of this
application on the attorney and client scale including the costs of
two counsel.
Judge
Pretorius
Case
number : 15860/2006
Heard
on : 29 November 2012
For
the Applicant / Plaintiff : JP Voster SC
:
AM Heystek
Instructed
by : Le Roux Vivier and Associates
For
the Respondent : EF Dippenaar SC
:
AC Botha
Instructed
by : Bezuidenhout van Zyl & Associates INC.
Date
of Judgment : 9 January 2013