Gamagara Local Municipality v All Persons Intending Occupying Erven 14167 And 14409 Kathu (1991/2014) [2014] ZANCHC 32 (18 November 2014)

75 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Eviction — Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 — Application for interim interdict — Gamagara Local Municipality sought to interdict respondents from occupying and erecting structures on Erven 14167 and 14409, Kathu, due to unlawful occupation — Respondents not currently in occupation but intending to occupy — Court issued rule nisi for respondents to show cause why interdict should not be made final, recognizing the threat of unlawful occupation despite doubts regarding the application of PIE to non-occupiers.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an urgent application brought in the High Court (Northern Cape Division, Kimberley) in terms of section 5 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE). The applicant, Gamagara Local Municipality, sought relief directed at persons alleged to be in the process of unlawfully invading municipal land.


The respondents were cited in broad terms as “All persons intending occupying Erven 14167 and 14409 Kathu”. The matter therefore concerned a group of persons not individually identified, described by reference to their alleged conduct and intention in relation to the two erven.


Procedurally, on 11 November 2014 the applicant approached the court urgently. The court granted an order authorising service of the section 5(2) PIE notice together with the notice of motion for the contemplated eviction proceedings (Part B relief). The hearing regarding the requested prohibitory interdict (Part A relief) was postponed to 14 November 2014 in the unopposed motion court. On that date, some respondents appeared without having filed opposing papers, and indicated through a spokesperson, Ms Salvation Mogodile, an intention to oppose on the return date. Judgment was delivered on 18 November 2014.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was an alleged land invasion at Kathu, involving alleged demarcation of stands and the partial erection of structures on Erven 14167 and 14409, and the municipality’s attempt to prevent further establishment of occupation pending the finalisation of eviction proceedings.


2. Material Facts


The applicant’s case, as accepted for purposes of interim relief, was that there was an ongoing invasion of Erven 14167 and 14409. The conduct relied upon was that persons were “planting” markers/poles and/or beacons on the stands to demarcate individual sites.


On Erf 14409, the municipality stated it had established that there were 20 to 30 demarcated areas. On Erf 14167, it stated there were approximately 100 demarcated stands and 30 to 40 structures, with some shacks in the process of being erected for future accommodation.


A further material fact, expressly relied upon by the court in considering the applicability of PIE and the formulation of relief, was the applicant’s allegation that none of the structures had yet been occupied and that they did not appear to contain furniture, household equipment, or apparel. The applicant’s papers thus presented the situation as one of intended occupation and preparatory conduct, rather than established residence.


The court referred to photographs attached to the founding papers as depicting the alleged invasion, and accepted on a prima facie basis that the land was being invaded and that the threat of further invasion was ongoing.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions the court was required to determine arose at the interim interdict stage and concerned the viability and effectiveness of the relief sought against the described class of respondents.


A principal issue was whether the applicant’s approach under PIE was conceptually aligned with the statute’s scope, given that PIE is directed at the eviction of persons from their homes, while the municipality’s case was that the relevant persons were not yet in occupation and were merely intending to occupy or were in the process of establishing structures.


A closely related issue was a practical and legal difficulty identified by the court concerning the citation of the respondents, namely the feasibility and efficacy of granting a prohibitory interdict against unknown and potentially fluctuating persons described as intending (but not necessarily already) to occupy the property.


The dispute therefore concerned a combination of legal interpretation (the scope of PIE and the meaning of “home” within its constitutional context), and the application of law to the facts (whether the alleged conduct constituted a basis for interim relief, notwithstanding the court’s doubts about the chosen procedural route and the description of the respondent class).


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter by engaging with the legal position on the scope of PIE, relying on the exposition by Brand JA in Barnett and Others v Minister of Land Affairs and Others 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA). From that authority, the court accepted that PIE applies to the eviction of persons from their homes, which is supported by PIE’s terminology, its preamble, and its direct linkage to section 26(3) of the Constitution, which protects against eviction from a home without a court order after consideration of relevant circumstances.


In adopting the principles set out in Barnett, the court highlighted that a “home” requires regular occupation coupled with a degree of permanence. The court also noted that the constitutional context underscores that a home is more than shelter and constitutes a zone of personal intimacy and security, as articulated in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers [2004] ZACC 7; 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); 2004 (12) BCLR 1268.


Against that legal framework, the court identified a significant tension in the applicant’s own factual case. The municipality alleged that none of the structures were occupied and that there were no indicia of residence (such as household effects). This created a difficulty because the relief was framed through PIE-based eviction machinery and was pursued against persons who were, on the applicant’s version, not yet unlawful occupiers in established occupation of homes.


The court further expressed a primary concern about the citation of respondents. It questioned how an interim prohibitory interdict, if granted, would be effective against unknown persons who were merely “intending” to occupy and were not shown to be in present unlawful occupation. This was treated as a practical and conceptual obstacle to the relief as formulated.


Despite these doubts, the court considered that, at the interim stage, it should not foreclose the applicant’s ability to pursue protective relief. The court relied on the fundamental principle that a person may not take the law into their own hands, and accepted that the applicant’s land was prima facie being invaded, with the ongoing risk of escalation. The court treated the persistent threat of further invasion as a decisive factor justifying the issue of a rule nisi and interim restraint, pending fuller ventilation on the return date and pending final adjudication of the eviction proceedings.


The court therefore made an evaluative interim judgment: although it expressed serious reservations about the sustainability of the legal course chosen (particularly the alignment with PIE and the description of respondents), it nevertheless granted interim relief to preserve the position and prevent further establishment of occupation pending later determination.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court issued a rule nisi calling upon the respondents to appear on 28 November 2014 at 09h30 to show cause why final interdictory orders should not be made.


Pending the return date and pending final adjudication of the eviction proceedings (Part B), the court ordered that the interdictory relief in paragraphs 1.1 to 1.3 would operate as an interim interdict with immediate effect. The interim relief restrained the respondents from erecting further structures on Erven 14167 and 14409, from taking occupation of any structures on those erven, and from conducting activities aimed directly or indirectly at establishing a home or dwelling on the erven.


The court directed that a copy of the order be served forthwith on the respondents in accordance with the Uniform Rules of Court. As to costs, it ordered that the respondents were to pay the costs of the application only if the application was unreasonably opposed.


Cases Cited


Barnett and Others v Minister of Land Affairs and Others 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA). Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) ([2002] 4 All SA 384). Beck v Scholz [1953] 1 QB 570 (CA). Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers [2004] ZACC 7; 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); 2004 (12) BCLR 1268.


Legislation Cited


Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (sections 5 and 5(2)). Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (section 26(3)).


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court (service in accordance with the uniform rules was directed, without specific rule numbers being identified in the judgment).


Held


The court held that the municipality had shown, on a prima facie basis, that its land was being invaded through demarcation and the partial erection of structures, and that the threat of further invasion was ongoing. Although the court expressed serious doubt about the sustainability of the applicant’s chosen legal course—particularly given the requirement that PIE applies to eviction from homes and the difficulty of granting effective relief against persons merely “intending” to occupy—it nevertheless granted interim protection.


A rule nisi was issued, and an interim interdict was put into operation immediately, restraining further erection of structures, occupation, and related conduct aimed at establishing homes on the erven, pending the return date and the final eviction proceedings.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


PIE is concerned with the eviction of persons from their homes, which in its constitutional context requires an element of regular occupation and a degree of permanence, and is directly linked to the protections in section 26(3) of the Constitution.


Within the PIE and constitutional framework, a home is treated as more than shelter and is associated with personal intimacy, privacy, and security; eviction and demolition implicate constitutionally protected interests and require judicial oversight.


Where an applicant shows prima facie evidence of a threatened or ongoing land invasion, a court may, as an interim measure, grant a rule nisi and interim restraint to prevent escalation and to avoid resort to self-help, even where there are doubts about the final sustainability of the chosen procedural route and the practical difficulties associated with citing and binding an indeterminate class of intended occupiers.

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[2014] ZANCHC 32
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Gamagara Local Municipality v All Persons Intending Occupying Erven 14167 And 14409 Kathu (1991/2014) [2014] ZANCHC 32 (18 November 2014)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
[NORTHERN CAPE DIVISION,
KIMBERLEY]
CASE NO: 1991/2014
In
the matter between:
GAMAGARA
LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY

APPLICANT
And
ALL
PERSONS INTENDING OCCUPYING
ERVEN
14167 AND 14409
KATHU

RESPONDENTS
Date of hearing: 14 November 2014
Date of judgment: 18 November 2014
JUDGMENT
Phatshoane
J
1.
On
11 November 2014, Gamagara Local Municipality, the applicant,
approached this Court on an urgent basis in terms of  s 5
of
the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation
of Land Act, 19 of 1998 (the PIE). The relief sought is
essentially
twofold. Firstly, the applicant sought an order authorising it to
serve the notice motion in terms of which “All
persons
intending
to occupy Erven 14167 and 14409 Kathu”, the respondents, would
on 28 November 2014 be called upon to show course on 12 December

2014, why an order,
inter
alia
,
evicting them from the said premises; ordering that they demolish or
remove any structures thereon, should not be made final.
Encapsulated
in the notice of motion is a Notice in terms of s 5(2) of the PIE.
Section 5(2) provides that the court must give
written and effective
notice of the intention of the owner or person in charge to obtain an
order for eviction of the unlawful
occupation to the unlawful
occupier and the municipality in whose area of jurisdiction the land
is situated.
2.
Secondly,
the applicant is seeking a prohibitory interdict on terms couched
substantially as follows:
2.1
the
respondents are interdicted and restrained from erecting any further
homes and/or abodes and/or dwellings or other structures
on Erven
14167 and 14409, Kathu;
2.2
the
respondents are interdicted and restrained from taking occupation of
and/or occupying or inhabiting any home and/or dwelling
and/or abode
and/or other structure which might be erected on Erven 14167 and/or
14409, Kathu;
2.3
the
respondents are prohibited from conducting any activity whatsoever on
Erven 14167 and/or 14409, Kathu, which is aimed either
directly or
indirectly at establishing a home and/or a dwelling and/or abode or
other structure on the said erven;
2.4
the
respondents are pay the costs of the application only if unreasonably
opposed.
3.
The
order sought in the preceding paragraph is to operate as an interim
interdict with immediate effect, pending final adjudication
of the
application for the relief set out in Part B of the notice of motion,
the eviction proceedings. On 11 November 2014 I granted
the order
authorising service of the Notice in terms of s 5(2) of the PIE and
the notice of motion in respect of the eviction proceedings.
The
hearing in respect of the prohibitory interdict was postponed to the
unopposed Motion Court of Friday 14 November 2014. On
this latter
date a handful of the respondents attended Court and had not filed
any opposing papers. Through their spokesperson,
Ms Salvation
Mogodile, they stated that they intend to oppose the prohibitory
interdict on the return date.
4.
A
substantive point which I raised during argument with Adv Coetzee SC,
for the applicant, was the citation of the respondents,
in other
words, the practical effect of the prohibitory interdict on the
so-called “All persons (who are not in occupation
but are)
intending
to occupy Erven 14167 and 14409 Kathu. It is apposite to quote
in
extenso
the legal position in respect of the application of the PIE as
pronounced by Brand JA in
Barnett
and Others v Minister of Land Affairs and Others
2007 (6) SA 313
(SCA)
at 327-328 paras 37-40:

[37]…..
I believe it can be accepted
with confidence that PIE only applies to the eviction of persons from
their homes
. Though this is
not expressly stated by the operative provisions of PIE, it is borne
out, firstly, by the use of terminology such
as 'relocation' and
'reside' (in ss 4(7) and 4(9)) and, secondly, by the wording of the
preamble, which, in turn establishes a
direct link with s 26(3) of
the Constitution (see eg
Ndlovu
v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika
2003 (1) SA 113
(SCA) ([2002]
4 All SA 384)
in para [3]). The
constitutional guarantee provided by s 26(3) is that 'no-one may be
evicted from their home, or have their home
demolished, without an
order of court made after considering all the relevant
circumstances'.
[38]
……Though the concept 'home' is not easy to define and
although I agree with the defendants' argument that one
can
conceivably have more than one home, the term does, in my view,
require an element of regular occupation coupled with some
degree of
permanence. This is in accordance, I think, with the dictionary
meanings of: 'the dwelling in which one habitually lives;
the fixed
residence of a family or household; and the seat of domestic life and
interests' (see eg The Oxford English Dictionary
2 ed vol VII). It is
also borne out, in my view, by the following statement in
Beck v
Scholz
[1953] 1 QB 570
(CA) at 575 - 6:
'The
word ''home'' itself is not easy of exact definition, but the
question posed, and to be answered by ordinary common sense
standards, is whether the particular premises are in the personal
occupation of the tenant as the tenant's home, or, if the tenant
has
more than one home, as one of his homes. Occupation merely as a
convenience for . . . occasional visits . . . would not, I
think,
according to the common sense of the matter, be occupation as a
''home''.'
[39]
Moreover, within the context of s 26(3) of the Constitution - and
thus within the context of PIE - I believe that my understanding
of
what is meant by a 'home' is supported by Sachs J, speaking for the
Constitutional Court, in
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various
Occupiers
[2004] ZACC 7
;
2005 (1) SA 217
(CC)
(2004 (12) BCLR 1268)
in para
[17],where he said:

Section
26(3) evinces special constitutional regard for a person's place of
abode. It acknowledges that a home is more than just
a shelter from
the elements. It is a zone of personal intimacy and family security.
Often it will be the only relatively secure
space of privacy and
tranquillity in what (for poor people, in particular) is a turbulent
and hostile world. Forced removal is
a shock for any family, the more
so for one that has established itself on a site that has become its
familiar habitat.”
5.
A
case made out in the applicant’s papers is that there is at
present an invasion of Erven 14409 and 14167 in that there are

persons
intending
to occupy and are “planting” markers/poles and/or beacons
on the stands for purposes of demarcation of individual stands.
It
further states that it had established that there were 20 to 30
demarcated areas on Erf 14409 whereas on Erf 14167 there were
some
100 demarcated stands and some 30 to 40 structures, some partially in
the process of erecting shacks for future accommodation.
The
applicant further states:

The
respondent is quite clearly intending to demarcate stands and erect
structures thereon for purposes of taking occupation of
the stands. I
repeat that none of them have yet been occupied and none of them seem
to have any furniture or household equipment
or apparel”.
6.
The
essence of a case for the applicant as set out in the preceding
paragraph is not without problems regard being had to the application

of the PIE
to
the eviction of persons from their homes but their further primary
quandary lies in the citation of the respondents. It escapes
me how
this prohibitory interdict, if granted, is to be effective against
any unknown persons still intending to occupy the premises
but not
presently in any unlawful occupation.
7.
Although
I am in serious doubt about the sustainability of the legal course
the applicants chose to follow, I am of the view that,
during this
interim phase, doors should not be closed to them. This is so because
it is a fundamental principle of our law that
a person may not take
the law into his/her own hands.
Prima
facie
,
the applicant’s land is being invaded by certain persons as
more fully depicted on the photographs attached to their founding

papers. The threat of further invasion is forever present and cannot
be ignored. For this reason alone a rule nisi is to issue.
8.
In
the result the following order is made.
Order:
1.
A rule nisi
be and is hereby issued calling upon the respondents to appear before
this Court on 28 November 2014 at 09h30 in order
to show cause, if
any, why the following orders should not be made:
1.1
the
respondents are interdicted and restrained from erecting any further
homes and/or abodes and/or dwellings or other structures
on Erven
14167 and 14409, Kathu;
1.2
the
respondents are interdicted and restrained from taking occupation of
and/or occupying or inhabiting any home and/or dwelling
and/or abode
and/or other structure which might be erected on Erven 14167 and/or
14409, Kathu;
1.3
the
respondents are prohibited from conducting any activity whatsoever on
Erven 14167 and/or 14409, Kathu, which is aimed either
directly or
indirectly at establishing a home and/or a dwelling and/or abode or
other structure on the said Erven;
1.4
the
respondents pay the costs of the application only if unreasonably
opposed.
2.
The
order set out in para 1.1- 1.3 above shall operate as an interim
interdict with immediate effect, pending final adjudication
of the
application for the relief contained in Part B of the notice of
motion, eviction proceedings.
3.
A
copy of this order is to be served forthwith on the respondents in
accordance with the uniform Rules of this Court.
PHATSHOANE
J
NORTHERN
CAPE DIVISION
For
the applicant: Adv W.L. Coetzee SC instructed by Duncan & Rothman
For
the Respondent: Ms Salvation Mogodile (in person)