About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
>>
2014
>>
[2014] ZAFSHC 99
|
|
Absa Insurance Company Limited v Mocke (4724/2013) [2014] ZAFSHC 99 (29 May 2014)
IN
DIE HOË HOF VAN SUID-AFRIKA
VRYSTAATSE
AFDELING, BLOEMFONTEIN
Saaknommer
: 4724/2013
In
die saak tussen:-
ABSA
INSURANCE COMPANY
LIMITED
..................................................................................
Eiser
en
JACO
PELSER MOCKE
......................................................................................................
Verweerder
CORAM:
VAN ZYL, R
GELEWER
OP:
29 MEI 2014
[1]
Hierdie is `n aansoek om summiere vonnis waarin eiser die
betaling van die bedrag van R 368 055.00,
tesame met rente en
koste, vanaf verweerder vorder.
[2]
Voormelde vordering is voortspruitend uit die sluiting van drie
versekeringskontrakte tussen eiser, wie ‘n behoorlik
geregistreerde versekeraar is, en verweerder, ten opsigte waarvan
eiser beweer dat verweerder aan hom die premies ten opsigte van
sodanige versekeringskontrakte verskuldig is. In die verband
het die verweerder aan eiser ‘n tjek oorhandig ter betaling
van
die tersaaklike premies, welke tjek gedishonoreer is met die
verwysing “
refer to drawer
”.
[3]
In sy opponerende verklaring erken verweerder dat hy die drie
versekeringskontrakte met eiser gesluit het en dat hy die tersaaklike
tjek oorhandig het ter betaling van die verskuldigde premies.
Verweerder beweer egter dat vanweë die redes in die opponerende
verklaring vermeld, eiser nie sy verpligtinge in terme van die
versekeringskontrakte nagekom het nie, waarop verweerder die
versekeringskontrakte
regsgeldig gekanselleer het en derhalwe
betaling van die tjek gestop het.
[4]
In die opponerende verklaring is ‘n aantal punte
in
limine
geopper ten opsigte waarvan
verweerder beweer dat eiser se aansoek om summiere vonnis nie aan die
tersaaklike bepalings van Reël
32(2) voldoen nie. Hierdie
punte
in limine
is deur Mnr Burger, namens verweerder, in sy betoogshoofde herhaal en
ook gedurende sy mondelinge betoog geopper. Vanweë
die
gevolgtrekking waartoe ek in hierdie uitspraak gaan kom wat betref
die meriete van eiser se aansoek om summiere vonnis, meen
ek dat dit
onnodig is om met die tersaaklike punte
in
limine
te handel.
[5]
Na my mening is dit duidelik dat eiser se vordering, soos uiteengesit
in die besonderhede van vordering, gebaseer is op die
sluiting van
drie verskillende verskeringskontrakte voortspruitend waaruit die
drie onderskeie versekeringspremies, as synde likiede
bedrae,
beweerdelik deur verweerder aan eiser verskuldig is. In die
verband het eiser in sy besonderhede van vordering ‘n
afsonderlike bewering gemaak ten opsigte van die sluiting van elk van
die drie onderskeie versekeringskontrakte en dan die beweerde
terme
en voorwaardes van elk van sodanige versekeringskontrakte afsonderlik
uiteengesit. Dit is opgevolg deur die volgende
bewerings in
paragraaf 7 van die besonderhede van vordering:
“
Pursuant
to the conclusion of the aforesaid first, second and third insurance
policies the defendant was indebted to the plaintiff
in the amount of
R368 054-81, being the sum of the premiums payable under the
first, second and third insurance policies respectively.”
Ten
opsigte van elk van die voormelde versekeringskontrakte is daar dan
ook beweer dat
“
a copy of the .....
insurance policy document is attached hereto and marked Annexure
‘....’ ” en
is daar dan
inderdaad drie afsonderlike dokumente bestaande uit twee of drie
bladsye elk aangeheg tot die besonderhede van vordering,
onderskeidelik gemerk Aanhangsels “A1”, “A2”
en “A3”.
Daaropvolgend
is die volgende bewerings in paragraaf 8 van die besonderhede van
vordering gemaak:
“
On
29 May 2013, defendant delivered to the plaintiff a cheque as payment
of the aforesaid amount of R368 055-00.”
Daarna
het die bewerings gevolg met betrekking tot die wanbetaling van die
tersaaklike tjek en is ‘n afskrif van die tjek
ook aangeheg tot
die besonderhede van vordering.
[6]
In die onderhawige geval kan dit nie in dispuut wees dat die
onderskeie drie vorderings likiede vorderings is nie, aangesien
die
bedrag van die premie ten opsigte van elk van die drie onderskeie
versekeringskontrakte, uitdruklik ooreengekom is.
[7]
In die beregting van ‘n aansoek om summiere vonnis, is die Hof
beperk tot die wyse waarop eiser sy saak aangebied het.
In die
verband word dit as volg gestel in
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE,
S J Van
Niekerk
et al
,
op p. 11-10, par 11.2.3:
“
The
whole procedure of summary judgment was created to benefit
plaintiffs. At the very least, therefore, it is expected of
a
plaintiff, in presenting his case, to place himself squarely within
the four corners of the remedy. Any defects in the
presentation
of his case which are not merely technical and, for that reason,
cannot be condoned, will have as their consequence
a refusal of
summary judgment, even if no
bona fide
defence has been disclosed by the defendant. A court will not
assist a plaintiff by breathing life into a poorly presented
case –
on the contrary, the court will consider itself bound to the terms in
which the plaintiff has elected to formulate
his claim.”
[8]
Wat die onus in bogemelde verband betref, rus dit op die eiser, soos
blyk uit die volgende aanhaling uit
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, A PRACTICAL GUIDE,
supra
, op
p. 11-25, para 11.4.3:
“
Owing
to the fact that summary judgment is a drastic remedy, in the sense
that a plaintiff may obtain a final judgment without a
trial, the
point of departure in determening such an application is to ascertain
whether the plaintiff has placed himself squarely
within the strict
requirements of the rule. He must stand or fall by the
presentation of his case. The onus is on the
plaintiff to make
out a valid and complete cause of action – if he fails to do
so, summary judgment must be refused, in which
event the defendant’s
opposing affidavit is not even considered.”
[9]
Dit is geykte reg dat die party wat die bestaan van ‘n kontrak
beweer, die terme van die kontrak wat hy poog af te dwing,
moet
bewys.
SIEN McWILLIAMS v FIRST
CONSOLIDATED
HOLDINGS
(PTY) LTD
1982 (2) SA 1
(A).
[10]
In
GULF STEEL (PTY) LTD v RACK-RITE BAR
(PTY) LTD AND ANOTHER
1998 (1) SA 679
(O) het die volgende tersaaklike feite en beginsels geblyk:
“
In
accordance with the provisions of Rule 18(6) of the Uniform Rules of
Court a party who in his pleadings relies upon a contract
must state
whether the contract is written or oral and when, where and by whom
it was concluded and if the contract is written
a true copy of it or
the part relied upon in the pleadings must be annexed thereto.
Paragraph 5 of the plaintiff's particulars
of claim reads as follows:
'On
or about 3 June 1992 and at Selosesha the plaintiff and the first
defendant herein represented by the second defendant entered
into a
written agreement in terms whereof the plaintiff sold and delivered
goods to the first defendant on an open account. Seen
(
sic
)
annexure A attach (
sic
)
hereto.'
The
plaintiff then goes on to refer to various provisions of the said
annexure in the further allegations made in its particulars
of
claim. However, when regard is had to the annexure itself it is quite
clear that the application for credit was signed on 3
June 1991, and
not on or about 3 June 1992 as pleaded by the plaintiff. It is
of course conceivable that this may be due
to a typing error and
quite capable of being amended without in any way prejudicing the
application for summary judgment but, more
importantly, without
compromising the defendant in establishing a
bona
fide
defence that is required in terms
of the Rule which would enable this Court to refuse summary
judgment. However, there is
a further material contradiction between
the pleaded particulars of claim and the annexure A annexed thereto,
in that it is quite
clear,
ex facie
the annexure, that the defendant was represented by S Gerber in his
capacity as general manager whereas the plaintiff has pleaded
that
the first defendant was represented by the second defendant.
Apart therefrom it is noticeable that the plaintiff seeks
'judgment
against the first and second defendants in the amount of R193
902,13'. This is clearly not correct. The second defendant's
liability under the deed of suretyship is joint and several with the
first defendant, and accordingly the plaintiff ought to have
claimed
payment from the first and second defendants jointly and
severally, the one paying the other being absolved. If regard
is had
to the application for summary judgment which reads:
'.
. . for an order in the following terms:
(a)
that summary judgment be granted
against the defendant in terms of the summons for payment of the sum
R193 902,13;
(b)
.
. .',
as
well s the supporting affidavit which is not strictly in accordance
with the requirement of the Rules, it is quite apparent that
the
quality of the plaintiff's pleadings leaves much to be desired. At
the hearing of this matter there was no formal or any kind
of
application to attempt to amend either the summons or the application
for summary judgment, even though there were two
defendants
before the Court and just one application for summary judgment
against 'the defendant'.
Mr
De Wet
, who appeared on behalf of both defendants at the
hearing of this matter, correctly conceded that the defence raised on
behalf
of the first defendant was sketchy, bold and vague. It is
trite law that the affidavit filed by the defendant must set out his
defence fully. Whilst a defendant need not deal exhaustively
with the facts and the evidence relied upon in support thereof,
the
least that is required of a defendant is to disclose his defence and
the material facts upon which it is based with sufficient
particularity and completeness so that the Court can decide whether
the affidavit disclosed a
bona fide
defence. A defendant must
do so in a manner that is not inherently or seriously
unconvincing and the defence must of course
be one that is valid in
law. I am quite satisfied that the defendant in this matter has not
discharged the
onus
upon it to avoid summary judgment in view
of its failure to convince the Court that the defence raised is
bona
fide
.
Having
found that the affidavit raised no defence to the claim for goods
sold and delivered, the only aspect which remains
in the
affidavit is the allegation by the second defendant that the
suretyship he signed was intended not for the obligations of
the
first defendant, but for another company bearing the same name. I am
satisfied that it is improbable, having due regard to
common
commercial practice, that a company such as the plaintiff would
obtain a suretyship from a director of a company in respect
of one of
his companies and not in respect of another. The second defendant
does not state in his affidavit that the plaintiff
was aware of the
existence of the second company. There is no explanation why the deed
of suretyship does not bear the registration
number of either of
these two companies. Accordingly I hold the view that I am
entitled to draw an adverse conclusion against
the second defendant
on the probabilities of this matter, particularly if regard is had to
the remainder of the affidavit which
contains a point
in limine
which was devoid of all substance and a defence which does not meet
the test that is required of a defendant with regard to the
claim for
goods sold and delivered.
In
the matter of
Northern
Cape Scrap & Metals (Edms) Bpk v Upington Radiators & Motor
Graveyard (Edms) Bpk
1974
(3) SA 788 (NC)
at
793C--D the learned Judge quotes with approval:
'It
will therefore be seen that summary judgment is an extremely
extraordinary and drastic remedy. It shuts the mouth of the
defendant finally. A party who seeks to avail himself of this
drastic remedy must in my view strictly comply with
the
requirements of the Rule.'
In
view of the nature of the remedy the Court must be satisfied that a
plaintiff who seeks summary judgment has established its
claim
clearly on the papers and the defendants have failed to set up
a
bona fide
defence as required in terms of the Rules of this Court. There are
accordingly two basic requirements that the plaintiff must meet,
namely a clear claim and pleadings which are technically correct
before the Court. If either of these requirements is not met,
the
Court is obliged to refuse summary judgment. In fact, before even
considering whether the defendant has established a
bona
fide
defence, it is necessary for the
Court to be satisfied that the plaintiff's claim has been
clearly established and its pleadings
are technically in order.
Even if a defendant fails to put up any defence or puts up a defence
which does not meet the standard
required of a defendant to resist
summary judgment, summary judgment should
nevertheless be refused if the
plaintiff's claim is not clearly established on its papers and its
pleadings are not technically
in order and in compliance with the
Rules of Court.
I
have highlighted some of the shortcomings in the plaintiff's
pleadings. I am of the view that these pleadings were prepared
without
proper consideration of the relevant issues, and leave the
impression that those responsible for the drafting of these pleadings
certainly did not properly apply their minds thereto. Mr
Williams
,
who represented the plaintiff at the hearing, tried his very best to
explain the shortcomings in the plaintiff's pleadings, but
failed to
convince this Court, as the problems he was confronted with were not
capable of easy explanation.
Even
though I am of the view that the defendants have not presented an
affidavit to the Court with sufficient particularity
and detail
which would entitle this Court to refuse the application for summary
judgment on the strength of such affidavit, I am
nevertheless
obliged, in view of the extraordinary nature of the remedy sought,
namely summary judgment, to dismiss the plaintiff's
application for
summary judgment on the basis of the various defects in its own
pleadings.”
[11]
Die eerste twee aangehegte versekeringskontrakte is gesluit op 11
Februarie 2013. Ten opsigte van elk van hierdie kontrakte
is
die volgende soortgelyke bewerings gemaak as synde van die wesenlike
terme van die kontrakte:
“
....The
premium of .... would be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff
within 45 days of conclusion of the ...policy contract;
.....The
premium of ..... therefore became due and payable on or about 18
April 2013.”
Twee
soortgelyke bewerings is ten opsigte van die derde
versekeringskontrak gemaak, behalwe dat beweer is dat dit gesluit is
op
12 Februarie 2013 en dat die premie derhalwe opeisbaar en
betaalbaar geword het op 19 April 2013.
[12]
Wanneer voormelde berekening van ‘n 45-dae tydperk gemaak word,
bereik dit nie die datums van 18 April 2013 en 19 April
2013,
onderskeidelik, nie. Hierdie bewerings ten opsigte van die
opeisbaarheid en betaalbaarheid van die onderskeie
versekeringspremies,
synde wesenlike terme van elk van die beweerde
kontrakte, kan dus na my mening nie korrek wees nie.
[13]
Addisioneel tot voormelde, is daardie bewerings in ieder geval totaal
teenstrydig met die tersaaklike bepaling wat in die verband
op elk
van die drie kontrakte wat aangeheg is tot die besonderhede van
vordering, voorkom en wat as volg lees:
“
Ek
bewus is van my verpligting om die premie soos hierbo uiteengesit te
betaal, dat die premie opeisbaar en betaalbaar word
by
ondertekening hiervan
tensy uitstel
skriftelik deur die versekeraar se Produksiebestuurder: Agri
Oes verleen is ...”
Indien
daar sodanige uitstel vir betaling verleen was en dat dít die
verwysing na 45 dae tot gevolg gehad het, moes sodanige
bewering in
ieder geval in die besonderhede van vordering gemaak gewees het. Na
my mening voldoen eiser se besonderhede van vordering
dus nie aan die
bepalings van Reël 18(6) nie en is die omstandighede in die
onderhawige geval baie soortgelyk aan die in voormelde
GULF
STEEL
- beslissing .
[14]
Verdermeer tot voormelde teenstrydighede, bevat elk van die drie
kontrakte die volgende bewoording:
“
Ons,
die ondergetekendes, kom hiermee ooreen dat die
versekeringsbesonderhede, sertifikaat, polisvoorwaardes en sketskaart
die
basis van hierdie polis tussen Absa Versekeringsmaatskappy en die
versekerde sal wees.”
Elkeen
van die kontrakte bevat ook ‘n verklaring deur die versekerde
dat “ek die polisvoorwaardes ontvang en nagegaan
het.”.
Die
eerste twee kontrakte bevat ook die volgende verklaring deur die
versekerde:
“
Ek
is bewus dat hierdie polis in werking tree soos uiteengesit in die
gedeelte van die polisbewoording wat handel oor die AANVANG
VAN
DEKKING.”
[15]
Na my mening blyk dit dus verdermeer dat eiser se vorderings gebaseer
is op versekeringskontrakte waarvan die volledige polisvoorwaardes,
wat juis ooreengekom is die basis van die polis tussen eiser en
verweerder sal vorm en waarop klaarblyklik gesteun word in die
besonderhede van vordering, nie aangeheg is tot die besonderhede van
vordering nie. In
MOOSA AND OTHERS
NNO v HASSAM
2010 (2) SA 410
(KZP) op
413 B tot 414 B, is hierdie beginsel as volg gestel:
“
Rule
18(6) speaks of a party who in his pleading 'relies' on a contract or
'part' thereof. A party clearly 'relies upon a contract'
when he
uses it as a 'link in the chain of his cause of action'.
South
African Railways and Harbours v Deal Enterprises (Pty) Ltd
1975
(3) SA 944
(W)
at
953A; and
Van
Tonder v Western Credit Ltd
1966
(1) SA 189 (C)
at
193H.
Although
both of these cases were decided at a time when rule 18(6) made
no provision for a true copy of the written agreements
to be annexed
to the pleading, the views of the learned judges, as to the meaning
to be attached to the phrase in question, are
still relevant and
instructive.
[18]
In the present case the respondents base their cause of action
against the applicants upon the written agreement. The
written
agreement is a vital link in the chain of the respondents' cause of
action against the applicants. In order for the respondents'
cause of
action to be properly pleaded, it is necessary for the written
agreement relied upon to be annexed to the particulars
of claim. In
the absence of the written agreement the basis of the respondents'
cause of action does not appear
ex
facie
the pleadings.
[19]
An allegation that a party is not in possession of the written
agreement relied upon, constitutes an acknowledgment that the
basis
for the cause of action advanced is lacking, or that a link in the
chain of the cause of action advanced is missing.
Consequently,
such an allegation as made in the present case does not constitute
compliance with the requirements of rule 18(6),
nor does it excuse
their non-compliance. In addition an allegation that the party has
taken steps to obtain a copy, without success,
or to annex an
incomplete, or unsigned, draft thereof, would not for the same reason
constitute compliance with the demands
of rule 18(6), nor would
it excuse their non-compliance.
[20]
It is therefore clear that a party who bases its cause of action upon
a written agreement should obtain a true copy of the
agreement before
advancing its claim. However, this is not to say that a failure to
annex a written agreement relied upon
may never be condoned in
terms of rule 27(3).
[21]
Good cause would have to be shown why the party concerned is unable,
at that stage, to annex a copy of the written agreement
relied upon.
Relevant considerations would be the steps taken to obtain a copy of
the written agreement and the prospects of the
written agreement
being obtained in the future. That a true copy will be available
before the issues arising therefrom have
to be determined will be of
particular importance in this regard. In addition any prejudice to
the opposing party caused by the
failure to annex the agreement to
the pleading would have to be considered. Of significance in this
regard would be whether
the pleading concisely and clearly sets
out the terms relied upon in the written agreement upon which the
cause of action is based,
and is not excipiable.”
Sien
ook
ABSA BANK LIMITED v NICHOLAS AND
ANOTHER;
ABSA
BANK LIMITED v NICHOLAS AND ANOTHER
[2013] JOL 30256
(WCC).
[17]
Gevolglik is ek van mening dat eiser hom nie van sy onus gekwyt het
om ‘n volledige en geldige skuldoorsaak teen verweerder
uit te
maak nie. Soos blyk uit die regspraak reeds aangehaal, in
besonder die bogemelde
GULF
STEEL
-uitspraak, moet summiere
vonnis dus geweier word sonder dat ek eers die inhoud en meriete van
verweerder se opponerende verklaring
oorweeg.
[18]
Mnr Zietsman, namens eiser, het betoog dat summiere vonnis steeds
toegestaan behoort te word, deurdat die gedishonoreerde tjek,
welke
tjek `n likiede dokument is, op sigself `n volledige skuldoorsaak
daarstel. Ek kan egter nie met hierdie submissie saamstem
nie,
aangesien dit nie is hoe die skuldoorsaak in die besonderhede van
vordering geformuleer en uitgemaak is nie.
[19]
Wat die koste betref, is ek van mening dat daar geen rede bestaan
waarom die sogenaamde gebruiklike kostebevel ten opsigte
van
onsuksesvolle aansoeke om summiere vonnisse, nie ook in hierdie geval
gelas behoort te word nie.
[20]
Gevolglik word die volgende bevele gemaak:
1.
Eiser se aansoek om summiere vonnis word
van die hand gewys.
2.
Verlof word aan verweerder verleen om die
aksie te verdedig.
3.
Koste van die aansoek om summiere vonnis is
koste in die geding.
____________
C. VAN ZYL, R
Namens
die Eiser:
Adv. P.J.J. Zietsman
In
opdrag van:
Honey
Prokureurs
Bloemfontein
Namens
die Verweerder:
Adv. A.H. Burger SC
In
opdrag van:
Kramer
Weihmann & Joubert Ing.
Bloemfontein