City of Johannesburg v Kaplan NO and Another (111/05) [2006] ZASCA 39; 2006 (5) SA 10 (SCA) (29 March 2006)

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[2006] ZASCA 39
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City of Johannesburg v Kaplan NO and Another (111/05) [2006] ZASCA 39; 2006 (5) SA 10 (SCA); 68 SATC 286 (29 March 2006)

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A
IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
REPORTABLE
Case
no: 111/05
In
the matter between
THE
CITY OF JOHANNESBURG Appellant
and
HARRY
KAPLAN NO (in his capacity as Liquidator
of
KROKIPARK CC) (In Liquidation) First Respondent
FIRST
NATIONAL MORTGAGES
NOMINEES
(PTY) LTD (Reg No 65/02087/07) Second Respondent
Coram:
HARMS, ZULMAN, STREICHER, HEHER JJA and CACHALIA AJA
Heard:
13
MARCH 2006
Delivered: 29 MARCH
2006
Summary:
Local
Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000
,
s 118
– municipal
debts a ‘charge on the property’ – effect of
Insolvency Act 24
of 1936
,
s 89
on the preference thereby conferred.
Neutral citation: This
judgment may be referred to as City of Johannesburg v Kaplan NO
[2006] SCA 45 (RSA).
__________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
__________________________________________________________________
HEHER
JA
HEHER JA:
[1] This
is an appeal against an order of Stockwell AJ in the Witwatersrand
Local Division. He dismissed the appellant’s application
with costs
including the costs of two counsel but granted leave to appeal to
this Court.
[2] The
appellant is a municipality as defined in s 1 of the Local
Government: Municipal Systems Act, 32 of 2000 (‘the Municipal
Systems Act’). In terms of s 4, the appellant may finance the
affairs of the municipality by charging fees for services and rates
on property.
[3] The
first respondent is the liquidator of Krokipark CC, a close
corporation that was wound up on 16 May 2003. The corporation
was the
registered owner of Erf 406 Wynberg. The first respondent sold the
property for a price of R700 000 on 26 August 2003.
He abides
the decision of the court. The second respondent is First National
Mortgages Nominees (Pty) Ltd. It holds a participation
mortgage bond
over the property for an amount of R1 231 823,09 as at 16 April 2004.
[4] The
estate is indebted to the appellant for rates, service fees, basic
charges,
‘
sundry
services’ and interest. The liquidator paid an amount of
R386 239,72 to
the
appellant in order to obtain a clearance certificate enabling him to
transfer the properties. A balance of R469 404,71 remains
due
and payable.
1
The issue in the appeal is whether or not the municipality’s
preference arising under s 118(3) of the Act trumps the preference
attaching to the second respondent’s mortgage bond.
[5] The
appellant sought an order in the court
a quo
in the following
terms:
‘
1. Declaring that
the amount due to the Applicant by the First Respondent on behalf of
the present registered owner of the property
known as Erf 406 Wynberg
(“the property”) for municipal service fees, surcharges on fees,
property rates and other municipal
taxes, levies and duties on the
property for the period prior to the two years preceding the date of
application for the certificate
referred to in Section 118(1) of the
Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000 (“the Municipal Systems Act”)
is a charge upon the
property and enjoys preference in the
distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the property over the
Second Respondent’s participation
mortgage bond registered against
the property.
2. Declaring
that the aforesaid amount falls to be paid to the Applicant by the
First Respondent as:
2.1 a
secured claim falling within a class of security outside the ambit of
the definition of “security” in the
Insolvency Act;
2.2 alternatively
,
in satisfaction of a claim secured by the property as contemplated in
Section 95(1)
of the
Insolvency Act;
2.3 further
alternatively a cost of sequestration as contemplated in
Section 97
of the
Insolvency Act, and
more particularly a cost of liquidation as
contemplated in
Section 97(2)(c)
of the
Insolvency Act.
3. That
the First
Respondent pays the costs of this application.’
[6] Section 118 of
the Municipal Systems Act provides:
‘
(1) A registrar
of deeds may not register the transfer of property except on
production to that registrar of deeds of a prescribed
certificate-
(a)
issued by
the municipality or municipalities in which that property is
situated; and
(b)
which
certifies that all amounts that became due in connection with that
property for municipal service fees, surcharges on fees,
property
rates and other municipal taxes, levies and duties during the two
years preceding the date of application for the certificate
have been
fully paid.
(1A) A prescribed
certificate issued by a municipality in terms of subsection (1) is
valid for a period of 120 days from the date
it has been issued.
(2)
In the case of the transfer of property by a trustee of an insolvent
estate, the provisions of this section are subject to section
89 of
the Insolvency Act, 1936 (Act 24 of 1936).
(3)
An amount due for municipal service fees, surcharges on fees,
property rates and other municipal taxes, levies and duties is
a
charge upon the property in connection with which the amount is owing
and enjoys preference over any mortgage bond registered against
the
property.’
(Subsections (4) and
(5) are not relevant to this appeal and all further references to s
118 are a reference to the quoted subsections.)
[7] The application
was dismissed by Stockwell AJ on the ground that the time limit of
two years imposed in s 118(1)(b) applied also
to municipal debts
secured under s 118(3) and the appellant was therefore debarred from
claiming any preference over the second respondent’s
bond beyond
that period.
[8] This Court has
subsequently found (in a case that did not involve a liquidation or
insolvency) the ground on which the judge
a quo
relied to be
unsustainable: see
BOE Bank Ltd v City of Tshwane Metropolitan
Municipality
2005 (4) SA 336
(SCA), in which it was held that the
only plausible interpretation of s 118(3) is that it is an
independent self-contained provision
(para 8 at 342A) not subject to
the time limit contemplated in s 118(1) (para 11 at 343F). The
correctness of that judgment was not
challenged by the second
respondent in the appeal.
[9] The second
respondent, to defend the order of the court
a quo
, relied on
the cross-reference in s 118(2) to s 89 and more particularly on
s
89(4)
of the
Insolvency Act, a
ground argued before the learned judge
upon which he had not found it necessary to express an opinion.
Section 89
provides-
‘(1)
The cost of maintaining, conserving and realizing any property shall
be paid out of the proceeds of that property, if sufficient
and if
insufficient and that property is subject to a special mortgage,
landlord’s legal hypothec, pledge, or right of retention
the
deficiency shall be paid by those creditors,
pro rata
,
who
have proved their claims and who would have been entitled, in
priority to other persons, to payment of their claims out of those
proceeds if they had been sufficient to cover the said cost and those
claims. The trustee’s remuneration in respect of any such
property
and a proportionate share of the costs incurred by the trustee in
giving security for his proper administration of the estate,
calculated on the proceeds of the sale of the property, a
proportionate share of the Master’s fees, and if the property is
immovable,
any tax as defined in subsection (5) which is or will
become due thereon in respect of any period not exceeding two years
immediately
preceding the date of the sequestration of the estate in
question and in respect of the period from that date to the date of
the
transfer of that property by the trustee of that estate, with any
interest of penalty which may be due on the said tax in respect
of
any such period, shall form part of the costs of realization.
(2)
If a secured creditor (other than a secured creditor upon whose
petition the estate in question was sequestrated) states in
his
affidavit submitted in support of his claim against the estate that
he relies for the satisfaction of his claim solely on the
proceeds of
the property which constitutes his security, he shall not be liable
for any costs of sequestration other than the costs
specified in
subsection (1), and other than costs for which he may be liable under
paragraph
(a)
or
(b)
of the proviso to section
one
hundred and six
.
(3) Any interest
due on a secured claim in respect of any period not exceeding two
years immediately preceding the date of sequestration
shall be
likewise secured as if it were part of the capital sum.
(4)
Notwithstanding the provisions of any law which prohibits the
transfer of any immovable property unless any tax as defined in
subsection (5) due thereon has been paid, that law shall not debar
the trustee of an insolvent estate from transferring any immovable
property in that estate for the purpose of liquidating the estate, if
he has paid the tax which may have been due on that property
in
respect of the periods mentioned in subsection (1) and no preference
shall be accorded to any claim for such a tax in respect
of any other
period.
(5)
For the purposes of subsections (1) and (4) ‘tax’ in relation to
immovable property means any amount payable periodically
in respect
of that property to the State or for the benefit of a provincial
administration or to a body established by or under the
authority of
any law in discharge of a liability to make such periodical payments,
if that liability is an incident of the ownership
of that property.’
(Once again, any
further mention of
s 89
will be a reference to this section.)
[10] The case for
the second respondent is this:
section 118(3)
provides security for
municipal debts but, although it in its terms is not subject to a
time limit under ordinary circumstances,
once there is an insolvency
or liquidation
(s 89
applies to both instances) a two-year time limit
is imposed by virtue of the concluding words of
s 89(4)
, namely that
‘no preference shall be accorded to any claim for such a tax in
respect of any other period’ (ie, a period exceeding
two years
immediately preceding the date of the sequestration).
[11] The appellant,
however, submitted that the whole context of
s 89
is concerned, as
the sidenote to the section suggests, with costs to which securities
are subject, and that the provision in question
has no bearing upon
the appellant’s claim for payment of the municipal debts.
[12] The submissions
of counsel tended to concentrate on the terms of the statutory
provisions without due regard to their historical
context. In my view
an examination of the origins of
s 118
and
s 89
leads to the
emergence of a coherent legislation intention concerning their
purpose.
[13] The principal
elements of
s 118
are an embargo provision with a time limit
(s
118(1))
, a security provision without a time limit
(s 118(3))
, and a
provision located between the two
(s 118(2))
which subjects the
provisions of
s 118
as a whole to the terms of
s 89.
[14] Embargo
provisions have been the subject of repeated judicial pronouncement
for at least a hundred years. In
Johannesburg Municipality v
Cohen’s Trustees
1909 TS 811
Innes CJ said (at 817):
‘
Now reading that
section in connection with other provisions of the statute, the
intention seems to have been to give to the local
authority a right
to veto the transfer of property until its claims in respect of rates
should be satisfied. The result, of course,
was to create, in effect,
a very real and extensive preference over the proceeds of rateable
property realised in insolvency; and
to compel payment of the burden
thus imposed before a sale of such property could be carried through
even in cases where insolvency
had not supervened. The hold over the
property thus given to the local authority is entirely the creation
of the statute; its object
was to ensure payment of the liabilities
due by ratepayers as such, and one would therefore think that it was
intended to continue
until all liabilities arising out of rates had
been discharged; in other words, that the account of the municipality
against the
property should be closed when transfer passed, and that
transfer should not pass until it was closed.’
The court was there
concerned with s 26 of the Local Authorities Rating Ordinance of 1903
(Transvaal) (which contained an embargo
unfettered by a time limit).
Similar provisions (but with a time limit of three years) were
included in later Transvaal legislation:
s 47 of the Local Government
Ordinance 9 of 1912, s 49 of the Local Government Ordinance 11 of
1926 and s 50(1) of the Local Government
Ordinance 17 of 1939 (which
was repealed by the
Local Government Laws Amendment Act 51 of 2002
).
It is clear that the legislature has transmuted the last-mentioned
section into
s 118(1)
with the time limit reduced from three years to
two.
[15] The provenance
of a security provision such as contained in
s 118(3)
in local
government legislation is more recent. It was first included in s
50(2) of the 1939 Transvaal Ordinance at its promulgation
in the
following terms:
‘
2(a) All such
charges and sums mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection
(1) shall be a charge upon the premises or interest
in land in
respect of which they are owing and shall be preferent to any
mortgage bond passed over such property subsequent to the
coming into
operation of this Ordinance.’
The introduction of
s 50(2)(a) was probably a delayed reaction to the judgment in
Rabie
NO v Rand Townships Registrar
1926 TPD 286
, which held that an
embargo provision in s 47(b) of the 1912 Ordinance did not constitute
a ‘claim ranking in priority’ over
a mortgage bond. As will be
seen, such security clauses had been assuming a prominence in
legislative drafting during the years preceding
1936, when the
present
Insolvency Act replaced
the statute of 1916.
[16] The effect of
the words used in
s 118(3)
is to create in favour of a municipality a
security for the payment of the prescribed municipal debts (municipal
service fees, surcharges
on fees, property rates and other municipal
taxes, levies and duties) so that a municipality enjoys preference
over a registered
mortgage bond on the proceeds of the property. The
extent of that preference when the debtor is declared insolvent
depends, as will
be shown, upon the operation of
s 118(2).
[17] As to
s 118(2)
,
the first matter to be noted is that it refers specifically to the
transfer of property by a trustee of an insolvent estate. Does
this
exclude its application to a liquidator (of a company or a close
corporation)? Such artificial persons are equally as liable
to pay
the charges referred to in
s 118(1)
as natural persons are. The
municipality’s need for protection is no more or less in one case
than in the other. I can think of
no rational ground for applying
s
89
to
s 118
in the context of the sequestration of an individual but
excluding it from a liquidation. To do so would lead to an absurdity
so
glaring that the legislature could not have contemplated it:
Venter v R
1907 TS 910.
[18]
Section 118(2)
had its genesis in a proviso to
s 50(1)
(the embargo provision) of
the 1939 Ordinance in the following terms:
‘
provided that in
the case of transfer of immovable property the provisions of this
section shall be read subject to the provisions
of section
eighty-nine of the
Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936
, and the latter
provisions shall apply’.
The words ‘the
provisions of this section’ in the quoted proviso related to the
whole of
s 50
(ie to both embargo and security provisions). It would
seem that the drafter of
s 118
chose rather to treat what had
formerly been a proviso as a substantive subsection
(s 118(2))
but
repeated its application to the whole of the section, although it
would perhaps have been more logical to have inserted it after
the
security provision.
[19] The provisions
contained in
s 89(4)
repeated the substance of s 88(4) of the
Insolvency Act 32 of 1916, which provided:
‘
(4) Notwithstanding
any law prohibiting the transfer of property upon which there are
unpaid rates, taxes or licences, no trustee
shall be prevented from
transferring any property by reason of any unpaid rates, taxes or
licences thereon which at the date of sequestration
had been in
arrear for longer than the calendar year current with the
sequestration and the calendar year preceding.’
It
will be observed that the significant addition (in s 89(4)) was the
phrase
‘
and no preference
shall be accorded to any claim for such a tax in respect of any other
period’.
[20] The reason for
the addition seems clear. Prior to 1936 a practice had grown up in
South Africa (and Rhodesia) of creating statutory
quasi-liens and
statutory charges or preferences. See
Commissioner of Taxes v
Master and Trustee in Insolvent Estate Collias
1930 SR 12 at 16
and Mars (Hockly ed)
The Law of Insolvency
3ed (1936) at
352-3, the last-mentioned being an apparent contextualization of the
change in the law brought about by s 89(4) in
1936. Reference to the
examples in
Collias
and in Mars show that charges of such a
nature usually carried no time limit on their operation. Section
118(3) represented a continuation
of the practice. The security
provided amounts to a lien having the effect of a tacit statutory
hypothec:
Stadsraad van Pretoria v Letabakop Farming Operations
(Pty) Ltd
1981 (4) SA 911
(T) at 917A-H;
BOE Bank
supra at
341G-H; and no limit is placed on its duration outside of insolvency.
[21] In this context
the logic of s 89(4) is plain: it was necessary to inform creditors
and trustees of the rights and obligations
attaching to the
realisation of immovable property in an estate so that there would be
no doubt as to what the trustee must pay before
being permitted to
transfer the property and what statutory restraints and claims would
attach to the proceeds after transfer. In
this way the limits of the
costs of realisation of such property (in the context of s 89(1)) are
also determined. The legislature
had, in s 89(3), laid down that
interest on a secured claim would be secured as if it were part of
the capital sum for two years
prior to the date of sequestration. The
legislature, having provided in the first part of s 89(4) for a
limitation on the effective
duration of an embargo provision, saw the
section as an appropriate vehicle to similarly limit the duration of
preferences which
arose from the quasi-liens and charges which were
the vogue. Thus construed both s 89(3) and 89(4) serve a consistent
purpose in
providing a uniform duration (two years prior to the date
of sequestration and from that date until the date of transfer) for
interest
on securities and on embargoes and claims for a tax (as
defined in s 89(5)). See also
De Wet en andere v Stadsraad van
Verwoerdburg
1978 (2) SA 86
(T) at 101D.
[22] To the extent
that the municipal debts described in s 118(3) qualify as a such tax
or taxes the limitations of s 89(4), when
applicable, likewise apply
to the preference conferred by the first-mentioned section. In so far
as they do not fall within the scope
of such a tax, s 89(4) has no
bearing on the effect or duration of the preference. See also
Eastern
Substructure of Greater Johannesburg Transitional Council v Venter NO
[2000] ZASCA 139
;
2001 (1) SA 360
(SCA) at 369B-D.
[23]
It follows from
the foregoing that I disagree that the purpose of s 89(4) is limited
to the regulation of the costs to which securities
are subject in
insolvency and that it has no bearing on the operation of s 118(3).
Counsel also placed much stress on a submission
that a creditor in an
insolvent estate ‘takes his debtor as he finds him’, meaning
thereby that the second respondent was obliged
to accept that the
first respondent was burdened by the preference created by the charge
on the property before insolvency intervened.
Like most legal
generalisations that statement is only as valid as the legislature
permits it to be. In this case the creditor’s
pre-insolvency rights
have been expressly curtailed by the operation of s 118(2) read with
s 89(4).
[24] It will be
noted that the two year period in s 89(1) differs from that appearing
in s 118(1): two years prior to the date of
sequestration as against
two years preceding the date of application for a clearance
certificate. When a trustee makes application
for a certificate the
two year period under s 118(1) will effectively be less than the two
year period under s 89(1), because the
date of application is
necessarily later than the date of sequestration. The first part of s
89(4) means that when an embargo period
laid down in any other law is
effectively shorter than the two year period in s 89(1) the
first-mentioned period continues to apply
after sequestration. So the
operation of s 118(1) is not affected by s 89(4). When, however, the
embargo provision in any other law
is effectively longer than that in
s 89(1) then, by reason of the provisions of s 89(4), the period in s
89(1) will override the
period in the other law.
[25] Before
proceeding, it may assist in providing a clearer appreciation of the
conclusions at which I have thus far arrived if I
summarise the
operation of s 118(1) and (3) in situations where the municipal
debtor is not subject to a sequestration or liquidation
order and to
compare that with the position after the making of such orders.
[26] When such a
debtor is not subject to such an order-
1. No property may
be transferred unless a clearance certificate is produced to the
registrar of deeds that certifies full payment
of all municipal debts
as described in s 118(1) which have become due during a period of two
years before the date of application
for the certificate.
2. Any amount due
for municipal debts (ie not limited by the aforesaid period of two
years) that have not prescribed is secured by
the property and, if
not paid and an appropriate order of court is obtained, the property
may be sold in execution and the proceeds
applied in payment of the
debts. In such event the proceeds will be applied to payment of the
municipal debts in full. Only after
satisfaction of such debts will
the remainder, if any, be available for payment of the debt secured
by a mortgage bond over the property.
[27] Once a debtor
has been sequestrated or liquidated the position is, to the extent
that the municipal debts are ‘taxes’ within
the meaning of s
89(5), (but not otherwise) the following-
1. No property may
be transferred unless the clearance certificate certifies full
payment of municipal debts that have become due
during a period of
two years before the date of application for the certificate.
2. The preference
accorded by s 118(3) in favour of the municipality over that of a
holder of a mortgage bond is limited to claims
which fell due during
the period laid down in s 89(1), ie two years prior to the date of
sequestration or liquidation up to the date
of transfer.
3. Interest
charged on the secured claim of the municipality is secured as if it
were part of the claim.
[28] After
sequestration or liquidation those municipal debts that are not
‘taxes’ within the meaning of s 89(5) continue to attract
the
benefits of s 118(3) without being affected by s 89 of the Insolvency
Act.
[29] The question
which now requires to be addressed is the subject matter of the
municipality’s claim. The appellant’s counsel
submitted that the
effect of s 118(3) is to bring about an innominate lump sum
preference under which the separate elements are subsumed
and no part
can be identified by its original elements. I do not agree. The
charge upon the property giving rise to a preference
is merely a
description of a right arising from one or more of the particular
causes of indebtedness mentioned in s 118(3). The existence
of the
right to security depends upon the existence of those elements, which
do not forego their identity by reason of being labelled
‘a charge
on the property’.
[30] What then is
the nature of the appellant’s claims under s 118 in the present
case? Do they fall within the ambit of s 89(5)
or not? It will be
recalled that s 89(4) places a time limit on a preference arising
from a claim for a ‘tax’ as defined in s
89(5) while, on the
other hand, the preference created by s 118(3) is in respect of
municipal service fees, surcharges on fees, property
rates and other
municipal taxes, levies and duties. No evidence was adduced
establishing whether the amounts claimed all fell under
either
provision and counsel seem to have regarded it as a non-issue. There
may well be conflicting views on whether service charges,
basic fees
and refusal removal fees are charges ‘periodically payable’ ‘in
respect of’ property and whether the liability
to pay them is ‘an
incident of ownership’ (using the terminology of s 89(5)): see
Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metro Council v Galloway NO and
others
1997 (1) SA 348
(W) and cf
Eastern Substructure of
Greater Johannesburg Transitional Council v Venter NO
supra at
368J-369D and
Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality
and Another
;
Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality
and Others
;
Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC,
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng and Others (Kwazulu-Natal Law
Society and
Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae)
2006 (1) SA
530
(CC) at paras 39-42. This is, however, putting the cart before
the horse. As Brand JA pointed out in
Barnard NO v Regspersoon van
Aminie en ‘n ander
2001 (3) SA 973
(SCA) at 984B-984E the
starting point is to determine whether the claim is for a ‘tax’
in its ordinary sense and only if the
answer is positive to apply the
restrictive provisions of s 89(4). While it is clear that property
rates are such a tax and that
service charges which are a
quid pro
quo
for a measured consumption are probably not, the status of
the appellant’s other claims remains uncertain and the
determination
may be affected by the local by-laws or regulations
which govern them and in respect of which we have not been addressed.
Nor have
we been told what the expression ‘sundry services’
means.
[31] As I have noted
the real issue between the parties was the application and effect of
s 89. Having decided that issue, it is possible
to grant declaratory
relief and to leave the unresolved issues to resolution by the
parties. The lien which the appellant holds confers
a right of
retention within the terms of s 95(1) of the Insolvency Act and
justifies the declaratory relief claimed in paragraph
2.2 of the
notice of motion.
[32] The effect of
the order which I propose, although not in the precise terms
initially claimed by the appellant, represents substantial
success
for the appellant and should carry an appropriate order for costs in
both courts. Despite the fact that the appellant has
been
unsuccessful in resisting reliance on s 89(4) it seems to me that the
second respondent has won a pyrrhic victory: the result
is an
extension of the period of the appellant’s preference beyond that
provided in s 118(1) in so far as the municipal debts equate
to s
89(5) taxes, and in relation to all debts that do not so equate the
period of preference is limited only by prescription.
[33] In relation to
the proceeds of the property remaining after the clearance
certificate was obtained I would accordingly make the
following
order:
1. The appeal
succeeds with costs including the costs of two counsel.
2. The order of the
court
a quo
is set aside and replaced by the following order:
1. It is declared
that the amounts due by the first respondent to the applicant on
behalf of the registered owner of Erf 406 Wynberg
in respect of
municipal debts which are taxes within the meaning of
s 89(5)
of the
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936
are a charge upon the property and enjoy
preference in the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the
property over the second
respondent’s participation mortgage bond
registered over the property for a period of two years prior to the
date of liquidation
of Krokipark CC and from that date until the date
of transfer of the property.
2. It
is further declared that the said amounts fall to be paid to the
applicant by the first respondent in satisfaction of a claim
secured
by the property as contemplated in
s 95(1)
of the
Insolvency Act 24
of 1936
.
3. It
is further declared that to the extent that any of the applicant’s
claims do not fall within the meaning of ‘tax’ in
s 89(5)
of the
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936
the amounts of such claims-
3.1 are a charge
against the property and enjoy preference over the participation
mortgage bond registered against the property in
favour of the second
respondent;
3.2 are not subject
to the terms of
s 89(4)
of the
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936
;
3.3 fall to be paid
by the first respondent in satisfaction of a claim secured by the
property as contemplated by
s 95
of the
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936
.
4. The second
respondent is to pay the costs of the application including the costs
of two counsel.
__________________
J A HEHER
JUDGE OF APPEAL
HARMS
JA )Concur
ZULMAN
JA )
STREICHER
JA )
CACHALIA
AJA )
1
For
the purposes of issuing the clearance certificate the appellant
furnished an advice that the amount of total arrears of the
corporation was made up as follows:
DescriptionServiceV.A.T.Sub-totalAssessment
Rates
Sewerage
& Basics
Water
& Basics
Sundry
Services
Interest
Arrears448090.50
40575.89
52869.47
21469.62
279183.13
5680.58
7401.70
373.54448090.50
46256.47
60271.17
21843.16
279183.13Totals.:842188.6113455.82855644.43