Quatrotech CC v Magistrate C. Neyt and Another (1607/2013) [2014] ZAFSHC 19 (6 February 2014)

80 Reportability
Insolvency Law

Brief Summary

Insolvency — Claim under section 151 of the Insolvency Act — Review of magistrate's refusal to allow claim — Applicant's claim based on goods sold with ownership reserved — Magistrate rejected claim due to lack of evidence of ownership and security — Court held that applicant failed to comply with section 44(4) requirements, including valuation of security — Review application dismissed with costs.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The matter concerned a review application brought in terms of Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court. The applicant, Quatrotech CC, approached the Free State Division of the High Court to review and set aside a ruling made by the first respondent, Magistrate C. Neyt (Sasolburg), in the course of insolvency-related proceedings. The second respondent was Rubnic Oil (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation), in whose insolvent estate the disputed claim was sought to be proved.


Procedurally, the dispute arose from a special meeting of creditors in the insolvent estate of the second respondent held on 18 February 2013, where the applicant’s claim—submitted for approval—was refused by the magistrate. The applicant then launched review proceedings in the High Court under Rule 53, seeking an order that the magistrate’s decision be set aside and that the applicant’s claim be declared properly proved, together with an appropriate costs order (either as costs in the winding-up or against the unsuccessful party).


The subject-matter of the dispute was the proof and acceptance of a creditor’s claim in insolvency proceedings, specifically a claim asserted to be supported by security in the form of a reservation of ownership (retention of title) over goods allegedly sold and delivered to the insolvent company, and the statutory compliance requirements for proving such a claim.


Material Facts


The applicant lodged a claim purportedly in compliance with section 44(4) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, submitting it in affidavit form with two tax invoices attached. The invoices related to goods sold and delivered by the applicant to the second respondent. The applicant’s affidavit asserted, in substance, that ownership of the goods was reserved in favour of the creditor, and further stated that neither the deponent nor anyone else to his knowledge had received any security for the debt except for reservation of ownership in terms of section 84 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, and that reliance was placed solely on the proceeds of the goods sold reflected in the annexed invoice(s).


On each attached invoice, beneath the second respondent’s address, there appeared an endorsement in a clearly different typeface stating: “All equipment installed stays our property until fully paid.” It also emerged that the amounts reflected in the two annexures differed, because in one invoice a charge for services was deleted, leaving different totals.


The magistrate rejected the claim, recording (in Afrikaans) that the claim ought to be rejected on the basis that there was no proof of reserved ownership and that no security had been valued, and accordingly rejected the claim.


In opposing the review, the second respondent advanced factual contentions aimed at undermining the applicant’s reliance on the invoices and its security assertion. These included that the invoices attached to the section 44(4) affidavit were more than three years old and could not establish ownership; that the applicant had previously stated under oath (in liquidation proceedings it instituted against the second respondent) that it held no security for payment of the debt; that the invoice relied upon in the liquidation proceedings did not contain an ownership reservation endorsement; and that the endorsement appearing on the invoices attached to the section 44(4) affidavit was added ex post facto. The second respondent also contended that the applicant’s failure to provide a valuation of the alleged security was fatal under section 44(4), entitling the magistrate to reject the claim.


The applicant, in response, sought to confine the review to what was placed before the magistrate at the section 151 enquiry/meeting, contending that material from the liquidation proceedings was extrinsic and should not be considered. It also contended that the magistrate was required to assess validity on the face of the claim, and that the value of the security could only be determined when the goods were sold and the proceeds realised.


The High Court noted further factual difficulties relevant to the claim’s acceptance. It recorded that it was conceded that reservation of ownership would ordinarily arise from agreement/contract, yet no other document evidencing such an agreement was produced or referred to before the magistrate or the High Court. The High Court also observed that the endorsement of the reservation clause appeared at an “unlikely place” on the invoice (beneath the debtor’s address), raising questions of authenticity. Additionally, the court noted issues concerning the applicant’s conduct and documentation, including a lack of explanation for inconsistency regarding security assertions and that the deponent to the section 44(4) affidavit was not the person authorised to institute the review proceedings (authority having been given to a different person).


Legal Issues


The central questions the court was required to determine were whether the magistrate’s refusal to allow the applicant’s claim should be reviewed and set aside, and specifically whether the magistrate was entitled to reject the claim on the bases recorded, namely (i) lack of proof of reservation of ownership/security, and (ii) non-compliance with statutory requirements concerning the valuation of security.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of legal requirements to the proved or placed facts, rather than the resolution of oral factual disputes. It required the court to assess, on review, whether the claim as presented satisfied statutory formalities and whether the magistrate’s rejection was justified in light of the governing principles relating to proof of claims and the assertion of secured status.


The matter also involved a limited evaluative assessment of the credibility and genuineness of the claim documentation (including whether a reservation-of-ownership clause was genuinely part of the contractual arrangement), insofar as those considerations bore on whether the magistrate was entitled to reject the claim.


Court’s Reasoning


The High Court approached the matter from the perspective that the applicant’s claim depended on establishing that the goods sold to the second respondent were supplied on terms that ownership was reserved until full payment, and that those goods therefore constituted the applicant’s security. The court emphasised that such a reservation of ownership is ordinarily a matter of agreement/contract, and not merely a unilateral assertion.


A key aspect of the court’s reasoning was that there was no indication nor averment that the second respondent knew about, and agreed to, the alleged reservation of ownership. The court treated this as significant because reservation of ownership forms an integral part of the agreement of sale. In this regard, the court referred to authority indicating that such a reservation must be established as part of the contractual arrangement rather than assumed from a unilateral endorsement.


The court also scrutinised the form and placement of the purported reservation clause on the invoices. It characterised the placement—under the debtor’s address and in a different typeface—as raising questions about authenticity. In explaining why this mattered, the court referenced the ordinary understanding of an “invoice” as a list of goods or services with the sum due, and reasoned that the reservation clause could not properly be treated as part of an invoice in the manner relied upon by the applicant. On this basis, the court concluded that the magistrate was entitled to reject the claim on the score that the alleged reservation was not acceptably demonstrated.


Independently of the reservation-of-ownership concern, the court held that the applicant failed to comply with the express requirements of section 44(4) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. The court noted that where a creditor alleges that security is held, section 44(4) requires the creditor to provide the nature and particulars of the security and the amount at which the security is valued by the creditor. The applicant’s stance—that the proceeds of the goods would determine the value once sold—was rejected as inconsistent with the statutory text, because the statute requires the creditor to state the valuation, not to defer valuation to a later sale.


The court therefore treated the failure to provide a valuation as non-compliance with section 44(4), which in turn meant that the magistrate was entitled to reject the claim.


Although the court stated that it did not need, for purposes of the review, to refer to the invoice used by the applicant in support of the liquidation proceedings, it nonetheless commented that what emerged was an absence of honesty and an unexplained inconsistency. The court also rejected the explanation that any contradictory sworn statement about the absence of security could be excused on the basis that the deponent was a lay person. These considerations supported the court’s overall conclusion that the magistrate’s refusal to accept the claim should not be interfered with on review.


Outcome and Relief


The High Court dismissed the review application. The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the application on an attorney and client scale.


Cases Cited


Aircondi Refrigeration (Pty) Ltd v Ruskin N.O. and Others 1981 (1) SA 799 (W)


Cachalia v De Klerk N.O. and Benjamin N.O. 1952 (4) SA 672 (T)


Marendaz v Smuts 1966 (4) SA 66 (T)


BOE Bank Ltd v Bassage 2006 (5) SA 33 (SCA)


Legislation Cited


Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (sections 44(4), 84, 151)


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 53


Held


The court held that the magistrate was entitled to reject the applicant’s claim at the special meeting of creditors. The applicant failed to establish, on the material placed before the court, a properly supported reservation of ownership forming part of the sale agreement, and the endorsement on the invoice was treated as insufficient and questionable for purposes of proving secured status. Separately and decisively, the applicant did not comply with section 44(4) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 because, while alleging security, it failed to state the value at which the security was valued by the creditor. The review was accordingly dismissed with punitive costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A creditor asserting reservation of ownership as security must show that such reservation forms part of the agreement/contract of sale, rather than relying solely on an endorsement appearing on an invoice, particularly where there is no indication that the debtor knew of and agreed to the term.


In proving a claim under section 44(4) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, where a creditor alleges that security is held, the creditor must state the nature and particulars of the security and must provide the amount at which the security is valued by the creditor. A failure to provide the creditor’s valuation constitutes non-compliance with the statutory requirements and can justify rejection of the claim.


On review under Rule 53, where the claim documentation and statutory requirements justify the presiding officer’s rejection of the claim, the court will not set aside the ruling, particularly where the claim’s genuineness and internal consistency are placed in question on the record before the court.

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[2014] ZAFSHC 19
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Quatrotech CC v Magistrate C. Neyt and Another (1607/2013) [2014] ZAFSHC 19 (6 February 2014)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case No.: 1607/2013
In the matter between:
QUATROTECH
CC
...................................................................................................
APPLICANT
and
MAGISTRATE C.
NEYT
.................................................................................
1
st
RESPONDENT
RUBNIC OIL (PTY) LTD (in
liquidation)
.....................................................
2
nd
RESPONDENT
CORAM
: MOLOI , J
HEARD ON
: 06 FEBRUARY 2014
DELIVERED ON
: 27 FEBRUARY 2014
JUDGMENT
[1] This is a review in terms of Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of
Court against the refusal by the Magistrate, Sasolburg, to allow
the
applicant’s claim under the provisions of
section 151
of the
Insolvency Act No 24 of 1936
submitted for approval at a special
meeting of creditors in the insolvent estate of the second respondent
held on 18 February 2013.
This court is approached to review and set
aside the magistrate’s ruling and order that the applicant’s
claim is properly
proved and that the costs be costs in the winding
up of the second respondent, alternatively be paid by an unsuccessful
party to
these proceedings.
[2] The applicant submitted a claim as required by
section 44(4)
of the
Insolvency Act No 24 of 1936
in a form of an affidavit to
which was attached two tax invoices for consideration by the
magistrate, the first respondent. The
invoices were for goods sold
and delivered by the applicant to the second respondent which was
liquidated by the applicant. The
affidavit stated:

1.
That Rubnic Oil (Pty) Ltd… in terms where ownership of the
goods
were
reserved in favour of the creditor….
(5)
That I, the said Pieter Willem Bronkhorst has not, nor has any other
person, to my knowledge on my received any security for
the said debt
or any part thereof, except for reservation of ownership in terms of
section 84
of the
Insolvency Act. We
solely reply (sic) on this
proceeds of the goods sold as per annexure A.”(sic).
Annexure A is a tax invoice on which,
under the address of the second respondent, the following words were
endorsed in clearly different
typestyle “All equipment
installed stays our property until fully paid.”  The same
appears on Annexure B though
the amounts differ as a charge for
services rendered was deleted in Annexure A.
[3] The first respondent rejected the claim and noted:

die
eis behoort verwerp te word op grond van geen bewys van eiendomsreg
voorbehou en daar is geen sekuriteit waardeer nie. Eis 5
verwerp.”
The applicant argued that the magistrate erred in rejecting the
claim as she had merely to look at the applicant’s evidence

that the goods were installed and ownership thereof was retained and
not go into the other evidence to prove a claim as one would
do in
the court of law. This argument was based on the decisions in
Aircondi Regrigeration (Pty) Ltd v Ruskin N.O and Others
1981 (1) SA 799
(W) at 803 – 4 and
Cachalia v De Klerk
N.O and Benjamin N.O
1952 (4) SA 672
(T) at 675 E- F.
The magistrate, so it was argued, had to decide the validity of the
claim merely on the face of it without
regard to any extrinsic
evidence. As to the second part of the rejection of the claim it was
argued that it was clear where reference
was made to the retention of
ownership, that the proceeds of the sale of the goods was the only
security the appellant had, and
that what the amount of the security
would be, could only be determined when the goods were sold.
[4] The applicant’s claim is thus based on the goods sold to
the second respondent wherein the ownership thereof was reserved

until fully paid for. Those goods thus constituted the applicant’s
security. The applicant relied on the proceeds of those
goods as
contained in the sale invoice.  On the same invoice the
applicant had also abandoned the remainder of the claim made
up of
services rendered leaving the amounts on annexures A and B different.
[5] In its opposition of the review proceedings the second
respondent contended that the invoices attached to
Section 44(4)
affidavit were more than three (3) years old and could therefore no
suffice to establish ownership of the goods; the applicant
stated
categorically on oath that it held no security for the payment of the
debt in the liquidation proceedings it instituted
against the second
respondent; that the invoice it attached to the founding affidavit in
those proceedings had no endorsement retaining
the ownership of the
goods and that such endorsement on Annexures A and B of the
section
44(4)
affidavit was done
ex post facto.
The second respondent
further contended that the failure by the applicant to provide the
evaluation of the security was fatal to
its claim and that the
magistrate was consequently entitled to reject the claim.
As regards the proceedings in the liquidation of the second
respondent, the applicant argued that they should not be considered

in this review as the liquidation proceedings did not form part of
the
section 151
enquiry held by the magistrate, but were raised only
in the review proceedings before this court.  As to why, in the
liquidation
proceedings the applicant stated on oath that it held no
security for the claim it was contended that the applicant was a lay
person
who cannot be expected to know the implications of what is
contained in the affidavit he deposed to and that such evidence was
extrinsic and inadmissible in the determination of a valid claim
against the second respondent.
[6] During the hearing I enquired if this court can ignore the
discrepancies regarding the reservation of ownership evidenced in
the
invoice used in support of the liquidation proceedings and those used
in support of the claim in terms of
section 44(4)
of the
Insolvency
Act. I
could not be provided with a cogent answer. I also enquired
whether reservation of ownership was not a matter of
agreement/contract
and not merely an endorsement of the reservation
clause and, in particular, under the address of the second respondent
on the invoice.
It was conceded that in the normal course of events,
reservations of ownership were a matter of agreement/contract. No
other document
suggesting the existence of such an agreement was
placed before the magistrate nor this court.
[7] The genuineness of the applicant’s claim is questionable
on at least two grounds. Firstly, there is no indication nor averment

that the second respondent knew about and agreed to the alleged
reservation of ownership of the goods installed in its place of

business. Such an arrangement forms an integral part of the agreement
of sale.  No such agreement could be produced nor referred
to.
Marendaz v Smuts
,
1966 (4) SA 66
(T) at 73A.
Secondly, the endorsement of the reservation clause at the most
unlikely place on the invoice, viz under the
second respondent’s
address must raise many eye brows as it cannot be seen to be
authentic.  In
The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary
,
Clavendon Press- Oxford 1993 edition an “invoice” is
described as “
A list of items or goods sent or services
performed, with a statement of the sum due.”
In
practice those are the
essentialia
of an invoice and it is
generally accepted as such.  The reservation clause could not be
part of an invoice and the magistrate
was entitled to reject the
claim on that score alone.  The applicant’s miseries did
not end there.
Section 44(4)
requires that where security is
alleged to be held, the nature and particulars of that security “
and
the amount at which the security is valued by the creditor”
be provided.
BOE Bank Ltd v Bassage,
2006 (5) SA 33
(SCA) at 36 D-E.  The failure of the applicant to provide the
information regarding the value of the security held amounts
to
non-compliance with the requirements of
section 44(4)
of the
Insolvency Act and
entitled the magistrate to reject the claim as a
consequence:
Marendaz v Smuts, supra
. The argument that
the proceeds of the items held as security would determine the value
of the security is misplaced. The section
is very clear viz the
creditor and not the sale of the security must state the value of the
security.
[8] I do not need, for purposes of this review application, refer
to the same invoice used by the applicant in support of its
liquidation
of the second respondent. What becomes clear, however, is
that the applicant is not honest with the court and its
modus
operandi
leaves much to be desired.  This glaring
inconsistency and discrepancy is not explained.  It also needs
to be noted that
the sworn statement made in the liquidation
proceedings that the applicant did not hold security for the debt is
dangerously mischievous.
The fact that the deponent is a lay person
is the shallowest of all explanations under the sun. It also needs to
be noted that
the deponent of the
section 44(4)
affidavit is not the
person authorized to institute these proceedings as the powers were
given to one Philippus Petrus Bronkhorst
by,
inter alia
,
the selfsame Pieter Willem Bronkhorst who deposed to the
section
44(4)
affidavit.
[9] In the premises the following order is made:
1. The review application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is ordered to pay the costs on an attorney and
client scale.
K. J.
MOLOI, J
On behalf of the applicant: Adv. H van
Twisk
Instructed
by:
Rosendorff
Reitz Barry
BLOEMFONTEIN
On behalf of 2
nd
respondent:
Adv. HP van Nieuwenhuizen
Instructed
by:
Matsepes
Inc
BLOEMFONTEIN