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[2014] ZAGPPHC 567
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Motsei v Minister of Police (65356/2012 , 65249/12) [2014] ZAGPPHC 567 (23 May 2014)
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH GAUTENG
HIGH COURT
PRETORIA
(REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA)
Case
no: 65356/2012
Date:
23 May 2014
Reportable
Of
interest to other judges
In
the matter between:
KGAOGELO
MOTSEI
.......................................................................................................
PLAINTIFF
VERSUS
MINISTER
OF
POLICE
..................................................................................................
DEFENDANT
AND
Case no:65249/12
In
the matter between:
KUTLANO
PHEFADU
........................................................................................................
PLAINITFF
VERSUS
MINISTER
OF
POLICE
.................................................................................................
DEFENDANT
Coram:
Baqwa J
Heard:
29 April 2014
Delivered:
23 May 2014
JUDGMENT
BAQWA
J
Summary
:
In
an action for wrongful arrest, detention and assault-onus on
defendant to prove lawfulness of actions-upon failure to discharge
onus-upon application by plaintiffs for judgment at close of
defendant’s case-judgment for plaintiffs without hearing their
evidence.
Annotations
Case
law
Brand
v Minister of Justice 1959(4) SA 712 A at 714
Minister
of Law and Order v Hurley 1986(3) SA 568(A) at 587-589
Minister
van Wet and Order v Matshoba 1990(1) SA 280(A)
Stambolie
v Commissioner of Police 1990(2) SA 369 (25C)
Lombo
v African National Congress
[2002] 3 All SA 577
(SCA); 2002(5) SA
668(SCA) at paragraph 32
Mhaga
v Minister of Safety and Security 2001(2) All SA 534 (TK)
Manqalaza
v MEC for Safety and Security Earstern Cape
[2001] All SA 255(TK)
Minister
of Law and Order v Hurley 1986(3) SA 568(A)
Tsose
v Minister of Justice 1951(3) SA 10(A) at 18
Smith
v Meyerton Outfitters 1971(1) SA 137(T)
Ramsay
v Minister van Polisie 1981(4) SA 802(A) at 818
Rex
v Jolly and Others 1923 A.D at p179
See
Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re: S v Walters 2002(4)
SA 613(CC) paragraph 53 and 54
Govender
v Minister of Safety and Security 2001(4) SA 273(SCA) 2001(2) SACR
197(SCA)
Macu
v Du Toit 1983(4) SA 629(A)
Malahe
v Minister of Safety and Security
[1998] ZASCA 64
;
[1998] 4 All SA 246(A)
; 1999(1) SA
528(SCA)
Gordon
Lloyd Page and Associates v Rivera 2001(1)SA 88 SCA at 92-93
Claude
Neon Lights (SA) Ltd v Daniel 1976(4) SA 403 (A) at 409 G-H
Marine
& Trade Insurance Co Ltd v Van der Schyff 1972(1) SA 26 (A)
Corbridge
v Welch
(1892) 9 SC 277
at 279
Louw
v Minister of Safety and Security 2006(2) SACR 178(T) 186a-187e
Dreyer
v Sonop Beperk 1952(2) SA 392(O)
Union
Government v Sykes
1913 AD 156
at 173
Goosen
v Stevenson
1932 TPD 223
at 226
[1]
This is a claim for damages for wrongful arrest and detention and
assault against the Minister of Police who is being sued in
his
capacity as the Head of the South African Police Services. It is
alleged by the plaintiffs that the arrests, detention and
assault was
committed by members of the South African Police Services acting with
the course and scope of their employment by the
defendant.
[2]
Summons were issued separately by the plaintiffs under two case
numbers. It was however agreed by the parties that the two cases
be
heard at the same time in order to curtail proceedings as the
incidents which gave rise to the two cases happened at the same
time
and place and that the parties would essentially rely on the same set
of witnesses to prove or disprove the cases brought
by or against
them.
[3]
By agreement between the parties the issues of liability and quantum
were to be separated in terms of the provisions of Rule
33(4). I
accordingly separated the issues and postponed the aspect of quantum
sine die
.
The matter proceeded on the question of defendant’s liability
only.
[4]
The defendant accepted the duty to begin after which he proceeded to
call five witnesses. He thereafter closed his case whereupon
plaintiffs applied for judgment in their favour.
[5]
Background
5.1.
Four members of police were patrolling in two vehicles in the
Mabopane area in the early hours of 2 September 2012 at or near
Morula Sun when they came upon a group of about four to ten people
walking on foot along the Lucas Mangope Highway. They stopped
to
search them. Whilst busy with the searching, a maroon Toyota Corolla
came to a stop on the opposite side of the road. Three
male occupants
alighted from the vehicle and walked to the spot where the search was
taking place. Upon arrival they accused the
group that was being
searched of having fought with them and stealing their wrist watch.
The two groups then accused each other
of possession of a firearm.
The policemen decided to order the two groups to lie down to enable
them to search for the firearm.
5.2.
The second group did not lie down. One of the policemen grabbed the
driver and searched him. No firearm was found. The police
escorted
him towards the Toyota Corolla vehicle with a view to searching it.
They could not do so due to interference by the two
plaintiffs who
tried to grab the driver away from them. They also obstructed access
to the vehicle by closing the doors which the
police were trying to
open.
5.3.
The police then tried to arrest the two plaintiffs and in doing so
got hold of Motsei who resisted the attempt to take him
to the police
van. Phefadu tried to record the police action using his cell phone
but this was knocked to the ground by one of
the policemen. Phefadu
was also shouting obscenities to the policemen. Motsei, during the
grappling with the police managed to
get underneath the police van.
The police tried to pull him out but their efforts were in vain. He
later crawled out from underneath
the van an ran away only to come
back after a shot while.
[6]
Arrest and detention
6.1.Section
40 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
provides the list of
offences where police officers may arrest offenders without a
warrant. It states that the peace officer must
entertain a suspicion
that the arrestee committed an offence referred to in Schedule 1 and
that the suspicion must rest on reasonable
grounds. The rationale for
this stringent approach is that in most claims for damages at common
law for wrongful arrest, the courts
have always adjudicated upon the
requirement for such a claim that the defendant acted without
reasonable and probable cause for
effecting the arrest. There are a
myriad judicial, academic and media reports about the public disquiet
on the abuse by some peace
officers of the provision of
section 40(1)
because they arrest persons merely because they have the ‘right’
to do so but where under the circumstances an arrest
is neither
objectively nor subjectively justified.
6.2.
The liberty of an individual is constitutionally enshrined in the
right of freedom and security
section 12 of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996
. This point was
restated by Bertelsman J in
Louw v Minister of Safety and Security
2006(2) SACR 178(T) 186a-187e
that an arrest is a drastic measure
invading a personal liberty and it must be justifiable according to
the demands of the Bill
of Rights..’’ ‘’
[P]olice are obliged to consider, in each case when a charge has
been laid for which a suspect might be arrested, whether there are
no
less invasive options to bring the suspect before the court than an
immediate detention of the person concerned.’’
The
Constitution does not espouse a dispensation of arbitrary deprivation
of freedom of movement and security. The court authoritatively
cited
the case of
Mhaga v Minister of Safety and Security 2001(2) All SA
534 (TK)
, where the court held that in a case where a police
officer had arrested and detained a person, once the arrest and
detention is
admitted, the onus of proving the lawfulness thereof
rests on the State.
6.3.
Arrest and detention is
prima facie
wrongful and unlawful and
it is therefore for the defendant to allege and prove lawfulness of
the arrest or detention.
See Brand v
Minister of Justice 1959(4) SA 712 A at 714
Minister
of Law and Order v Hurley 1986(3) SA 568(A) at 587-589
Minister
van Wet and Order v Matshoba 1990(1) SA 280(A)
Stambolie
v Commissioner of Police 1990(2) SA 369 (25C)
Lombo
v African National Congress
[2002] 3 All SA 577
(SCA); 2002(5) SA
668(SCA) at paragraph 32
6.4.
An arrest can be effected without a warrant and is lawful if, at the
time of the arrest, the plaintiff has committed an offence
in the
presence of an arresting officer who has a reasonable belief that the
plaintiff had committed a Schedule one offence. The
defendant has to
show not only that the arresting officer suspected the plaintiff of
committing the offence but also that the officer
reasonably suspected
the plaintiff of having committed a Schedule one offence.
Mhaga
v Minister of Safety and Security 2001(2) All SA 534(TK)
Manqalaza
v MEC for Safety and Security Eastern Cape
[2001] All SA 255(TK)
6.5.
The principle that a defendant must justify an arrest without a
warrant is also applicable where the arrest allegedly took
place in
terms of a statutory authority.
Minister
of Law and Order v Hurley 1986(3) SA 568(A)
6.6.
An honest belief in the legality of the arrest or detention is no
defence.
Tsose
v Minister of Justice 1951(3) SA 10(A) at 18
Smith
v Meyerton Outfitters 1971(1) SA 137(T)
Ramsay
v Minister van Polisie 1981(4) SA 802(A) at 818
A
defence available to the defendant is justification or proof of
lawfulness of the crime.
6.7.
Physical interference, which affects a person’s bodily
intergrity constitutes assault.
In
Rex v Jolly and Others 1923 A.D at p179
, the following
definition of assault, taken from an early edition of Gardiner and
Lansdown, was said by Innes C.J to appear to
be ‘satisfactory
for all practical purposes’:
‘’
The
act of intentionally and unlawfully applying force to the person of
another, directly or indirectly, or attempting or threatening
by any
act to apply that force, if the person making the threat causes the
other to believe that he has the ability to effect his
purpose.’’
6.8.
The onus of alleging and proving an excuse for, or justification
contained in
section 49(1)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act (defence
of
necessity where force was necessary in order to effect a lawful
arrest or to prevent an escape from arrest), rests on the defendant.
See
Ex Parte Minister of Safety and Security: In re: S v Walters 2002(4)
SA 613(CC) paragraph 53 and 54
Govender
v Minister of Safety and Security 2001(4) SA 273(SCA) 2001(2) SACR
197(SCA)
Macu
v Du Toit 1983(4) SA 629(A)
Malahe
v Minister of Safety and Security
[1998] ZASCA 64
;
[1998] 4 All SA 246(A)
; 1999(1) SA
528(SCA)
[7]
Judgment at close of
plaintiff’s case
Absolution
from the instance is explained by De Villiers CJ in the case of
Corbridge v Welch
(1892) 9 SC 277
at 279
where he stated as
follows;
‘’
By
long practice in the courts of South Africa ‘’absolution
from the instance’’ has acquired a wider range
than it
possessed in the Dutch Courts. The latter courts confined this form
of judgment to those cases in which a plea in abatement
would be
successfully pleaded according to the practice of the English
Courts…[i]t has been a constant practice to grant
absolution
in cases where the plaintiff has not established the facts in support
of his case to the satisfaction of the court.
At first it was treated
as equivalent to a nonsuit, and confined to cases in which evidence
had been given for the plaintiff only.
In course of time, however, it
was extended to cases in which evidence for the defendant had also
been given. It was found convenient
to have a form of judgment which
would enable the plaintiff to take fresh proceedings without exposing
himself to a plea of
lis
finite
.’’
Rule
39(6)
provides as follows:
‘’
(6)
At the close of the case for the plaintiff, the defendant may apply
for absolution from the instance, in which event the defendant
or one
advocate on his behalf may address the court and the plaintiff or one
advocate on his behalf may reply. The defendant or
his advocate may
thereupon reply on any matter arising out of the address of plaintiff
or his advocate.’’
In
terms of this rule, after the plaintiff has closed his case, the
defendant, before commencing his case, may apply for the dismissal
of
plaintiff’s claim. The applicable approach was enunciated by
Harms JA in
Gordon Lloyd Page and Associates v Rivera 2001(1)SA 88
SCA at 92-93
‘’
The
test for absolution to be applied by a trial court at the end of a
plaintiff’s case was formulated in
Claude
Neon Lights (SA) Ltd v Daniel 1976(4) SA 403 (A) at 409 G-H
in these terms:
‘…
(W)hen
absolution from the instance is sought at the close of plaintiff’s
case, the test to be applied is not whether the
evidence led by
plaintiff establishes what would finally be required to be
established, but whether there is evidence upon which
a Court,
applying its mind reasonably to such evidence, could or might (not
should, nor ought to) find for the plaintiff.
(Gascoyne
v Paul and Hunter
1917 TPD 170
at 173; Ruto Flour Mills (Pty) Ltd v
Adelson (2)
1958 (4) SA 307(T).
’
This
implies that a plaintiff has to make out a
prima facie
case in
the sense that there is evidence relating to all the elements of the
claim-to survive absolution because without such evidence
no Court
could find for the plaintiff (
Marine & Trade Insurance Co Ltd
v Van der Schyff 1972(1) SA 26 (A) at 37G-38A
; Schmidt Bewysreg
4
th
ed at 91-92). The test has from time to time been
formulated in different terms, especially it has been said that the
Court must
consider whether there is ‘evidence upon which a
reasonable man might find for the plaintiff’ (
Gascoyne (loc
cit)
)- a test which had its origin in jury trials when the
‘reasonable man’ was a reasonable member of the jury
(
Ruto Flour Mills
). Such a formulation tends to cloud the
issue. The Court ought not to be concerned with what someone else
might think; it should
rather be concerned with its own judgment and
not that of another ‘reasonable’ person or Court. Having
said this, absolution
at the end of the plaintiff’s case, in
the ordinary course of events, will nevertheless be granted sparingly
but when the
occasion arises, a Court should order it in the
interests of justice.’’
The
established criterion for ascertaining whether or not a plaintiff had
adduced sufficient evidence to avert a ruling of absolution
from the
instance (prima facie evidence, prima facie proof or prima facie
case), as espoused by the dictum in
Gascoyne v Paul and Hunter
1917 TPD 170
is entangled with ambiguity. In
Dreyer v Sonop
Beperk 1952(2) SA 392(O)
the court described the situation thus:
‘
There
is no doubt that the amount of evidence which will be regarded as
prima facie evidence in a case depends very much on the
circumstances. It was pointed out by Sir James Rose-Innes in the case
of
Union
Government v Sykes
1913 AD 156
at 173
:
‘The important point is that less evidence will suffice to
establish a prima facie case where the matter is peculiarly within
the knowledge of the opposite party than would under other
circumstances be required…’’ The concept of prima
facie proof is better understood by the exposition given by Tindall J
in
Goosen v
Stevenson
1932 TPD 223
at 226
that;
‘’
If
the party, on whom lies the burden of proof, goes as far as he
reasonably can in producing evidence and that evidence ‘calls
for an answer’ then, in such circumstances, he has produced
prima facie proof, and, in the absence of an answer from the
other
side, it becomes conclusive proof and he completely discharges his
onus of proof.’ The question is whether the evidence
given in
this case amounts to prima facie evidence in that sense, and whether,
in the absence of an answer, it amounts to sufficient
proof.’’
The
test is similar where a defendant upon whom the onus rests fails to
lead such evidence in discharge of that onus with the result
that a
reasonable man could not come to the conclusion that it might be
accepted, the Court is entitled to give judgment for the
plaintiff.
Herbstein
and Van Winsen-The Civil Practice of the High Courts P20
[8]
Application of the
law to the facts
8.1.
In casu
, the defendant had to establish the lawfulness of the
arrest and detention. In doing so he tendered the evidence of three
of the
arresting officers. Their evidence was to the effect that
there was an allegation regarding the possession of a firearm by a
member
or members of the group that they were searching for drugs and
weapons when three other males arrived during the search. These three
male also alleged that the group that was being searched possessed a
firearm. There were counter allegations concerning possession
of a
firearm. This information triggered a search by the police officers
of both groups.
8.2.
What is to be noted is that there was no inquiry as to who exactly
had possessed the firearm and there was no consent given
for the
search. This happened against a background of the defendant’s
witnesses having admitted that they were conducting
random searches
in a crime prevention operation. The defendant’s witnesses
Moloi and Kola admitted that they did not suspect
the plaintiffs and
associates to have committed any crime. In the circumstances, any
purported suspicion leading to the arrest
could not have been formed
on reasonable grounds.
8.3.
The defendant’s pleaded case is that the plaintiffs were
arrested on the statutory authority accorded to the police officers
by section 67 of the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act no
68 of 1995).
8.4.
The allegation by defendant is that plaintiffs interfered with the
police in the execution of their duties. A most superficial
examination of the surrounding facts gives a lie to this allegation.
According to Moloi and Kola, plaintiffs interfered with them
when
they were trying to search the Toyota motor vehicle. Plaintiffs
closed the doors of the motor vehicle as the police officers
tried to
open them in order to search. This triggered the decision to arrest
the plaintiffs. According to Constable Papo the decision
to arrest
plaintiffs was triggered by the plaintiffs trying to pull the driver
Kenneth away as he was being led to the motor vehicle.
He states that
the arresting officers never reached the motor vehicle. The arrest of
plaintiffs gave rise to this action. There
are two irreconcilable
versions of how the arrest occurred. The defendant therefore
establishes two prima facie cases on the same
facts.
8.5.
Counsel for the defendant has sought to minimise these contradictions
by defendant’s witnesses as being immaterial. This
I do not
accept. Cumulatively the contradictions in my view go to the
foundation of the defendant’s defence. Taking into
account that
defendant has closed his case there can be no further opportunity to
reconcile the conflicting versions in the defendant’s
case.
[9]
The testimony of the defendant’s witness is riddled with
inconsistencies and contradictions.
9.1.
They all testified that they observed a group of pedestrians walking
alongside the Lucas Mangope Highway and they stopped to
randomly
search the group without any suspicion of the group having committed
an offence. The search was random to look for drugs
or weapons. Moloi
and Kola testified that they were walking alongside the road. Papo
testified to the contrary that the pedestrians
were walking in the
middle of the road and disturbing traffic and causing a disturbance.
9.2.
Moloi testified that Motsei had a bloody shirt and some blood on his
head and that Phefadu had blood on his lip. Kola testified
that
street-lighting was good and visibility clear. According to Kola he
only saw blood on Motsei’s head and blood on the
lip of
Phefadu. Papo on the other hand testified that Motsei was not wearing
a shirt and had blood on his ear whilst he did not
see any injuries
on Phefadu.
9.3.
They all testified that the driver of the vehicle, Kenneth was
escorted to his motor vehicle. Moloi and Kola testified that
it was
them who did the escorting whilst Papo testified that it was Papo and
Kola not Moloi.
9.4.
Moloi testified that he searched the driver only after he grabbed the
driver by the arm and forcefully searched him. It was
only then that
the driver co-operated. Kola and Papo denied seeing Moloi grabbing
the driver by the arm and seeing Moloi search
him.
9.5.
Moloi and Kola testified that when they got to the vehicle they
opened the doors and that Motsei and Phefadu kept on closing
the
doors every time they opened them. Papo, however, testified that he
and Kola took the driver, but that they never came as far
as the
vehicle. He denied that the doors of the vehicle were opened by Moloi
and Kola and then closed by Motsei and Phefadu. According
to him they
never got to the vehicle.
9.6.
Moloi and Kola testified that they decided to arrest Motsei and
Phefadu for interfering by keeping on shutting the motor vehicle
doors. Papo testified that they decided to arrest Motsei and Phefadu
because they were trying to get the driver away from the police
and
that there was no interference at the vehicle because they never
reached the vehicle.
9.7.
They all testified that Motsei crawled underneath the police van.
Moloi testified that he, Kola and Papo tried to pull Motsei
from
under the vehicle by his legs. Papo said that Moloi and Kola pulled
him by his shoulders and that he only joined them once
he had
finished searching the pedestrians.
9.8.
All the witnesses had filed affidavits regarding the incident into
the police docket. Kola testified that he , Moloi and Papo
sat
together during the drafting of the affidavits. Under
cross-examination he admitted that they compared notes and discussed
the events in order to elicit the best grammar in recording the
statements. Papo denied the sequence of events. He testified that
Moloi was in the cells, Kola in the station and he in the office. He
denied discussing grammar with any of the members. What has
been
notable is that the affidavits were identical, word for word and
paragraph by paragraph.
[9.9]
An affidavit is a statement under oath regarding the observations of
the deponent regarding any set of facts. It is not meant
to contain
the observations of others hence the swearing to the veracity thereof
by the deponent. These were police officers who
commissioned each
other’s affidavits and who ought to have understood the gravity
of making a statement under oath. The alleged
collaboration in the
making of the statements and the contradictions regarding the manner
in which they were produced is further
proof not only of the
mendacity of the witnesses but also of the unreliable nature of their
evidence.
9.10.
The only conclusion I can therefore come to is that the arrest and
detention of the plaintiffs was not based on the reasonable
grounds
and was therefore not lawful. The defendant has therefore failed to
establish an essential element of their defence: lawfulness.
[10]
Assault
Regarding
the question of assault, the evidence of warrant office Makgale is to
the effect that both plaintiffs had severe injuries
which included
swollen faces, bruised eyes and when he saw them in the afternoon of
2 September 2012 and that they had bloodied
clothing. They had to be
taken to receive medical attention. In the pre-trial conference the
application of force was admitted
even though defendant alleged that
such force was applied in order to effect an arrest.
[11]
In the matter of
Hodgkinson
v Fourie 1930 (TPD) 740 at 743
the Court stated as follows:
‘’
At
the close of the case of the one side upon whom the onus lies, the
question which the judicial officer has to put himself is
: ‘’is
there evidence on which a reasonable man might find for that side.’’
If
the evidence is not only not convincing but actually found by the
trial court to be utter fabrication, then it is evidence on
which a
reasonable man would not check find, and the Court would then be
perfectly justified in granting absolution.’’
[12]
The Court thus confirmed the converse of absolution at the end of the
plaintiff’s case, namely, that judgment can be
sought at the
end of a defendant’s case where the onus rested on that
defendant without evidence being led by plaintiff and
without
plaintiff closing its case.
[13]
Counsel for the defendant has sought to persuade the Court to counter
balance the position in which the defendant finds himself
by
considering certain inconsistencies in plaintiff’s pleadings.
At this stage the application for judgment in favour of
the
plaintiffs is based upon the failure by the defendant to prove
justification by tendering evidence that does not establish
the
lawfulness of his actions. The tendered evidence however comes short
and fails to establish a
prima
facie
case. The
onus on the defendant is accordingly not discharged. I cannot as
counsel submits bring to bear speculative considerations
regarding
evidence that has not yet been tendered by plaintiffs. That would not
be applying the test referred to in the
Hodgkinson
case properly.
[14]
Costs
13.1.
During the pre-trial stages defendant was informed by plaintiffs that
should it proceed to conduct the proceedings in the
manner they did,
a punitive costs order would be sought against defendant.
The
conduct referred to was pertaining to the fact that the defendant
only discovered after being compelled to do so. He also had
to be
compelled to furnish a reply to plaintiff’s request for further
particulars and to provide a reply to plaintiff’s
Rule 35(3)
application.
13.2.
Plaintiffs’ counsel has pursued the application for punitive
costs and this has been opposed by the defendant. I have
considered
the matter and I agree with defendant’s counsel that plaintiff
would be covered for costs in the court orders
compelling defendant
to comply as aforesaid. Moreover, plaintiff could have applied for
defendant’s defence to be struck
off in terms of the Uniform
Rules of Court upon failure to comply. This would have led to
curtailment of proceedings and enabled
plaintiffs to obtain the
relief sought without much ado. Plaintiffs did not bring such an
application and it would be an inversion
of the rules to grant a
punitive costs order at this stage. I am accordingly of the
view that party and party costs should
be awarded.
[15]
In the result the following order is made:
15.1.
Judgment is granted against the defendant as follows:
15.2.
The defendant is liable for 100% of the agreed or proven damages of
the plaintiff resulting from plaintiff’s unlawful
arrest,
detention and assault which occurred on 2 September 2012.
15.3.
The remaining issue of quantum is postponed
sine die
to be
decided or agreed upon at a later stage.
15.4.
The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs of suit
to date on a party and party scale in respect of the determination
of
merits on the High Court scale.
15.5.
Should the defendant fail to pay the plaintiff’s party and
party costs as taxed or agreed within 30 (thirty) days from
the date
of taxation, alternatively date of settlement of such costs, the
defendant shall be liable to pay interest at a rate of
15.5% per
annum and any outstanding amount, as from and including the
date of taxation.
15.6.
The plaintiff shall, in the event that the parties are not in
agreement as to the costs referred to in paragraph 15.5 above,
serve
the notice of taxation on the defendant’s attorneys and shall
allow the defendant fourteen court days to make payment
of the taxed
costs.
15.7.
The taxed or agreed costs, as referred to above, shall be paid into
the trust account of Gildenhuys Malatji Incorporated,
ABSA Bank,
Brooklyn Branch, Account Numer […], Branch Code 335345 under
Reference: [….]
___________________
S.A.M
BAQWA
(JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT)
Counsel
for the first plaintiff: Adv A Vorster
Instructed
by: Gildenhuys Malatji Attorneys
Counsel
for the second plaintiff: Adv JC Van Eeden
Instructed
by: Gildenhuys Malatji Attorneys
Counsel
for the respondent: Adv P Nonyane
Instructed
by: State Attorney