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[2014] ZAGPPHC 179
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Omar v Law Society of the Northern Provinces and Another (42471/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 179 (9 April 2014)
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG
DIVISION PRETORIA
CASE
NR: 42471/2013
DATE:
09 APRIL 2014
In the matter
between:
YASMIN
OMAR
.........................................................................
APPLICANT
And
THE LAW SOCIETY
OF THE
NORTHERN
PROVINCES
.....................................
FIRST
RESPONDENT
MS T
MOOLA
.....................................................
SECOND
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
MULLER AJ:
[1] The Applicant is
a practitioner duly admitted as an attorney and is practising at a
law firm, Zehir Omar Attorneys.
[2] The Respondents
are, firstly, the Law Society of the Northern Provinces (hereinafter
referred to as “the society”)
and secondly Ms T Mooia, an
official who is employed by the society as a legal officer in its
disciplinary department.
[3] The society is a
body governed by the Attorneys Act, Act 53 of 1979 (hereinafter
referred to as the “Act”). I do
not think that it is
necessary to emphasise that attorneys are required to comply with the
high standards set by the profession
and also with the provisions of
the Act and the rules promulgated in terms of the Act. The society,
amongst its many duties and
obligations, also exercises disciplinary
jurisdiction over practitioners, practising within its area of
jurisdiction.
[4] Applicant
instituted proceedings in the High Court:
(i) to review and
set aside the decision of the Respondents to summons the applicant to
an investigative committee meeting pertaining
to a complaint by a
member of the public, dated 1st January 2012.
(ii) to review and
set aside any disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Respondents
against the Applicant; and
(iii) to award costs
against Second Respondent de bonis propriis on a scale as between
attorney and client, alternatively, against
both Respondents jointly
and severally the one paying the other to be absolved.
[5] During January
2012 a client of the firm where applicant is employed lodged a
complaint at the society against Mr Omar who is
the senior
practitioner at the firm. It is unnecessary for purposes of this
judgment to deal with the content of the complaint.
[6] Pursuant to the
complaint lodged by the client, Mr Omar by letter addressed to him,
by the society, was afforded the opportunity
to respond to the
allegations made against him. The letter was signed by an officer in
the disciplinary department of the society.
The letter also recorded
that should he fail to respond on or before a particular date the
writer will have no option but to refer
the matter to a disciplinary
committee.
[7] Mr Omar complied
with the request of the society. Subsequently Mr Omar received a
further letter (dated 3 October 2012) requesting
him to make himself
available to appear before an investigating committee of the council
of the society in order to discuss, explain
or elucidate the
complaint. It is important to add that the letter dated 3 October
2012 was signed by a director (MJS Grobler)
of the society. Mr
Omar’s attention was specifically drawn to rule 97A.2 and
97A.3. I will revert to the rules referred to
above presently. Mr
Omar requested further particulars pertaining to the complaint. The
mandate of Zehir Omar Attorneys had been
terminated in the interim
and the content of the file of the complainant was handed back to
him. Due to the society’s failure
to furnish further
particulars as requested the meeting of the investigating committee
failed to proceed on the appointed date.
Eventually another date for
the meeting was arranged for 16 July 2013 in a letter dated 6 May
2013 that stated inter alia: “Writer
confirms that the
Disciplinary Meeting scheduled for 16 July 2013 will be before an
Investigating Committee for the discussion
of the complaint against
you and against yourself. The Investigating Committee will thereafter
deliberate and recommend if there
are merits in the complaint for
charges to be formulated by writer”.
[8] A further letter
dated 29 May 2013 also confirmed the date with reference to a
“disciplinary meeting”. Mr Omar was
also informed that he
may not send a representative to attend on his behalf. It is clear
from the said letter that the purpose
of the investigating committee
is to investigate and to make recommendations to the council whether
there is merit in the complaint
(whether a prima facie case has been
made out) for formal charges to be formulated.
[9] The next day a
letter was addressed to applicant requesting her to appear on the
same date before an investigating committee
in order to discuss,
explain or elucidate the complaint by the complainant. This letter
was also signed by director, M J S Grobler.
[10] Zehir Omar
Attorneys on 14 June 2013 directed a letter to the society
complaining that the particulars requested had not been
forthcoming.
The society was also alerted to the fact that the meeting to be held
was a disciplinary meeting and that further particulars
are required.
Applicant was informed by letter that a disciplinary meeting and an
investigating meeting and a disciplinary meeting
were the same thing.
The letter requesting applicant to attend the investigating committee
was construed by the applicant as a
summons to attend a committee
meeting. The society was requested to furnish reasons for the
decision to summon applicant in terms
of section 5(1) of PAJA, Act 3
of 2000. In response to the letters dated 11 June 2013 and 14 June
2013 Second Respondent addressed
letters to both Mr Omar and
applicant. In the said letters Second Respondent made it clear that
they were not formally charged
pending the recommendation of the
investigating committee and that the request for further particulars
was premature. They were
further informed that the pro-forma
prosecutor (Second Respondent) has a discretion to call the relevant
parties before a disciplinary
meeting or hearing. Second Respondent
explained the position thus: "Please be advised further that
writer as the pro-forma
Prosecutor has the
discretion to call relevant parties for a Disciplinary Meeting or
Hearing, in light thereof[ Mrs Omar was called
in order to properly
ventilate the issues before the Investigating Committee of the Law
Society of the Northern Provinces. Writer
wishes to place on record
that Mrs Omar received timeous notice in this regard as required by
the Rules of the Law Society of the
Northern Provinces. Writer is not
required to furnish yourself with any further justification or
explanation for calling Mrs Omar
to the Meeting.
Please be advised
further that my colleague previously placed this matter before an
informal “B” Investigating Committee
of the Law Society
of the Northern Provinces who were of the view that you attend a
Discussion, which recommendation writer agrees
with. Writer
reiterates that writer will not enter into further debate with
yourself as writer has efficiently explained your issues
of concern
in previous correspondence exchanged herein, and more specifically in
writer’s letters dated 29 May 2013 and this
letter dated 19
June 2013.
Writer trusts that
yourself and Mrs Omar will avail yourselves on 16 July 2013”.
[11] The society in
its opposing affidavit made it clear that applicant was not served
with a summons to appear before the investigating
committee, but was
simply notified to do so by letter. It is common cause that applicant
was not afforded the opportunity to make
written representations to
the society, as was the case with Mr Omar. It is admitted by the
society that the reference in the letter
dated 19 June 2013 to a
“disciplinary meeting” was in error. It is denied by the
society that it is necessary for a
formal resolution of council to
initiate an investigation after a complaint had been received.
Finally, it was stated in the opposing
affidavit that the society has
subsequently decided not to continue with any disciplinary action
against Mr Omar or applicant.
[12] The record of
the proceeding was filed by the society. The contents thereof are not
in dispute. It revealed that the complainant
was not present. He
could not be contacted telephonically. The committee could therefore
not consider all matters and issues. It
is recorded that the
following was recommended by the investigating committee: “No
resolution was arrived and the recommendation
made by the committee
was that a further meeting should be convened with both complainant
and Ms Y Omar and Mr Z Omar present and,
most importantly, it should
be made clear to the complainant that the Law Society of the Northern
Province is extremely annoyed
at his contemptuous ignoring the
meeting and not attending and not even tendering an explanation or
the reason for his absence
and his ignoring the prosecution or his
inability to attend or decision not to attend.
The committee also
felt that the complainant should be informed that the committee
considered mulching the complainant with the
costs of the meeting but
had decided against same in absence of any explanation from him for
his absence.
The committee was
appraised of an application for review launched by attorneys Z Omar
but had no discussion thereon as it was not
an item on the agenda".
[13] S 67 of the Act
grants the council the power to appoint one or more committees to
assist it in carrying out its duties, the
performance of its
functions and the exercise of its powers. Such committees shall
consist of members of the council concerned
or of members of the
society or both. The council may assign to a committee appointed in
terms of sub¬section (1) such of its
powers that it may deem fit,
but shall not be divested of any power which it may have assigned to
a committee and may amend or
withdraw any decision of such a
committee provided that if the council has assigned to a committee
the power to inquire into any
case of alleged or unprofessional or
dishonourable or unworthy conduct and to impose any punishment in
respect thereof in accordance
with s 72, the council shall not amend
or withdraw any decision arrived at or anything done by such
committee in terms of the powers
so assigned. Council therefore
retained the power to exercise its own discretion despite the
recommendation of an investigating
committee. I will return to s 67
in due course.
[14] Part XIII
(Disciplinary Proceedings) of the rules of the society promulgated
under the Act states in rule 93 that the council
shall have
disciplinary jurisdiction over all practitioners no matter where the
conduct which is, or allegedly is unprofessional
or dishonourable or
unworthy is perpetrated. Rule 94(1) states: "The council shall
consider any complaint made by or on behalf
of any person feeling
aggrieved by reason of any alleged unprofessional or dishonourable or
unworthy conduct on the part of any
practitioner, whether such
conduct took place before or after the promulgation of these rules”.
[15] Rule 95
provides that the council may, dismiss a complaint on the one hand,
upon receipt of a complaint, if it is of the opinion
that no prima
facie case has been made out. Where, on the other hand, council is of
the opinion that a prima facie case has been
made out, it may adopt
the procedures as referred to in rule 95.2.
[16] Rule 95.2
states; “Upon receipt of a complaint, the council may-
95.1
95.1 where it is of
the opinion that a prima facie case of unprofessional or
dishonourable or unworthy conduct of the part of the
practitioner
concerned has been made out -
95.2.1 furnish the
practitioner with particulars of the complaint and call upon him to
furnish the council in writing within such
time as the council may
direct, with his explanation and answer to the complaint, and may
require such explanation to be verified
by affidavit; or
95.2.2 at any time
and whether or not it has also proceeded or also thereafter proceeds
under rule 95.2.1, call upon him to appear
at such time and place as
it may determine to explain or elucidate or discuss the matter;
Provided that a
referral of the complaint to the practitioner shall be in writing
with a copy thereof to the most senior person
at the relevant firm in
years of admission according to the records of the Law Society, who
shall likewise respond to the complaint”.
[17] The deponent on
behalf of the society states in the opposing affidavit that legal
officers act on behalf of the council in
terms of their mandate and
exercise the powers delegated to them by the council to investigate
complaints. He mentions that the
society receives between 8 000 - 90
complaints per annum and that the council is not able to deal with
each and every complaint
received at council level. Complaints are
investigated by the legal officers and such legal officers have the
discretion to call
the relevant parties to either an investigating
committee or a disciplinary meeting and to subpoena witnesses. The
deponent goes
on to state that it is unnecessary for a formal
resolution of council to initiate an investigation concerning a
complaint that
had been submitted to the society. The deponent denies
that Second Respondent was not authorised to investigate the
complaint and
to call upon applicant to attend the proceedings of the
investigating committee.
[18] To my mind
disciplinary proceedings begin when council, after consideration of a
complaint lodged with the society, is of the
opinion that a prima
facie case of unprofessional, dishonourable or unworthy conduct has
been made out and has resolved that proceedings
be instituted in
terms of rule 95.2.1 or 95.2.2.
[19] Applicant
complains in the papers (and it was also argued) that the procedure
envisaged by rule 95.2.2 can only follow after
the procedure in terms
of rule 95.2.1 had been instituted.
[20] I disagree. It
is clear from the wording of rule 95.2.2 that the council may at any
time and whether or not it has proceeded
under rule 95.2.1 call upon
the practitioner to appear before an investigating committee to
explain or elucidate or discuss the
matter. There is of course an
important proviso. Rule 95.2.1 provides that particulars of the
complaint lodged with the society
be furnished to the practitioner to
enable him to reply. In the event that the procedure in terms of rule
95.2.2 is initiated without
resorting to the procedure in rule
95.2.1, particulars of the complaint lodged by the complainant must
also be provided to the
be provided to the practitioner concerned.
There is no reason, if particulars of the complaint have to be
furnished to a practitioner
under rule 95.2.1, to enable the
practitioner to make written representations, why the particulars
should not be provided to the
practitioner when the procedure under
rule 95.2.2 is invoked. The provision contained in rule
95.2.1 is manifestly
included to comply with the audi alteram partem principle. It follows
that the audi alteram partem principle
should be extended, for the
very same reason, to the procedure under Rule 95.2.2.
[21] It is common
cause that particulars of complaint lodged with the society were not
provided to applicant when she was called
upon to appear before the
investigating committee. The suggestion by the society that applicant
was fully appraised of the complaint
because the complaint had been
furnished to Mr Omar, who is also the senior practitioner of the
firm, cannot be accepted. No steps
had been taken against her until
she was informed to attend the investigating committee meeting.
Applicant is only required to
act when disciplinary proceedings are
instituted against her. Until then nothing is required of her.
[22] The rule of
natural justice dictates that she be informed of the particulars of
the complaint. The fact that she was named
in the complaint is of no
concern until such time that the council has resolved that
disciplinary proceedings be instituted against
her. Generally bodies
that are required to investigate need not observe the rules of
natural justice and bodies required to investigate
facts and make
recommendations to some other body or person with the power to act
need not necessarily apply the rules of natural
justice depending on
the circumstances. Cassem en ‘n Ander v Oos-Kaapse Kommittee
van Groepsgebiederaad en Andere 1959 (3)
651 (A); Real Printing and
Publishing Co (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Justice
1965 (2) SA 782
(C);
South African Defence and Aid Fund and Another v Minister of Justice
1967 (1) SA 263
(A); Bell v Van Rensburg N.O
1971 (3) SA 693
(C) at
704 - 705, 724H, 725G; Van der Merwe and Others v Slabbert N.O and
Others
1998 (3) SA 613
(NPD) at 624D - F.
[23] However, the
rule of natural justice is applicable whenever a statute empowers a
public official or body to do an act or give
a decision prejudicially
affecting an individual in his liberty or property or existing rights
or whenever such an individual has
a legitimate expectation entitling
him to a hearing. The rule of natural justice is part of the
principle of legality, which is
a foundational value of our
Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) postulates that a public official or
body concerned must act fairly.
Du Preez and Another v Truth and
Reconciliation Commission
[1997] ZASCA 2
;
1997 (3) SA 204
A at 231F - G.
[24] In this regard
the oft quoted words of Lord Denning MR In Re Pergamon Press Limited
[1970] 3 All ER 535
(CA) at 539c-f are
apposite: “He
submitted that when there was no determination or decision but only
an investigation or enquiry, the rule of
natural justice did not
apply ... I cannot accept counsel for the inspectors' submission. It
is true, of course, that the inspectors
are not a court of law. Their
proceedings are not judicial proceedings ... They are not even quasi
judicial for they decide nothing.
They only investigate and report.
They sit in private...
But this should not
lead us to minimise the significance of their task. They have to make
a report which may have wide repercussions.
They may, if they think
fit, make findings of fact which are very damaging to those whom they
name. They may accuse some; they
may condemn others; they may ruin a
reputations or careers. Their report may lead to judicial
proceedings. It may expose persons
to criminal proceedings or civil
actions ... Seeing that their work and their report may lead to such
consequences I am clearly
of the opinion that the inspectors must act
fairly’1.
The investigation
and report of an investigating committee fall in the above category
and is subject to that rule of natural justice.
I am also mindful and
have taken cognisance of the judgment in Law Society, Northern
Provinces (Incorporated as the Law Society
of the Transvaal) v Maseka
and Others 2005 (6) SA 372 (BH) at 382B - F. The question in that
case was whether a practitioner has
the right to a hearing before the
society decide to inspect his books in terms of s70 of the Act. That
case is distinguishable
on the facts. The learned Judge nevertheless
was of the view that the society does exercise a public power. I
agree.
[25] The reason
underlying the purpose of the investigating committee is to afford
the parties the opportunity to canvass the complaint
fully. The
council is placed in a better position to determine whether a prima
facie case has been made out or not after investigation
of the
investigating of all the facts and circumstances. The report of the
committee to the council may have serious repercussions
for
practitioners and may in appropriate circumstances ruin careers and
may, in addition, indeed lead to criminal proceedings.
Rule 95(3)
allows council upon a consideration of the complainant and the
practitioner’s explanation and answer thereto or
elucidation of
the matter, to dismiss the complaint if no case has been made out. If
it is satisfied that the complaint is justified,
but of a trivial
nature, it may inform the complainant and the practitioner in writing
of its decision and issue a written warning
to the practitioner.
[26] Under Rule 95.5
council may, if it is of the opinion that a prima facie case has been
made out, and it is not of a trivial
nature, call upon the
practitioner concerned on not less than ten (10) days prior notice to
appear at such time and place as the
council may determine in order
that a further enquiry in terms of s 71 of the Act may be conducted.
The latter enquiry is forma!
in that it requires a summons issued
under the hand of the president or secretary (not a director) of the
society and served upon
any person who may give material information.
The summons is similar to a subpoena in a civil trial in a
Magistrates Court. No
summons is necessary for a practitioner to
appear before an investigating committee established in terms of rule
95.2.2.
[27] I interpose, to
briefly return to my earlier reference to rule 97A.2 and rule 97A.3
referred to in the letters dated 28 May
2013 in terms whereof Mr Omar
and applicant were requested to appear before the investigating
committee. In my view rule 97A.2
and 97A.3 are not applicable to
proceedings conducted in terms of rule 95.2.2. They are applicable to
an enquiry under s 71 of
the Act. I am not called upon to deal with
enquiries under s 71 and will not venture to do so.
[28] I turn now to
determine whether the council may delegate its powers to legal
officers in the employ of the society, who are
not members of
council, to initiate, conduct or terminate any disciplinary
proceedings provided for in the Act and the rules.
[29] S 60 of the Act
provides that the society shall be managed and controlled by a
council which may exercise the powers of the
society. Council may in
terms of s67 appoint committees to assist it to carry out its duties
perform its functions or the exercise
its powers. S 67(1 )(c)
provides that the council may designate one or more members of a
committee appointed by it, as chairman.
[30] S 67(2) states:
"a council may assign to a committee appointed by it in terms of
subsection (1) such of its powers as
it may deem fit, but shall not
be divested of any powers which it may have assigned to a committee,
and may amend or withdraw any
decision of any such committee:
Provided that if a council has assigned to a committee the power to
enquire into any case of alleged
unprofessional, dishonourable or
unworthy conduct and to impose any punishment in respect thereof in
accordance with section 72,
the council shall not amend or withdraw
any decision arrived at or anything done by such committee in terms
of the powers so assigned".
[31] S 69(m) and
69(p) provide that council may prescribe the procedure to be followed
in connection with any enquiry referred to
in s 71 and may do
anything which is required for properly and effectively carrying out
its duties and functions. Rule 95.1 and
95.2 provide that the council
must consider complaints lodged with the society. If council is of
the opinion that a complaint does
not disclose a prima facie case, it
must dismiss the complaint. If council is of the opinion that a prima
facie case has been made
out council may initiate disciplinary
proceedings including proceedings in terms of rule 95.2.1 or 95.2.2
or both.
[32] There can be no
doubt from a plain reading of the provisions of the Act referred to
above and the rules that only council have
the power to initiate
disciplinary proceedings after consideration of a complaint lodged
with the society. In Attorney-General
OFS v Cyril Anderson
Investments Pty Ltd
1965 4 SA 628
(AD) Botha JA stated: “The
maxim delegatus delagere non potest is based upon the assumption
that, where the legislator has
delegated powers and functions to a
subordinate authority, it intended that authority itself to exercise
those powers and to perform
those functions and not to delegate them
to someone else, and that the power delegated does not therefore
include the power to
delegate.” S 69 allows council to delegate
disciplinary functions of council to committees. It does not allow
those delegated
functions to be delegated by any of the committees to
individual legal officers in the employ of the society. From the
evidence
adduced by the society, legal officers have a wide
discretion to initiate, conduct, and even withdraw disciplinary
proceedings.
According to the deponent legal officers have the
delegated power to institute proceedings referred to in rule 95.2.1
and 95.2.2.
Council effectively abdicated its control of the
disciplinary process to its legal officers which it cannot do. That
is not what
the legislature intended. It begs the question whether it
is the legal officers who decide what matters are serious enough to
be
referred to council and what matters are not.
[33] The delegated
powers of the legal officers render the recommendation of the
investigating committee meaningless because Second
Respondent as
legal officer, decides, instead of the council (or duly appointed
committee), whether a prima facie case has been
made out, and if so,
whether to proceed with further disciplinary steps. That is what
happened in this case. Second Respondent,
not council, has decided to
initiate proceedings against applicant in terms of rule 95.2 and to
discontinue further disciplinary
steps despite the recommendation by
the investigating committee to council to postpone the meeting. The
fact that 8 000 - 9 000
complaints are received per annum affords no
reason to disregard the provisions of the Act and the rules of the
society.
[34] I have come to
the conclusion that the decision taken by Second Respondent to
initiate proceedings in terms of rule 95.2.2
against applicant is
ultra vires the Act and the rules. However the withdrawal of all
disciplinary proceedings against applicant
(and Mr Omar) will render
the relief claimed academic.
[35] I now come to
the question of costs. The matter was originally allocated to Mali AJ
in the opposed motion court. I was requested
by a secretary of
Ledwaba DJP to take the matter over after Mali AJ recused herself.
[36] When the matter
was called before me on 13 February 2014 at 14h00. Mr Omar who
appeared on behalf of the applicant argued mainly
three points in
limine.
i) that the
allocation of the case to me is improper and null and void;
ii) that I am not
appointed as acting judge; and
iii) that the
application was incorrectly removed from the roll of 14 February 2014
and erroneously set down for 10 February 2014.
[37] The application
was incorrectly allocated to Friday 14 February 2014 by the
Registrar. It is common cause that Respondents
removed the case from
the roll and set it down the 10th of February 2014. The respondent’s
removal of the case from the roll
was the correct course to adopt.
The practice in this court is to enrol opposed motions for Mondays.
Applicant is not prejudiced.
The request for a postponement on the
basis that the case was not properly set down is unfounded.
[38] Mr Omar
informed me from the bar that he himself has contacted the office of
the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development
before lunch
(I presume that he had spoken to an official in the office of the
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development)
and was informed
that the Minister is unaware of my appointment.
[39] I adjourned to
obtain a copy of my written appointment from the Judge President’s
office. I had copies made and had them
distributed to the parties by
my secretary before I returned to Court. Upon resumption, Mr Omar
sought a postponement to consider
whether there was proper compliance
with s 175 of the Constitution of 1996. Mr Omar required, so he said,
time to establish whether
the Minister consulted the Judge President
as required by s 175 of the Constitution. (Mr Leotlela on behalf of
Respondents opposed
the application for a postponement and also
indicated that Respondents do not take issue with my appointment.)
[40] A Judge who
presides in a case which he or she is disqualified from sitting
because he or she is not duly appointed, acts in
breach of s 175(2)
read with s 165 and Item 6 of Schedule 2 of the Constitution. It is
also important to bear in mind that s34
of the Bill of Rights is also
applicable to the judiciary. Compare President of the Republic of
South Africa and Others v South
African Football Union and Others
1997 4 SA 147
(CC) at 168G-H. Litigants, no doubt, have the right to
question the appointment of Judges. The onus, as in the case of an
application
for recusal, is on the litigant.
[41] When I enquired
from Mr Omar why I was not informed beforehand in chambers of his
objection to me presiding, he informed me
that he suffers from a
sickness and is unable to walk across the street to my chambers which
is situated in the Palace of Justice.
It would, in any event, have
taken little effort from Mr Omar (as an officer of the court) to have
determined from the Deputy Judge-President,
whose office is situated
in the same building where the matter was heard or even from the
office of the Judge-President after he
purportedly obtained the
information from the office of the Minister, which turned out to be
wrong. Mr Omar did not take the obvious
steps to confirm the
correctness of the information he obtained. Instead of following the
accepted practise in seeking a meeting
with me in chambers with the
representatives of the Respondents present, to put to me the grounds
for my recusal, he embarked upon
an oral application based on hearsay
evidence, in open court without any warning.
[42] Mr Omar also
took issue with the fact that the allocation of the application to me
was improper because it should have been
referred back to the senior
Judge in the motion court who allocated the case to Mali AJ
originally. He argued that the allocation
is highly irregular. After
having heard argument I stated to Mr Omar that the application will
not be postponed and will be argued
on 14 February 2014.
[43] Applicant would
have been successful had the disciplinary proceeding not being
withdrawn. I have decided as a mark of my disapproval,
not to award
costs in favour of the applicant. The attack on the procedure, which
was followed when the Deputy Judge President
allocated the
application to me for adjudication is without merit. It was aimed at
tainting the administration of justice without
any justification
whatsoever.
I must however in
fairness also state that Mr Omar apologised to me when the arguments
were concluded.
[44] Costs were
sought against Second Respondent de bonis propriis on attorney and
client scale. There is also no merit in seeking
such an order.
In the result I make
the following order:
ORDER:
The application
is dismissed.
No order as to
costs.
GC MULLER
ACTING JUDGE OF
THE HIGH COURT
For Applicant: Z
Omar (Attorney)
Instructed by Z
Omar Attorneys Springs
For Respondents:
J Leotlela (Attorney)
Instructed by
Rooth & Wessels Pretoria
Date heard: 13 &
14 February 2014.