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[2014] ZAGPPHC 162
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Uniqon Wonings (Pty) Ltd v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (6715/2008) [2014] ZAGPPHC 162 (4 April 2014)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
HIGH COURT, PRETORIA)
Case
Number: 6715/2008
DATE:
4/4/2014
In
the matter between:
UNIQON
WONINGS (PTY)
LTD
..........................................................................
PLAINTIFF
And
CITY
OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
….....................
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
Fabricius
J,
1.
Plaintiff
and the former Kungwini have different views about the legality of
property rates for the 2004/2005 financial year on
the hand, and on
the other hand what the effective rate was for that period, if any.
The Kungwini Local Municipality was “purportedly”
(as
Plaintiffs claim) disestablished in terms of Notice 1866 of 2010 and
incorporated into the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.
The
Local Municipality was originally created in accordance with the
Local Government Municipal Structures
Act 117 of 1998
. It is alleged that
the City of Tshwane is responsible for the repayment of certain
amounts which, Plaintiff alleges, were paid
to it whilst not owing
and/or without any lawful cause. The summons that Plaintiff issued on
21 October 2013 sets out Plaintiff’s
main claim and two
alternative claims and in paragraph 3 thereof pleaded the following:
“On 3 June 2008, the above honourable
Court gave judgment in
case number 3908/2005, a copy of which is annexed hereto as annexure
“A”, in terms of which
it was determined that the
increase in property rates for the 2004/2005 financial year of the
Defendant to 0,054 cents in the rand
was invalid. The increased
property rates were set aside and therefore no effective rate was
payable for the 2004/2005 financial
year.” The appeal was heard
the Supreme Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal and the
cross-appeal. The judgment is
reported as
Kungwini
Local Municipality vs Silver Lakes Homeowner’s Association and
Another
[2008] ZASCA 83
;
2008 (6) SA 187
. To this
paragraph Defendant pleaded as follows: “The Defendant
pertinently denies that there was no effective rate payable
for the
2004/2005 financial year and specifically pleads that the effective
rate applicable was 0,02 cents in the rand for the
2004/2005
financial year.”
2.
On
10 March 2014 Plaintiff filed an application in terms of the
provisions of
Rule 34
(3)
of the Rules of this Court.
It contended that for the sake of convenience the following issue
should be determined first and separately
from any other issues in
dispute: “Whether the allegation made in paragraph 3 of
Plaintiff’s particulars of claim namely
that no effective
property rate was payable for the 2004/2005 financial year of
Kungwini Local Authorities is correct or whether
the property rate of
0,02 cent in the rand was applicable, as pleaded by the Defendant in
paragraph 2.1 of the plea.” Defendant
filed an opposing
affidavit but on the morning of the trial it was agreed that I ought
to decide this issue first and separately.
In Defendant’s
answering affidavit, its decision was put as follows:
2.1
The
Defendant does not contend that “the property rates of the
previous financial year” were applicable. It is the Defendant’s
case that;
2.2
In
terms of the
Local Government
Transition Act, Act 209 of 1993
property rates are not required to be levied for a specific financial
year (i.e. 1 July of one year to 30 June of the following
year);
2.3
Property
rates did not lapse at the end of a financial year;
2.4
The
resolution of the Kungwini Local Municipality dated 19 February 2003,
that it would levy property rates based on an assessment
rate tariff
of R0,02 value from 1 April 2003 remain valid and enforceable until
30 June 2005.”
3.
In
the
Silver Lakes
case in the High Court the Applicants sought an order, amongst
others, that the promulgation of the assessment rate tariff of R0.054
value for properties in the Bronberg area of the Municipality be
declared null and void and be set aside. Also, that the Municipality
be prohibited from further implementing the assessment rate tariff of
R0.054 value for properties in the Bronberg area from the
date of the
Application and that it be declared that the Municipality was not
lawfully entitled to have levied this assessment
rate for the
properties in the Bronberg area from 1 August 2004. As I have said,
these orders were granted substantially in those
terms, and the
appeal was dismissed. The first prayer that had been sought was that
the decision by the Municipality on 29 June
2004 to approve the
mentioned rate tariff be declared null and void, was refused. The
cross-appeal against that decision was also
dismissed by the Supreme
Court of Appeal, and there is no such substantive application in
those terms before me.
4.
Before
dealing with the
Silver Lakes
decision and the parties’
argument, I deem it appropriate to refer to the decision of
CDA
Boerdery (Edms) Bpk and Others vs Nelson Mandela Metropolitan
Municipality and Others
[2007] ZASCA 1
;
2007 (4) SA 276
SCA
. It will be noted
that the Bench of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the
Silver
Lakes
decision was not referred to previous decision in the
CDA Boerdery
case. The majority judgment per Cameron JA
dealt with the so-called “old-order subordination” of a
Local Authority’s
power to levy rates. This was done in the
context of the
Cape Municipal Ordinance 20 of 1974
which is substantially the same as the
Local Authorities Rating
Ordinance no. 11 of 1977
for the Transvaal Province as it
then was. In terms of the
Cape Municipal Ordinance
a
Municipality was obliged to obtain the Premier’s approval for
new rates that it sought to impose on landowners. Cameron
JA dealt
briefly with the history of the old-order, if I can call it that, and
in the context of the new legislation, including
Constitutional
provisions and the provisions of the
Local Government
Transition Act,
held the following (at par. 37):
“…
the
new Constitutional order conferred a radically enhanced status on
municipalities. Under the interim Constitution, each level
of
Government (National, Provincial and Local) derived its powers
directly from the Constitution (though Local Government’s
powers were subject to definition and regulation by either the
National or Provincial Governments). The constitutional status of
Local Government was therefore “materially different”
from the pre-constitutional era. The advent of the final Constitution
has taken us even further from the constitutional structure in which
the ordinance was imbedded. The new Constitution has enhanced,
rather
than diminish, the status of Local Government. As under the interim
Constitution, municipalities are no longer merely creatures
of
statute that they enjoy only the delegated or subordinate legislative
power derived exclusively from ordinances or parliamentary
legislation. The Constitution has moved away from a hierarchical
division of governmental power in favour of a new vision, in which
Local Government is inter-dependant, and (subject to permissible
constitutional constraints) inviolable and has latitude to define
and
express its unique character.”
See
also:
City of Cape Town and Another vs Robertson and Another
[2004] ZACC 21
;
2005 (2) SA 323
(CC) par. 58 – 60
.
In
the context of s. 10 G (7), which empowers municipalities to levy and
recover property rates, no allusion to “any other
law”
was made in contra-distinction to the provisions of s. 10 G (6) of
the Transition Act which required that municipalities
perform
valuations of properties “subject to any other law”.
According to Cameron JA this suggested that s. 10 G (7)
conferred a
free standing rate-levying competence on municipalities. In his view
the particular portion of the
Cape
Ordinance
was impliedly repealed
when the Constitution Order was established.
5.
The
Constitutional Court dealt with the relevant history of legislation
relating to the power of a municipality to impose levies
and rates in
Liebenberg N. O. vs Bergrivier
Municipality and Minister for Local Government, Environmental Affairs
and Development Planning Western
Cape
[2013] ZACC 16
(6 June 2013)
.
It is clear that a municipality’s authority to impose rates and
levies is derived from
s. 229 of the
Constitution
. The purpose of a
municipality’s revenue-raising powers is to finance a
municipality’s performance of its constitutional
and statutory
objects and duties as set out in
s.
152 (1) and 153 of the Constitution
.
The statutory framework for the transition to Democratic Local
Government envisaged a staggered process implemented over several
years. The first step in this process was the adoption of the
Local
Government Transition Act 209 of 1993 (“the Transition Act”).
In 1996 a number of provisions were
inserted into this Act by the
Local
Government Transition Act Second
Amendment Act 97 of 1996.
In
particular
s. 10 G (6) and (7)
were introduced to regulate the powers of Local Government to impose
rates and levies and according to the Constitutional Court
“conferred
a free standing rate-levying competence on municipalities”.
This finding is of course in line with the reasoning
of Cameron JA
that I have referred to. The
Transition
Act
was due to lapse on 30 April
1999. However the life of its financial provisions was extended on at
least two occasions. The first
instance was in 1998, by means of a
Constitutional Amendment (Act 65 of
1998)
which extended the life of
the whole of the
Transition Act
for
a limited period. The second was by an
Amendment
to the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 33 of 2000
,
which kept in place
s. 10 G
for an indefinite period. (See
s. 93
(4)
). During this period, the
Constitutional Court said, the old-order legislation in terms of
which municipalities could levy rates
on property remained in force.
I must point out that this
dictum
does not accord with the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Appeal in
the
CDA
decision that I referred to. In this context the old-order
legislation would include the mentioned
Local
Authorities Rating Ordinance 11 of 1977
.
Ultimately, the
Local Government:
Municipal Finance Management Act
(The “Finance Act”)
56 of 2003
repealed
s. 10 G (7)
with
effect from 1 July 2005.
6.
S.
10 (G) (7) of the
Transition
Act
was therefore in force during
the period relevant in this case namely the financial year 2004/2005.
I must accept also that according
to the Constitutional Court finding
that I have referred to
(par. 43)
the old-order legislation in terms of which municipalities could levy
rates on property remained in force. Cameron JA in the mentioned
CDA
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in turn, had been of the view
that this legislation had been impliedly repealed, as I have
said.
This decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal was not referred to by
the Constitutional Court in the
Liebenberg
case. I must in this context of
course accept the reasoning and conclusion of the Constitutional
Court, and during argument it became
clear that Counsel for
Defendant, Mr T. Motepe, also based his argument on this conclusion.
7.
I
may add that in the
Liebenberg
decision the Court found
(at
par. 74)
that substantial
compliance with the objects of the requirements in
s.
10 G (7)
was sufficient inasmuch as
it was argued that the said
Finance
Act
also had to be complied with
when rates were determined. This would be in line with what was
stated by the Supreme Court of Appeal
in
Nokeng
Tsa Taemane Local Municipality vs Dinokeng Property Owners
Association and Others
[2011] 2 All SA 46
to be the following: “
(at par.
14)
It is important to mention that
the mere failure to comply with one or other administrative provision
does not mean that the whole
procedure is necessarily void. It
depends in the first instance on whether the Act contemplated that
the relevant failure should
be visited with nullity and in the second
instance on its materiality… To nullify the revenue stream of
the Local Authority
merely because of an administrative hiccup
appears to mean it to be so drastic a result that it is unlikely that
the Legislature
could have intended it.” Also, in my view, one
must keep in mind the relevant
dictum
in
this context in
African Christian
Democratic Party vs Electoral Commission and Others
[2006] ZACC 1
;
2006 (3) SA 305
(CC) par. 25
where in the context
of assessing a Local Authority’s compliance with the Municipal
Electoral Legislation, the Court held
that a narrowly textual and
legalistic approach is to be avoided. Rather, the question is whether
the steps taken by the Local
Authority are effective when measured
against the object of the legislature, which is attained from the
language, scope and purpose
of the Act as a whole and the statutory
requirement in particular. Therefore, a failure by a municipality to
comply with relevant
statutory provisions does not necessarily lead
to the actions under scrutiny being rendered invalid. The question is
whether there
has been substantial compliance, taking into account
the relevant statutory provisions in particular, and the legislation
as a
whole.
8.
Before
argument the parties handed up by agreement, a document titled
‘Common Cause Background Facts’. These are the
following:
8.1
The
Kungwini Local Municipality was established with effect 5 December
2000 with its demarcated area including various previously
peri-urban
areas, commonly referred to as the Bronberg area;
8.2
The
Bronberg area including Silver Lakes, Mooikloof and various
agricultural smallholdings and farms were not included in formal
valuation roll as part of the former Eastern Gauteng Services
Council;
8.3
The
Kungwini Local Municipality thus commenced with the preparation of a
new valuation roll applicable from 1 July 2002
inter alia
in
terms of
s. 10 G (6) of the
Local Government Transition Act
>;
8.4
After
publication of the newly completed valuation roll, the final
Valuation Appeal Board Hearings were disposed of the first week
of
February 2003;
8.5
The
following finalisation of the process, the Kungwini Local
Municipality resolved per Council resolution to implement assessment
rate tariffs as published per notice 4/2003 (page 2 of the main
evidence bundle);
8.6
The
notice 4/2003 was not linked to a financial year and did not have any
specified end timeframe of operation;
8.7
The
notice 4/2003 was never challenged or set aside by any competent
Court;
8.8
The
Kungwini Local Municipality subsequently attempted to increase the
assessment rate tariffs but was interdicted from doing so
per Court
orders of Bertelsmann J (main evidence bundle pages 154 to 156) [I
may add that the interim interdict that was granted
was made pending
the institution of an action, which never took place, and in my view
the interdict therefore had lapsed];
8.9
The
Kungwini Local Municipality throughout raised 0,02 cent in the rand
assessment rates, which ultimately culminated in a settlement
agreement between Kungwini West Alliance and the Municipality (main
evidence bundle pages 157 to 167);
8.10
It
is recognised that the Plaintiff was not a party to such settlement
agreement;
8.11
The
Plaintiff does not admit publication of the notice 4/2003.
(Publication
was however admitted during argument.)
9.
PLAINTIFF’S
ARGUMENT:
Plaintiff
relied on
s. 10 (G) of the Transition Act
, which deals
with financial matters. In particular it was contended that
subsection 2 (d), (3) (a), (6) and (7) (a) (i)
were of
particular relevance. It was also contended that the mentioned
Ordinance 11 of 1977
remained applicable until the
implementation of the
Local Government: Municipal Property
Rates Act 6 of 2000
from 2 July 2005.
S. 1
of
this Ordinance provided that “financial year” meant the
period from 1 July in any year to 30 June in the succeeding
year.
S.
21
provided that Local Authority may levy rates or rates on
rate-able property recorded in the valuation of the roll for a
financial
year to which the roll is applicable. Certain regulations
were promulgated in terms of this Ordinance per
Administrator’s
Notice 446 and Schedule 17
in particular referred to the
notice that had to be given in respect of a fixed financial year
namely 1 July to 30 June.
S. 10 G of the Transition Act
was still in force as I have said, and the submission was that
insofar as it may not be clear from
s. 10 G
that
property rates were or should only have been promulgated for one
financial year, the period from 1 July in any year to 30
June in the
succeeding year,
Ordinance 11 of 1977
still applied
until the
Property Rates Act
came in to beING, which
was after the 2004/2005 financial year.
S. 21 of this
Ordinance
, as I have said referred to a particular financial
year. The submission was therefore that the intention of the
Legislator at all
relevant times was abundantly clear, namely that
property rates and taxes would be promulgated and be applicable only
for one financial
year. There was therefore no basis upon which it
could be argued that, in respect of the 2004/2005 financial year
applicable to
Kungwini, when the property rates and taxes were
declared void and invalid, property rates and taxes applicable to the
previous
financial year, would have automatically become applicable
and “would have risen from the dead”. It was submitted by
Mr R. Du Plessis SC on behalf of Plaintiff that the Local Authority
understood this to have been so in any event. With reference
to the
“evidence bundle” the following submissions were then
made:
9.1
The
2004/2005 financial year would normally commence on 1 July 2004 and
terminate on 30 June 2005;
9.2
On
19 February 2003 a notice by Kungwini of the property rates and taxes
applicable from 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2003 was published,
determining that the Bromberg area would be taxed at a rate of 0,02
cents in the rand;
9.3
A
further notice for the next financial year was published that a rate
tariff of 0,0876 cents in the rand would apply from 1 August
2003;
9.4
On
8 September 2003 another notice was published in the Beeld, in terms
of which it was stated that the assessment rates tariff
increase of
0,0876 cents in the Bronberg area would be phased in over a three
year period for 2003/2004, 2004/2005 and 2005/2006.
Rates would have
been effective from 4 October 2003;
9.5
This
publication also appeared in the Provincial Gazette of 24 September
2003;
9.6
However,
on 29 October 2003 another advertisement appeared indicating that
such rates and taxes would be effective as from 14 November
2003 as
published in that Provincial Gazette. The contents do not appear to
differ from the publication of 24 September 2003;
9.7
On
7 June 2004 a notice appeared pertaining to the budget of the
2004/2005 financial year, with no reference in there pertaining
to
the property rates and taxes;
9.8
A
special Council meeting was held on 29 June 2004. As part of that
budget, property rates and taxes were discussed. It was recorded
that
assessment rates for the Bronberg area would increase from R0,022 to
R0,054. This was contrary to the foregoing promulgations.
The minutes
however refer to the previous “financial year”;
9.9
An
official notice was published on 28 July 2004 in terms of which it
was stated that the assessment rates tariff of R0,054 per
rand value
for properties in the Bronberg area would be approved. This was set
aside by the Court;
9.10
In
a letter of Kungwini to National Treasury dated 29 November 2004, it
was stated that the assessment rates for 2003/2004 for the
whole of
Kungwini, except the Bronberg area, were R0,0876 cents in the rand.
In the Bronberg area for 2003/2004 the amount that
was charged was
R0,020. That had been increased in the 2004/2005 financial year to
R0,054. This appeared to be contrary to the
publications referred to
above;
9.11
On
20 July 2005 Local Authority Notice of the new financial year namely
2005/2006 was published recording the increase at the time;
9.12
It
was important to note that the last mentioned Notice referred to
s.
10 G of the Transition Act,
read with certain other statutory
provisions, and read with Ordinance 11 of 1977. That was therefore a
recognition that the Ordinance
11 of 1977 was still applicable at the
time. The same was applicable to all the other Local Authority
Notices already referred
to;
9.13
From
the abovementioned analysis it therefore appeared that there was an
attempt by Kungwini itself at all relevant times to determine
property rates and taxes for each separate financial year. Therefore
the applicable property rates and taxes would automatically
terminate
and not be applicable anymore, as at 30 June each relevant year;
9.14
It
therefore followed that whatever property rates and taxes were
applicable from 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004, terminated as at
30 June
2004;
9.15
It
was therefore clear, after the mentioned decision of the Supreme
Court of Appeal, no valid property rates and taxes were applicable
from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005.
10.
As
far as Defendant’s argument was concerned, it was submitted by
Plaintiff that the property rates of R0,02 per rand may
have been the
factual position, but not the legal position inasmuch as Defendant
was not entitled to have levied even R0,02 per
rand for 2004/2005
financial year, as there had simply been no compliance with any of
the statutory provisions in terms of which
the property rates and
taxes could have been promulgated. The conclusion therefore was that
no property rates and taxes were applicable
to Plaintiff in respect
of Plaintiff’s properties, in the Bronberg area, over the
period 2004/2005. Plaintiff’s allegations
in paragraph 3 of the
particulars of claim should therefore be determined as being correct.
DEFENDANT’S
ARGUMENT:
It
was submitted that Defendant’s mentioned first resolution for
the 2002/2003 year was clearly a resolution taken in terms
of
s.
10 G (7) (a) (i)
of the
Transition
Act
and not a resolution in terms
of
s. 21 (1)
of
the Ordinance. Reliance was placed on the mentioned
Liebenberg
judgment and the finding that
s. 10 G
(6) and (7)
of the
Transition
Act
conferred a free-standing
rate-levying competence on municipalities. The old-order legislation
in terms of which municipalities
could levy rates on property,
remained in force (until 2 July 2005), and accordingly during the
period 22 November 1996, when
s. 10 G
of the
Transition
Act
commenced, until 2 July 2005,
Local Authorities could levy property rates in terms of either the
Ordinance or s. 10 G (7)
of
the
Transition Act
.
It was therefore not correct, as Plaintiff’s case seems to be,
that the
Ordinance
and
the
Transition Act
must be read together. It was accordingly submitted that
s.
10 G (7)
of the
Transition
Act
does not require a Local
Authority to resolve to levy property rates for only one financial
year and that such property rates do
not automatically terminate at
the end of a particular financial year. In contrast to the
Ordinance
and s. 12 (1) of the Municipal Property Rates Act
,
s. 10 G (7)
of
the
Transition Act
does
not contain any such limitations.
S.
10 G (7) (c) and (d)
introduced for
the first time a public participation process in respect of the
levying of property rates in terms of which objections
could be
lodged which the Local Authority was obliged to consider. The
Transition Act
in this regard made provision for an initial and amended date on
which the determination would come into operation, depending on
whether or not the objections were upheld. If it was the intention of
the legislature the property rates would only be levied “for
a
financial year”, there would be no need for such different
dates of commencement. On Plaintiff’s argument the initial
date
could moreover never have been before 1 July, which implies that if
objections were upheld and the determination amended,
the
Municipality would not be entitled to levy
any
property rates during the periods from 1 July until the amended date
of commencement of the determination. It is inconceivable
to suggest
that this could ever have been the intention of the legislature,
keeping in mind the broader legislative scheme, the
duties and powers
of their Municipality and the purpose for which rates were levied. Mr
Motepe also submitted that the High Court
decision of Legodi J which
was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeal
(the
Silver Lakes
Appeal
)
by necessary implication held that there was a valid property rate
determination as at 31 July 2004 inasmuch as the decision by
the
Municipality on 29 June 2004 was not declared null and void by the
High Court, which decision was confirmed by the Supreme
Court of
Appeal. The decision therefore stood, and the judgment of Van Heerden
JA on appeal clearly indicated that valid property
rates existed on
31 July 2004. The crux of the matter only concerned the increase in
assessment rate and not whether the decision
of 29 June had been
lawfully made. It is therefore Defendant’s case that it was
entitled to levy and recover property rates
in the Bronberg area
during the period 2 August 2004 to 30 June 2005 calculated at an
assessment rate tariff of R0,02 per rand
value. The remaining issues
in the action ought to be postponed
sine
die
.
11.
With
reference to the
CDA Boerdery
decision, the
Constitutional Court in
Minister of Local Government, WC vs
Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate 2014 (1) SA 521 at 532
said that
as a matter of general principle, old-order legislation remains in
force until the necessary steps are taken to have
it set aside.
See
also:
S vs Thunzi and Another (Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development joint) 2011 (3) BCLR 281, par. 25 and 55.
It
however also added that the statutory provision requiring the
Premier’s assent in the CDA case was an isolated and excisable
requirement. I am of the view therefore that the CDA Boerdery
decision is not authority for the proposition that the relevant
Municipal Ordinance had been impliedly repealed. The two mentioned
decisions of the Constitutional Court do not support that conclusion.
12.
In
Rates Action Group vs City of Cape
Town supra
the whole question of an
applied repeal of legislation is discussed in some detail. For
present purposes however the finding in
paragraphs 47 to 50 are of
more importance. The submission of Mr Motepe that in the present
instance their Municipality had a choice
which legislative provision
it could follow, is not that novel. The provisions of
s.
229 of the Constitution
grants
municipalities an original power to levy rates on properties while
the
Transition Act
sets out in detail the mechanism and processes through which
municipalities were required to value properties and levy rates. In
Liebenberg supra
,
as I have said, it was held that
s.
10 G (6) and (7)
of the
Transition
Act
confer a free standing
rate-levying competence on municipalities. It is in my view therefore
clear that if a municipality complies
with the relevant provisions of
the
Transition Act
,
one cannot be heard to say that its action is unlawful or invalid if
at the same time it does not also comply with every prescript
of the
Rating Ordinance. Having regard to the duties of the Municipality and
the purpose of the levying of rates, would wholly
artificial to hold
that because of certain non-material non-compliance with one or other
statutory document, no rates at all would
be enforced for a
particular year. I am therefore in agreement with Mr Motepe’s
submission that
s. 10 G (7)
or the
Transition Act
read as a whole, does not require Local Authority to resolve to levy
property rates for only one financial year, and that such
property
rates do not automatically terminate at the end of a financial year.
I am of the view further that both the judgment of
Legodi J and that
of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the
Silver
Lakes
decision make it clear that
only increases in rates were dealt with, and not the question whether
or not
valid
property rates existed. In fact, under my view, both decisions say
exactly the opposite.
13.
In
the premises the following order is made:
It
is declared that the Defendant was entitled to levy and recover
property rates in the Bronberg area during the period 1 August
2004
to 30 June 2005 calculated at an assessment rate tariff of R0,02 per
rand value;
The
remaining issues in the action are postponed sine die;
Plaintiff
is ordered to pay the costs of the hearing of the separated issue,
including the cost of 2 Counsel where so employed.
JUDGE
H.J FABRICIUS
JUDGE
OF THE GAUTENG HIGH COURT, PRETORIA DIVISION
COUNSEL
FOR PLAINTIFF: ADV R DU PLESSIS SC
INSTRUCTED
BY: LEN DEKKER & ASS, PRETORIA
COUNSEL
FOR DEFENDANT: ADV J MOTEPE
INSTRUCTED
BY: DE SWARDT VOGEL MAYAMBO, PRETORIA
HEARD
ON: 12/3/2014