Uniqon Wonings (Pty) Limited v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (22726/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 1052 (13 March 2014)

82 Reportability
Municipal Law

Brief Summary

Municipal Law — Property Rates — Clearance Certificates — Applicant sought to compel the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality to provide property rates certificates necessary for the transfer of unregistered erven in the Six Fountains Estate. The respondent had unlawfully levied rates on separate stands not yet registered, and continued to pursue claims for outstanding amounts based on these incorrect assessments. The court found that the applicant had made all necessary payments under protest and was entitled to clearance certificates despite the respondent's failure to provide justification for the alleged outstanding amounts. The respondent's refusal to issue the certificates was deemed unlawful.

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[2014] ZAGPPHC 1052
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Uniqon Wonings (Pty) Limited v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (22726/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 1052 (13 March 2014)

IN
THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT, PRETORIA
(REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA)
Case No:
22726/2013
Date: 13 March
2014
Reportable
Of interest to
other judges
In the matter
between
UNIQON
WONINGS (PTY)
LIMITED
.............................................................................
Applicant
and
CITY
OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
.......................................
Respondent
CORAM:
EBERSOHN AJ
DATE
HEARD 25 June 2013
DATE JUDGMENT
HANDED DOWN 13 MARCH 2014
JUDGMENT
EBERSOHN AJ
[1] The applicant is
a company which develops properties.
[2] The respondent
is a metropolitan municipality.
[3] The matter was
argued on 27 June 2013 as an urgent application and after argument
judgment was reserved and as the matter was
argued on an urgent basis
without heads of argument being submitted by any of the parties, the
court called upon counsel on behalf
of the parties to submit full
written heads of argument. Apart from aspects dealt with in verbal
argument, the court also allowed
the parties the opportunity to, in
the written heads of argument, raise further arguments.
[4] The applicant
brought the application to compel the respondent to furnish it with
property rates certificates for transfer purposes
and ancillary
relief pertaining to its development named Six Fountains Estate.
[5]
The applicant commenced the particular township development 2003. In
respect of the proclaimed township it sold certain stands
which have
already been transferred "
out
of the remainder of the development to respective purchasers"
and
most
of the erven in the township have been transferred to purchasers and
have been registered in the Deeds Office.
[6]
The remaining unregistered erven have however not been
"born"
and
remain registered on the main Title Deed of the development. For ease
of reference the unregistered erven in the development
which are
still part of the main title deed, will hereinafter be referred to as
"the
remainder"
to
distinguish same from erven already registered in the names of
purchasers.
[7]
The respondent's predecessor, the Kungwini Local Municipality
("Kungwini")
apparently
unlawfully levied property rates and taxes on separate stands as if
they had been sold to separate purchasers. It is
common cause that
such conduct was incorrect and unlawful by virtue of section 2(1) of
the Local Government: Municipal Property
Rates Act 6 of 2004
("the
Rates Act")
which
provides that
"a
Metropolitan or Local Municipality may levy a rate on property in its
area",
"property"
being
defined in such act as
"immovable
property
registered
in the name of a person,
including, in the case of a sectional title scheme, a sectional title
unit
registered
in the name of a person".
(See
: Rynfield Township Ltd v Benoni Town Council and Another
1950 (4) SA
717
(T);
Florida
Hills Township Ltd v Roodepoort Maraisburg Town Council
1961 (2) SA
386
(T)
where
this principle was laid down already before the Rates Act was
promulgated.)
[8] The respondent
however did not, until very recently, concede that the legal position
was as set out in the previous paragraph
and paragraphs [16] and [17]
of the judgment of Prinsloo J in Mooikloof Estates (Edms) Bpk. v Die
Stadsraad van Tshwane, case no.
29998/2013 handed down in June 2013
(not yet reported).
[9] Kungwini was
incorporated as part of the respondent on 1 July 2011.
Notwithstanding the incorrect rating system applied by Kungwini,
the
respondent continued to send out accounts on the basis as imported
from Kungwini, until such time as ratepayers complained
of the
incorrectness, whereafter corrective measures were allegedly taken.
[10]
Notwithstanding the incorrect levying system the respondent also went
further and instituted action against the applicant in
the Regional
Court for payment of alleged outstanding property rates and taxes.
The claims in such summons
"claims
1 - 21 of the particulars of claim" are
based
on one Title Deed, T21949/2003, i.e. the main title deed in respect
of the remainder of Six Fountains Estate. The claims are
erroneously
based on separate accounts on the basis of rates and taxes being
levied in respect of 21 unregistered stands/erven.
It is
incomprehensible how such an action could have been instituted in the
first instance.
[11]
Such erven have not yet been
"born"
as
explained above, and were therefore not rateable as they were not
registered. This is admitted in the answering affidavit. Why
the
matter
was
opposed
in this court is not understood.
[12]
As appears from paragraph 8.2 of the answering affidavit, the summons
was alleged to have been issued
"to
ensure continuity in collections of Kungwini accounts" how
non-sensical that may be,
and
was apparently issued in respect of amounts alleged to be owing in
respect of rates and taxes levied during the period before
Kungwini
was taken over by the respondent on 1 July 2011.
[13] Respondent
since 1 July 2011 (erroneously) continued to present the applicant
with separate accounts pertaining to property
rates and taxes levied
by the respondent on each and every separate remaining stand.
Included in these accounts were, however,
also globular amounts which
reflected outstanding property rates that were allegedly owing to
Kungwini before 1 July 2011. This
was not denied in the answering
affidavit.
[14] Applicant
explains in paragraph 19 of its founding affidavit (which explanation
is also not denied) that notwithstanding numerous
requests to the
respondent, respondent has failed and refused to provide applicant
with detailed explanations and justification
for the amounts
allegedly due and owing on each account of each stand before 1 July
2011, the period during which Kungwini controlled
the properties.
Furthermore, no information has been forthcoming pertaining to the
applicable valuation rolls for that period,
nor of the calculation of
the property rates and taxes promulgated over the period for
Kungwini. Applicant has not received accounts
for such property rates
and taxes up to the date of the bringing of this application, except
for the aforesaid globular amounts.
[15]
The applicant has been making payments of all property rates and
taxes determined and levied by the respondent on the basis
of each
separate stand,
since
1 3ulv 2011
,
even though such property rates and taxes have not been correctly
levied. Such payments were made under protest. The averments
that
such payments were made were not denied.
[16]
The amounts that were paid to the respondent
after
1 July 2011
.
levied on the basis of individual erven, are reflected in a summary
of payments set out in annexure "A6" to the founding

affidavit. In the answering affidavit it is not disputed that the
summary of payments in annexure "A6" is correct, and
that
the amounts reflected therein were paid (R365 652.53).
[17]
In respect of one stand (stand 163) a further amount of R165 044,57
was paid
after
1 July 2011
being
an amount which was alleged by the respondent to have been payable as
the total amount outstanding in respect of all the stands
that have
not been transferred by the applicant to purchasers. The applicant
explained that such payment was done simply for purposes
of obtaining
a clearance certificate in respect of stand 163. Such payment was
made on approximately 4 May 2012, under protest.
Again it is not
disputed that such payment was made.
[18] Approximately
two months before the application was issued (i.e. approximately
February 2013) the respondent consolidated all
the outstanding
property rates and taxes in respect of ail the unregistered remaining
erven forming part of Six Fountains Estate,
into one account.
[19] In paragraph 27
(pl2) of the founding affidavit the deponent on behalf of the
applicant stated that the respondent refuses
to provide clearance
certificates because the respondent avers that approximately R3,2
million is outstanding for property rates
and taxes for the period
before 1 July 2011, therefore for the period during which the
property fell under the jurisdiction of
Kungwini. It is further
stated in paragraph 28 (pl2) that the respondent has failed and
refused to provide any justification for
this amount, nor was an
explanation provided of how the amount has been made up and
calculated, and respondent has provided no
supporting documents or
evidence pertaining to why and how this amount is outstanding, when
it became due and payable and how it
was calculated.
[20] The respondent
in it's answering affidavit stated that a clearance certificate will
be issued if all rates and taxes that became
due in connection with
the township property, during the two years preceding the date of
application for a certificate, have been
fully paid. Respondent
however still failed to explain or provide details regarding the
alleged R3,2 million (before 1 July 2011)
and also failed to provide
a clearance certificate in respect of the rates and taxes allegedly
due in connection of the township
property during the two years
preceding the application for a certificate.
[21] The applicant
has recently sold certain stands to purchasers, which stands cannot
be transferred and registered in the names
of such purchasers as a
result of the respondent's refusal to issue clearance certificates.
[22] The applicant
avers that, based on the respondent's accounts levied in respect of
separate erven, all the outstanding accounts
of the respondent that
were issued from 1 July 2011 regarding individual stands have been
paid up notwithstanding the fact that
they have been calculated
incorrectly. Applicant also contends that on 1 July 2013 (two years
after Kungwini became part of the
respondent) applicant have made all
outstanding payments that allegedly became due in connection with all
the unsold stands and
that it only needed to make payment of small
amounts in respect of the three stands that were sold (stands 163,
165 and 172) to
bring all payments up to date by 1 July 2013). This
was not disputed by the respondent.
[23]
In summary, it remained the respondent's stance in it's answering
affidavit that "
all
rates and taxes in respect of the township property"
must
be
"paid in
full for the two year period preceding the date of application"
before
the applicant will be provided with a clearance certificate. The
amount was however not set out, nor a calculation thereof.
[24] As stated a
clearance certificate was necessary as the transfers to the
purchasers could not be registered in the Deeds Office
without it.
[25] The notice of
motion, founding affidavit and annexures thereto were served on 17
April 2013. Respondent's answering affidavit
was only received on 18
June 2013 notwithstanding the fact that the respondent was called
upon to serve same already on 27 May
2013. A replying affidavit was
also filed and is p289 to 309 of the court's papers.
[26]
In it's replying affidavit the applicant's deponent explained that,
pursuant to the unreported judgment of Prinsloo J on 14
June 2013, in
the Mooikloof Estates matter,
supra,
(a
matter in which the legal questions are mostly identical to the
aspects to be decided in the present application, which judgment
was
handed down after this application was instituted) the applicant came
to the conclusion that it need not subject itself to
any order
compelling it to make any further payments of property rates and
taxes in respect of any of its erven to be registered
in the Six
Fountains Estate of which it is the owner, before it would be
entitled to clearance certificates. The notice of motion
was
therefore amended and the amendment is to be found on pages 298-301
of the record. (As appear from the amended notice of motion
a new
prayer 1A was inserted on the basis of the aforesaid judgment of
Prinsloo J.
[27] A draft order
was compiled by applicant's counsel which was handed up in court. It
reads as follows:
1. That the
respondent be ordered to issue clearance certificates within 3
(three) days from date hereof to the applicant in respect
of Stands
No 163, 165 and 172 in the Six Fountains Estate upon payment by the
applicant of the application fee of R50,40 (fifty
rand and forty
cents) per erf,
2. A declaratory
order that respondent has not been and is not entitled to levy
property rates and taxes on stands not having been
sold by the
applicant in the Six Fountains Estate to any purchasers, and not
having been transferred to any separate individual
purchases, but is
entitled only to levy property rates and taxes on ail remaining
stands in the Six Fountains Estate, still registered
under the main
Title Deed No. T21949/2003, as one property, in terms of the Property
Rates Act, No. 6 of 2004.
3. The respondent
be ordered to provide applicant with ail documents, accounts,
valuation rolls and documentation pertaining to
promulgation of
property rates and taxes, for the period before I July 2011, in
respect of ali property rates and taxes allegedly
outstanding and due
and owing by the applicant to respondent, regarding the whole of the
property making up the Six Fountains Estate.
4. That all the
information and documents referred to in prayer 3 above shall be
provided to applicant within 60 (sixty) days from
date of this order.
5. An order that
should the amount of property rates and taxes that is alleged to be
outstanding by applicant to respondent, still
be in dispute after
respondent's compliance prayers 5 and 6 referred to above, respondent
shall take the necessary steps should
it still wish to institute
legal proceedings, within 90 (ninety) days of this order, for payment
of any amount that respondent
alleges is due and owing by the
applicant to the respondent.
6. An order that
respondent must recalculate all alleged outstanding property rates
and taxes, allegedly due and owing to respondent,
with reference to
the Six Fountains Estate, and remaining stands as one property, with
reference to each and every valuation roil
relied on, each and every
property rate that was applicable and each and every payment that has
been made by applicant to respondent
in respect of property rates and
taxes in the said development.
7. The respondent
shall present applicant with such a calculation within 60 (sixty)
days from date of this order.
8. That pending
finalisation of any remaining dispute regarding outstanding property
rates and taxes, as referred to in prayers
7, 8 and 9 above,
respondent is ordered to issue clearance certificates within 7(seven)
days after any application for such certificate
is made, in respect
of any stand to be transferred to any purchaser in the Six Fountains
Estate, if payment is made of the application
fee applicable in
respect of the issuing of a clearance certificate, which is presently
R50,40 per application.
9. Costs of this
application on a scale as between attorney and client.
[28] During the
hearing counsel indicated to the court that prayer 5 therein was not
proceeded with, that prayers 2, 3, 4, & and
7 were not
disputed by the respondent and that an order couid accordingly be
made in terms thereof.
[29] What, however,
remained in contention was whether the court should make an order as
per prayers 1, 8 and 9 of such draft order,
or whether alternative
relief as per prayers 2 and 3 of the amended notice of motion, or
other alternative relief, should be granted
to the applicant.
[30] Applicant's
counsel indicated that the applicant, apart from prayers 2, 3, 4, 6
and 7 which were not opposed, primarily seeks
the relief as set out
in prayer 1 of the draft order and then also relief in terms of
prayers 8 and 9.
[31] In the
alternative to the relief in prayer 1 the applicant counsel indicated
that it will seek relief as set out in prayers
2 and 3 of the
original notice of motion or, as further and/or alternative relief,
an alternative order as explained below.
[32] The court now
deals with the applicants main contention namely that the applicant
is not obliged to pay to the respondent any
amount in respect of
rates and taxes for the purpose of obtaining clearance certificates
in respect of new stands to be registered
except for an application
fee of R50,40 per erf.
[33]
The applicant relied on the judgment of Prinsloo J. in Mooikloof
Estates,
supra.
[34]
It is clear that, as the applicant's counsel submitted, the matter
can be decided on one crisp issue, as was done by Prinsloo
3
in
Mooikloof Estates,
supra,
which
essentially amounts to a proper interpretation of the provisions of
section 118(1)
of the
Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act
6 of 2004
.
[35]
In argument counsel on behalf of the respondent agreed that Mooikloof
Estates,
supra,
was,
as to the legal principles to be decided, exactly the same as the
present matter. Indeed, except for some factual differences,
the
essential facts and issues in this matter are essentially the same
and the judgment of Prinsloo J is therefore highly comparable
and a
strong precedent in the present application.
[36]
The crisp issue is the question whether the respondent, who was also
the respondent in the Mooikloof Estates case can withhold
clearance
certificates in respect of new unregistered stands until levies in
respect of the whole
("remainder")
of
the Six Fountain Estates have been paid.
[37]
On a proper interpretation of section 118(1) of the Local Government:
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000
("the
Systems Act")
it
is clear that the respondent cannot insist on such payment before a
clearance certificate is provided.
[38] In paragraph 18
of his judgment Prinsloo J explains that a clearance certificate
originates from the provisions of section
118(1) of the Systems Act.
[39] Section 118(1)
and 118(1A) provide as follows:
"118
Restraint on Transfer of Property
(1) A
Registrar of Deeds
mav not register the
transfer of property
except on production
to the Registrar of Deeds of a prescribed certificate -
(a) issued by
the Municipality or Municipalities in which
that
property
is situated; and
(b) which
certifies that all amounts that became due
in
connection with that
property
for
municipal service fees, surcharges on fees, property rates and other
municipal taxes, levies and duties during the
two
years preceding the date of
application
for the certificate have been fully paid.
1A A
prescribed certificate issued by a Municipality in terms of
subsection (1) is valid for a period of
60 days
from the date it has been issued."
(own
emphasis)
[40]
In interpreting these provisions, it is evident from section 118(1)
that reference is made to a particular property i.e.
the
property to
be
registered
.
This is evident from the words
"may
not register the transfer of property"
in
section 118(1) and the further reference in subsections 118(l)(a) and
(b) to
"that
property"
and
"in
connection with that property".
[41]
There is no basis for a contention that the reference to "
property"
or
"that
property"
was
meant to be a reference to the remainder or whole of the development.
It is not the development that is to be transferred, but
the specific
stand in question. As section 118(1) clearly refers to a prohibition
to register a transfer of property the words
"that
property"
can
only be interpreted to be a reference to the property to be
transferred, and not the remainder, which is not transferred if
a
specific stand is registered for the first time.
[42] Prinsloo J was
correct, with respect, when he came to the following conclusion in
par[26] of Mooikloof Estates, supra:
"
Mnr
Pretorius, tereg na my mening, het betoog dat die verwysing na
'in verband met daardie eiendom'
slegs kan slaan op die erf en nie op die restant nie. Die erf is die
eiendom wat oorgedra word
soos gepostuleer in subartikel (1) wat
bepaai dat die Registrateur nie 'die oordrag van eiendom registreer
nie' behalwe by voorlegging
van die sertifikaat. Dit is nie die
restant wat oorgedra word nie maar die erf."
[43]
The word "
property"
should
also be understood with reference to the definition thereof in
section 1 of the Rates Act 5 of 2004 where
"property"
is
defined as:
"(a)
immovable property
registered
in
the name of a person, including in the case of a sectional title
scheme
,
a sectional title unit registered in the name of
a person;
(b)
a
right registered
against immovable property in the
name of a person, excluding a mortgage bond registered against the
property
."
It
therefore also refers to the fact that registration is required
before it will be regarded as
"property".
(Compare
also the definition of "owner" in the lastmentioned act,
which equally refers to a person in whose name property
or property
rights are registered.)
[44]
It was apparently contended by the respondent, as appears from
paragraph [26] of the judgment of Prinsloo J, that a different

interpretation had to be followed (i.e. that reference to "
daardie
eiendom"
should
be understood as a reference to the remainder) because
"anders
kan individuele erwe (waarop daar nou ooreengekom is geen helasting
betaalbaar is nie) straffeioos die een na die ander
oorgedra word
sonder dat daar enige belasting daarop betaal word".(
See
Mooikloof Estates (supra) at par[26], pl6).
[45] The answer to
this contention, is firstly, as was also decided by Prinsloo J, that
the municipality is not without remedy as
it would be entitled to
value and charge rates and taxes on the newly registered property
immediately after registration and from
date of registration. Such
rates and taxes would also typically be levied at a higher rate as
registered property will typically
convert to developed property.
[46] A further
strong consideration in favour of the interpretation propounded by
the applicant, (which was not considered by Prinsloo
J.), is the fact
that section 118(3) of the Systems Act also provides a remedy to
Municipalities to collect monies that become
payable to them for
property rates and taxes and for the provision of municipal services.
Section 118(3) of the Systems Act provides:
"(3) An
amount due for municipal service fees
,
surcharges and fees
,
property rates and other municipal taxes
,
levies and duties is a charge upon the property
in connection with which the amount is owing and enjoys preference
over any mortgage
bond registered against the property."
[47] In City of
Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabathe & Another
2013 (JDR) 1039 (SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal
at in [9] decided
as follows:
"Municipalities
are obliged to collect monies that become payable to them for
property rates and taxes and for the provision
of municipal services
(s96). They are assisted to fulfil that obligation in two ways:
First, they are given a security for repayment
of the debt, in that
it is a charge upon the property concerned (s118(3)); and
r
second they are given the capacity to block the transfer of ownership
of the property until debts have been paid in certain circumstances
[i.e.
after the properties have been "born"]
(s118(1))
(per Nugent 3A, City of Cape Town v Real People Housing (Pty) Ltd
2010 (5) SA 196
(SCA) para2). The principal elements of si 18 are
accordingly a veto or embargo provision with a time limit (s118(1))
and
a security
provision
without a time limit (s118(3
))
(City of Johannesburg v Kaplan N.O. & Another
2006 (5)
SA 10
(SCA) para[13]. The two subsections does provide the
municipality with two different remedies."
(own
accentuation).
(See: City of
Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Mathabate (supra), parlO - 12 ;
City of Johannesburg v Kaplan N.O. & Another
2006 (5) SA 10
(SCA)).
[48] Therefore,
registration of a stand will still leave a municipality with security
in respect of the remainder of the property
which should typically,
if not in all cases, be much more than outstanding rates and taxes.
Even if the registration of a new stand
has the result that the
remainder of the development is diminished the municipality would
still be left with security in terms
of section 118(3). If a
municipality acts diligently, as it should, to collect rates and
taxes, it will have sufficient remedies
and security for it's claims.
[49] Whatever the
consequences may be of an interpretation of section 118(1) of the
Systems Act, such as was followed by Prinsloo
J., and even if the
transfer of a stand may have the result that properties may be
transferred in circumstances where developers
still owe rates and
taxes, this cannot be a basis for an interpretation such as tendered
by the respondent, which would clearly
be at variance with the clear
wording of section 118(1). This would be contrary to the principle of
statutory interpretation that
clear wording of a statute should be
given effect to.
[50]
The principle that individual stands do not come into existence
before a specific transfer of a specific stand is registered
in the
Deeds Office, is a principle that has already been established prior
to the promulgation of the Systems Act. ( See: Kosmos
Ridge Home
Owners Association (unreported decision: case no: 24537/2002,
Transvaal Provincial Division, a judgment of Hartzenberg
J
dated
06/12/2002); Rynfield Township Limited v Benoni Town Council
& Another,
1950 (4) SA 717
(T); Florida Hills Township
Limited v Roodepoort Maraisburg Town Council,
1961 (2) SA 386
(T))).
[51]
In Kosmos Ridge Home Owners Association v Kosmos Ridge (Pty) Ltd
(supra), Hartzenberg J specifically held (par7) that in respect
of
stands that are not yet transferred forming part of a township
development,
"...die
dorpseienaar nie uitklaringsertifikate benodig voordat hy oordrag gee
aan kopers van die restant van die erwe nie".
[52]
The decision of Prinsloo J's was correct, with respect, and that the
court in the present application cannot come to the conclusion
that
his decision and the aforesaid judgment of Hartzenberg J in Kosmos
Ridge,
supra,
was
clearly wrong. As such Prinsloo J's interpretation of section 118(1)
should be followed. It is the end of the matter and the
only monies
that would then be payable to obtain a clearance certificate is the
application fee of R50,40 referred to in the Mooikloof
Estates matter
(see para [27] thereof).
[53]
The applicant would be entitled to the relief set out in
praver
1
of
the draft order handed up, with regard to the stands which have
already been sold that already need to be transferred.
[54]
In view of the conclusion of Prinsloo J, and the interpretation of
section 118(1) of the Systems Act, as propounded herein,
the
position
would indeed be the same in respect of all future stands to
be
registered.
An
order should therefore be made in respect of ail future stands to be
registered. This would also prevent unnecessary litigation
in respect
of stands that are presently not yet sold, which will be registered
in future. In the premises the relief set out in
prayer 8 of the
draft order should aiso be granted in respect of the transfer of all
future stands.
[55] Under the
circumstances it is not necessary for the court to deal with the
applicant's alternative argument.
[56] The necessary
order will be made. Costs will follow the event. The respondent acted
grossly unreasonably, in the face of the
clear judgment of Prinsloo J
and other authorities. Before Prinsloo J. the respondent's counsel
conceded (paragraph 17 of that
judgment) that the legal position is
as is set out in this judgment. In this court the counsel of the
respondent also had problems
to convince the court that the position
was different. The respondent failed to properly read the applicable
legislation and authorities
and for some unexplained reason subjected
land owners to considerable financial abuse. Prinsloo J. regarded the
matter as some
new aspect of the law and did not grant punitive
costs, but when the matter came before this court it no longer was
something new
but the respondent had the clear judgment of Prinsloo J
and other authorities before them. This court have therefore no
hesitation
in granting attorney and client costs.
[57] The following
order is made:

1.
That the matter be treated as an urgent application and that the
respondent be ordered to issue clearance certificates within
7
(seven) days from the date of handing down this judgment, to the
applicant in respect of Stands No 163, 165 and 172 in the Six

Fountains Estate upon payment by the applicant of the application fee
of R50,40 (fifty rand and forty cents) per stand.
2. A declaratory
order is issued that respondent has not been and is not entitled to
levy property rates and taxes on stands not
having been sold by the
applicant in the Six Fountains Estate to any purchasers and not
having been transferred to any separate
individual purchases, but is
entitled only to levy property rates and taxes on all remaining
stands in the Six Fountains Estate,
still registered under the main
Title Deed No. T21949/2003, as one property, in terms of the Property
Rates Act, No. 6 of 2004.
3. The respondent
be ordered to provide applicant with all documents, accounts,
valuation rolls and documentation pertaining to
the promulgation of
property rates and taxes, for the period before 1 July 2011, in
respect of ail property rates and taxes allegedly
outstanding and due
and owing by the applicant to respondent, regarding the whole of the
property making up the Six Fountains Estate.
4. That all the
information and documents referred to in paragraph 3 above shall be
provided to applicant within 60 (sixty) days
from date of this order.
5. An order is
issued that respondent must recalculate all alleged outstanding
property rates and taxes, allegedly due and owing
to respondent, with
reference to the Six Fountains Estate, and remaining stands as one
property, with reference to each and every
valuation roll relied on,
each and every property rate that was applicable and each and every
payment that has been made by applicant
to respondent in respect of
property rates and taxes in the said development.
6. The respondent
shall present applicant with the calculation referred to in paragraph
5 of this order within 60 (sixty) days from
date of this order.
7. That pending
finalisation of any remaining dispute regarding outstanding property
rates and taxes, as referred to in the paragraphs
of this order,
respondent is ordered to issue clearance certificates within 7(seven)
days after any application for such certificate
is made, in respect
of any stand to be transferred to any purchaser in the Six Fountains
Estate if payment is made of the application
fee applicable in
respect of the issuing of a clearance certificate, which is presently
R50,40 per application.
9. The costs of
this application shall be paid by the respondent on the scale of
attorney and client which costs shall include the
costs of two
counsel and the heads drawn by counsel.
P.Z. EBERSOHN
ACTING JUDGE OF
THE HIGH COURT
Applicants counsel:
Adv. J.S. Stone
Adv. E. van As
Applicants
attorneys: Len Dekker & Associates
Ref. Jacobs /Unl002
Tel. 012 346 8774
Respondents counsel:
Adv. A. Vorster
Respondent's
attorneys: Hugo &. Ngwenya Inc
Ref. Mr.
Hugo/MP/ZLR/TS430
Tel. 012 665 2997