Moumakwe and Others v Great North Long Distance Taxi Association (38431/2012) [2014] ZAGPPHC 50 (27 February 2014)

52 Reportability
Administrative Law

Brief Summary

Interdict — Locus standi — Applicants seeking interdict against taxi association to operate on designated routes — Respondent raising point in limine regarding applicants' locus standi due to alleged lack of valid operating licences — Court finding that applicants have sufficient interest in the matter as owners of taxis, regardless of the validity of their permits — Point in limine dismissed with costs.

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[2014] ZAGPPHC 50
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Moumakwe and Others v Great North Long Distance Taxi Association (38431/2012) [2014] ZAGPPHC 50 (27 February 2014)

IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTH GAUTENG,
PRETORIA)
CASE
NO: 38431/2012
DATE:
27 FEBRUARY 2014
In the matter
between:
MIRRIAM
MOUMAKWE
................................
1ST
APPLICANT
DAVID
LAMOLA
..............................................
2ND
APPLICANT
PIET
LEKALAKALA
.......................................
3RD
APPLICANT
WALTER
LEKALAKALA
................................
4TH
APPLICANT
BETHUEL
RAMPHAKA
.................................
5TH
APPLICANT
JAN
MALEFO
..................................................
6TH
APPLICANT
SAMSON
THETSA
..........................................
7TH
APPLICANT
ALFRED
MATOMO
.......................................
8TH
APPLICANT
DAN
NQOLA
..................................................
9TH
APPLICANT
JOHANNES
MOLEKOA
............................
10TH
APPLICANT
ISAAC
MOLOBELA
...................................
11TH
APPLICANT
And
GREAT NORTH LONG
DISTANCE
TAXI
ASSOCIATION
......................................
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
KGANYAGO AJ
[1] The applicants
have brought an application against the respondent for the relief as
set out in the notice of motion which reads
as follows:
1.1 Directing the
respondent to immediately permit the applicants to operate a minibus
taxi type service on the route and/or routes
as it appears in the
operating licences and in the same manner as every other member of
the association;
1.2 That the
respondent and its members be interdicted and restrained to interfere
in any manner with the taxi operations of the
applicants, conducted
in accordance with their operating licences;
1.3 That the
respondent be ordered to pay the cost of this application as between
attorney and client;
1.4 Further and/or
alternative relief.
[2] According to the
applicants, they are all members of the respondent and that they are
all the holders of the valid operating
licence to operate on the
routes as per their permits.
[3] The respondent
is opposing the applicants’ application and raised a point in
limine. The respondent’s point in limine
is that some of the
applicants lack the necessary locus standi to bring this application
since they do not have valid operating
licences or that their
licences have expired. The respondent contends further that some of
the applicants does not have motor vehicles
and therefore cannot
operate.
[4] Counsel for the
respondent submitted that at the time the applicants initiate their
application, they must all be having operating
licences.
[5] Counsel for the
applicants submitted that it is not a requirement for one to have the
operating licence before one can initiate
the application. The
applicants’ counsel further submitted that the appropriate
route which the respondent should have followed
was to file a rule 7
notice.
[6] In reply counsel
for the respondent submitted that they are not challenging the
authority of the applicants to sign the affidavit
and therefore rule
7 notice is not applicable.
[7] In interdict
applications, the general rule is that the applicant must be a person
having locus standi to apply in that he/she
is having an interest in
the subject matter. In the case of Cabinet of the Transitional Govt
of SWA v Eins
1988 (3) SA 369
AD at page 388 A-E, the court said the
following:
“A person who
claims relief from a court in respect of any matter must, as a
general rule, establish that he has direct interest
in that matter in
order to acquire the necessary locus standi to seek the relief.
Reference to a few cases, mentioned in the next
paragraph, will be
sufficient to illustrate the point. In Dalrymple and other v Colonial
Treasurer
1910 TS 372
at 390 Wessels J stated that: ‘The person
who sues must have an interest in the subject matter of the suit and
that interest
must be a direct interest’. And that ‘Courts
of law… are not constituted for the discussion of academic
questions,
and they require the litigant to have only an interest,
but also an interest that is not too remote!
A little later in
his judgment (at 392) the learned Judge said that since the action
popularis has disappeared,
‘Courts of law
have required the applicant to show direct interest in the subject
matter of the litigation or some grievance
special to himself’.
In Geldenhuys and Neethling v Beuthin
1918 AD 426
Innes CJ referred
to the function of courts of law in terms similar to those employed
in Dalrymple’s case supra. The learned
Chief Justice said (at
441):
‘After all,
courts of law exist for the settlement of concrete controversies and
actual infringements of rights, not to pronounce
upon abstract
questions, or to advise upon differing contentions, however
important’”.
[8] From the papers
filed it is clear that the applicants have an interest in the subject
matter. They are the owners of taxis and
their interest is to operate
on the route that is been operated by the respondent. Whether they
are having a valid taxi permit
or not, is not an issue which will
prevent them from initiating an application for an interdict, but
will be an issue which will
determine whether they are entitled to
the relief of which they are seeking or not. In other words, at the
end of the case, the
issue whether they are having valid taxi
permits, will be taken into consideration to determine whether the
order which they are
seeking is capable to be implemented or not.
[9] Under the
circumstances, in my view, the respondent’s point in limine has
no merit.
[10] In the result I
make the following order:
1. The respondent’s
point in limine is dismissed with costs.
M F KGANYAGO
ACTING JUDGE OF
THE HIGH COURT