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[2007] ZASCA 161
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Bezuidenhout v Director of Public Prosecutions (175/07) [2007] ZASCA 161; [2007] SCA 161 (RSA); 2008 (2) SACR 579 (SCA) (29 November 2007)
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
REPORTABLE AS TO PARAS [1] TO
[24], [68] – [72]
Case no: 175/07
In the matter
between
W
F BEZUIDENHOUT
................................
APPELLANT
and
THE DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
................................
RESPONDENT
Coram:
FARLAM, CLOETE and HEHER JJA
Heard:
8 NOVEMBER 2007
Delivered: 29 NOVEMBER 2007
Summary: Criminal
procedure – appeal – special entry – application
for – duty of judge; Criminal procedure
– appeal –
further evidence – application to admit – duty of judge;
Criminal procedure – trial –
application for postponement
after conviction to consult expert in relation to sentence –
refusal – approach of court.
Neutral
citation: This judgment may be referred to as
Bezuidenhout
v Director of Public Prosecutions
[2007]
SCA 161 (RSA).
_____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
__________________________________________________________________
HEHER JA
HEHER JA:
[1] Hoërskool
Standerton held a Valentine’s Ball on the night of 18 February
2003. Within hours vicious unprovoked assaults
were carried out on
two victims whose only offence was that they were poor, alone and
without protection. Sadly, the three events
were not unconnected.
[2] On 25 February a
local attorney contacted Detective Inspector Nortje. He represented
the parents of several youths whose concern
was to avoid prosecution.
On the following day Nortje and his colleague Detective Inspector
Jordaan apprehended the appellant, a
22 year old self-employed
contractor, near his home in the town.
[3] The appellant
stood trial before Smit J in the Secunda Circuit Court charged with
the murder of Joey Grey at a house in Impala
Crescent and assault
with intent to commit grievous bodily harm on Adriaan Oosthuizen at
the Standerton Caravan Park by hitting him
with an iron bar. He
pleaded not guilty but elected to reserve his defence.
[4] The State called
one eyewitness to the first-mentioned incident and the pathologist
who carried out a post-mortem examination
on the body of Mr Grey on
26 February. A trial-within-a-trial was held to determine the
admissibility of a statement made by the
appellant to magistrate
Fischer on 27 February. After a ruling in favour of the State it was
duly taken into evidence. Inspector
Nortje also gave evidence about
the pointing out by the appellant of an iron pole lying in the garage
at his residence.
[5] In respect of
the lesser charge the State relied in the main on written statements
made by an alleged eyewitness and the complainant.
Both statements
were admitted as evidence under the provisions of
s 3
of the
Law of
Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988
.
[6] The appellant
did not testify. His case was closed without the leading of evidence.
[7] Smit J convicted
the appellant on both counts as charged.
[8] Counsel for the
appellant (who was not his counsel in the appeal) asked for a
postponement in order to allow him to consult an
expert witness, then
unavailable, for the purpose of preparing and presenting evidence in
mitigation. The learned judge refused to
postpone the case for a
period which would have been sufficient for that purpose.
Consequently no evidence was presented, the appellant
relying upon an
address by his counsel.
[9] Smit J decided
that the murder had been committed by the appellant in the execution
or furtherance of a common purpose. It therefore
fell within
Part 1
of Schedule 2 to the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1977.
Accordingly the defence was required by s 51(1)(a) read with s
51(3)(a)
of that Act to establish substantial and compelling
circumstances which justified a lesser sentence than life
imprisonment. The learned
judge found that no such circumstances had
been shown to exist and imposed the mandatory sentence. In relation
to the second offence
the learned judge held that imprisonment for
one year was the appropriate sentence.
[10] The appellant
applied for leave to appeal in respect of the convictions and
sentences. He also applied under s 316(3) for the
making of various
special entries on the ground that the proceedings had been tainted
by irregularity or were not in accordance with
justice.
[11] The appellant
also gave notice of his intention to apply for leave to present the
evidence of a forensic medical consultant,
Dr Leon Wagner, and a
criminologist, Dr Irma Labuschagne, in terms of s 316(3) of the Act.
Attached to the notice was a supporting
affidavit of the appellant to
which were annexed affidavits by the proposed witnesses.
[12] The order made
by Smit J in the application was ambiguous. The appellant’s
legal advisers understood it only as a grant
of certain of the
special entries. I think the learned judge probably also intended to
accede to the application for leave to appeal
as a whole. Be that as
it may, this Court granted leave to appeal against both the
conviction and sentence generally.
The special
entries
[13]
At the commencement of the appeal before us counsel abandoned
reliance on the special entries
per
se
.
He informed us that they could as well be argued as part of his
attack on the merits of the convictions. That was a proper approach
1
:
[14] Unfortunately,
the procedures adopted by the trial judge to the application for the
making of the special entries fell materially
short of what law and
established practice demanded of him. It is desirable that reference
be made to his handling of the application
so that other trial judges
may be placed on their guard in relation to what is a relatively rare
occurrence.
[15]
The special entry procedure is designed to cater for irregularities
which affect the fairness of a criminal trial. The formal
requirements are set out in s 317 of the Criminal Procedure Act. An
entry must be made unless the court to whom application is made
is of
the opinion that the application is not made
bona
fide
or
that it is frivolous or absurd or that the granting of the
application would be an abuse of the
process
of the court (s 317(1)). In the present case, Smit J, faced with ten
applications for special entries said simply, ‘Ek
is nie van
voorneme om al die aspekte te oorweeg nie. Ek meen daar is vier
aspekte wat oorweging verdien.’ The result was that
six of the
entries sought did not receive the specific consideration which the
learned judge was bound to give to them and he did
not purport to
refuse those
applications
on any of the
grounds recognised by the statute.
[16]
The great majority of grounds depended upon irregularities not
arising
ex
facie
the
record (eg alleged shortcomings in the conduct of the appellant’s
legal representatives). Many were dependent on the say-so
of the
appellant. These were irregularities which fell outside the
cognizance of the trial judge. In such an event he was required
to
have the irregularity formulated and established by evidence
2
:
that may be done on affidavit in appropriate cases
3
.
It is also the duty of the trial court to determine whether or not a
complaint of irregularity is well-founded
4
.
Where, as here, it is impossible to make such a determination on
affidavit, the taking of evidence can hardly be avoided. But Smit
J
did not hear evidence and indeed did not make a finding as to the
substance of the complaints at all. (While it may ordinarily
be
advisable to remit the case to the trial judge to make factual
findings in certain cases,
5
that may not be
feasible in this instance as the learned judge has retired from
active service
6
.)
Nor did the learned judge settle the terms of those special entries
which he did grant, as he was obliged to do by s 317(4). If
he had
done so, he would probably have appreciated that none of individual
reasons that he had, briefly, enunciated for granting
each of the
four successful applications fell within the scope of any of the
special entries outlined
in the application.
[17] Finally, in
this regard, s 320 of the Act provides:
‘
The judge or
judges, as the case may be, of any court before whom a person is
convicted shall, in the case of an appeal under section
316 or 316B
or of an application for a special entry under section 317 or the
reservation of a question of law under section 319
or an application
to the court of appeal for leave to appeal or for a special entry
under this Act, furnish to the registrar a report
giving his, her or
their opinion upon the case or upon any point arising in the case,
and such report, which shall form part of the
record, shall without
delay be forwarded by the registrar to the registrar of the court
of appeal.’
The learned judge
did not submit any report to the registrar and, accordingly, this
court
was
deprived of the benefit of his opinions both as to the entries
granted and ‘refused’.
7
[18]
In the present instance the appellant asked for special leave to
appeal not only against the (supposed) refusal of his application
in
respect of convictions and sentence but also against certain of the
unsuccessful applications for special entries
8
.
Leave to appeal was not granted in relation to any of those entries.
[19] Having regard
to the attitude of counsel to the successful entries to which I have
earlier referred, further reference thereto
is unnecessary.
The application
to hear further evidence
[20] The appellant
applied to Smit J after conviction and sentence to hear the evidence
of two further witnesses, Drs Wagner and Labuschagne.
The first
deposed to an affidavit which cast doubt upon the validity of certain
findings and evidence of Dr Batev, the pathologist.
The second
provided a lengthy report, confirmed on oath, addressed to the
appropriate sentencing of the appellant.
[21] Smit J made no
reference whatsoever to the proposed evidence of Dr Wagner in
his judgment on the
application and made no order that it should be heard or accepted.
This Court did not grant special leave in that
regard. As to Dr
Labuschagne, Smit J said:
‘
Daarbenewens
is daar dan tans ook ‘n aansoek voor my om toestemming te
verleen dat die hof van appèl verdere getuienis
kan aanvaar
van dr Irma Labuschagne en daardie getuienis kan oorweeg vir
doeleindes van die oplegging van ‘n gepaste vonnis.
Ek meen, in
terme van die bepalings van artikel 316(3), behoort ek gevolglik ook
‘n bevel te verleen dat die hof van appèl
sodanige
getuienis sal aanvaar en oorweeg en dan oorweeg wat ‘n gepaste
vonnis in die omstandighede is. . .
Wat die aansoek om
verlof om te appelleer teen die vonnis aanbetref word die bevel
ingevolge artikel 316(3) van die Strafproseswet
51 van 1977 gemaak
dat die getuienis van dr Irma Labuschagne aangehoor en oorweeg word.’
[22] But s 316(3) no
longer relates to the admission of further evidence. Section 316 now
provides:
‘
(5)(
a
)
An application for leave to appeal under subsection (1) may be
accompanied by an application to adduce further evidence (hereafter
in this section referred to as an application for further evidence)
relating to the prospective appeal.
(
b
)
An application for further evidence must be supported by an affidavit
stating that-
(i) further evidence
which would presumably be accepted as true, is available;
(ii) if accepted the
evidence could reasonably lead to a different verdict or sentence;
and
(iii) there is a
reasonably acceptable explanation for the failure to produce the
evidence before the close of the trial.
(
c
)
The court granting an application for further evidence must-
(i) receive that
evidence and further evidence rendered necessary thereby, including
evidence in rebuttal called by the prosecutor
and evidence called by
the court; and
(ii) record its
findings or views with regard to that evidence, including the cogency
and the sufficiency of the evidence, and the
demeanour and
credibility of any witness.
(6) Any evidence
received under subsection (5) shall for the purpose of an appeal be
deemed to be evidence taken or admitted at the
trial in question.’
Clearly,
what the statute contemplates is that when the trial court is
satisfied that the requirements of s 316(5)(b) have been met
and has
granted the application, it shall itself take the steps laid out in s
315(5)(c) in order to place the appeal court in a position
to deal
adequately and fully with the additional evidence in the context of
an appeal against conviction or sentence
9
.
But here too the trial court failed in its duty. There may be
circumstances where, with the concurrence of an opposing party, an
affidavit may be received in satisfaction of s 316(c)(
i
)
without the necessity for oral evidence, but this was not such a case
and, in any event, the trial court was still bound to comply
with the
requirements of s 316(c)(ii), which it did not do.
[23] When apprised
of the lack of a formal basis for reliance upon the proposed new
evidence of Dr
Wagner, counsel made an informal application for this Court to
exercise its powers under s 22(a) of the Supreme Court
Act 59 of 1959
to receive that
evidence. We would
be loth to deprive an accused person of a full opportunity to present
his case on appeal because the trial court
has been inattentive to
its statutory duty. But acceptance of such evidence presupposes that
the basic foundation, as determined
in a long line of cases, has been
laid:
‘
[T]heir tenor
throughout has been to emphasise the Court’s reluctance to
re-open a trial. They may be summarised as follows:
(a) There should be
some reasonably sufficient explanation, based on allegations which
may be true, why the evidence which it is sought
to lead was not led
at the trial.
(b) There should be
a prima facie likelihood of the truth of the evidence.
(c)
The evidence should be materially relevant to the outcome of the
trial.’
10
[24]
Counsel for the appellant was driven to concede that the application,
even as supported by his client’s affidavit to the
trial court,
did not satisfy the first requirement. Nor could he contend that the
substance of Dr Wagner’s proposed evidence
amounted to more
than speculation, not based on personal examination of the body of Mr
Grey, as to a cause of death other than that
confirmed in evidence by
Dr Batev,
viz
a
blow to the back of the head by a rigid object such as the iron bar
recovered from the garage of the appellant. The proposed evidence
would therefore not have a material bearing on the outcome of the
trial and the third requirement was for that reason also not
satisfied.
We are accordingly
bound to refuse the application to adduce the further evidence of Dr
Wagner.
The appeal
against the convictions
[25] The substance
of the case against the appellant on count 1 was
i) the direct
evidence of an eyewitness which implicated him;
ii) the medical
evidence;
iii) the content of
a statement made by him before magistrate Fischer on the morning of
27 February 2003;
iv) the handing over
of an iron bar by the appellant to the police;
That was by any
standard a formidable combination and, in addition, he failed to give
evidence.
[26]
Counsel for the appellant relied on four basic submissions in
attacking the judgment on the merits of the conviction. First,
he
contended that,
ex
facie
the
record, his client’s counsel at the trial had committed a
violation of his instructions by making formal and informal
admissions
in contradiction of the appellant’s stated refusal
to do so. Second, he submitted that certain admissions were made in
conflict
with clear indications that the appellant possessed no
knowledge of the matters admitted. Third, he criticised the
eyewitness, Mr
Johannes Maqo, as unreliable in the substance of his
testimony. Finally, counsel attempted to persuade us that the trial
court erred
in admitting in evidence the statement to the magistrate.
[27] The first
submission is without merit. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charges. His counsel informed the court that his
client chose to
furnish no explanation of his plea at that stage and to answer no
questions. He added, ‘Daar sal egter in die
loop van die
verhoor erkennings gemaak word wat die verrigtinge aansienlik sal
verkort’. Smit J then asked the appellant if
he had heard his
advocate and whether he was satisfied with what he had said. The
appellant replied affirmatively to both questions.
State counsel then
took over. He began by saying:
‘
U edele, my
geleerde vriend het verwys na sekere erkennings. Ek het voor die
agbare hof ’n bundel geplaas wat dan ook sekere
erkennings
bevat. Dit is dan die formele erkennings. . . deur die beskuldigde in
terme van artikel 220 van Wet 51 van 1977.’
He proceeded to read
out the admissions as follows:
‘
1. Dat die
oorledene gemeld in die akte van beskuldiging te wete Joey Philippus
Cyril Grey op 19/2/2003 gesterf het as gevolg van
beserings opgedoen
op 19/2/2003 te Standerton in die distrik van Standerton.
2. Dat die liggaam
van die oorledene nie verdere beserings opgedoen het nie sedert die
beserings in paragraaf 1 vermeld opgedoen is,
totdat die lykskouing
op die oorledene uitgevoer was op 26/2/2003.
3. Dat Dr Nikola
Batev die lykskouing op die liggaam van die oorledene uitgevoer het
op 26/2/2003 en sy bevindings op die vorm GW
7/15 genotuleer het
welke feite en bevindings korrek en volledig is, en dat die oorsaak
van dood korrek aangeteken is synde “Head
injury”
(Hoofbesering).
Die
lykskouingsverslag word by ooreenkoms ingehandig synde bewysstuk B.’
[28] The document
containing the admissions was Exhibit A. It was headed in capitals
‘Erkennings in terme van artikel 220 van
Wet 51 van 1977’.
It had been signed by the appellant and his advocate. Smit J asked
defence counsel whether he was satisfied
with the admissions as
minuted to which he replied, ‘Inderdaad so’. Smit J did
not ask the appellant the same questions
but s 220 (as opposed to s
115) did not require him to do so.The appellant did not then or
thereafter before sentence put in issue
the correctness of his
counsel’s conduct or his own comprehension of what had
transpired. His counsel’s submission to
us that there was an
inherent contradiction between the appellant’s refusal to
explain his plea or answer questions and the
making of the formal
admissions immediately thereafter is unsustainable. The two steps
were entirely unconnected. The formal admissions
had obviously been
prepared in advance and approved by the appellant. The prosecutor
could have introduced them at any time during
the trial. He chose to
do so after the plea procedures for which s 115 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (‘the Act’)
makes provision had
been concluded.
[29]
The submission that the appellant’s absence of personal
knowledge precluded the making of the formal admissions (and by
inference must have been at odds with counsel’s instructions)
is also devoid of merit. One of the advantages of being placed
in
possession of a summary of substantial facts
11
and copies of
exhibits and witness statements in advance of the trial
12
,
is that an accused person is enabled to assess the merits of the case
which the state proposes to prove against him and to decide
which
averments he does and does not wish to place in dispute. Despite lack
of personal knowledge on his part, if the proposed medical
evidence
reveals a gunshot wound to the heart as the cause of death, the
accused may reasonably conclude that the evidence is uncontestable.
The considered admissions made in this case were likewise not at
variance with an absence of personal knowledge of the matters
admitted.
That applies also to the possibility (according to counsel)
that between the time of the assault on the deceased (of which the
appellant
did possess personal knowledge) and the next morning when
he was found dead in his room, some unknown third party may have
entered
the room and inflicted on him the injuries which the doctor
found on the body
and of which he
died.
[30] A further
admission made by counsel at the trial was also criticised on appeal
as being at variance with appellant’s evidence
in the trial
within the trial and, therefore, by inference, in conflict with his
instructions. After the court had ruled on the admissibility
of the
statement, counsel for the state told the court that the defence
admitted in terms of s 220 of the Act that the contents of
the
statement made before the magistrate could be taken into evidence.
This was obviously done to avoid the recall of the magistrate
to whom
defence counsel considered he could not usefully address further
questions. That is a sensible, time-saving expedient which
is
commonly resorted to when an accused does not place in issue the
correctness of the magistrate’s recording of his statement.
The
appellant did not do so in this instance. Although he had testified
that the police had told him about their knowledge of the
incident in
order to persuade him to speak (in itself not an improper mode of
interrogation), it was not his case that he had been
instructed to
repeat any part of what he was told to the magistrate or that he did
so. Nor was it put to the magistrate during cross-examination
in the
trial-within-a-trial that he had deviated from the actual words
uttered to him by the appellant in any way at all. In these
circumstances the submission of counsel on appeal bore no relation to
reality and one deplores that it was made at all.
[31] Turning to the
direct evidence, counsel submitted that the eyewitness had been
unreliable in the substance of his testimony.
The submission calls
for consideration of his account of the events. Mr Maqo awoke at
about 3am to the sound of kicking on a door.
The area outside was lit
by the lights from the store across the road. From the window he
could see seven white males armed with
what appeared to be ‘kieries’.
They entered the deceased’s room and dragged him outside. They
surrounded him and
beat him all over his body. Six of the persons
were boys, one man was older with long hair. (Later he said there
were two who could
be described as ‘older’.) He was the
appellant, a person the witness had seen before. When the attackers
became aware
that they were being observed they ran off and climbed
into a white ‘bakkie’, four on the rear and three in
front. The
appellant took the passenger’s seat in front. One of
the seven then returned to the deceased and called the others but
they
did not respond. He looked at the deceased, turned away
laughing, and returned to the vehicle which then drove off. The
witness and
a friend attempted to help the deceased but when they
touched him he complained of pain. Full of blood he crawled on his
stomach
into his room where they left him and tried without success
to find his girlfriend. In the morning the deceased was dead.
[32] In
cross-examination the witness was not materially shaken. The
following version was put to him by counsel:
‘
Die
beskuldigde het ‘n meisietjie gaan aflaai in Kosmospark en
hulle het van sy huis af vertrek ongeveer 12-uur middernag. Die
rede
was dat die meisie se ma het gesê dat hy 12-uur kan ry dan moet
hy haar by die huis besorg. Nadat die meisie afgelaai
is het hy weer
huis toe gery vanuit Kosmospark op die pad wat Leandra/Standerton toe
beweeg. Net voordat hy by Giants winkel aangekom
het het persone wat
agter op die bakkie was hard bo-op die bakkie se bak geklap. Hy het
tot stilstand gekom. Die persone wat agter
op die bakkie was het
afgespring en die persoon wat voor in die bakkie saam met hom gery
het, het uitgespring. Hy het na ‘n
murasie gehardloop wat
basies aan die oorkant van Giants was en dit blyk te wees die murasie
soos voorkom in foto’s 1 en 2
van die fotobundel. Beskuldigde
het hierop sy bakkie uit die pad, van die pad afgetrek en basies tot
stilstand gekom voor hierdie
geel item wat op foto’s 1 en 2
sigbaar is voor die murasie. Hy het sy ligte afgesit en sy voertuig
gesluit. Hy het by ‘n
deur ingegaan in die murasie wat volgens
foto’s 1 en 2 blyk te wees op die regterkant van die murasie.
Kan
ek u net vra is daar ‘n deur op die regterkant van daardie
foto’s 1 en 2?
---
Ja, daar is ‘n deur.
Goed. Hy sê
toe hy binne-in die vertrek inkom het hy gemerk dat die persone wat
saam met hom in die voertuig was en op die voertuig
was is betrokke
by ‘n aanranding op ‘n persoon. Een van hierdie persone
het ‘n pyp gehad soos wat blyk uit foto
16 in die fotobundel.
Kan ek u net daarso onderbreek. Sal u sê dat daardie pyp wat u
daarso sien sal dit inpas met u beskrywing
van ‘n kierie?
--- Hulle het
kieries gehad.
Nee
goed, ek hoor wat u sê hulle het kieries gehad. Sal daardie een
van die kieries kon wees waarvan u gepraat het?
---
Almal het geslaan.
Nee
meneer, daardie foto, daardie pyp op foto 16 lyk hy soos die kieries
wat hulle gehad het?
---
Ja, dit lyk soos ‘n kierie want dié wat kieries gehad
het was besig om te slaan.
Op die stadium
wat hy ingekom het het hierdie persoon opgespring, hy was op die
grond gewees en na die beskuldigde aangehardloop gekom.
Beskuldigde
het die persoon wat na hom toe aangehardloop gekom het plat geslaan.
Het u so ‘n voorval gesien?
--- Dit is nie so
nie. Hulle het hom uit die vertrek uitgehaal, hulle het die deur
geskop en hulle het hom gesleep.
Goed.
Net hierna het daar ‘n persoon met die naam van Gustav Lindeque
wat in die beskuldigde se geselskap was wat in sy voertuig
of op sy
voertuig teenwoordig was gesê: “Go, go, go” waarna
die groep na buite gehardloop het en in en op die bakkie
geklim het.
Kan ek u net onderbreek hierso. Is dit so dat die bakkie geparkeer
was net voor hierdie oranje ding soos dit sigbaar
is op foto’s
1 en 2?
---
Ja, dit was daar geparkeer.
So
nou was die voertuig nie meer geparkeer 70 na 100 meter weg?
--- Dit beteken toe
ek so gesê het dit was op die stadium toe die voertuig weggery
het.
Hierna
het dieselfde Gustav weer om die murasie inbeweeg, ‘n kort
rukkie daar gebly, teruggekeer, op die bakkie geklim en het
hulle
weggery na sy huis. Het u gesien toe die bakkie vanaf, daar waar hy
geparkeer was soos aangedui op foto’s 1 en 2 wegbeweeg
het?
--- Ja, dit het
weggetrek en dit het in die pad wat na Pretoria toe inlei af beweeg
ondertoe.
My
instruksies is dat die beskuldigde nie die oorledene wou gedood het
nie. My instruksies is voorts dat die beskuldigde nie voorsien
het
dat die oorledene gedood kon word uit dit wat plaasgevind het nie. My
instruksies is ook dat die beskuldigde inderdaad nie weet
of die
oorledene beswyk het as gevolg van dit wat plaasgevind het daar op
daardie stadium. Wil u of kan u daarop reageer?
---
Nee, daar was niks waarop ek kan antwoord nie. Die waarheid het ek
reeds vertel.’
[33]
It will be observed that the witness was thereby corroborated in
identifying the appellant as an active participant in the assault
at
the scene although the nature of such participation was in dispute.
What is also important in the version put to Maqo is that
the
appellant agreed that
one
person
was in possession of a weapon resembling the iron pipe recovered from
his possession.
[34] The evidence
relating to the finding of the iron pipe emanated from Nortje.
Together with Detective Inspector Van Zyl of the
Criminal Records
Bureau he searched the appellant’s vehicle without success for
possible evidence. (This took place after the
appellant made his
statement to the magistrate.) The record of his evidence continues:
‘
By die
beskuldigde se woning het ek hom gevra of het hy nog die pyp en hy
het toe die pyp aan my uitgewys.
Wat
was u presiese woorde aan die beskuldigde met betrekking tot die pyp?
--- Net, Het jy nog
die pyp?
Na
watter pyp het u verwys?
---
Na die pyp, ekskuus, die pyp waarmee die oorledene aangerand is.
Was
die betrokke pyp toe nog beskikbaar?
---
Dit is korrek u edele, hy het daar in die garage gelê.
Hoe
het u geweet dat dit die betrokke pyp is?
---
Die beskuldigde het hom vir my uitgewys.
Die
betrokke pyp is daar enige foto daarvan geneem?
---
Dit is korrek, u edele. Ek het inspekteur Van Zyl versoek om’n
foto van die pyp te neem terwyl dit nog daar op die grond
gelê
het.
Dit is ‘n
ysterpyp, u edele.
En
is dit moontlik om vir die hof te sê watse tipe pyp dit is, hoe
swaar dit is.
---
Ek het aangeneem dit is amper ‘n tipe pyp amper soos ‘n
tentpaal of iets want hy het hakies aan die onderkant met
drie
gaatjies, wat ek nou maar aangeneem het jy seker iets aan vasmaak.’
The only questions
concerning the pipe put in cross-examination by the appellant’s
counsel related to count 2. They have no
bearing on count 1. Within
the time frame of events it is clear that Nortje asked and received
the answer concerning the pipe in
the context of the reference to it
in the statement made to magistrate Fischer.
[35] On the morning
of 27 February 2003 the appellant made a statement which was taken
down by magistrate Fischer in the latter’s
office at
Standerton. According to the evidence of Fischer the recordal was
preceded by a series of questions put by him and answered
by the
appellant. It was made clear to the appellant that he was under no
obligation to make a statement. When asked to tell how
it had come
about that he was in the magistrate’s office to tell his story
the appellant replied:
‘
Inspekteur
Nortje het gesê ek kan ‘n verklaring voor ‘n
landdros aflê as ek wil. As ek wil nie is dit ook
goed. Ek wil
egter ‘n verklaring aflê. Ek verkies dit so.’
As to whether he
still desired to make a statement despite the fact that it could be
used as evidence against him in court, the appellant
replied
affirmatively. The questions and answers continue as follows:
‘
(d) Het die
polisie of enige ander persoon u aangerand of gedreig om ‘n
verklaring voor my te kom aflê:
Antwoord: Nee, glad
nie
(e) Is u deur enige
persoon beïnvloed om ‘n verklaring voor my te kom aflê:
Antwoord: Glad nie.
(f) Is u deur enige
persoon aangemoedig om ‘n verklaring voor my te kom aflê:
Antwoord: Glad nie
(g) Is enige
beloftes aan u voorgehou om u te oorreed om ‘n verklaring af te
lê:
Antwoord: Nee, glad
nie.
(h) Verwag u enige
voordele as u ‘n verklaring aflê:
Antwoord: Nee.’
Notwithstanding
these answers the magistrate informed the appellant that he could
expect no benefit of any kind whatsoever if he made
a statement.
After all this, the appellant was once again asked whether he was,
despite the absence of any benefit, still willing
to make a
statement. He replied affirmatively.
The recordal
continues:
‘
(n) U het nou
wel aan my gesê dat u nie deur enigiemand aangerand, gedreig,
aangemoedig of beïnvloed is nie en dat geen
beloftes aan u
voorgehou is ten einde u te oorreed om die verklaring af te lê
nie. Ek wil u nogtans vra om my in u vertroue
te neem en as daar na u
oordeel enigiets onbehoorlik gebeur het wat u beïnvloed het om
na my te kom om die verklaring af te
lê dit nou aan my te
openbaar. Ek onderneem om dit onverwyld te ondersoek en indien nodig,
toe te sien dat u die nodige beskerming
verleen word. Het daar
enigiets gebeur wat u kan openbaar?:
Antwoord: Nee.
(o) Verstaan u wat
ek so pas aan u verduidelik het?:
Antwoord: Ja.
(p) Wil u nog
enigiets byvoeg tot wat u alreeds in die verband gesê het?:
Antwoord: Nee.
6. Hierna lê
die verklaarder die onderstaande verkaring vrywillig af, welke
verklaring in sy/haar teenwoordigheid in sy/haar
eie woorde ten tye
van die aflegging daarvan neergeskryf word, sonder dat enige vrae aan
hom/haar gestel word behalwe vrae wat nodig
is om onduidelike of
onverstaanbare verklarings op te klaar’.
[36] Although the
issue is the admissibility of the statement made before the
magistrate on 27 February 2003 in an interview which
commenced at
08h48, that question cannot be resolved without a full consideration
of the influences acting on the mind of the appellant
from the time
that he was confronted by Inspector Nortje and Jordaan at shortly
before 18h00 on the previous evening.
[37] When the
trial-within-a-trial commenced the presiding judge asked the
appellant’s counsel on what grounds the admissibility
of the
statement was attacked. Counsel replied that the statement had not
been made freely and voluntarily and without undue influence.
He
later confirmed that no allegation of physical violence or threats to
that effect had been made by the police. Counsel made no
mention of
reliance on any infringement of the appellant’s constitutional
rights and indeed no failing of that nature was addressed
during the
subsequent judgment on admissibility although both in
cross-examination of state witnesses and in the evidence in chief
of
the appellant in the trial-within-a-trial it was said that he had not
been informed of his right to remain silent. In addition,
Nortje
testified about a telephone call made by the appellant to his
employer while in custody during which the appellant requested
him to
arrange legal representation. Both of the last-mentioned two aspects
assumed much more importance in the submissions on behalf
of the
appellant on appeal than they appear to have done at the trial. I
shall however assume in the appellant’s favour that
such
significance has been present throughout.
[38] Certain facts
were objectively established, were not disputed or were common cause
during the trial-within-a-trial. The weight
to be attached to or the
slant put upon them by the evidence and perceptions of the
participants differed and requires evaluation.
Shortly before 18h00
on 26 February the two inspectors, acting on information, approached
the appellant near his home in Standerton.
All three are
Afrikaans-speaking. Nortje told the appellant he was investigating a
murder in which the appellant might be implicated.
The appellant
accompanied them to their office.
[39] Between 18h20
and 18h25 all three persons signed a document in English headed in
bold letters ‘NOTICE OF RIGHTS IN TERMS
OF THE CONSTITUTION’.
The appellant signed as a ‘detainee’ under a heading (in
bold) ‘CERTIFICATE BY DETAINEE’
in which he purported to
certify that he had been informed by Detective Inspector Nortje in
Afrikaans of his rights in terms of the
Constitution as set out in
the Notice and that he understood the contents ‘thereof’.
Nortje signed as the ‘person
who informed the detainee’.
Jordaan certified that the appellant had been so informed in his
presence and signed as a witness
accordingly.
[40] The terms of
the Notice (Exhibit E) were as follows:
‘
(1) You are
being detained for the following reason:
I received
information that you were involved in a murder case
(2) As a person who
is detained you have the following rights:
(a) you have the
right to consult with a legal practitioner of your choice or, should
you so prefer, to apply to the Legal Aid Board
to be provided by the
State with the services of a legal practitioner;
(b) you have the
right to challenge the lawfulness of your detention in person before
a court of law and to be released if such detention
is unlawful;
(c) you have the
right to be detained under conditions consonant with human dignity,
which shall include at least the provision of
adequate accommodation,
nutrition, reading material and medical treatment at state expense;
and
(d) you have the
right to be given the opportunity to communicate with, and be visited
by, your spouse or partner, next-of-kin, religious
counsellor and a
medical practitioner of your choice.
(3) As a person
arrested for the alleged commission of an offence, you have the
following rights:
(a) you have the
right to remain silent and anything you say may be recorded and may
be used as evidence against you;
(b) you are not
compelled to make a confession or admission which could be used in
evidence against you;
(c) you have the
right to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible but
not later than 48 hours after your arrest or
the end of the first
court day after the expiry of the 48 hours, if the 48 hours expire
outside ordinary court hours or on a day
which is not an ordinary
court day;
(d) you have the
right, at the first court appearance after your arrest, to be
informed of the reason for your continued detention,
or to be
released; and
(e) you have the
right to be released from detention if the interests of justice
permit, subject to reasonable conditions.
(4) You can exercise
all the abovementioned rights at any stage during your detention.’
Exhibit E was in the
form of a page from a book. The original was removed from the book
and given to the appellant. A copy was retained.
[41] The appellant
asked Nortje for permission to make two telephone calls, one to his
employer, the other to his parents. He made
them in Nortje’s
presence. He asked his employer to arrange legal representation for
him. It was not suggested in cross-examination
that the appellant was
dictated to by Nortje in this regard or that his freedom of action
was in any degree affected or influenced
by Nortje.
[42] The appellant
was detained in a cell at the police station overnight. The following
morning Nortje at about 07h30 took a warning
statement in Afrikaans
(Exhibit F), which he and the appellant signed on each page. The
appellant also initialled various deletions
made by Nortje.
Paragraphs 3,4 and 5 are material:
‘
3
Ek het die verdagte
as volg ingelig:
Die doel van
hierdie onderhoud is om u die geleentheid te gee om ‘n
verklaring te maak rakende die beweringe teen u en om
sekere vrae
aan u te stel rakende die beweringe dat u betrokke was by die
pleging van die misdryf(we).
U het die reg om
deurentyd tydens hierdie onderhoud te swyg en is nie verplig om
enige verklaring te maak of enige vrae te beantwoord
nie. Enige
verklaring wat u maak en enigiets wat u sê, sal neergeskryf
word en kan as getuienis in ‘n hof gebruik word.
Indien u
verkies om ‘n verklaring te maak of om die vrae te beantwoord,
sal sodanige verklarings of antwoorde aan die Prokureur-generaal
of
die staatsaanklaer voorgelê word, wat die inhoud daarvan in ag
sal neem ook wanneer besluit word of u vervolg moet word
of nie.
U het die reg om
met ‘n regsverteenwoordiger van u keuse te konsulteer, of
indien u dit verkies, aansoek te doen by die Regshulpraad
om
voorsien te word van die dienste van’n regsverteenwoordiger op
staatskoste. Die regsverteenwoordiger van u keuse of die
een
voorsien deur die Regshulpraad, kan ook teenwoordig wees tydens die
onderhoud.
Die verdagte erken
dat hy hierdie regte, asook die doel van die onderhoud, begryp.
4
Ek het van die
verdagte verneem of hy verkies om te konsulteer met ‘n
regsverteenwoordiger voordat hy besluit om ‘n verklaring
te
maak. Die verdagte het aangedui dat hy-
. . . (c) verkies om
nie konsulteer met ‘n regsverteenwoordiger nie,
voordat hy sal
besluit om ‘n verklaring te maak.
. . .
Ek het die volgende
stappe geneem om hom van die geleentheid daartoe te voorsien:
Meld dat hy wel
‘n regsverteenwoordiger sal kry vir ‘n borgaansoek.
. . .
Die volgende het
geblyk as gevolg van die stappe wat ek geneem het:
Meld dat hy reeds
met sy baas Theunis gepraat het, en dat hy ‘n verteenwoordiger
sal reël.
5
Ek het die verdagte
gevra of hy verkies om ‘n verklaring te maak rakende die
bewering(e) teen hom. Die verdagte het aangedui
dat hy -
. . .
(d)
net bereid is om ‘n verklaring te maak aan ‘n landdros of
vrederegter’.
[43] Thereafter
Nortje made arrangements with the court for the taking of a statement
from the appellant. Magistrate Fischer recorded
in writing the
subsequent interaction between himself and the appellant.
[44] The appellant
testified in the trial within the trial that he made the statement to
the magistrate for two reasons:
1. He thought from
various things said by Nortje that the latter knew something of what
had occurred on the night of 18-19 February.
He felt that he, as the
oldest member of the group, should stand up for his friends and take
the blame on himself, knowing that his
friends would come and tell
the truth in due course.
2. As he put it,
‘
Ek het begin
gesels oor die ding toe sê hy vir my ja, dit is reg ek moet
gesels daaroor, ek moet met hom oop kaarte speel en
ek sal ligter op
die ou einde van die dag daarvan afkom.’
[45] It is clear
from his testimony that he had already decided to disclose his
version to Nortje and had commenced doing so when
Nortje allegedly
held out the prospect of lighter treatment.
[46] There is a
further aspect which requires some consideration in the context of
the alleged exercise of undue influence by the
police. According to
the appellant he was threatened by Nortje at the time of his initial
arrival at the police offices on the evening
of 26 March in the
following context:
‘
. . . by die
aankoms by die speurkantoor is ek gevra of ek iets weet omtrent
hierdie saak en ek het gesê ek weet niks nie en
sy woorde was
gewees: Jy beter praat anders sluit ons jou toe.’
Both policemen
denied that such a statement was made. Where do the probabilities lie
and how strong are they? First, it was not the
appellant’s case
that he was influenced by the threat. He testified that his response
was:
‘
. . . ek het
vir hom gesê dit is reg dan sluit jy my toe en ons het vertrek
daarvan af terug na die polisiekantore, toe het
hulle my ingeboek . .
. Die volgende oggend het inspekteur Mark Nortje my weer kom haal by
polisieselle en ons het gery na sy kantoor
toe, die speurtakkantoor .
. . waar hy weer vir my gevra het of ek iets weet of ek hom iets kan
vertel en ek het weer vir hom gesê
ek weet niks nie’.
Second, both the
making of the threat and any influence that the threat, if made at
all, may have exercised on his mind are inconsistent
with the terms
of Exhibit E, para 3 of Exhibit F and the appellant’s responses
to the magistrate recorded in para 5 of the
recordal. Third, the
‘threat’ did not merit mention by the appellant in his
reasons for making the statement, as furnished
in evidence. There
can, in my view, be no doubt that whatever may have been said to the
appellant by way of persuasion at the initial
stage of his detention
contributed not at all to his decision to disclose his version of the
events to the magistrate.
[47] Did the
appellant decide to speak out because Nortje promised or told him he
would come off lighter if he did so? Nortje denied
making such a
remark. The evidence of the appellant read in context is revealing.
What is significant is that the version was uninfluenced
by
interruptions or prompting by his counsel. One may accept that the
appellant made a fair disclosure of those matters which he
regarded
as important:
‘
Die volgende
oggend het inspekteur Mark Nortje my weer kom haal by die
polisieselle en ons het gery na sy kantoor toe, die speurtakkantoor.
Ja,
wat gebeur daar?
---
Waar hy weer vir my gevra het of ek iets weet of ek hom iets kan
vertel en ek het weer vir hom gesê ek weet niks nie. Toe
sê
Inspekteur Mark Nortje vir my laat ek jou vertel wat het daar gebeur.
Nou op daardie stadium was ‘n mens, jy is baie
gespanne. Ek was
baie gespanne gewees en op my senuwees. Ek weet nie waar is my
vriende op daardie stadium nie of hulle alreeds in
aanhouding is of
wat die situasie is nie en inspekteur Mark Nortje het opgestaan, hy
het ‘n draai in sy kantoortjie geloop
en hy het vir my gesê
laat ek jou vertel wat het gebeur en hy het gesê ons het met
die bakkie gery, ons het by daardie
plek gestop, ons het uit die
bakkie uitgeklim en van die bakkie af ingeklim, ons het binne-in die
murasie inbeweeg, ons het die persoon
uit die kamer uitgetrek en ons
het hom aangerand en daarna weer op die bakkie geklim en ingeklip en
vertrek, weggejaag.
Toe
hy dit nou vir u sê wat kom toe nou by u op?
--- Dit kom toe by
my op dat hy informasie gekry het, ‘n deel informasie gekry het
omtrent die saak.
Het
u gedink by wie?
---
By een van die persone wat teenwoordig was in die aanrandingsproses.
Ja,
wat doen u toe of wat laat dit u dink en op sterkte van wat Nortje
vir u sê?
---
Ek begin toe vir inspekteur Nortje vertel omtrent hierdie saak want
hy het vir my gesê ek moet met hom gesels en ek gaan
toe voort
met die (onhoorbaar).
Waarom
praat u nou met hom? Hy sê nou vir u laat ek jou vertel wat
gebeur het, hy vertel vir u en u begin toe nou met hom praat,
waarom
praat u toe nou met hom oor hierdie voorval?
---
Ek het net gevoel omrede hy iets weet omtrent dit en my vriende dra
nie kennis van die ding nie, van hulle, u weet ek moet met
inspekteur
Mark Nortje gesels daaroor.
Ek
is jammer u sê nou u vriende weet nie … (tussenbei)
--- Ek weet nie wie
weet en wie weet nie daarvan nie.
Waarvan
praat u nou?
---
Van die aanranding u weet dat ek opgeneem is.
Dat
die polisie u in hegtenis geneem het?
---
Ja.
HOF
:
Ek verstaan nie mooi nie. As ek reg verstaan het sê u hy het
vir u gesê u moet gesels en u gaan toe voort en u praat.
Nou
vra die advokaat vir u nou maar hoekom praat jy en nou sê jy
vir my jy praat omdat hy iets weet en my vriende dra nie kennis
nie
daarom moet jy gesels. Is dit wat u vir my sê?
--- Ja, van my
vriende weet ek nie of hulle almal daarvan af kennis dra nie maar
omrede die ding by inspekteur Mark Nortje uitgekom
het dat hy vir my
van die punte bewys het en uitgelig het, het ek aangeneem dat een van
hulle het heel waarskynlik met inspekteur
Mark Nortje gesels oor die
saak.
Maar
ek verstaan nie hoekom praat jy nou? Omdat die ander een gepraat het
praat jy ook maar. Is dit wat jy sê?
---
Nee, u edele. Ek het net gevoel ek moet opstaan vir my vriende. Ek
het nie geweet waar hulle situasies is op daardie oomblik nie
en ek
vat die ergste blaam op my op daardie stadium.’
This passage leads
one to conclude that what persuaded the appellant to speak was his
belief that the police were on to him and his
friends and that he
felt a responsibility to take on himself the greater burden of blame.
But, after the judge expressed his lack
of understanding, appellant’s
counsel pressed the appellant for a clearer answer: The record
continues:
‘
Wat sy
edele wil weet is wat motiveer u nou om met Nortje te praat? Hoekom
praat u met hom? Wat beoog u om daarmee te bereik?
–
Hy
het vir my, sy woorde aan my was gewees dat as ek met hom gesels oor
die ding sal ek ligter daarvan afkom op die ou einde van die
dag.
Goed. Terwyl u
met hom praat …(tussenbei)
HOF
:
Maar nou wil ek net weet, nou verstaan ek dan ook nie wat wil u
eintlik vir my sê? Sê vir my wat jy wil sê meneer.
Sê jy eintlik nou vir my omdat hy nou vir jou gesê het jy
gaan ligter afkom nou gaan jy maar praat, is dit wat jy sê?
Dit
help nie dat jy jou kop skud nie. Sê vir my op die band. ---
Ja,
u edele.
Omdat
hy ‘n belofte aan u gemaak het u gaan ligter afkom daarom praat
u nou maar?
---
Ja, u edele. Ja.
MNR
MYBURGH
:
Mnr Bezuidenhout, op watter stadium het hy dit nou vir u gesê
dat as u praat sal u ligter afkom?
---
Net voordat ek met hom die verklaring, voordat ek vir hom die
verklaring afgegee het. Ek het begin gesels oor die ding toe sê
hy vir my ja, dit is reg ek moet gesels daaroor, ek moet met hom oop
kaarte speel en ek sal ligter op die ou einde van die dag daarvan
afkom.’
A short while later,
while dealing with the admissibility of the making of the statement
to the magistrate, the following exchange
took place between his
counsel and the appellant:
‘
Daar is
sekere vrae aan u gevra onder andere of u voordele verwag omdat
iemand u aangemoedig het om ‘n verklaring te maak en
u het nee
gesê. Kan u aan sy edele verduidelik waarom u nie vertroue in
die landdros gehad het en hom meegedeel het van wat
plaasgevind het
tussen u en inspekteur Nortje nie?
---
Omrede inspekteur Nortje vir my gesê het as ek hierdie
verklaring oorgee aan die landdros sal ek baie ligter daarvan afkom.
So ek het dit net so gehou ek het nie verder uitgebrei oor dinge
nie.’
[48] From the
evidence one may fairly adduce that such prospects as Nortje may have
held out to the appellant only arose after he
had made the decision
to speak out to the police (for other reasons not affecting
admissibility). Neither does it seem that such
‘promise’
as was made amounted to more than a vague and unspecified hint of an
eventual benefit. The appellant did not
say what he understood Nortje
to mean either as to the nature or the time of the advantage to him.
Furthermore it can be noted how
the benefit to be derived from
talking to the police subtly shifts (without explanation) at the end
of the quoted passage to a benefit
derived from communicating the
same statement to the magistrate.
[49] At the end of
appellant’s evidence in chief, counsel, apparently feeling the
need for further emphasis in this regard,
asked:
‘
Mnr
Bezuidenhout, kan u net aan sy edele verduidelik waarom het u daardie
verklaring aan die landdros gemaak?
–
Ek
het van my kant af gevoel omrede ek die oudste persoon is tussen ons
groep ek moet van, ek moet die ergste slag op myself dra met
die wete
dat ons in die hof verskyn, u weet, dat my vriende sal terugkom en
die waarheid sal praat oor wat gebeur het.
Is
dit die rede?
–
Dit
is korrek.’
Counsel
for the State, having understood this reply as the definitive reason
for the making of the statement, one which
per
se
excluded
further debate against its admissibility on the grounds of undue
influence, elected not cross-examine the appellant at all
in the
trial within a trial. The learned judge saw matters the same way.
While there is much to be said for their attitude, given
the
seemingly unequivocal and unconditional substance of that final
answer, I think that they were wrong. A full conspectus of the
evidence that I have quoted shows that the appellant furnished two
separate although interrelated explanations for the making of
the
statement. The failure to cross-examine thus left the making and
effect of the alleged promise in some degree of limbo. The question
is whether that uncertainty was sufficient to exclude the making of
the promise beyond a reasonable doubt or at least to exclude
the
reasonable possibility that the appellant was influenced by it.
[50]
In my view the recorded responses of the appellant to the magistrate
are conclusive of the issue. It was the appellant’s
evidence
that he was told that he would come off more lightly if he made the
statement. He did not tell the magistrate this. Why
he did not do so
is by no means clear from his answer to his counsel:
‘
Omrede
inspekteur Nortje vir my gesê het as ek hierdie verklaring
oorgee aan die landdros sal ek baie ligter daarvan afkom.
So ek het
dit net so gehou; ek het nie verder uitgebrei oor dinge nie.’
He did not testify
that he was warned or instructed not to tell the magistrate of the
‘promise’ or that if he did, it
would be nullified. No
physical threat to his person was in prospect if he disclosed the
‘promise.’ Nor did he say that
he had any reason to
believe that would be the consequence. On the face of it, there was
no reason why the appellant could not and
would not have been candid
with the magistrate if such an inducement had been held out to him by
the police.
[51] With regard to
the proceedings in the magistrate’s office (as recorded by Mr
Fischer) the following is clear-
i) the free choice
as to whether to speak out or remain silent was entirely the
appellant’s;
ii) the consequences
of making a full disclosure were explained to him;
he was unequivocal
in his denial of influence or encouragement to make the statement
despite the very full opportunity afforded
to him to make such an
allegation;
he was similarly
unequivocal in his denial of the holding out of any promises or
benefits.
[52] Nor can it be
ignored that shortly before going to the magistrate, the appellant
had signed Exhibit F in which paras 3, 4 and
5 were the subject of
signatures or initialling by the appellant and which also witness to
the free exercise of a choice to disclose
his version of the events
to a magistrate. Despite Nortje’s evidence that he read its
contents to the appellant and that appellant
signed and initialled
the document, the sum total of the appellant’s testimony on
this aspect was:
‘
Hierdie
document is voltooi die oggend net voordat ek landdros, na die
landdros toe geneem is . . . Ek het dit tegelykertyd wat ons
hierdie
document voltooi het, na dit het daardie twee A4 folio’s
voltooi met my verklaring op in my eie handskrif.’
He did not deny that
Nortje read Exhibit F to him nor did he suggest that he did not know
of or understand its contents. Its terms
are inconsistent with the
making of any inducement to him on which he could place reliance.
[53] Allowing that
the alleged inducement, if made at all, was at best for the appellant
subsidiary to the other factors which he
identified as persuasive in
his decision to make the statement, I am satisfied that the only
reasonable inference to be drawn from
the totality of the evidence is
that the appellant did not regard the prospect of such lighter
treatment as might flow from the making
of the statement as a matter
sufficiently worthy of mention to the magistrate even in response to
direct unambiguous questions put
by the magistrate. It would have
been unreasonable in the circumstances for the trial court to regard
his unexpressed hopes as sufficient
ground for excluding the
statement on the basis of undue influence or lack of the necessary
freedom in choosing to make it. This
inference prevails
notwithstanding the absence of cross-examination.
[54] The appellant
did not say in evidence that he had been deprived of access to legal
advice at any time. Nor did he testify that,
if he had been afforded
the opportunity, he would have called for legal assistance during his
interrogation or prior to being taken
to the magistrate. His
testimony, in so far as it was relevant to his rights under the
constitution, was given in the context of
signing Exhibit E. In
cross-examination of Nortje his counsel had put to him that he did
not warn the appellant of his right to silence,
that he did not
explain its contents to him and the appellant did not read or
understand it. Nortje (supported by Jordaan) by contrast
testified he
did warn appellant of his right to silence both in the evening and
the following morning, that he did explain it to
him in Afrikaans,
that the appellant read and signed Exhibit E and that he handed him a
copy of the signed document (in English).
But when the appellant gave
evidence he said of Exhibit E:
‘
Ek het die
document daardie selfde dag onderteken [when the police first took
him in] maar daar was nie in baie duidelikheid vir my
verduidelik
nie. Ek het ook nie hierdie document deurgelees wat my regte is nie.
Het u geweet dat u
kon swyg? – Nee.’
[55] On this
version, the document was explained – but not very clearly. The
appellant did not explain why, in these circumstances,
he signed the
certificate. It will be remembered that it was at or about the same
time, so he testified, that Jordaan threatened
to lock him up if he
did not talk, to which his reply was ‘Well then, lock me up’.
(That reaction, if true, showed quite
clearly that the appellant knew
that he had the power - if not the right - to remain silent and was
prepared to exercise it.) Nor
did he deny Nortje’s evidence
that he was given a copy of Exhibit E. The evidence of Nortje
relating to legal representation
was that he informed the appellant
of his rights prior to the signing of Exhibit E; the appellant
indicated that he understood. He
asked the appellant for an
explanation of the events, whereupon the appellant made certain
admissions to him which Nortje regarded
as tantamount to a
confession. He stopped the appellant and asked him whether he would
be willing to make a statement to a magistrate.
The appellant was
prepared to so. The appellant asked to make two telephone calls. One
was to his employer, the other to his parents.
Nortje was present
during the calls. He testified that the appellant asked his employer
if he would arrange legal representation.
At that stage the purpose
of legal representation was not clear to Nortje but the following
morning when Nortje again explained his
rights to him, the appellant
told him that he wanted legal representation for the bail
application. Indeed this is what Nortje then
recorded in Exhibit F
and the appellant initialled.
[56] The proceedings
in the magistrate’s office began as follows:
‘
V Is daar
iets wat u uit u eie vrye wil aan my wil vertel?
A Ja
V Verstaan u dat u
die reg het om regsverteenwoordiging te bekom en as u nie
regsverteenwoordiger kan bekostig nie u kan aansoek doen
vir
regshulp?
V Verlang u ‘n
prokureur?
A Nee’.
[57] The appellant’s
evidence in the trial-within-a-trial did not touch on the making of
the telephone calls. He did not deny
that he told Nortje that he had
made arrangements for legal representation for purposes of a bail
application.
[58] From the
aforegoing the following conclusions seem to me to follow inexorably.
First, that appellant was afforded an unconstrained
opportunity to
arrange his own legal representation; second, that he did so only for
the purpose of a bail application; third, that
it was not his case
that he did not know of his right to immediate legal advice and
assistance; finally, that even if he was ignorant
of that right
(despite the unambiguous evidence of the policemen that he was
apprised of it at least twice before being taken to
the magistrate)
there is no suggestion that he would have taken advantage of it. It
may be added that the opportunity offered the
appellant to
communicate with his parents and his employer (neither being in
dispute) is inconsistent with an intention on the part
of the police
to exert improper pressure on him or to deprive him of access to
outside assistance. When I weigh these conclusions
together with the
appellant’s unreserved responses to the magistrate’s very
comprehensive preliminary questions I am
persuaded that despite the
absence of cross-examination of the appellant, the evidence of Nortje
and Jordaan was rightly accepted
by the trial court as embodying the
truth of the events between the appellant’s detention and the
making of the statement to
the magistrate. The evidence of the
appellant in particular, in so far as it relied on ignorance of his
right to remain silent, was
dishonest and false beyond a reasonable
doubt. The defence based on ignorance of the right and lack of access
to legal representation
had no foundation in the evidence and could
not reasonably stand in the face of the testimony of the policemen
supported as they
were by the cumulative force of the appellant’s
responses in Exhibit F and to the magistrate.
[59] The totality of
the evidence persuades me that Smit J did not err in admitting the
appellant’s statement, notwithstanding
the absence of
cross-examination of the appellant.
[60] Having
addressed the disputes surrounding the State evidence on the merits
of the appeal I am in a position to evaluate the case
which the State
presented against the appellant. The main elements were:
1. The evidence of
Maqo who testified that he saw a number of persons drag the deceased
from his room and beat him. He later identified
the appellant as one
of those persons. His evidence accords in material respects with
content of the statement made by the appellant
to the magistrate.
While the circumstances under which the witness watched the assault
were far from ideal his evidence was consistent
and was accepted by
the trial court as truthful.
2. The evidence of
Dr Batev that the death of the deceased was caused by blunt force to
the head administered with a very hard rigid
object, not a fist, such
as the iron pipe. He also sustained a broken femur and multiple blows
to the head resulting in serious brain
damage attributable to a
similar cause. The evidence was persuasive and remained unrebutted.
3. The statement
made by the appellant to the magistrate in the following terms:
‘
Verlede week
Dinsdag aand, die datum onbekend aan my was daar ‘n na
partytjie by 93 Coligny straat vanaf die Valentines bal
van Hoërskool
Standerton. Ek het verskeie kere na 21h00 gery om kinders te gaan
haal by die bal en daarna kinders te gaan aflaai
by hulle huise.
Later die aand het ek Gustav Mol, Kenneth en ongeveer 2 ander seuns
Engen garage toe gery by Wimpy om koeldrank te
koop vir drank en
sigarette. Daarna het ons gery na ‘n meisie naby die Hoërskool
vir Gustav, vir een of ander rede. Daarna
is ons terug na die Engen
garage toe en ons het nog koeldrank gekoop en brood geëet oor
die toonbank en toe teruggekeer na 93
Colignystraat toe. Ek en
bogenoemde persone het gery om ‘n meisie af te laai naby die
Hoërskool. Daarna het ek in die
karavaan park gaan ry, by die
Vaalrivier. Ek het gestop by ‘n klein kamertjie. In die kamer
was ‘n hond. Ek het die hond
geslaan. ‘n Persoon het te
voorskyn gekom en ek het hom ook met die vuis geslaan. Ons is toe
terug na 93 Colignystraat toe.
Verder gekuier. Ek en dieselfde
bogenoemde persone het gery om ‘n meisie te gaan aflaai in die
uitbreiding. Ons het teruggekeer
na die Leandra-Standerton pad. Net
voor die t- aansluiting was daar ‘n kafee op linkerkant. Ek het
om die kafee gery. Toe ek
weer noordwaarts ry het ek ‘n leë
huis in my ligte gesien. Ek het daar gestop. Ek het uit my voertuig
geklim en in die
huis ingehardloop en daar het ‘n persoon
navore gekom. Ek het hom eers met my vuis gslaan. Hy het weer
opgestaan en die bogenoemde
persone het hom ook met die vuis geslaan.
Ek het ‘n pyp in my linkerhand gehad. Toe begin ek hom oor sy
bene en heupe slaan
met die pyp. Daarna het ons teruggekeer na die
voertuig toe. Gustav het toe weer teruggegaan na die leë huis
toe om uit te vind
of the persoon “oraait” is. En hy het
weer teruggekeer na die bakkie toe en ons is weer terug na 93
Colignystraat toe.
Dis al.’
Of course, the
statement is not necessarily accurate or truthful in all its details.
Taken at face value, it places the appellant
at the scene of the
events relating to count 1, in possession of the weapon which
inflicted the fatal injuries and participating,
without lawful
excuse, in an attack on the deceased.
4. The undisputed
evidence of Nortje that after the appellant had made the statement to
the magistrate, he took the appellant to his
place of residence.
There he asked him ‘of het hy nog die pyp’, referring to
the pipe mentioned in the statement made
by the appellant which was
in his possession. The appellant pointed out the iron pipe lying in
his garage. He did not attribute possession
of the pipe to any other
person or otherwise distance himself from its use during the assault.
The appellant failed
to give evidence. The cumulative effect is overwhelming. The forceful
application of such a weapon to the head
of the deceased leads, in
the absence of countervailing evidence, to only one reasonable
inference: the assailant foresaw the fatal
consequences of his act as
a reasonable possibility and proceeded in despite of that
appreciation. That it was the appellant who
wielded the pipe is
likewise the only reasonable inference to be drawn from all the
circumstances. Any other inference depends upon
speculative
assumptions. Counsel did not submit otherwise. The state case on the
first count was therefore proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
[61] The second
charge on which the appellant was convicted was one of assault with
intent to commit grievous bodily harm allegedly
inflicted on the
complainant Oosthuizen at Standerton on or about 19 February 2003 by
striking him with a pipe. The only witness
for the prosecution was
Paul Breedt, a detective inspector in the police who was deputed to
look into a reported incident at the
Standerton caravan park.
[62] On 20 February,
the day following the alleged assault, he interviewed the complainant
and took a signed written statement from
him (Exhibit H1). According
to Breedt, Oosthuizen lived in poor circumstances in a one-roomed
‘storeroom’ at the park
together with his dog. Oosthuizen
had damaged lips and black eyes when Breedt met him and appeared to
have been seriously assaulted.
The inspector also spoke to a Mr
Kruger, apparently the caretaker or manager of the park who lived in
a caravan near the vehicle
gate and some 50-70 metres from the
complainant’s dwelling. He took a signed statement from Kruger
which placed him on the
scene as an eyewitness to the assault on the
complainant. Breedt handed the statements to Nortje who was part of
the investigation
team. The latter, in the course of his evidence in
the main trial, was asked by the State counsel, ‘Wat is die
posisie tans
met betrekking tot mnr Oosthuizen en mnr Kruger, waar is
hulle?’ His evidence in this regard was relied on by the
prosecution
to justify the admission of the hearsay averments in the
two statements. The record reflects the following evidence:
‘
U edele,
hulle het toe in die karavaanpark gebly en ek het agterna navraag
gaan doen en ek kon hulle nie weer opspoor nie. Ek het
toe ‘n
berig in die koerant, ons plaaslike koerant, geplaas om inligting te
bekom aangaande die twee persone. Ek is toe in
kennis gestel dat
beide persone reeds oorlede is.
Wat
is die omstandighede waaronder hulle oorlede is?
-
U edele, een persoon
het verdrink by die karavaanpark self, by die rivier en die ander
persoon is dood aan kanker.
Wie
is die persoon wat verdrink het?
–
Kruger.
Mnr
Kruger, en mnr Oosthuizen oorlede aan kanker?
–
Aan kanker, ja.
Kon
u enige dokumentasie kry ter bevestiging van hierdie feite?
–
U edele, ek
wou gistermiddag gekry het maar die Binnelandse Sake kantoor sluit al
drie-uur. So ek kon nie daarby uitkom nie ons was
te laat besig
gewees hierso.’
[63] The State
relied on
s 3
of the
Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988
for the
admission of the two statements. The defence opposed their admission.
The learned judge, having considered their terms, decided
the
interests of justice overwhelmingly favoured the admission of the
hearsay evidence. He accepted the testimony of Nortje concerning
the
unavailability of the two witnesses as fact without comment. However
that evidence was in itself hearsay upon hearsay and there
was no
acceptable explanation produced that could have enabled the court to
have regard to ‘the reason why the evidence is
not given by the
person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence
depends’ as required by
s 3(c)(v).
[64]
Such a shortcoming need not
per
se
be
decisive of the matter in every case as the interests of justice may
nevertheless favour admission of evidence even without the
furnishing
of such a reason. But that will certainly require exceptional
circumstances since the factor mentioned in
s 3(c)(v)
is fundamental
to the enquiry: if the party wishing to rely on the evidence is
unable even to explain satisfactorily why he cannot
call the witness
upon whose credibility its value depends, the court will almost
always rule that direct evidence best serves the
interest of justice.
That is certainly so when the fact or extent of participation of an
accused person in a crime depends solely
upon the credibility and
reliability of the witness. The case may be different if, for
example, the sole purpose of the evidence
is to provide evidence
aliunde
in support of a
confession (s 209 of the Act) and the commission of the crime
per
se
is
not disputed.
[65] It is, however,
unnecessary to decide whether the trial judge correctly exercised his
discretion to admit the two witness statements
in the interests of
justice. The offence was proved without reference to the contents of
those statements. Inspector Breedt testified
that on 20 February 2003
the complainant lived in a small room in the park. He was suffering
from readily apparent facial injuries
consistent with a severe
assault. Whether one regards the appellant’s statement to the
magistrate as containing a confession
to an assault or merely as an
admission of the facts contained in it, the evidence of Breedt
confirms in material respects the fact
and seriousness of the assault
and its general time and location. The injuries which Breedt saw
could obviously not have been caused
by a single blow of a fist as
the appellant’s statement conveyed. But the appellant did not
attribute the complainant’s
injuries to any other person and
the only reasonable inference is that his was the entire
responsibility for such injuries as the
complainant suffered. The
cumulative effect was sufficient to establish a prima facie case
against the appellant which achieved proof
beyond a reasonable doubt
by his failure to testify in the main trial.
[66] Smit J
convicted the appellant ‘as charged’, ie of assaulting
the complainant with an iron bar. That was incorrect
as there was no
evidence to suggest any use of a weapon. The severity of the assault
justifies the inference of an intent to commit
grievous bodily harm.
The terms of his order require an appropriate amendment to reflect
the correct position. Save in that minor
respect the appeal against
the conviction on count 2 must fail.
[67]
As to the sentence, as I have mentioned earlier, the learned judge
concluded that the offence was one committed by a person or
group of
persons acting in the execution or furtherance of a common purpose.
What is contemplated by the statute is not, of course,
a common
purpose to commit any crime other than the scheduled offence
viz
murder.
A proven common purpose to assault which results in an intentional
killing will not of itself activate Part 1 of the Schedule.
The
learned judge appears to have overlooked this requirement (or perhaps
he understood the law differently). He said:
‘
As
‘n groep van persone optree is daar ‘n beginsel in ons
reg dat hulle met ‘n gemeenskaplike opset optree as hulle
aan
sekere vereistes voldoen. Vir doeleindes van hierdie uitspraak is dit
nie vir my nodig om al die vereistes uiteen te sit nie
behalwe om te
sê ek meen die vereistes is aan voldoen en u wie ookal saam met
u was het duidelik met ‘n gemeenskaplike
opset opgetree.’
During
the earlier jaunt on the same evening, despite beating the victim
severely, the unlawful conduct stopped well short of doing
him to
death. While it is true that at least one of the party carried an
iron bar throughout, a potentially fatal instrument if recklessly
used, there is no evidence that anyone but the appellant contemplated
its use in such manner and he only at the time of his attack
on the
deceased, by necessary inference, drawn
ex
post facto,
from
the manner and force with which he must have wielded it. Sight should
also not be lost of the fact that he was the prime mover
and an adult
while his accomplices were apparently still at school. In the
circumstances it seems to me that the evidence was insufficient
to
prove beyond reasonable doubt a common purpose to kill. The sentence
must therefore be set aside.
[68] But there is a
further matter to be considered. After judgment on the merits of the
charges the following interchange took place
between the judge and
counsel for the accused:
‘
HOF
:
Mnr Myburgh, ek is in u hande. Ek sien daar is nog 20 minute oor. Ek
is bereid om die saak af te handel vanmiddag of as u eers met
beskuldigde wil praat en verder argumente aan my wil voorlê kan
die saak afstaan na more oggend toe. Dit is vir u om te besluit.
MNR
MYBURGH
:
Dankie, u edele. U edele, ek het nou instruksies ontvang dat ek
voorvonnisverslae aan u sal voorlê en sal ek u versoek om
op
daardie basis dan ‘n verdaging in hierdie aangeleentheid te
bied. Die kriminoloog, dr Labuschagne, kan in hierdie verband
opdragte gee ten einde ‘n voorvonnisverslag saam te stel ten
einde die beskuldigde …(tussenbei)
HOF
:
Het sy nog nie die beskuldigde gesien nie?
MNR
MYBURGH
:
Sy het nog nie.
HOF
:
Ek is jammer, ek is nie bereid om uitstel daarvoor te verleen nie.
MNR
MYBURGH
:
Soos dit u behaag.
HOF
:
Die beskuldigde het geweet die saak kom aan. As hy so ‘n
verslag wou gehad het kon hy dit voor die tyd gedoen het. Ek gaan
nie
die saak uitstel nie. Ek is net hierdie week beskikbaar behalwe as Dr
Labuschagne vir my kan sê sy kan in hierdie week
dit afhandel
voor Donderdagmiddag is ek jammer gaan ek nie verdure uitstel verleen
nie. Hy is in ieder geval nie meer ‘n jeugdige
nie. Hy is al
goed in die 20’s.
MNR
MYBURGH
:
Dit is so, inderdaad. Nee u edele, dr Labuschagne sal nie beskikbaar
wees nie. Ek weet dat sy op die huidige oomblik in die Kaap
is besig
om aangeleenthede daar te hanteer. Onder daardie omstandighede u
edele, sal ek dan versoek dat die aangeleentheid sal afstaan
tot more
toe dat ek dan behoorlike instruksies ontvang.’
The case was
thereafter adjourned to the following day. The court then heard
addresses from counsel and, finding no substantial and
compelling
circumstances present, sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment
on count 1. The learned judge said:
‘
In die laaste
instansie het mnr Myburgh gesê dat hy beoog om die getuienis
van ‘n kriminoloog aan my voor te lê.
Die kriminoloog was
nie beskikbaar om hierdie week getuienis af te lê nie. Ek is
voorheen nooit daarvan in kennis gestel nie
en ek het gemeen dit is
in belang van reg en geregtigheid dat die saak afgehandel word. Ek
meen ook dat die getuienis van die kriminoloog
as sodanig die saak
nie veel verder kan voer nie in soverre u verkies het om geen feite
aan my voor te lê nie. Wat ookal die
kriminoloog aan my kom sê
moes hy van u verkry het. Ek sou graag van u wou verneem wat u
gedwing het om daardie aand op te
tree soos u opgetree het. Dit gaan
‘n mens se verstand eintlik te bowe dat ‘n man wat in ‘n
meer bevoorregte posisie
is so teenoor medemense kan optree.
Gevolglik meen ek ook dat die aspek van ‘n kriminoloog nie
enigsins kon bydra tot die bepaling
of daar wesenlike en dwingende
omstandighede teenwoordig was nie.’
[69] On behalf of
the appellant his counsel contended on appeal that the refusal to
afford a reasonable opportunity to consult with
the expert witness
with a view to preparing evidence in mitigation amounted to a serious
irregularity. I agree. The appellant faced
the heaviest sentence
which the law allows. Someone in that position should be extended
every reasonable opportunity to lay all relevant
mitigating factors
before the court. Against such a prospect the convenience to the
court is secondary unless there is well-founded
reason to believe
that the accused is abusing his right or has been unreasonably
dilatory in preparing himself to exercise it. While
some accused are
sufficiently prescient or pessimistic to anticipate the need for an
investigation into sentence others will not,
for any one of a number
of reasons, take steps in advance to seek expert advice. (Innocence,
lack of foresight, contrary advice,
lack of means, and an incomplete
insight into the ramifications of the case before the completion of
the prosecution evidence are
obvious, and acceptable, reasons; there
are no doubt others which may not be as acceptable but will still
fall short of justifying
the truncation of an accused’s right
to a fair trial.)
[70] In the present
instance the reason for not consulting the expert witness before
conviction was not explained and the court did
not attempt to find it
out. There was no sufficient basis for refusing a postponement even
if that meant reconstituting the court
at some later time. That Dr
Labuschagne was bound to rely on information obtained from the
appellant was hardly relevant. He need
not have been the only source
of material evidence. In any event, the possibility always existed of
the appellant himself testifying
in mitigation in confirmation of her
report.
[71] The result is
that the appellant did not receive a fair trial on the aspect of the
sentence. This affects both counts. Having
regard to my
previously-expressed conclusion on the fate of the sentence imposed
on count 1, the proper procedure would be to remit
the case to the
trial court (or such other judge as the Judge President may appoint
for the purpose if the trial judge has been discharged
from active
service as contempkated in s 3(2)(b) of the Judges’
Remuneration and Conditions of Employment Act, in which case
he could
not be called upon to perform service as contemplated in s 7(1) of
the Act, or is otherwise unavailable as contemplated
in
s 275(2)
of
the
Criminal Procedure Act.). The
evidence of Dr Labuschagne can then
be led (together with such other witnesses as the appellant and the
State may be advised to call)
so as to enable the sentences on counts
1 and 2 to be reconsidered and imposed afresh.
[72] The following
order is made:
1. The appeal
against the convictions on counts 1 and 2 is dismissed save that the
conviction on count 2 is limited to striking the
complainant with the
fist.
2. The appeal
against the sentences imposed on counts 1 and 2 succeeds. The
sentences are set aside.
3. The matter is
remitted to the trial court or such other judge as the Judge
President may appoint for the purposes of
s 275(2)
of the
Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977
, if applicable, to hear such additional
evidence as the appellant and the State are advised to present on
sentence and, thereafter,
to impose sentence afresh on both counts.
____________________
J A HEHER
JUDGE OF APPEAL
FARLAM JA )Concur
CLOETE JA )
1
Sefatsa
and Others v Attorney-General, Transvaal and Another
1989
(1) SA 821
(A) at 843F-844B;
S
v Heslop
2007 (4) SA
38
(SCA) at 46G.
2
R
v Matsego and Others
1956
(3) SA 411
(A) at 415A-D;
S
v Naidoo
1962 (2) SA
625
(A) at 629H;
Kroon
v S
1997
[2] All SA
330 (SCA) at 333b-e.
3
R
v Knight
1935 AD 342
at 345;
R v Velshi
1953 (2) SA 553
(A)
at 561D
4
S
v Majola
1982 (1) SA
125
(A) at 131H-132A, 133
in
fine
.
5
See
R v Matshego
supra at 415D
6
Section
3(2)(a)
of the
Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of
Employment Act 47 of 2001
.
7
See
R v Mogale
1955
(2) SA 155
(A) at 161D-E. Although Kriegler and Kruger, Hiemstra,
Suid-Afrikaanse
Strafproses
6 ed 895
describe such a report as ‘superfluous’ – because
judgments and rulings usually contain motivated reasons
for
decisions reached – an instance such as the present, in which
the reasons delivered
ex
tempore
fall well
short of providing an adequate explanation for the decision,
provides a continuing
raison
d’etre
for
compliance with the dictates of the section. It may, of course,
depending on what has preceded the report, be necessary to do
no
more than affirm the court’s already expressed reasons.
8
Section
317
(5)
9
Cf
S v Tsawane and
Another
1989 (1) SA
268
(A) at 273H-I.
10
S
v De Jager
1965 (2)
SA 612
(A) at 613C-D;
S
v Wilmot
2002 (2)
SACR 145
(SCA) at para 31.
11
Section
144(3)(a) of the Act.
12
Shabalala
and Others v Attorney-General of Transvaal
[1995] ZACC 12
;
1996
(1) SA 725
(CC).