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[2014] ZAGPPHC 103
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Masako v Van Schalkwyk and Others (A326/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 103 (7 February 2014)
IN THE
NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT, PRETORIA
(REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA)
CASE NO: A326/2013
DATE: 07 FEBRUARY 2014
IN THE MATTER BETWEEN
ITUMELENG
DAVID
MASAKO
........................................................
APPLICANT
AND
MAGISTRATE
BEN VAN SCHALKWYK
................................
1
st
RESPONDENT
TI
IE ACTING NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS
......................................................
2
ND
RESPONDENT
THE
MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
.....................................
3
rd
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
PRINSLOO. J
[1]
In this review application, which came
before us in terms of the provisions of rule 53 of the Uniform Rules
of Court, the applicant,
a practising advocatc,
appeared on his own behalf and Ms Marriott
appeared for the second respondent. The other two respondents did not
feature before
us as opposing parties and appeared to abide the
decision.
Introduction
and background
[2]
In very broad terms, it can be said that
during 2005 the applicant was a prosecutor in Pretoria magistrate’s
court J where
cases involving alleged rcckless and negligent driving,
drunken driving and related charges were heard.
Complaints by two of the accused who had to
appear in this court about the alleged unlawful conduct of the
applicant, came to the
attention of the then senior public prosecutor
and other authorities with the result that, during 2006, the
applicant was charged
with two counts of corruption, two counts of
fraud and two counts of theft based on the allegations made by the
two complainants.
There were also alternative charges.
[3]
For purposes of this review application,
it is not necessary to analyse the evidence led during this lengthy
trial that followed
upon the charges having been laid against the
applicant as the accuscd. The actual charges were also not included
in the record
which was lodged by the applicant. I do, however,
consider it appropriate to skctch, in very broad and general terms, a
concise
summary of the evidence led during the trial which came
before the first respondent in the Pretoria North regional court.
[4]
At the outset, I make a few remarks
about the procedural history of the ease. This is summarised in what
I consider to be an opposing
affidavit filed by the first respondent
regional court magistrate in September 2012 after the rule 53 review
application was lodged
by the applicant in August 2012.
According to the allegations made in this
affidavit of the first respondent, the case was transferred from the
Pretoria magistrate's
court to the Pretoria North regional court 2 on
12 May 2006. On that date the magistrate postponed the matter to 12
August 2006
to obtain proper instructions from the Director of Public
Prosecutions. Then followed a number of postponements. These were, as
far as 1 can gather, mainly initiated by the applicant. There were
times when the case had to be postponed because the attorney
whom the
applicant said he had instructed and paid was absent. On another
occasion there was no interpreter and on occasion the
applicant was
also absent. I do not consider it necessary to mention all the
details of all the postponements. At one point the
applicant also
asked for certain documents to be disclosed and, in the end, the
trial only commenced before the first respondent
on 13 July 2009.
In his comprehensive judgment, the first
respondent also remarks that the case was transferred to Pretoria
North because the applicant
was well-known in the Pretoria
magistrate's court. It appears that this may have been done on the
instructions of the Director
of Public Prosecutions. At one stage the
applicant suggested that he was not going to have a fair trial
because the first respondent
and the prosecutor were both white. The
first respondent then postponed the case for two months to afford the
applicant an opportunity
to prepare an application for the recusal of
the first respondent but on the next trial date the applicant
indicated that he was
not proceeding with such an application and
that he was satisfied to proceed with the trial before the first
respondent.
[5]
It also appears from the opposing
affidavit,
supra
,
and the judgment, that the applicant pleaded not guilty at the
commencement of the trial but did not disclose the basis of his
defence. He appeared to comfortably conduct his trial without
experiencing the difficulties which one may sometimes expect to come
the way of a lay litigant. According to the remarks made by the first
respondent in his judgment, and according to the record,
the
applicant boasted on occasion that he has a Masters degree in law and
also a Masters degree in music and was busy with a second
Masters
degree and that he was quite capable of training prosecutors and
magistrates because of his superior knowledge of the law.
According to the opposing affidavit, the
applicant also, in June 2009, and about a month before the trial
commenced, objected to
the jurisdiction of the Pretoria North
regional court. This objection was overruled. Details of the
objection and the reasons for
overruling it, do not appear from
either the opposing affidavit or the judgment. Before us, neither
counsel raised any argument
relating to the jurisdiction of the
Pretoria North regional court. The issue is not mentioned at all
in either the notice of motion or the founding
affidavit of the rule 53 review application. The applicant's lengthy
heads of argument,
running into some 75 pages, contain no reference
to the question of jurisdiction.
[6]
I turn, very briefly, to a short
overview of the evidence. The first complainant, also the first state
witness, was Mr Mpho Malangeni
who appeared in the traffic court J on
a charge of reckless driving on 5 May 2005. He was also represented
by a Legal Aid attorney,
Ms Moodly. At one point the applicant, then
the prosecutor, was asked what the fine would be upon conviction and
he said R1 500,00.
The case was postponed so that Malangeni could get
the money because he wanted to pay the fine. On 12 September 2005
Malangeni
told his lawyer that he wanted to pay the fine. She left,
Malangeni met the applicant in the latter's office, counted out the
money
and gave it to him. He asked for a receipt and the applicant
gave him a document which was exhibit "C". Later he showed
this document to his cousin, Andrew Lebisi, who said that it was not
really a receipt and Lebisi went to court in order to confront
the
applicant. He also determined that according to the clerk of the
court only R800,00 had been paid towards the fine. In
cross-examination,
Malangeni stuck to his guns. It was put to him by
the applicant that the money was handed over to a paralegal,
assisting in court
J, one Thabo Mabetoa but it was only R800,00 and
Thabo went to pay the money in at the clerk of the court. This
Malangeni denied.
Lebisi also testified and corroborated the
evidence of Malangeni in some material aspects. When he confronted
the applicant, the
latter first said that he would give him a receipt
or "slip" and later said that he was feeling sick and would
be postponing
all his cases on a particular day. Later, when he was
again asked for the "slip" he asked Lebisi whether the
latter thought
that he was corrupt and if so, Lebisi could go to
complain to the "highest authority". Lebisi confirmed that
the records
indicated that only R800,00 had been paid.
The second complainant and third state witness
w'as Happy Fanka Baloyi. He also had to appear in J court and the
summons mentioned
that he could pay an admission of guilt fine of R1
500,00. He got to court on 9 December 2005. He spoke to the applicant
and told
him that he could only pay R500,00 and asked for a
reduction, w'hich the applicant refused. Later the applicant
approached him,
asked where the R500,00 was and Baloyi handed the
money over to the applicant. The applicant asked when he would bring
the balance
of R1 000,00 and no fixed date was determined. The case
was postponed to 23 December 2005. Baloyi reported this to his
employer
who told him to get a receipt for the R500.00. He went back
to the applicant and asked for the receipt. The applicant stored his
own telephone number on the cell phone of Baloyi. The number was also
mentioned by the first respondent in his judgment. When Baloyi
went
back to court on 23 December 2005 the applicant was absent. There was
another prosecutor. The magistrate also raised the question
of an
admission of guilt. He said that he had already paid R500,00 and
thought that he would meet the applicant to arrange for
payment of the balance. This may have started
the investigation which ultimately led to the applicant being
charged. The case against
Baloyi was withdrawn in January 2006.
Baloyi stuck to his guns in cross-examination and insisted that the
applicant had taken his
R500.00.
[7]
Pieter Willem Coetzcr was a fellow
prosecutor in court J at the relevant time. I do not intend
summarising his evidence. The fact
is that the perceived
irregularities were discussed with him by the then senior prosecutor,
Mr Lagaraba. Lagaraba also testified.
He said that when he fixed an
admission of guilt amount the prosecutor cannot alter or change the
amount. I le confirmed that Coetzcr
came to him in December 2005 with
Baloyi who reported that he had paid the applicant R500,00. He also
related the issue of the
applicant having fed his telephone number
into Baloyi's cell phone. Nobody approached him to reduce the
admission of guilt amount
that he had fixed. He also said that it
would not be permissible for the applicant to give the money to the
paralegal to go and
pay in at the clerk of the court. Both Coetzer
and Lagaraba said that they saw the applicant's cell phone number on
Baloyi’s
phone. That is when further steps were taken. This
evidence corroborated that of Baloyi.
The applicant's version that he gave
Malangeni's money (only R800,00) to the paralegal Thabo to go and pay
in was repudiated by
Thabo who also testified. He said he never
received the money from Malangeni and only went along with Malangeni
who himself paid
the amount to the clerk of the court.
[8J The charges levelled against the applicant
were based on the complaints by Malangeni and Baloyi. The first three
counts related
to the complaint by Malangeni and counts 4 to 6
related to Baloyi's complaint. Count 1 was one of fraud, count 2
corruption and
count 3 theft. Then count 4 was fraud again, 5
corruption and 6 theft.
[9]
What is of importance for purposes of
this review application is that the applicant, as accused, at the end
of the state case, applied
for his acquittal in terms of the
provisions of section 174 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of
1977. As part of the application,
the applicant delivered a lengthy
address to the court. The prosecutor delivered an address in
opposition to the application and
the applicant replied. Relevant
authorities were quoted to the first respondent by both sides. The
first respondent, when giving
his judgment in deciding the
application, held that there was not enough evidence in respect of
counts 2 and 5, the two corruption
charges, in respect of which he
could convict and he acquitted the applicant on those two charges but
refused the application for
acquittal in respect of the other four
charges.
In my view, it is quite clear from the first
respondent's judgment, that he applied his mind properly to the
application. He indicated
that he came to his conclusion after
reading the evidence, presumably the available transcript of the
evidence of
the state case. He also referred to the case of
S
v
Mpetha
and Others
1983 4 SA 262
(CPD) at
265D-G where the following is said:
"However, it must be remembered that it is
only a very limited role that can be played by credibility at this
stage of the
proceedings, if a witness gives evidence which is
relevant to the charges being considered by the court then that
evidence can
only be ignored if it is of such poor quality that no
reasonable person could possibly accept it. This would really only be
in
the most exceptional case where the credibility of a witness is so
utterly destroyed that no part of his material evidence can possibly
be believed. Before credibility can play a role at all it is a very
high degree of untrustworthiness that has to be shown. It must
not be
overlooked that the triers of fact are entitled 'while rejecting one
portion of the sworn testimony of a witness to accept
another
portion’. See
R
v Kwnalo
1916 AD 480
at 484. Any
lesser test than the very high one which, in my judgment, is demanded
would run counter to both principle and the requirements
of section
174."
[10]
What is plain in my view is that the
learned regional magistrate (the first respondent) properly applied
his mind before exercising
his discretion when deciding the section
174 application. He read the evidence again, he duly considered the
addresses from both
sides and the authorities quoted, he quoted more
authority when giving his judgment and he clearly weighed up the
different charges
against the requirements of the section 174 test.
This led to his finding.
which I have mentioned, namely an acquittal in
respect of counts 2 and 5 and a refusal of the application in respect
of the other
four charges.
[11]
This judgment was already granted on 24
May 2010. The trial then continued and the applicant offered the
defence evidence, which
I have already briefly summarised.
[12]
On 1 March 2011 the first respondent
started giving his judgment. It was a lengthy and, in my view, well
reasoned judgment. However,
I specifically refrain from expressing a
view on the correctness thereof. To do so, would be unnecessary, and
perhaps improper.
[13]
While the first respondent was in the
process of handing down his judgment, he was interrupted by the
applicant to indicate that
he was not feeling well and that there
were also other family problems relating to the welfare of his son.
The handing down of
the judgment was then interrupted until 21 April
201 I when the judgment was concluded and the applicant convicted on
counts 3
and 6, the two theft charges. This has to do with the monies
which Malangeni and Baloyi alleged were unlawfully taken from them
by
the applicant. The applicant was acquitted on the fraud charges,
counts 1 and 4.
114] As I understand the record, the sentencing
of the applicant only took place more than a year later, on 21 August
2012. On a
reading of the record, it seems to me
that the first respondent properly applied his
mind to all the relevant circumstances. The applicant, as accused,
was sentenced
to eighteen months imprisonment on each count. The
sentence was wholly suspended for five years on condition that the
applicant
was not convicted of an offence involving dishonesty
committed during the period of suspension. Again, 1 refrain from
expressing
a view as to the correctness or appropriateness of the
sentence imposed. The first respondent also, in terms of section 103
of
Act 60 of 2000, declared the applicant fit to possess a firearm.
f 15] There was no application for leave to
appeal.
[16] On 31 August 2012 the applicant, in terms
of rule 53, launched an application for the reviewing and setting
aside of "the
proceedings before the first respondent ... in
which the first respondent convicted the applicant of two counts of
theft and sentenced
him to eighteen months imprisonment suspended for
five years".
[ 17] On 13 September 2012 the second
respondent filed a notice of intention to oppose and the first
respondent's "opposing
affidavit" to which I have referred
was dated 7 September 2012 and evidently filed with the clerk of the
court on 25 October
2012
.
The relief sought by the applicant
[18]
On 15 January 2013 the applicant filed
an "amended notice of motion in terms of rule 53”.
[19]
It is convenient to quote the prayers in
this notice of motion:
"(a) That the proceedings before the first
respondent under Pretoria North case no SU2/138/2006 in which the
first respondent
has convicted the applicant of two (2) counts of
theft and sentenced him to 18 (eighteen) months imprisonment
suspended for 5 (five)
years, be reviewed and set aside;
(b)
That the review application is brought
in terms of the common law read with section 33 of the Constitution
of the Republic of South
Africa 1996 (’the Constitution') on
the grounds that it constitutes administrative action, and on the
basis that it constitutes
the exercise of public power which is in
breach of the requirements of the rule of law;
(c)
That the conviction and sentence of the
applicant in those proceedings be reviewed and set aside on the basis
that the magistrate
failed to apply his mind to the relevant issues
in accordance with the 'behest of the statute
(section 174
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
) and the tenets of natural
justice';
(d)
That it be declared that the decision of
the first respondent to convict and sentence the applicant to be
inconsistent with the
Constitution and, therefore, unlawful,
irrational and invalid;
(e)
That the costs occasioned by any
opposition to this application for review be paid by the respondent
who opposes it;"
There is also a prayer for alternative
relief.
[20]
The founding affidavit is a relatively
concise affair. It runs into some
IVi
pages. The first four pages are devoted to background details. It
also appears from these details that the applicant made
representations
to the Director of Public Prosecutions and to the
national prosecuting authority (presumably to avoid the prosecution)
but in December
2007 the Director of Public Prosecutions decided to
continue with the prosecution and in December 2008 it was decided
that the
applicant should stand trial.
[2IJ The main thrust of the applicant’s
case appears from paragraphs 12 to 14 of the founding affidavit.
There is an allegation
that the presiding officer, when trying an
unrepresented accused, should ensure that the accused fully
understands his rights concerning
cross-examination and the adducing
and challenging of evidence as well as the rules of procedure and
evidence. In his opposing
affidavit, the first respondent points out
that the applicant cross-examined all the witnesses over a lengthy
time. It did not
appear that he was lacking the skills and ability to
conduct his case. He himself put it to some of
the witnesses that he was the best prosecutor in South Africa. He has
a Masters degree
in law as well as in music and is also busy with his
second Masters degree in law. At one stage he mentioned that he is so
learned
that he can train judges and magistrates. He also represented
accused persons in the regional and magistrate courts. All this
appears
from the record. As I have already mentioned, the first
respondent also alluded to this in his judgment. This argument was
not
developed in any way in the applicant’s lengthy heads of
argument presented to us for the hearing neither did he place any
emphasis thereon during the hearing. Ms Marriott also argued that she
could find no basis for this complaint when studying the
record. 1
find myself in respectful agreement with this submission.
[22]
In paragraphs 12.1 and
12.2 of the founding affidavit the applicant states:
"12.1 The trier-of-fact should avoid
giving away
(sic)
to irritation or demonstrating a hostile attitude towards a
recalcitrant accused who refuses to accept legal representation at
state expense.
12.2 The magistrate in this case failed to
conduct himself in an open- minded, impartial and fair manner. This
is demonstrated by
the way he treated me as an accused person, his
judicial questioning on slate witnesses and his impatience towards me
as an accused
person and his direct and indirect judicial
intervention entry into the arena. All this occurred prior to the
section 174
of the
Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977
and after the unfair
ruling of this provision
(section 174).
"
No
details of such alleged hostile conduct are mentioned, either in the
founding affidavit or in the heads of argument neither were
details
in support of this argument relied upon during the hearing before us.
On a general reading of the record, I was left with
the impression
that the first respondent showed remarkable restraint throughout in
the face of conduct on the part of the applicant
which may well have
amounted to contempt of court. An example can be found at pp343 to
344 of the record where the first respondent
tries to persuade the
applicant to continue with his argument in reply before judgment was
handed down in the
section 174
application. I quote an extract from
these pages:
"
COURT:
Continue. You should continue.
ACCUSED
:
You never said that to her. Why does she get the preferential
treatment?
COURT
:
Sir she had a brief... (intervenes)
ACCUSED
:
You know what you will appear one day I will be having my magistrate,
I will deal with you accordingly. Do not think what comes
around what
goes around comes around. It will dawn. Sooner or later. Magistrate
has taken sides with you and you are talking nonsense.
COURT:
I do not take sides with anybody sir. Continue with your argument?
ACCUSED
:
Are you still asking that 1 am starting with my argument or
what?
COURT
:
No 1 said continue.
ACCUSED
:
But it is a reply.
COURT
: Yes
continue with the reply the reply argument..."
[23]
Paragraph 13 of the
founding affidavit reads as follows:
"13. After the close of prosecution's
case, I applied for an acquittal on all counts, in terms of section
174 of the Criminal
Code. The first respondent acquitted me on count
2 and 5 (main counts and their alternatives of corruption) and not on
fraud and
theft charges (3 and 6). This resulted in a contradicted
and confusing order or verdict. The confusion is brought about the
fact
that 'no evidence’ was given a vague or ambiguous meaning.
To crown it all, the honourable magistrate promised to give reasons
later, and this was not done.”
[24]
1 have already dealt
with the way in which the section 174 application was handled by the
first respondent and will not embark upon
unnecessary repetition. I
also see no indication in his judgment on the section 174 application
that the first respondent undertook
"to give reasons later".
[25]
Part of paragraph 14
of the founding affidavit reads as follows:
"During judgment the court on its own
amended the charge-sheet, and made a finding that the amount stolen
by me is R700,00
and not R1 500.00."
This deals with the fact that the evidence
indicated that although Malangeni gave the applicant R1 500,00, the
records demonstrated
that R800,00 was paid in with the clerk of the
court, leaving the amount found to be stolen to be R700,00. It is
common cause that
the first respondent amended the figure downwards
accordingly and he confirms it during the course of his judgment. In
his opposing
affidavit he also says when dealing with this issue:
"... I therefore amended the amount which
a court is entitled to do. See
section 86(1)
of the
Criminal
Procedure Act. The
amount is reduced. There could be no prejudice."
In my view, this action taken by the first
respondent is in line with the requirements of
section 86(1).
This
argument was not developed with any force before us during the
hearing.
Conclusionarv remarks
[26]
The main thrust of
this review application is aimed at the first respondent's decision
taken at the end of the
section 174
proceedings. This much was
confirmed by the applicant during the hearing and also evidenced by
the wording of prayer (c),
supra
,
of the notice of motion, asking for the conviction and
sentence to be reviewed and set aside "on
the basis that the magistrate failed to apply his mind to the
relevant issues in
accordance with the 'behest of the statute
(section 174
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
) and the tenets
of natural justice'".
[27]
The
section 174
decision was challenged more than three years after it was made. It
is difficult to understand what is to become of the rest of
the trial
which ran its full course even if the
section 174
decision were to be
reviewed and set aside as requested.
[28]
It is worth
mentioning, in passing, that the refusal of discharge in terms of
section 174
is an interlocutory order and not appealable - see the
discussion in Hiemstra’s
Criminal
Procedure
(loose leaf edition) at
22-78(1) to 22-79. The learned author also points out that there is
no possibility of review' of refusal
of an application for discharge
unless irregularities in the trial are alleged -
Ebrahim
v
Minister
of Justice 2000(2)
SACR 173 (W)
at 175f-h.
1 have already dealt with the "irregularities"
as alleged in the founding affidavit. Of course, in the present case,
no
review application was launched at the time when the
section 174
decision was taken.
[29]
In support of his
argument attacking the first respondent's
section 174
decision, the
applicant relied heavily on the judgment in
S
v
Lubaxa
2001 4 SA 1251
(SCA).
In this case, a gang of seven men was charged
with the murder and subsequent robbery of a young couple in their
home in Port Nolloth.
The trial ran its full course and it seems that
one of the accused was acquitted on all charges whereas others were
convicted on
the two counts of murder and robbery and some also on
lesser charges such as theft. Sentences ranged from life imprisonment
to
shorter periods of imprisonment. The appellant in that case was
one of those convicted of the murder and robbery charges and
sentenced
to two terms of life imprisonment amongst other sentences.
The trial court granted the appellant leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Appeal against the convictions and sentences.
In that case, all the accused applied to be
discharged in terms of
section 174
but the applications were refused.
"One of the grounds of appeal, and indeed the principal reason
why leave to appeal was
granted, is that the trial court is said to
have misdirected itself by refusing to discharge the appellant at
that stage of the
trial." - See the judgment at 1254H-I.
At 1254J-1255B the learned Judge of Appeal says
the following:
"The refusal to discharge an accused at
the close of the prosecution's case entails the exercise of a
discretion and cannot
be the subject of an appeal
(Hiemstra
Suid-Afnkaanse
Strafproses
5
th
ed by Kriegler at 825). The question that is raised in this appeal
against the conviction, however, is whether
section 35(3)
of the
Constitution, which guarantees to every accused person the right to a
fair trial, has removed that discretion. If it has,
and the trial
court was bound as a matter of law to discharge the appellant in the
interest of a fair trial, then the failure to
do so would amount to
an irregularity which may vitiate the conviction."
At 1256I-1257A, the learned Judge of Appeal
says the following:
"1 have no doubt that an accused person
(whether or not he is represented) is entitled to be discharged at
the close of the
case for the prosecution of there is no possibility
of a conviction other than if he enters the witness- box and
incriminates himself.
The failure to discharge an accused in those
circumstances, if necessary
mero
motu
, is, in my view, a breach of
the rights that are guaranteed by the Constitution and will
ordinarily vitiate a conviction based
exclusively upon his
self-incriminatory evidence."
In that case, such a state of affairs was found
to have existed and the appeal succeeded to the extent that the
convictions and
sentences with regard to the main counts were set
aside.
The present case is clearly distinguishable
from what happened in
Luxaba.
Quite apart from the fact that there was no review application at the
conclusion of the
section 174 proceedings in that case, it
clearly appears from my brief summary of the evidence, and from
remarks made by the learned
magistrate (first respondent) in his
lengthy judgment, that this is not a case where there was "no
possibility of a conviction
other than if he enters the witness-box
and incriminates himself. It appears clearly from my summary of the
evidence and from the
remarks made by the first respondent during the
course of his judgment, that the state presented strong evidence
against the applicant
in the form of the complaints of Malangeni and
Baloyi and supporting and corroborating evidence by the other
witnesses referred
to. The circumstances under which the Supreme
Court of Appeal found a breach of the rights that are guaranteed by
the Constitution
to have been present in Lubaxa, do not exist in the
present case. Reliance by the applicant on Lubaxa is therefore, in my
view,
misplaced.
[30]
Finally, it is useful
to add that a review of this nature, in as much as it may qualify to
be entertained by a court, is not governed
by the provisions of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”).
The first respondent is not an
organ of state (see the definition in
section 239 of the Constitution, 1996) and his decision did not
amount to “administrative
action
,r
as defined in section 1 of PAJA. See, generally, Harms,
Civil
Procedure in the Superior Courts
at B-372 to B-373.
Conclusion
[31]
In view of the aforegoing. I have come to the conclusion that the
application must fail.
Coats
[32]
.
Ms Marriott indicated that she was not asking for a costs order again
si the applicant in the event of the application being unsuccessful.
In the circumstances; [ will not grant such a cost order.
The
Order
[33]
1
make
the
following order:
The
application is dismissed.
W R C PRINSLOO
JUDGE OK THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT
I
agree
NMASANGO
ACTIXG JUDGE OF THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH
COUR'li
HEARD
ON:
20
September 2012
FOR
THE APPLICANT:
In
Person
FOR THE RESPONDENT:
Ms
N
P
Marrioit
INSTRUCTED BY: