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[2014] ZAGPPHC 87
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Relebipi Properties CC v De Wet N.O. and Others (36209/2012) [2014] ZAGPPHC 87 (17 January 2014)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTH
GAUTENG, PRETORIA)
CASE
NO: 36209/2012
DATE:
17 JANUARY 2014
NOT
REPORTABLE
NOT
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES
In
the matter between:
RELEBIPI
PROPERTIES CC
…...........................................................................
APPLICANT
and
CHRISTIAAN
FREDERIK DE WET N.O
.............................................
FIRST
RESPONDENT
LEON
NAUDE
N.O
............................................................................
SECOND RESPONDENT
ALLAN
DAVID PELLOW
N.O
............................................................
THIRD RESPONDENT
GAVIN
CECIL GAINSFORD N.O
.................................................
FOURTH RESPONDENT
MARGARET
EDWARDS
N.O
............................................................
FIFTH RESPONDENT
SNYMAN
DE JAGER ATTORNEYS
...............................................
SIXTH RESPONDENT
HEUNIS
STREAULI ATTORNEYS
...........................................
SEVENTH
RESPONDENT
THE
REGISTRAR OF
DEEDS
....................................................
EIGHTH RESPONDENT
THE
MASTER OF THE HIGH
COURT
.........................................
NINTH
RESPONDENT
INVESTEC
BANK
...........................................................................
TENTH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
KUBUSHI,
J
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The
purpose of the application before me is to compel the first, second,
third, fourth and fifth respondents in their joint capacities
as
liquidators of Meltin Properties 59 CC (in liquidation) to sign all
documents required for the seventh respondent (or any other
properly
appointed conveyancing attorneys) to effect transfer of Sectional
Title Units 1 and 3 of SS Norma Jean Square, 124/2010
situated at Die
Howes Ext 197, 705 also known as units 1 and 3 Norma Jean Square, 244
Jean Avenue, Centurion, to the applicant
in effecting the purchase
agreement entered into between the applicant and Meltin Properties 59
CC.
[2]
The
applicant, is also applying for an order authorising the sheriff of
this court, in the event that the first, second third, fourth
and
fifth respondents in their joint capacities as liquidators of Meltin
Properties 59 CC (in liquidation) fail to sign all documents
required
for the seventh respondent (or any other properly appointed
conveyancing attorneys) to effect transfer of Sectional Title
Units 1
and 3 of SS Norma Jean Square, 124/2010 situated at Die Howes Ext
197, 705 also known as units 1 and 3 Norma Jean Square,
244 Jean
Avenue, Centurion, to the applicant in effecting the purchase
agreement entered into between the applicant and Meltin
Properties 59
CC.
[3]
The
sixth, eighth, ninth and tenth respondents are cited for their
information and no relief is sought against them and as such
they are
not opposing the
application.
The seventh respondent is not opposing the application, they wrote to
the applicant’s attorneys of record effectively
indicating that
in the event of no cost order being requested against them they will
not take part in the application. The tenth
respondent indicated its
intention to oppose the application but did not file opposing papers.
However, from the heads of argument
filed it appears as if counsel
for the first, second, third, fourth and fifth respondents, is acting
for the tenth respondent as
well. For the sake of convenience I shall
refer to the first, second, third, fourth, fifth and tenth
respondents collectively as
the respondents.
[4]
The
factual matrix of this matter is that the applicant entered into an
agreement of sale with Meltin Properties 59 CC (the seller)
for the
purchase of two units as described in paragraphs [1] and [2] of this
judgment (the property). The seller was represented
thereat by its
sole member Dr Keith Lawrence (Lawrence) who was duly authorised
thereto. The applicant paid the full purchase price
of the property
(R3 790 000) into the trust account of the seller’s attorneys.
In terms of this agreement the property was
to be transferred from
the seller to the purchaser on date of registration which was the
date on which such transfer shall have
been registered in the Deeds
Office.
[5]
Subsequently
thereto, another agreement was reached between the applicant and the
seller, brokered by the sixth respondent, attorneys
acting on behalf
of the seller - Snyman de Jager Inc. Herein also the seller was
represented by
the
said Lawrence and duly authorised thereto. In terms of this
agreement, the applicant as the purchaser therein authorised the
seller’s attorneys - Snyman de Jager Inc to release a portion
of the purchase price (R3 400 000) held in trust to the seller
to be
utilised towards the finalisation of the development. In exchange to
the release the applicant was granted a discount of
R150 000 on each
respective unit and immediate occupation of the two units. All this
happened before the property was transferred
into the applicant’s
name.
[6]
Sometime
later and before the property could be transferred into the name of
the applicant the seller went insolvent. The applicant
received
notice of the insolvency in October 2009. The first, second, third,
fourth and fifth respondents were appointed as liquidators
of the
seller’s insolvent estate. The applicant was thereafter in a
letter dated 4 November 2010 from the attorneys acting
on behalf of
the liquidators, informed that transfer of the property could not
take place as the funds for the purchase price had
been used by
Lawrence, with the applicant’s consent, for other purposes.
In
this application the applicant is thus demanding that the liquidators
be ordered to transfer the property into its name.
IS
THE APPLICANT ENTITLED TO THE TRANSFER
[7]
The
main issue, therefore, is whether the applicant is entitled to the
transfer of the property.
[8]
The
law in regard to the status of an immovable property, where the
agreement of sale in respect thereof was entered into before
the
seller went insolvent and the said property has not been transferred
into the name of the purchaser, is well settled. According
to the law
as it stands, a purchaser who bought land under such conditions runs
the risk of losing, both the land and any money
he or she may have
paid, in the event the estate of the registered owner is sequestrated
as insolvent.
[9]
There
is no legislative provision (neither the Insolvency Act nor the
Companies Act deals with sequestration/liquidation under such
circumstances) providing for such a situation and as a result the
common law principles are applicable. Under the common law, should
the estate of the seller of an immovable property be sequestrated
before transfer of the property is passed to the purchaser of
that
property, the property vests in the liquidator/trustee of the
seller’s insolvent estate. And in so far as the purchaser
may
have fully or partially performed in terms of the agreement of sale
concluded prior to the insolvency by payment of the whole
or portion
of the purchase price, he or she (the purchaser) is in a position of
a creditor with a concurrent claim against the
insolvent estate. See
Catherine Smith: The
Law
of Insolvency
2ed
at 151;
Glen
Anil Finance (Ptv)Ltd v Joint Liquidators, Glen Anil Development
Corporation (in liquidation
1981 (1) SA 171
(A) at 182D - H and
Sarrahwitz
v Maritz
Case No. (819/2012) [2013] ZAECGHC 10 (1 February 2013)
[10]
This
principle was succinctly enunciated as follows in Bryant &
Flanagan (Ptv)
Ltd
v Muller & Another NNO
1977
(1) SA 800
(N) at 804F - H:
“
Insolvency
does not automatically terminate an executory or partly performed
contract lying outside the categories specifically
covered by the Act
(The Alienation of Land Act 108 of 1986). Whether or not the contract
continues to operate depends on the decision
of the trustee, who is
allowed and indeed required to choose which shall happen. He is, of
course, responsible to the creditors
for his choice. But as between
himself and the other party to the contract, the decision is his
alone. It must be made within a
reasonable time. The results of the
trustees’ decision to bring the contract to a halt are that he
may not insist on its
further performance by the other party, and he
is not himself expected to fulfil the insolvent’s outstanding
obligations
under it. Like any other creditor owed an ordinary debt
which the insolvent incurred before sequestration, the other party is
left
with nothing more than a concurrent claim against the estate,
entitling him to share in the distribution of its free residue.”
[11]
It
is common cause in this instance that the applicant entered into an
agreement of sale in respect of the immovable property in
issue. It
is also common cause that the applicant paid a certain amount in
respect of the purchase price of that property. The
amount paid is in
dispute - the applicant alleges to have paid the full purchase price
whilst the respondents’ version is
that the applicant paid a
portion of the purchase price. It is also not in dispute that the
immovable property in question is a
subject of the deed of sale
concluded between the parties and the property was not transferred to
the applicant as the purchaser
of the property, prior to the
insolvency of the seller. The position therefore is that on the basis
of the common law principles
enunciated above the property now vests
in the trustees/liquidators, the respondents in this instance, of the
insolvent estate.
The applicant has, as such, no right to insists
upon the execution of the agreement by the respondents. Such
execution is in the
discretion of the respondents alone. And in so
far as the applicant may have fully or partially performed in terms
of that agreement
of sale by payment of the whole or portion of the
purchase price it is in a position of a creditor with a concurrent
claim against
the insolvent estate.
[12]
The
general rule is that the nature of the trustee’s choice is
either to stop the agreement or to persevere with it as a whole.
Indication, in this instance, is that the respondents elected to
perpetuate the agreement. This in my view is so because: firstly,
in
a letter dated 5 October 2009 written by Snyman de Jager attorneys to
the applicant, a copy of which is attached to the applicant’s
founding affidavit as annexure “MSR8”, the applicant was
informed that the liquidators have instructed attorneys Heunis
&
Straueli to attend to the transfer of the property; secondly, in
another letter dated 15 October 2009 written by Heunis &
Straueli
attorneys to the applicant, a copy of which is attached to the
applicant’s founding affidavit as annexure “MSR9”,
the applicant was informed that they (the attorneys) received a copy
of the Deed of Sale and are awaiting the appointment letter
and
approval from the liquidators to enable them to proceed; and a
further letter dated 4 November 2010 from Faber Sabelo Edelstein
attorneys to the applicant, a copy of which is attached to the
applicant’s founding affidavit as annexure “MSR10”,
the applicant was informed that the liquidators were anxious to deal
with the property on behalf of the creditors but were unable
to
proceed with the transfer of the property to the applicant without
payment of the purchase price the funds of which according
to them
were not paid to them or held in trust. It is thus obvious that the
respondent intended to transfer the property to the
applicant but
could however not proceed due to their averments that the purchase
price had not been paid.
[13]
It
is trite that once a trustee has chosen to perpetuate an agreement,
such agreement remains in force and as a result the other
party must
continue to do everything the agreement has always required of him or
her. The trustee is likewise bound to fulfil all
the insolvent’s
undischarged obligations, including any which ought to have been
carried out before the sequestration. The
obligations must be
performed in their entirety as per
the
agreement. Having accepted the benefits of the agreement a trustee
cannot limit the other party to a concurrent claim against
the free
residue of the estate for anything reciprocally due under the
agreement. See Bryant & Flanagan (Ptv) Ltd v
Muller
& Another NNO
above
at 805A - C.
[14]
This
is not entirely the situation in this instance. The respondents in
this instance are prepared to transfer the property to the
applicant
on payment of the purchase price which the applicant alleges it paid
in full to the seller. A dispute as to whether or
not the applicant
paid the purchase price of the property arose in the papers. The
applicant’s contention is that it paid
the full purchase price
whilst the respondents’ version is that the purchase price was
not paid. The argument being that
the applicant allowed the seller to
use the money it (the applicant) had paid in the trust account of the
seller’s attorneys
as the purchase price for other purposes
other than as a purchase price for the said property. In argument
before me the respondents’
counsel conceded that a portion of
the purchase price had indeed been paid. Although I was not required
in terms of the relief
claimed by the applicant to adjudicate this
issue I find however that for me to be able to adjudicate the issue
at hand I have
to make a finding as to whether the applicant has paid
the full purchase price or not.
[15]
It
is common cause that the applicant paid an amount of R3 740 000 into
the trust account of the seller’s attorneys. It is
not in
dispute that the applicant authorised the seller’s attorney to
release a portion of that amount, R3 400 000, and pay
it over to the
seller for the seller to finalise the development. The respondent’s
contention is that once the funds left
the trust account they were no
longer entrusted for the purpose of a purchase price. The funds were
used to pay off expenses of
the development. According to the
respondents’ counsel the applicant authorised the purported
purchase price to be utilised
for other purposes before the sale
transaction was finalised. In argument that the payment in this
instance was intended to be
used for a purpose other than to
discharge the purchase price, the respondents’ counsel referred
me to the judgment in Stialinah
v French
(1892)
9 SC 386
411 where De Villiers CJ stated as follows:
“
The
debtor, and in failing him, the creditor, must declare his intention
before or at the time of payment, in order that it may
still be open
to the creditor not to accept it upon the debtor’s terms, and
to the debtor not to make it upon the creditor’s
terms."
[16]
I am
in agreement with the respondents’ counsel that the applicant’s
intention should have been declared at the time
of payment. To my
mind, the applicant’s intention appears clear from both the
agreements it entered into with the seller.
To me, the intention was
always to pay the amount as the purchase price. It is quite clear
from the Deed of Sale that the amount
was paid in as purchase price
for the property. In the agreement in which the applicant authorised
the release of the funds, to
me, the intention remains that the
amount was for the purchase price. This agreement is specific and
provides that:
“
WHEREAS
the parties entered into Offers to Purchase dated 6 March 2008 in
respect of UNITS 1 and 3 in the scheme known as NORMA
JEAN SQUARE;
AND
WHEREAS the PURCHASER has made payments towards the purchase price on
each Unit into the bank account of Snyman de Jager Inc
in the total
amount of R3 790 000,00;
AND
WHEREAS the SELLER requires funds to finilise the development;
NOW
THEREFORE THE PARTIES AGREES [SIC!] AS FOLLOWS:
The
PURCHASER hereby authorise Snyman de Jager Inc to release an amount
of R3 400 000,00 (Three Million Four Hundred Thousand
rand) from the
amount currently held in a special deposit account to the SELLER; .
.
”
[17]
I
have no doubt therefore that the funds were intended for the payment
of the purchase price and remains even after they were
released to
the seller for the payment of the purchase price. I find the
contention by the respondents’ counsel that the
funds were
released for the personal use of Lawrence to be without substance.
The seller is a close corporation and cannot act
on its own. Its
member(s) in this instance, Lawrence, must act on its behalf.
Lawrence was the sole member of the seller and
according to the
agreement was duly authorised to act on behalf of the seller and it
can therefore not be said that he (Lawrence)
was acting in his
personal capacity when he received the funds. What he used the funds
for once released, in my view, is neither
here nor there. What is
clear is that the funds were meant for the purchase price of the
property and were released to the seller
for that purpose. Lawrence
was duly authorised to represent the seller in both agreements in
issue herein. I rule therefore that
the applicant performed in full
as per
the
agreement of sale. It paid the purchase price in full and having
elected to pursue the agreement the respondents are bound
to
transfer the property into the name of the applicant.
POINTS
IN
LIMINE
[18]
However,
the respondents’ counsel raised points in limine
which
according to him are fatal to the application. The points raised are
the anticipated dispute of fact; prescription; non-joinder
of the
seller and impossibility of performance. I shall therefore deal with
the points in seriatim.
ANTICIPATED
DISPUTE OF FACT
[19]
The
respondents’ counsel contends that the applicant opted for an
application procedure even though there was an anticipated
dispute of
fact. According to counsel application by way of motion procedure is
utilised where there are no disputes of facts.
The applicant can
therefore not succeed on motion. It knew in advance that it was not
on good ground as the application was bound
to be opposed. The
applicant knew at the time when it requested the liquidators to
transfer the property in its name that there
were no funds in the
trust account for the payment of the purchase price. It knew as such
that the respondents would refuse to
transfer the property into its
name. According to the respondents’ counsel the applicant could
not ask the liquidators to
transfer the property whilst it has
consented to the seller to use the funds for other purposes. The
applicant should have known
that it was taking a risk because the
seller disclosed that it did not have funds to complete the
development and that once the
funds left the trust account they were
no longer entrusted for the purpose of a purchase price.
[20]
It
is argued on behalf of the applicant that there is no dispute of fact
on the papers but a difference in interpretation. What
requires to be
determined by the court is whether the agreement is between the
applicant and the seller or the applicant and Lawrence.
The
applicant’s contention is that Lawrence is not part of the
agreement and that the applicant did not authorise the funds
to be
released to him (Lawrence) but to the seller. There is thus no
factual dispute as all the facts are contained in the agreement.
[21]
The
principal ways in which a dispute of fact arises have been succinctly
enunciated in Room Hire Co (Ptv) Ltd v Jeppe Street Mansions
(Ptv)
Ltd
1949
(3)
SA
1155
(TPD) at 1163. The clearest instance is, of course,
a.
when
the respondent denies all the material allegations made by the
various deponents on the applicant’s behalf, and produce
or
will produce, positive evidence by deponents or witnesses to the
contrary. He or she may have witnesses who are not presently
available or who, though averse to making an affidavit, would give
evidence viva voce
if
subpoenaed.
b.
The
respondent may admit the applicant’s affidavit evidence but
allege other facts which the applicant disputes.
c.
He
or she may concede that he or she has no knowledge of the main facts
stated by the applicant, but may deny them, putting applicant
to the
proof thereof and himself or herself giving or proposing to give
evidence to show that the applicant and his or her deponents
are
biased and untruthful or otherwise unreliable, and that certain facts
upon which the applicant and his or her deponents rely
to prove the
main facts are untrue.
d.
He
or she may state that he or she can lead no evidence himself or
herself or by others to dispute the truth of applicant’s
statements, which are peculiarly within applicant’s knowledge,
but he or she puts applicant to the proof thereof by oral
evidence
subject to cross-examination.
[22]
The
issue on this point is whether there is a dispute of fact in
circumstances where the applicant contends that the funds were
released to the seller whereas the respondents’ submission is
that the funds were released for the benefit of Lawrence.
[23]
This
issue arises from the facts contained in an agreement. The relevant
terms of the said agreement are set out in paragraph [16]
of this
judgment.
[24]
The
general rule is that a document is conclusive as to the terms of the
transaction which it was intended or required by law to
embody. Where
parties decide to embody their final agreement in written form, the
execution of the document deprives all previous
statements of their
legal effect. The previous statements are irrelevant and evidence to
prove them is inadmissible. The document
becomes conclusive as to the
terms of the transaction which it was intended to record. See Union
Government v Vianini
Ferro-Concrete
Pipes (Ptv) Ltd
1941
AD 43
at 47; Venter v Birchholtz
1972
(1) SA 276
(AD) at 282 and National Board (Pretoria) (Ptv) Ltd and
another v
Estate
Swanepoel
1975
(3) SA 16
(A) at 26A - H.
[25]
If I
find that there is indeed a dispute of fact, it means that the
respondents should or will have to produce positive evidence
by
deponents or witnesses contrary to the applicant’s evidence. In
the light of the judgments referred to in paragraph [24]
of this
judgment, the respondents’ evidence will be irrelevant and
inadmissible in the circumstances of this case. I am thus
satisfied
that there is no dispute of fact and that what is in issue is the
difference in interpretation. The extrinsic evidence
the respondents
seeks to rely on can be used for no other purpose but the
interpretation of the agreement. This point is therefore
unsustainable.
PRESCRIPTION
[26]
It
is argued on behalf of the respondents that the applicant’s
claim has become prescribed in terms of the provisions of the
Prescription Act No.68 of 1969
, as amended, in that a period of more
than three years has elapsed since the funds were paid over to
Lawrence and no demand has
been made for the refund of such funds.
The funds were released to Lawrence on 23 September 2008 which is
more than three years
before the applicant launched this application.
[27]
In
opposition to this point, the applicant’s counsel submits that
the applicant’s claim in this instance is not for
the return of
the funds released to Lawrence but for the transfer of the property
into its name. According to counsel, whether
the funds released and
the claim in respect thereof has prescribed, is irrelevant for
purposes of this application. He contends
that the first possible
time the applicant got to know that there was a problem with the
transfer is in November 2010 when it was
informed about the attitude
of the liquidators to the property. At all times before then the
applicant had no knowledge that the
property would not be
transferred. Information at its disposal was that transfer would take
place. The application was thus launched
three (3) months before the
claim prescribed.
[28]
I am
in agreement with the submission by the applicant’s counsel.
The purpose of this application is clearly set out in paragraph
13 of
the applicant’s founding affidavit. In essence the applicant
seeks an order to compel the respondents to sign all the
documents
required to effect the transfer of the property to the applicant to
give effect to the purchase agreement. It is common
cause that the
applicant only became aware that the liquidators were not going to
transfer the property to it in November 2010.
It is also not in
dispute that this application was launched in August 2012 which was
three months before the claim for the transfer
of the property could
become prescribed. To my mind, the applicant’s claim has not,
as suggested by the respondents’
counsel, become prescribed. I
am as a result compelled to reject this point.
NON
JOINDER
[29]
The
respondents’ contention is that the applicant should have
joined Lawrence, who has been sequestrated, and/or the trustees
to
his estate as a party to the proceedings as he (Lawrence) has a
material interest in these proceedings. The respondents’
view
is that Lawrence was involved in a substantial way in dissipating the
applicant’s funds.
[30]
The
argument by the applicant’s counsel is that the relief sought
by the applicant is against the liquidators now in charge
of the
insolvent estate of the seller and in their respective capacities as
the trustees of the estate. His further argument is
that the claim is
against the trustees based on the agreement entered into by the
applicant and the seller who is a close corporation.
Lawrence as such
is not involved and signed the agreement only as a duly authorised
representative of the seller. There is no argument
before this court
that the corporate veil should be lifted to include Lawrence as the
alter ego of the seller.
[31]
My
view is that on the findings I have already made, it was not
necessary for the applicant to have joined Lawrence or the trustees
of his estate to these proceedings. The claim in these proceedings,
as I have already stated, is for transfer of the property and
not for
the return of the funds. The applicant is therefore correct, the
claim is against the trustees/liquidators of the insolvent
estate of
the seller for the transfer of the property in the name of the
applicant.
IMPOSSIBILITY
OF PERFORMANCE
[32]
The
respondents’ contention is that transfer as prayed for by the
applicant cannot be given effect to as the funds intended
for the
purchase price of the property were dissipated by Lawrence and had
been denuded from the estate of the seller with the
consent of the
applicant.
[33]
This
point should also be dismissed. I have already made a ruling that the
funds were not released for the benefit of Lawrence but
for the
benefit of the seller.
[34]
I
rule therefore that the respondents’ counsel having failed to
sustain all the points he raised in limine
the
applicant should be granted the relief it seeks in its notice of
motion
COSTS
[35]
The
applicant having succeeded in its claim is entitled to costs of suit.
In its notice of motion the applicant prays for a special
cost order
on an attorney and client scale. I am however of the view that the
circumstances in this case do not entitle the applicant
to a punitive
cost order. To my mind, the respondent had a valid point of law which
required to be adjudicated upon. I as a result
grant a cost order
against the respondents (the first, second, third, fourth and fifth
respondents) in their joint capacity as
liquidators of the insolvent
estate of the seller. Such costs to be on a party and party scale.
ORDER
[36]
In
the circumstances I grant the following order:
a.
The
first, second, third, fourth and fifth respondents in their joint
capacities as liquidators of Meltin Properties 59 CC (in liquidation)
are ordered to sign within seven (7) days of being requested to do
so, all documents required for the seventh respondent (or any
other
properly appointed conveyancing attorneys) to effect transfer of
Sectional Title Units 1 and 3 of SS Norma Jean Square, 124/2010
situated at Die Howes Ext 197, 705, also known as units 1 & 3
Norma Jean Square, 244 Jean Avenue, Centurion, to the applicant
in
effecting the purchase agreement entered into between the applicant
and Meltin Properties 59 CC on 6 March 2008, alternatively
6 November
2008.
b.
In
the event that the first, second, third, fourth and fifth respondents
in their joint capacities as liquidators of Meltin Properties
59 CC
(in liquidation) fail or refuse to sign within seven (7) days of
being requested to do so all documents required for the
seventh
respondent (or any other properly appointed conveyancing attorneys)
to effect transfer of Sectional Title Units 1 and 3
of SS Norma Jean
Square,
124/2010
situated at Die Howes Ext 197, 705, also known as units 1 & 3
Norma Jean Square, 244 Jean Avenue, Centurion, to the
applicant in
effecting the purchase agreement entered into between the applicant
and Meltin Properties 59 CC on 6 March 2008, alternatively
6 November
2008, the sheriff of this court is ordered to sign all documents
required for the seventh respondent (or any other properly
appointed
conveyancing attorneys) to effect transfer of Sectional Title Units 1
and 3 of SS Norma Jean Square, 124/2010 situated
at Die Howes Ext
197, 705, also known as units 1 & 3 Norma Jean Square, 244 Jean
Avenue, Centurion, to the applicant in effecting
the purchase
agreement entered into between the applicant and Meltin Properties 59
CC on 6 March 2008, alternatively 6 November
2008.
c.
The
first, second, third, fourth and fifth respondents in their joint
capacity as liquidators of Meltin Properties 59 CC (In Liquidation)
are ordered to pay the costs of this application on a party and party
scale jointly and severally, the one paying the other to
be absolved.
E.
M. KUBUSHI
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
HEARD
ON THE : 20 AUGUST 2013
DATE
OF JUDGMENT : 17 JANUARY 2014
APPLICANT’S
COUNSEL: ADV J.C. KLOPPER
APPLICANT’S
ATTORNEY : VAN GREUNEN & ASSOCIATES INC
RESPONDENTS’
COUNSEL: ADV A. FARBER
RESPONDENTS’
ATTORNEY: FARBER SEABELO EDELSTEIN