Distell Limited v Melody Hills Trading Proprietary Limited (10404/2013, 10403/2013) [2015] ZAKZDHC 36 (24 April 2015)

80 Reportability
Insolvency Law

Brief Summary

Winding-up — Application for winding-up of company — Creditor's claim — Applicant seeking winding-up of respondent for inability to pay debts — Respondent disputing creditor status and delivery of goods — Court determining whether applicant proved its status as creditor and respondent's inability to pay debts — Evidence established that respondent operated in Western Cape and received deliveries, supporting applicant's claim — Application for winding-up granted.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The judgment concerns the return date of rules nisi granted in two related applications for the winding-up (liquidation) of companies in the KwaZulu-Natal High Court, Local Division, Durban. The matters were heard together by agreement between the parties, with primary reference to case number 10404/2013, because the outcome in case number 10403/2013 was treated as contingent upon proof of the principal debtor’s liability.


In case no. 10404/2013, the applicant was Distell Limited and the respondent was Melody Hills Trading 184 (Pty) Ltd. In case no. 10403/2013, the applicant was again Distell Limited, and the respondent was 888 Liquor Depot (Pty) Ltd, described in the judgment as a guarantor whose liability depended on the indebtedness of Melody Hills Trading 184 (Pty) Ltd as principal debtor.


The general subject-matter was whether Distell had established that it was a creditor of Melody Hills Trading 184 (Pty) Ltd for an amount of R2 001 523.24, and whether the respondents were unable to pay their debts as and when they fell due (commercial insolvency), justifying a final winding-up order. Distell also relied, in the alternative, on the ground that it was just and equitable to wind up the respondents, although the court’s determination focused on inability to pay debts.


2. Material Facts


It was not in dispute that on 27 September 2012 Distell and Melody Hills Trading 184 (Pty) Ltd concluded a credit supply agreement under which Distell would supply and deliver liquor products on credit to the respondent. The respondent would in turn distribute liquor products to Midmar Liquors Limited, which had been placed under business rescue in 2012 but continued trading.


Distell’s claim was that the respondent owed R2 001 523.24, said to arise from goods sold and delivered, with the debt comprising unpaid invoices for June 2013 and July 2013. Distell relied on documentation including a statement of account dated 31 August 2013 reflecting the indebtedness, and demand letters calling for payment.


The respondent disputed that Distell was its creditor and denied that Distell had delivered liquor products to it at its nominated address in relation to the amount claimed. It further asserted that it did not have a liquor branch in the Western Cape at Parow, and relied on clause 3 of the agreement which recorded a delivery address in Ballito, KwaZulu-Natal. In addition, the respondent emphasised that Distell did not provide delivery notes after demand, contending that this failure meant Distell did not prove delivery.


On the papers, the court treated the following as established (and material to the outcome) concerning the respondent’s operations in the Western Cape. Distell produced documentary material, including minutes of directors’ meetings and liquor-licensing related documentation, showing that the respondent resolved to apply to the National Liquor Authority to transfer registration and to add an additional address, and later resolved to apply to relocate its registered premises from 44 Duiker Street, Parow North, Western Cape to 8 Voortrekker Road, Bellville, Western Cape. The court also relied on a letter from the respondent’s attorney indicating that the company “used to trade from an address in Cape Town” and that important documents were kept at one location. These documents were treated as undermining the respondent’s denial of any Western Cape presence.


The court further relied on the respondent’s failure to challenge the indebtedness reflected in the statement of account and on the existence of substantial payments reflected on that statement (including payments of R500 000, R600 000, and R1 000 000). The court also relied on demand correspondence in August and September 2013, and email communications involving the respondent’s attorney (copied to a director of the respondent) that were treated as consistent with an acceptance that suppliers (including Distell) were owed amounts arising from the supply chain involving Midmar.


3. Legal Issues


The central questions the court was required to determine were whether Distell had established, on the papers, that it was a creditor of Melody Hills Trading 184 (Pty) Ltd in the amount claimed, and whether the respondent’s denial created a bona fide and reasonable dispute regarding indebtedness and delivery such that winding-up relief should not be granted.


Closely linked to this was the issue of locus standi: if Distell was not a creditor, it lacked standing to seek winding up. The court also had to determine whether the respondent was unable to pay its debts as and when they fell due in the ordinary course of business (a question involving the application of legal standards to facts and a value-laden assessment of commercial insolvency), rather than merely whether its balance sheet showed assets exceeding liabilities.


A further factual-legal issue was whether the respondent’s denial of a Western Cape branch (and the related denial of delivery to a Parow address) could be sustained in light of the documentary record, and whether the absence of delivery notes was decisive in proving or disproving delivery.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter on the basis that there were no disputes of fact incapable of resolution on the papers. It considered that the decisive enquiry was whether Distell had shown that it was a creditor and that the respondent was commercially insolvent, justifying final winding-up.


On the issue whether the respondent operated from Parow (and more broadly in the Western Cape), the court evaluated the respondent’s denial against documentary evidence generated within the respondent’s own corporate governance and regulatory processes. The minutes of directors’ meetings and the related liquor-registration documentation were treated as demonstrating that the respondent had registered premises in Parow and sought to relocate those premises to Bellville. The court also relied on the respondent’s attorney’s letter acknowledging that the company used to trade from an address in Cape Town. In the court’s assessment, these materials contradicted the respondent’s denial, and the denial was described as lacking candour, with the effect that the respondent’s delivery denials were viewed as part of an attempt to distance itself from the Western Cape.


Turning to delivery and indebtedness, the court accepted that delivery notes would have advanced Distell’s case, but held that the absence of delivery notes was not per se fatal where other evidence established delivery and indebtedness. The court considered the respondent’s demand for extensive documentation (covering the entire business relationship) to be unreasonable, while also observing that Distell’s case was confined to June and July 2013. The court also rejected the relevance of alleged transgressions of liquor regulatory provisions (including arguments about Regulation 23 of the National Liquor Regulations and alleged violations of the Liquor Act) to the narrow question whether deliveries were made and whether a debt existed.


The court placed weight on the statement of account reflecting indebtedness and a history of substantial payments, noting that the indebtedness was not challenged when the statement was rendered. The court also regarded the respondent’s failure to dispute the demand for payment as significant, reasoning that it would be curious and inexplicable for a party owing nothing to remain silent in the face of repeated demands and references to prior discussions. The email correspondence involving the respondent’s attorney, including emails about demands from suppliers and the need to attend urgently to payment to Distell, was treated as consistent with an acknowledgment of the debt rather than a bona fide dispute.


In addition, the court considered contractual provisions in the parties’ agreement. It relied on a clause providing that a certificate signed by a manager or director of the supplier would serve as prima facie proof of the respondent’s obligation and that the stipulated amount was due and payable. It also relied on a clause deeming the account statement correct unless objected to in writing within 14 days, and recorded that the respondent lodged no such objection. In the court’s view, these provisions, coupled with the documentary record and the respondent’s conduct, supported the conclusion that Distell had proved the debt and that the respondent did not dispute it on reasonable and bona fide grounds.


On insolvency, the court distinguished between claims of asset value and the ability to meet obligations in the ordinary course. Even though the respondent referred to assets approximated at R6 900 000, the court concluded that the respondent was commercially insolvent, because it had not demonstrated the existence of readily realisable assets enabling it to pay its debts as they fell due. The court ultimately held that Distell proved, on a preponderance of probabilities, that it was a creditor for the unpaid amount and that neither the principal debtor nor the guarantor was able to pay its debts.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court confirmed the provisional liquidation orders in both matters as final. It ordered that costs would be costs in the liquidation.


The relief sought by Distell was accordingly granted in the form of final winding-up orders, with the guarantor’s position flowing from the finding that the principal debtor was indebted and unable to pay.


Cases Cited


No case authorities were cited in the judgment.


Legislation Cited


Liquor Act 59 of 2003.


National Liquor Regulations (including reference to Regulation 23).


Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (referred to in the judgment as the “Electronic Communications and Transmissions Act”).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that Distell Limited proved, on the papers and on a balance of probabilities, that it was a creditor of Melody Hills Trading 184 (Pty) Ltd for R2 001 523.24 arising from liquor products supplied on credit, and that the respondent’s denials were not bona fide and reasonable in light of the documentary record, the absence of timely objection to statements of account, and the communications and conduct relied upon by the court.


The court further held that the respondent was commercially insolvent, in that it was unable to pay its debts as and when they fell due in the ordinary course of business, and had not shown the existence of readily realisable assets to meet its obligations. On that basis, the provisional liquidation orders in both case numbers were confirmed as final, with costs to be costs in liquidation.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that, in winding-up proceedings based on inability to pay debts, the applicant must establish creditor status and demonstrate the respondent’s commercial insolvency, namely an inability to pay debts as they fall due in the ordinary course, rather than merely pointing to balance-sheet assertions of asset value.


The court applied the principle that the absence of a particular class of documentary proof (here, delivery notes) is not necessarily decisive where other evidence on the papers sufficiently establishes delivery and indebtedness. It treated allegations of regulatory non-compliance in the liquor distribution process as not determinative of whether, in fact, goods were delivered and a debt accrued.


The court applied contractual provisions that permitted proof of indebtedness through a certificate constituting prima facie proof of the amount due, and a deeming provision by which a debtor is taken to accept the correctness of a statement of account absent a timely written objection. The court treated the respondent’s failure to object as materially supportive of Distell’s proof of indebtedness.


The court further applied the evaluative distinction between possessing assets in the abstract and demonstrating readily realisable assets capable of satisfying debts when due, treating the latter as central to the enquiry into commercial insolvency for winding-up relief.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban
>>
2015
>>
[2015] ZAKZDHC 36
|

|

Distell Limited v Melody Hills Trading Proprietary Limited (10404/2013, 10403/2013) [2015] ZAKZDHC 36 (24 April 2015)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
LOCAL DIVISION, DURBAN
CASE
NO’S 10404/2013
In the
matter between:
DISTELL
LIMITED
................................................................................................................
Applicant
and
MELODY
HILLS TRADING PROPRIETARY
LIMITED
..............................................
Respondent
AND
CASE NO: 10403/2013
DISTELL
LIMITED
...............................................................................................................
Applicant
and
888
LIQUOR DEPOT (PTY)
LTD
..................................................................................
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Delivered
on: 24 April 2015
NTSHANGASE
J
Introduction
[1]
This case is before court on the return date of the rules
nisi
in cases 10404/2013 and 10403/2013 in which orders are sought for the
winding up of Melody Hills Trading 184 Proprietary Limited
(the
respondent) and 888 Liquor Depot Proprietary Limited, (888 Liquor
Depot) in the respective cases.  The respondent features
as an
alleged principal debtor and the latter as a guarantor in respect of
liability of the respondent to the applicant to whom
the respondent
owes R2 001 523.24 according to the applicant.
[2]
The parties have agreed that the cases be heard simultaneously with
primary reference to be made to case 10404/2013 as the alleged

liability of the guarantor is contingent upon the applicant proving
the alleged liability of the principal debtor.
Background
to the application
[3]
It does not appear to be in dispute that on 27 September 2012 the
applicant and the respondent concluded an agreement in terms
whereof
the applicant would supply and deliver liquor products to the
respondent on credit.  The respondent would, in turn,
distribute
the liquor products to Midmar Liquors Limited (Midmar). Midmar was
placed under business rescue in 2012 but did not
cease trading.
The agreement is contained in an ‘Application for Supply of
Products and Purchase Facilities,’
annexure “JJJ2”
to the applicant’s founding affidavit. (the agreement).
[4]
The winding up is sought on the grounds that the respondent ‘is
unable to pay its debts as and when they fall due for
payment in the
ordinary course of its business,’ alternatively on the ground
that it is just and equitable that the respondents
be wound up.
The
issues
[5]
The respondent argues that the applicant is not its creditor and that
it has no
locus standi
to bring the present application before court.  The respondent
further submits that the applicant has failed to discharge
the onus
upon it to prove that the respondent is unable to pay its debts.
[6]
The applicant on this issue avers that –

(t)he applicant is a
creditor of the respondent in the amount of R2 001 523.24
(plus interest and costs). The debt arises
as a result of goods sold
and delivered by the applicant on account to the respondent.’
The applicant also states that –

(t)he debt consists of
unpaid invoices for June 2013 and July 2013.’
[7] The respondent in turn states –
‘…
I dispute that the
applicant has made delivery of any liquor products to the respondent
at its nominated address in relation to
the amount claimed by the
applicant. I submit further that the respondent did not have any
liquor branch situated in the Western
Cape at Parow.’
[8]
I think the task of this court is to determine whether the applicant
has proved that it is the respondent’s creditor who
is unable
to pay its debts and whether, upon consideration of all the papers
before it, the applicant has, on a balance of probabilities,

established a case for the winding up of the respondent.
[9]
Germaine to this aspect is the question whether the respondent at any
stage operated from the Western Cape and whether deliveries
which
bear on the amount claimed were made to the respondent or not. I
shall deal with these issues in what follows.  I pause
here to
state that there are no disputes of fact in this matter which cannot
be resolved on the papers before court.
The
issue whether the respondent operated at Parow
[10]
I will deal first with the question whether or not the respondent
operated at all as distributor of liquor products in the
Western
Cape.  I do so in the light of the respondent’s denial
that it had a branch from which it operated in the Western
Cape and
also in the light of reference to Melody Hills (Pty) Limited
alongside “Coastal Liquors Parow” as the entity
“sold
to” and “to deliver to” in the tax invoice,
annexure “JJJ 4” and reference to the same
entity as the
debtor in the statement dated 31 August 2013, annexure “JJJ3”
issued by the applicant. What the respondent
does not dispute is that
it traded as “Coastal Liquors.”
[11]
The respondent refers to Clause 3 of the Agreement, and points to the
fact that the delivery address as agreed to by the parties
is “corner
of Moffat and Stewart Drive, Ballito, KwaZulu-Natal.”
It
further avers that -

(a) perusal of the alleged
invoices annexed by the applicant which appears as annexure “JJJ4”
to the founding affidavit
mention that delivery allegedly occurred to
an address at 8 Voortrekker Road,
Boston
…’
(my emphasis)
and
that

(i)t appears from the
alleged statements of account, namely annexures “JJJ 3”that
an address of an entity referred to
as Coastal Liquors Parow is the
entity to which the statements have been addressed.  The
reference to
Parow might be an
address intended by the applicant to refer to a destination in the
Western Cape’
(my
emphasis)
[12]
The tenor of the foregoing averments proclaims unfamiliarity with the
address “Voortrekker Road, Boston as the place
to “deliver
to” as reflects on annexure “JJJ 4” as well as with
“an entity referred to as Coastal
Liquors Parow”.
The respondent’s averment postulates uncertainty and a surmise
that “Parow might be an
address intended by the applicant to
refer to a destination in the Western Cape.”
[13]
It is fair to grant that the respondent might be pleading lack of
familiarity with 8 Voortrekker Road
Boston
(my underlining) as reflects in annexure “JJJ 4” as the
place to “deliver to” whereas elsewhere 8 Voortrekker

Road is placed in “Bellville.” But the respondent cannot
truthfully plead unfamiliarity with “Coastal Liquors
Parow”
nor can it truthfully ‘submit … that the respondent did
not have any liquor branch situated in the Western
Cape at Parow.’
[14]
Appended hereunder are the relevant parts of an extract from the
minutes of a meeting of the Directors of the respondent dated
27
September 2012 – annexure “RA 5” to the applicant’s
replying affidavit:

Resolved that:
1.
The
Company will apply to the National Liquor Authority to transfer
Registration RG 0003716 from the name of Melody Hills Trading
184
(Pty) Ltd and to add an additional address at c/o Moffat &
Stewart Drive on Erf 3588, Liquor Depot Place, Ballito, KZN,
to the
existing address’
The
application is annexed to the applicant’s replying affidavit as
“RA 4”.
[15]
The registration certificate of Premium Liquor (Pty) Ltd dated 16
September 2011 annexed to annexure “RA 4” reflects
the
following:

REGISTRANT’S NAME AND
ADDRESS OF PREMISES AT OR FROM WHICH THE REGISTERED ACTIVITIES MAY BE
CONDUCTED
Premium Liquor (Pty) Ltd t/a Premium
Liquor, 44 Duiker Street, Parow Industrial, on Erf 11296, Parow,
Western Cape Province.’
[16]
On application for the transfer of the registration of Premium Liquor
Distributors to it the respondent proposed the following
registered
addresses:

1.1 Liquor Depot Place Corner
of Moffat & Stewart Drive on Erf 3588, Ballito, 4418, KZN
Province
1.2
44
Duiker Street, Parow Industrial on Erf 11296, Parow, Western Cape
Province.’
This
appears at ‘annexure “A” to annexure “RA 4.”
[17]
Appended hereunder is the relevant part of an extract from the
minutes of a meeting of Directors of the respondent, annexure
“RA
5”, held at Ballito on 2013/04/24.

RESOLVED THAT:
1.
The
company will apply to the National Liquor Authority
to
relocate its registered premises from 44 Duiker Street, Parow North,
Western Cape
to 8 Voortrekker Road,
Bellville, Western Cape…” (my emphasis).
It
is evident from this that the respondent did in fact have registered
premises, namely 44 Duiker Street, Parow North in the Western
Cape
from which it sought to transfer to 8 Voortrekker Road, Bellville in
the Western Cape.  The minutes were signed by the
respondent’s
Director Pravesh Rajkumar Singh (Pravesh).
[18]
What further defeats the respondent’s attempt to distance
itself from the Western Cape is a letter from its attorney

Hemanth Haricharan, a professional assistant to Hemanth Rajkumar
Singh (Hemanth), annexure “A 20” to applicant’s

supplementary affidavit in response to the respondent’s
affidavit dated 28 July 2014, whose relevant part reads:

It must be borne in mind that
the above company (Melody Hills 184
(Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) used to trade from an address in Cape
Town,
and all important documents were
kept at one location.’  (my emphasis).
[19]
The foregoing belies the respondent’s assertion that

(it) did not have any liquor
branch situated in the Western Cape at Parow’
an
assertion proffered in a vain attempt to distance itself from Parow
in aid of its denial that deliveries to it occurred in Parow.

This demonstrates a lack of candour, to say the least, on the part of
the respondent. It is evident that the respondent traded
from both
Ballito and Parow. The untruthful denial by the respondent that it
operated its distributor business in the Western Cape
has constrained
it to deny that liquor products were delivered to it, not only in
Ballito, but also in Parow.
The
alleged deliveries and debt amounting to R2001 523.24
[20]
Central to the respondent’s case, apart from asserting that no
deliveries relating to the amount claimed were made to
the nominated
address, is the issue that the applicant has declined, for no stated
reason, on demand, to furnish to the respondent,
delivery notes
evidencing delivery of goods to the value of R2001 523.24 in
consequence whereof, so the argument goes, the applicant
has failed
to discharge the onus resting upon it to prove delivery of goods on
which it relies.
[21]
The respondent’s attorneys by e-mail of 22 June 2014, demanded
production of delivery notes as follows:

2. We request you to
furnish us with all invoices, order notes and delivery notes from
inception of your client’s business
relationship with Melody
Hills, till final delivery.
3. We require all the documents for all collections
made by any persons, or entity for the account of Melody Hills.
4. We further require the
registration details of the vehicles attending to collection and
confirmation of who had signed the order
and delivery notes.’
It
suffices to say that this was a tall order indeed.  It was an
unreasonable demand which expected the applicant to produce
delivery
notes covering not only a long period of the parties’ business
relationship but also delivery notes on transactions
in which
millions of rand changed hands. On the other hand, given the fact
that the applicant assigns the debt to deliveries in
the months of
June and July 2013 only, the applicant could have managed to supply
the respondent with the required information
if it chose to in the
advancement of its case.  While production of delivery notes
would advance the applicant’s case,
failure to produce such
notes is not
per se
fatal to the applicant’s case unless its entire case is
pillared on no other evidence. Similarly, a delivery by one party
to
another at an address other than one nominated for delivery does not
by itself detract from the reality that delivery was made
to the
other party if other evidence establishes that it was.
[22]
Much was made of the fact that any delivery at any but the place
indicated on the invoice, without an order and an invoice
containing
the delivery address, would be a transgression of Regulation 23 of
the National Liquor Regulations.  Other alleged
violations of
the
Liquor Act 59 of 2003
were referred to impugn the applicant’s
delivery process. Any transgression of the
Liquor Act and
Regulations
has no bearing on the question whether deliveries were made or not to
the respondent.
[23]
What now falls to be determined is whether the applicant, by evidence
other than delivery notes, has established that it delivered
liquor
products to the respondent.  Viewed from the parties’
business transactions which involved millions of rands
it is
inconceivable that for its operations in Parow the respondent would
dispense with liquor product supplies from the applicant.

Annexure “JJJ 3” dated 31 August 2013, a statement of
account from the applicant reflecting an indebtedness of
R2 001 523.24
was rendered to “Coastal Liquors,
Parow, Melody Hills Trading 184 (Pty) Ltd.”  This alleged
indebtedness was not
challenged by the respondent.  Instead of
this the statement reflects payments of substantial amounts of money
by the respondent
which include R500 000, R600 000,
R1 000 000 and others.
[24]
On 21 August 2013 a letter of demand for payment of R2 001 523.24
annexure “JJJ 7” was addressed to the

“Director(s)/Manager(s)” of the respondent.  In the
letter of demand the applicant represented by Daya Pillay,

applicant’s General Manager of the Southern Region wrote to the
Director(s)/Manager(s) of the respondent as follows:

Re
letter of demand/overdue account (amount R2 001 523.24).
Previous correspondence as well as discussions regarding
the above have reference. We are disappointed to note that the
account
remains overdue.
We take note of challenges relating
to payment of your account by Midmar Ltd (under business rescue) but
respectfully submit that
this issue is no concern of ours. Our
customer is Melody Hills Trading (Pty) Ltd to whom we look for
payment together with the
sureties and co. principal debtors.
We must insist on your account being paid immediately.’
The
respondent did not challenge this alleged indebtedness and the demand
for immediate payment.  It is evident from the foregoing
that
the parties had engaged in correspondence over the alleged
indebtedness of the respondent.
A
failure by any person who did not owe any money to challenge
allegations of indebtedness and demands for payment would be as
curious as it would be inexplicable.
[25]
In e-mail correspondence which passed between Hemanth, the
respondent’s own attorney of record, no dispute is raised

against the respondent’s alleged indebtedness.  Instead,
by way of example, Hemanth, on 20 August 2013 sent to Juanito
Damons
(Juanito), the business rescue practitioner of Midmar, an e-mail,
annexure “JJJ 6” whose relevant part reads:

Further to your e-mail of even
date, kindly note that we are now receiving letters of demand from
the suppliers and this is simply
due to the fact that stock from
Melody Hills Trading was supplied to Midmar.
As
you are aware, the stock in the Midmar Stores belongs to Melody Hills
Trading.
In the event you cannot pay out the credit line, we are
amenable to uplifting the stock from the Midmar Stores and returning
to
the suppliers.
Further, the payment held in trust
which is in excess of R3.3 million could be used to pay the credit
line of Melody Hills Trading.’
To
this Juanito responded per e-mail on 20 August 2013 whose relevant
part reads:

I
spoke to you earlier and informed you to hold the matter over about
paying suppliers
until Friday, when we hope
to have judgment.’
[26]
The relevant part of Hemanth’s other e-mail, annexure “JJJ
9” dated 4 September 2013 reads:

Dear Juanito
We
need to attend to this payment to Distell urgently.”
This
was apparently triggered by the demand from the applicant dated 4
September 2013, annexure “JJJ 8” whose relevant
part
reads:

Our
letter of demand dated 21 August 2013 has reference.
We
have not received a response to the demand which is unacceptable.
We demand that you settle this
account by close of business on Monday, 9 September 2013.’
This
shows that despite demand on 21 August 2013 the amount claimed had
remained unpaid as at 4 September 2013.
[27]
The e-mail of 20 August 2013, annexure “JJJ 6” was copied
to Pravesh, a shareholder and Director of the respondent
and other
persons.  He raised no dispute in regard to its contents, nor
did he do so in regard to the contents of the e-mail
of 4 September
2013, annexure “JJJ 9”, copied to him.
[28]
The respondent takes issue with the e-mails as lacking probative
value.  It avers that the applicant wrongly induced Hemanth
into
believing that it had delivered liquor products to the respondent and
that the e-mails were a product of suspect information
furnished by
applicant to Hemanth.  The respondent contends that the
applicant’s reliance on an e-mail involving Hemanth
was wrong
as Hemanth was neither a shareholder nor a director of the respondent
and had no authority to bind the respondent.
The respondent
attempts to distance itself from Hemanth and refers to Hemanth as one
would to a distant acquaintance.  The
respondent states that the
applicant is

relying
upon certain e-mail communications allegedly addressed by a certain
Hemanth Rajkumar Singh …’
[29]
Hemanth and respondent cannot be distant acquaintances if regard is
had to the e-mails, annexure “JJJ 6” to the
applicant’s
founding affidavit which transmit –

the latest updated
correspondence with B R (presumably business rescue) and another
which conveys –
“…
we are now
receiving letters of demand from the suppliers…”
I
have earlier referred to this e-mail in greater detail.  What is
significant is that the e-mails from Hemanth were copied
to Pravesh.
If the identity of the sender of the e-mails and the e-mails
themselves to Pravesh were strange, his failure
as Director of the
respondent to react thereto, given the contents of such e-mails, was
just as strange.
[30]
The respondent submits that the e-mails ‘(do not) comply with
the material-requisites of the Electronic Communications
and
Transmissions Act’ and are consequently inadmissible.  No
argument was devoted to this aspect at the hearing of
the matter.
[31]
Hemanth himself deposed to an affidavit in attempts to identify
himself as an outsider whose involvement in e-mail communications

with various persons relevant to this matter flew from ‘a
business relationship’ born of dealings with the applicant
in
respect of other entities; it flew from an approach by the applicant
about the respondent’s account and a request by the
applicant
“to intervene”; it was born of an inducement to believe
that the amount in arrears was due to the applicant
for liquor
supplies delivered by it to the respondent and “in good faith
and upon representations made to (him) by the applicant
(he)
assisted.”  He does not state how he assisted.
[32]
I had thought that Hemanth sought to describe impartially the
circumstances which led to his involvement in the matter.

Instead he engaged in argument about the applicant’s invoice,
annexure “JJJ 4” stating that “it is of particular

concern that the alleged invoice describes the purported delivery
mode as being “customer collect …” and he
further
states that (his) understanding is that the National
Liquor Act, as
well as the National Liquor Regulations, do not allow the collection
by a customer of liquor products from a distributor as a mode
of
distribution …”
[33]
Hemanth argues further on behalf of the respondent stating that “(a)s
far as (he) is aware, the respondent did not have
vehicles in the
Western Cape to collect liquor from the applicant’s premises
bearing in mind the quantity in question to
the alleged value of over
R2 million.”
Hemanth
also attacks the applicant’s replying affidavit as
contradictory in regard to the issue of delivery of the liquor

products.
[34]
What Hemanth did not deal with is the nature of his association with
the respondent.  According to the applicant, the
applicant was
introduced to Hemanth in September 2012 when the applicant was
involved in litigation against Midmar.  Hemanth
was, at that
time, involved in negotiations to take over Midmar, a take over which
eventually happened at the end of 2012.
After the end of 2012
Hemanth approached the applicant on behalf of the respondent for
credit. Carol-Ann Wiese, the Customer Accounts
Manageress at the
applicant’s offices required that he execute a suretyship in
favour of the applicant for debts of the respondent,
which Hemanth
did. It is Annexure “A” to the affidavit of Jacobs, the
applicant’s Customer Accounts Manager and
deponent to
applicant’s affidavit in reply to Hemanth’s affidavit of
19 June 2014.
[35]
It is as improbable as it is inconceivable that Hemanth, a surety for
the respondent, would be so lacking on information regarding
the
respondent’s financial affairs that he would be vulnerable to
inducement by the applicant to believe that the respondent’s

alleged indebtedness arose from deliveries of liquor products to it
(to the respondent) which never happened.  The respondent’s

attempts to distance itself from Hemanth’s communications are
defeated by the respondent’s acquiescence to his involvement
in
communications copied to Pravesh which pertained to the respondent’s
alleged indebtedness. Needless to say that in the
light of the
foregoing, Hemanth fails dismally in his vain attempt to distance
himself from what he conveyed in his e-mails.
[36]
What emerges from the foregoing is the fact that the respondent was
aware of its alleged liability in the amount  R2 001 523.24;

if from no other source, then from the statement, annexure “JJJ
3” and from the letter of demand as well as from the
e-mails
copied to its director.  It was also aware that the amount of R2
000 523.24 was in respect of deliveries of liquor
products which
include deliveries to Parow in the Western Cape.
[37]
In what is relevant to the aspect of indebtedness, Clause II of the
parties’ agreement provides –

A certificate under signature
of any Manager or Director of the supplier (applicant) whose
authority shall not be necessary to prove,
prima
facie
shall be proof of the obligation
of the Applicant (respondent) towards the supplier and also of the
fact that the amount so stipulated
is already due and payable with
any interest payable thereon.’
The
certificate as contemplated under this Clause signed by the
applicant’s Customer Accounts Manager (Southern Africa)
reflects
the respondent’s indebtedness to the applicant, as
R2 001 523.24 plus interest and costs.
[38]
The relevant part of Clause 12 of the agreement provides –

Unless the applicant
(respondent) objects in writing within 14 (fourteen) days of date of
the statement to any item appearing thereon,
the applicant shall be
deemed to have accepted the statement as correct.’
The
respondent lodged no such objection.  This signifies its
acceptance of the certificate as correct.
[39]
Although the respondent, in its answering affidavit disputes the
correctness of the contents of annexure “JJJ 2”,
the
‘Application for supply of Products and Purchase Facilities,’
it provides no indication as to the nature of such
incorrectness:
Annexure “JJJ 2” constitutes an agreement between the
parties on whose behalf it was signed.
[40]
In the light of the foregoing it is inescapable to conclude, as I do,
that the applicant did in fact deliver to the respondent
the liquor
products for which R2001 523.24 is claimed.  The respondent does
not, on reasonable and
bona fide
grounds, dispute its indebtedness to the applicant.  The
respondent in fact made payments on the account as earlier
indicated.
Payments ceased when the respondent apparently
became unable to make further payments.  When respondent became
unable to make
further payments, in a frantic effort to find money,
Hemanth, in annexure “JJJ 6”, explored the possibility of
utilising
‘the payment held in trust which was in excess of
R3.3 million … to pay the credit line of Melody Hills
Trading.’
Juanito, explained, in response, that the money was
no longer available.
[41]
The respondent points to assets whose value it approximates at
R6 900 000 to show that it is not insolvent.
The
respondent is in fact insolvent; it is commercially insolvent.
Its commercial insolvency lies in its manifest inability
to pay its
debts as and when they fall due for payment in the ordinary course of
business.   Although the respondent
avers that it has
substantial assets, it has not demonstrated that there are readily
realisable assets available out of which or
out of the proceeds of
which the respondent is in fact able to pay its debts.
[42]
On a preponderance of probabilities the applicant has established
that it (the applicant) is in fact the respondent’s
creditor in
respect of the unpaid amount of R2 001 523.24 and that neither the
respondent as the principal debtor nor 888 Liquor
depot is able to
pay its debts.
I
accordingly make the following order:
1.
The provisional liquidation orders in cases
10403/2013 and 10404/2013 are confirmed as final.
2.
Costs shall be costs in liquidation.
DATE
OF HEARING: 13 February 2015
DATE
OF JUDGMENT: 24 April 2015
FOR
THE APPLICANT: Mr J C King SC, instructed by Edward Nathan
Sonnenbergs Inc, locally represented by Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs

Inc.
FOR
THE RESPONDENT: Mr M Manikam, instructed by Hemanth Singh &
Company, locally represented by Beekhan & Company.