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[2015] ZAKZPHC 50
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Mpili and Others v S (AR 182/2012) [2015] ZAKZPHC 50 (5 November 2015)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
Case
No: AR 182/2012
DATE:
05 NOVEMBER 2015
NOT
REPORTABLE
In
the matter between:
BUSISIWE
PRISCILLA
MPILI
....................................................................................
First
Appellant
ZWELIJIKILE
DALTON
MPINGANA
....................................................................
Second
Appellant
NKOSENYE
MPHENDULI
DLADLA
........................................................................
Third
Appellant
STHEMBISO
ANDRIES
MHLONGO
......................................................................
Fourth
Appellant
And
THE
STATE
............................................................................................................................
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Gorven
J:
[1]
In 2007 and 2008, the political temperature
in a branch of the African National Congress (the ANC) based in
Umlazi reached boiling
point. This revolved largely around the
election of delegates to the forthcoming national meetings to be held
in Polokwane. It
was further fuelled by interpersonal rivalries and
grudges. As a result, members of one camp of the branch conspired to
kill members
of the other camp. Two people were hired to do so and
firearms were procured for that purpose. An unsuccessful attempt was
made
on the life of the chairperson of the branch after which the
secretary was killed by multiple gunshot wounds.
[2]
As a result of these crimes, the appellants
appeared in the High Court before Kruger J, sitting with two
assessors. The charges
against all four were as follows:
Count
1: Conspiracy to commit the crime of murder;
Count
2: Attempted murder;
Count
3: Murder.
In
addition, the second and third appellants were charged with the
unlawful possession of a firearm as count 4. The first appellant
and
the second and fourth appellants were represented by a single legal
practitioner whilst the third appellant was separately
represented.
The appellants all pleaded not guilty to all of the charges and
elected not to disclose the basis of their defence.
[3]
The first appellant was found guilty on
count 1 and not guilty on the other two counts. The second appellant
was acquitted on count
1 and found guilty on counts 2, 3 and 4. He
was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment on count 2, life
imprisonment on count
3 and 3 years’ imprisonment on count 4.
The third appellant was convicted on count 2 but was acquitted on
counts 1, 3 and
4, having been discharged at the end of the State
case on counts 3 and 4 in terms of s 174 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51
of 1977 (the Act). He was sentenced to 8 years’
imprisonment. The fourth appellant was acquitted on count 1 but
convicted
on counts 2 and 3. On count 2 he was sentenced to 8 years’
imprisonment and on count 3 to 25 years’ imprisonment and
it
was ordered that his sentences were to run concurrently.
[4]
The second and fourth appellants were
granted leave to appeal against their convictions and sentences. The
third appellant was granted
leave to appeal against his conviction
only. The first appellant also appealed but subsequently withdrew her
appeal. In all cases,
leave to appeal was granted by the court
a
quo
.
[5]
The
State relied heavily upon an accomplice witness by the name of
Ngubane. He was warned in terms of s 204 of the Act.
[1]
His evidence was to the following effect. Strong rival camps and a
jockeying for position developed within a branch of the ANC
in Umlazi
in 2007. In May or June 2007, Ngubane and one Nene were released from
prison. They felt that Mshibe, the Chairperson
of the branch at the
time and the complainant in count 2, had failed to give them support
while they were in prison. In addition,
Mshibe had conducted
disciplinary hearings against them and Ngubane was fined by the
branch. He had also said in the presence of
others that Ngubane was a
killer, thus embarrassing him. A Branch General Conference was held
in May or June 2008 in preparation
for a national meeting of the ANC
to be held in 2009 in Polokwane. The fuse which lit the conflict
concerned the delegates who
were to represent the branch at
Polokwane. At the time, Mshibe and Mkhize, the deceased in count
three, were in control of the
branch. Mshibe was the chairperson and
Mkhize was the secretary. The first appellant, who along with the
second appellant was a
member of the branch executive committee,
harboured aspirations to attend the Polokwane conference. When Mshibe
and Mkhize would
not budge, the first, second and fourth appellants
decided that Mshibe should be killed. To that end, Ngubane and the
second appellant
located the third appellant and Nkosi Dladla
(Nkosi), who is since deceased. Ngubane said that Nkosi was the third
appellant’s
brother. These two agreed to the second appellant
and Ngubane’s request to kill him for a fee of R8 000.
[6]
On the appointed day, the two hitmen were
collected by the second appellant in the morning. They waited for
Mshibe to leave for
work but, because the motor vehicle was full of
people, they did not carry out the hit. When Ngubane returned from
work that afternoon
at approximately 16h00, he and the second and
fourth appellants agreed that the hitmen should kill Mshibe that
evening, because
he was expected to attend a meeting at around 17h00.
The second appellant and Ngubane then fetched the hitmen in the
second appellant’s
red Toyota Conquest. They took them to
Mangosuthu Highway and dropped them off at the side of the road. They
were able to see Mshibe
approaching in his vehicle on the road below
Mangosuthu Highway. The hitmen descended some stairs to that road.
The second appellant
and Ngubane drove slowly away to ensure that the
hitmen made their escape and, as they did so, heard a number of
gunshots and then
saw the hitmen cross the main road and go up
towards the men’s hostel. When Ngubane and the second appellant
telephoned the
hitmen, they claimed to have killed Mshibe. It was
later discovered that he did not die. Ngubane and the second
appellant then
went to the hitmen to find out what had happened. The
third appellant told them that one of the firearms only fired one
shot and
thereafter malfunctioned. The other was fired until there
were no more bullets. The hitmen agreed to make another attempt and
to
be paid only when successful.
[7]
Sometime thereafter, Ngubane, and the
first, second and fourth appellants decided that Mkhize, rather than
Mshibe, should be killed.
It was agreed that the second appellant and
the two hitmen would go to find the home of Mkhize. The next day the
fourth appellant
phoned Ngubane to find out whether the second
appellant had fetched the two hitmen. Ngubane said that, because he
was at work,
he did not know and told him to phone the second
appellant. The fourth appellant subsequently called back with a
report. Later,
while Ngubane was at the house of a councillor, one
Xulu, the second appellant arrived and reported that he, the third
appellant
and Nkosi had seen Mkhize passing on the road. Ngubane then
phoned the sister of Mkhize’s wife and warned her that Mkhize
must not go to work or should leave late for work, but gave no
reason. The second appellant later phoned him and said that he and
the hitmen had not seen Mkhize that day. Ngubane and the second and
fourth appellants met a few days later and it was decided that
the
killing must take place immediately. The second appellant had
procured a firearm from the fourth appellant to give to the hitmen.
Ngubane saw the firearm in their presence and it was a black Z88. It
was agreed that the second appellant should fetch the hitmen
the
following day so that they could kill Mkhize.
[8]
The following day, Friday 10 October 2008,
Ngubane left to work elsewhere. Whilst he was there, he was phoned by
the second appellant,
the third appellant, Nkosi and the fourth
appellant, all of whom told him that Mkhize had been killed. The
fourth appellant told
him that he was going to the place to see for
himself. On Ngubane’s return the following day, the roads were
teaming with
comrades who were singing that Mkhize had been killed by
councillor Xulu. Ngubane met the second appellant and the fourth
appellant
at the latter’s residence. The fourth appellant
requested the return of his firearm but the second appellant said
that he
had retained it. The fourth appellant gave R5 000 to
Ngubane and the second appellant and the two of them took it to the
third
appellant at the men’s hostel. They were to raise the
balance of R3 000 later. Nkosi, who was bathing at the time, was
not present when they handed it to the third appellant.
[9]
Ngubane had pangs of conscience about the
death of Mkhize because he regarded him as a friend. As a result, he
spoke to a police
officer he was working with who advised him to make
a clean breast of things. On 16 October 2008, he phoned Mshibe in the
morning,
went to see him at his home and told him his story. Mshibe
said he would revert to Ngubane and, that afternoon, arrived at the
home of the latter in the company of a police officer. Things
progressed and the police officers who had become involved said that
the persons should be fetched while everything was fresh. Ngubane
accompanied them and the four appellants and Nkosi were arrested.
Ngubane was subsequently arrested as well.
[10]
Mshibe gave evidence that, on 12 September
2008, shots were fired at his vehicle while he was driving to a
meeting. He was travelling
on a road below Mangosuthu Highway between
17h00 and 18h00 in the evening. He noticed two males coming down the
steps leading from
Mangosuthu Highway. When he came alongside, one of
them was pointing a firearm at his vehicle from approximately 8
metres away.
He tried to shield himself with his right hand and duck
for cover whilst driving. His right hand was hit and, while he saw
the
gunman ‘fiddling’ with the firearm, he managed to
escape and drove to St Augustine’s Hospital using only his left
hand. He was hospitalised for two or three weeks. On 10 October 2008,
he received a phone call and went to a place where he found
Mkhize
lying dead on the ground. The following week he received a phone call
from Ngubane who then came to see him at home and
told him his story.
He confirmed that he and Ngubane did not see eye to eye on political
matters but that Ngubane had claimed that
the death of Mkhize was
bothering him. He did not see the assailants sufficiently clearly so
as to be able to identify them.
[11]
Inspector Ramana testified that he and the
investigating officer at the time, Warrant Officer Malinga, who had
since died, accompanied
the second appellant to his house. They were
taking the second appellant to court on the morning of 17 October
2008. They told
him that they had information that he had a firearm
there. The second appellant took them to a certain room and informed
them that
a firearm was under the mattress there. Warrant Officer
Malinga lifted the mattress and recovered a firearm. It was a black
Z88,
which is the same firearm as is used by the police. The serial
number of that firearm had been removed. The second appellant was
arrested for unlawful possession of a firearm.
[12]
Formal admissions were made by the
appellants in terms of s 220 of the Act. The effect of these was
that Mkhize had been killed
on 10 October 2008 at the place his body
was recovered. His death was caused by multiple gunshot wounds fired
at him there. He
had three gunshot wounds to the head and five to the
chest. Two bullets were recovered from his body, one from the left
frontal
bone and one from the right frontal brain, as were cartridge
cases at the scene. The cartridge cases so recovered had been fired
from the firearm found at the second appellant’s home. It was
not possible to determine whether the bullets in question had
been
fired from that firearm. The firearm in question was a firearm as
defined in the
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000
and the serial number
had been removed and could not be determined. There is no issue that
the State proved the chain of evidence
concerning the murder and the
linking of the firearm to the murder.
[13]
The appellants all gave evidence in their
defence. Their evidence amounted to a bare denial of that of Ngubane.
The trial court
gave a lengthy, comprehensive summary of all the
evidence led at the trial. It evaluated the evidence of each witness
and demonstrated
a detailed, full grasp.
[14]
It
must be borne in mind that, not only was Ngubane a single witness to
many of the events, but he was an accomplice as well. Holmes
JA
warned of the difficulty accomplice witnesses present when, in
S
v Hlapezula
,
[2]
he said:
‘
It
is well settled that the testimony of an accomplice requires
particular scrutiny because of the cumulative effect of the following
factors. First, he is a self-confessed criminal. Second,
various considerations may lead him falsely to implicate the
accused,
for example, a desire to shield a culprit or, particularly
where he has not been sentenced, the hope of clemency. Third, by
reason
of his inside knowledge, he has a deceptive facility for
convincing description - his only fiction being the substitution of
the
accused for the culprit. Accordingly, even where
sec. 257
of the
Code has been satisfied, there has grown up a cautionary rule of
practice requiring
(a)
recognition
by the trial Court of the foregoing dangers, and
(b)
the
safeguard of some factor reducing the risk of a wrong conviction,
such as corroboration implicating the accused in the
commission of
the offence, or the absence of gainsaying evidence from him, or his
mendacity as a witness, or the implication
by the accomplice of
someone near and dear to him’.
It
has been said of single witnesses that their evidence must be ‘
clear
and satisfactory in every material respect’.
[3]
This
is not the test, however, as appears from
S
v Sauls & others
:
[4]
‘
There
is no rule of thumb test or formula to apply when it comes to a
consideration of the credibility of the single witness (see
the
remarks of RUMPFF JA in
S
v Webber
1971
(3) SA 754
(A)
at
758). The trial Judge will weigh his evidence, will consider its
merits and demerits and, having done so, will decide whether
it is
trustworthy and whether, despite the fact that there are shortcomings
or defects or contradictions in the testimony, he is
satisfied that
the truth has been told. The cautionary rule referred to by DE
VILLIERS JP in 1932 may be a guide to a right decision
but it does
not mean
"that
the appeal must succeed if any criticism, however slender, of the
witnesses' evidence were well founded"
(
Per
SCHREINER
JA in
R
v Nhlapo
(AD
10 November 1952) quoted in
R
v Bellingham
1955
(2) SA 566
(A)
at
569). It has been said more than once that the exercise of caution
must not be allowed to displace the exercise of common sense.’
[15]
The trial court was alive to the caution
necessary when evaluating the evidence of Ngubane. It listed various
aspects of his evidence
which were not challenged by the second
appellant. These included that the second appellant did not challenge
the evidence of Ngubane,
that the second appellant had located the
hitmen, that his red Toyota Conquest vehicle was used to transport
them, that Ngubane
was with him and the hitmen when the latter were
dropped off on the Mangosuthu Highway shortly before shots were
fired, that he
drove away slowly so as to make sure that the hitmen
escaped, that the fourth appellant had provided him with the firearm
which
he handed to the hitmen, that the fourth appellant requested
its return after the murder of Mkhize, that he had phoned Ngubane to
tell him that the murder was successful, that he was present when the
fourth appellant handed over the R5 000 to pay the hitmen
and
that he and Ngubane went to the hostel and handed this money to the
third appellant. The trial court was also alive to the
contradictions
and improbabilities in the version of the second appellant as well as
evidence which corroborated that of Ngubane.
Possibly the main aspect
was the evidence of Inspector Ramana that the firearm linked to the
offence was found in the possession
of the second appellant and was a
Z88 as Ngubane testified. The second appellant’s evidence about
the firearm was contradictory
and entirely improbable. Not only that,
but he failed to put his version to Inspector Ramana. His evidence
that a tuck shop run
from his house would be clear to anyone who
entered was contradicted by his own evidence that the tuck shop was
inside the house
and accessed by a separate door.
[16]
The third appellant did not challenge the
evidence of Ngubane that Nkosi was his brother but first asserted
this in his evidence.
In addition, the versions of Ngubane and Mshibe
as to the attempted murder coincide, even to the aspect of the
malfunctioning firearm.
Mshibe said that he noticed this and that one
of the assailants was ‘fiddling’ with it, thus enabling
him to escape.
Ngubane said that the third appellant gave this as the
reason for the failure to kill Mshibe and that, when it was time to
kill
Mkhize, asked for a functioning firearm because one of theirs
was not working. The evidence of the third appellant was utterly
unbelievable. A good example is that it was put on his behalf that
the police got lost trying to find his home and that this
demonstrated
that Ngubane did not know him. When he testified,
however, he simply said that the police had arrived at his home and
arrested
him.
[17]
As regards the fourth appellant, he did not
challenge significant parts of the evidence of Ngubane. First, that
he was present at
the meetings where the killing of Mshibe and Mkhize
was discussed. In particular, that he was at the meeting in the
afternoon when
it was said that Mshibe might be attending a meeting
at around 17h00 and that the hitmen should be fetched to carry out
their task.
Secondly, that he was present when the hitmen explained
why they had failed. Thirdly, that he thereafter provided the second
appellant
with his firearm, requested its return and gave the second
appellant the R5 000 to be paid to the hitmen. When these
failures were pointed out, he claimed that he had wanted to instruct
his counsel to challenge it but did not have the opportunity
to do
so. This was rejected by the trial court as false because, after
Ngubane’s evidence in chief, the matter was adjourned
for the
specific purpose of obtaining instructions on his evidence. In
addition, the fourth appellant interrupted proceedings on
a number of
occasions to instruct his legal representative and the evidence of
Ngubane endured over a couple of days with long
and short
adjournments where instructions could be given.
[18]
Suffice
it to say, I can find no misdirections committed by the court
a
quo
in its factual findings and its evaluation of the evidence. As a
result, we are bound by those findings. In
S
v Hadebe & others
,
[5]
the
approach was summarised as follows:
‘
[T]he
credibility findings and findings of fact of the trial Court
cannot be disturbed unless the recorded evidence shows them
to be
clearly wrong.’
This
was approved in
S
v Monyane & others
:
[6]
‘
In
the absence of demonstrable and material misdirection by the trial
court, its findings of fact are presumed to be correct
and will
only be disregarded if the recorded evidence shows them to be clearly
wrong’.
The
trial court correctly rejected as not being reasonably possibly true
the evidence of the three appellants. It correctly accepted
as true
beyond reasonable doubt that of Ngubane and the other State
witnesses.
[19]
The State alleged that the three appellants
acted in pursuance of a common purpose to commit the offences in
question. It is clear
that this common purpose between Ngubane, the
second appellant and the fourth appellant was proved as regards the
conspiracy to
murder Mshibe which led to the attempted murder with
which they were charged. It is also clear that it was proved in
respect of
the same people as regards the conspiracy to murder
Mkhize.
[20]
There is direct evidence that the second
and fourth appellants actively assisted in the attempted murder of
Mshibe during September
2008. The second appellant drove the third
appellant and Nkosi to the scene. Ngubane said that they had
descended by the steps
to the road below and he heard gunshots
shortly thereafter. Mshibe’s evidence corroborates that of
Ngubane as to how it happened
and that two assailants, standing near
the bottom of steps, were involved. He experienced only one firearm
attack on the day in
question. Ngubane and he were clearly talking of
the same event. The evidence of Ngubane was that the third appellant
admitted
that he and Nkosi had attempted to kill Mshibe and explained
their failure to do so by saying that a firearm had malfunctioned.
There was thus sufficient evidence of the involvement of the second
and third appellants in the offence. The involvement of the
fourth
appellant was limited to the planning leading up to the attempt.
There is no evidence that he was present or participated
in the
events at the scene. As such, the conviction can only stand if the
State proved that he was implicated by way of common
purpose. This
aspect was not addressed in the judgment of the court
a
quo
. Neither was it addressed by any of
the counsel on appeal. He simply submitted that there was no evidence
of his involvement, apart
from criticizing the evidence Ngubane.
[21]
Common
purpose involves joint criminal activity. The Supreme Court of Appeal
has distinguished between common purpose arising from
a prior
agreement and that arising where there is no such agreement.
[7]
The present matter concerns the first of these. In matters of common
purpose, ‘the action of the accused need not contribute
to the
criminal result in the sense that but for it the result would not
have ensued.’
[8]
An
accused need not be on the scene of the crime. Once it has been
proved that an agreement has been reached and steps taken to
implement it which involved an accused, that accused must show that
she or he has dissociated from the criminal conduct in order
to
escape the reach of the common purpose. In
S
v Ndluli & others
,
[9]
Nienaber JA said:
‘
Dissociation
consists of some or other form of conduct by a collaborator to an
offence with the intention of discontinuing his collaboration.
It is
a good defence to a charge of complicity in the eventual commission
of the offence by his erstwhile associate or associates
. . . The
more advanced an accused person’s participation in the
commission of the crime, the more pertinent and pronounced
his
conduct will have to be to convince a court, after the event, that he
genuinely meant to dissociate himself from it at the
time.’
[22]
In the present matter, therefore, what was
proved was that the fourth appellant participated in the planning of
the attempted murder.
He was part of the group that decided what to
do when the attempt failed. Along with the second appellant and
Ngubane, he agreed
that Mkhize should be murdered instead. The night
before Mkhize was murdered, the fourth appellant was present when the
second
appellant showed Ngubane the firearm, said that he had
procured it from the fourth appellant and it was agreed between the
three
of them that the murder should take place the next day. In
addition, the fourth appellant phoned Ngubane to report that Mkhize
had been murdered and indicated that he was going to visit the scene
to see for himself. He met thereafter with Ngubane and the
second
appellant and produced R5 000 to pay the third appellant and
Nkosi for having murdered Mkhize. What is abundantly clear
is that
there is no evidence that he dissociated from the attempted murder or
from the murder.
[23]
It should be noted that there was no
eyewitness to the murder of Mkhize. This aspect was also not dealt
with by the trial court
or any of the counsel who appeared before us.
What is clear, however, is that the firearm found in the possession
of the second
appellant was the one which fired the shots which
caused the death of Mkhize. In addition, the second appellant and
Ngubane paid
part of the agreed fee for the killing to the third
appellant who acknowledged having been party to the murder. The
firearm was
supplied by the fourth appellant. All three of the
appellants were in telephonic contact with Ngubane at the time of the
murder.
When the fourth appellant requested the return of the firearm
loaned to the hitmen by the second appellant, the second appellant
told him that he was keeping it. In the circumstances, the three
appellants were all linked to the murder beyond any reasonable
doubt.
The third appellant can count himself fortunate to have escaped a
conviction on the count of murder. The fourth appellant
can count
himself fortunate to have not been charged with the unlawful
possession of a firearm. In the result, there is no basis
on which to
uphold the appeals against the convictions.
[24]
As
mentioned, only the second and fourth appellants were given leave to
appeal against their sentences. The appeals on sentence
were only
argued faintly. As regards the second appellant, it was submitted
that the court
a
quo
should have found that there were substantial and compelling
circumstances warranting a downward deviation from the prescribed
sentence of life imprisonment. The fact that he was a first offender,
was forty years old and thus susceptible to be influenced
and had
participated in the community by way of his membership of the Branch
Executive Committee of the ANC and his company which
constructed low
cost housing, amounted to substantial and compelling circumstances.
The difficulty with this submission is that
the exercise is not a
one-sided one. In
S
v Malgas
,
[10]
the following was said:
‘
If
the sentencing court on consideration of the circumstances of
the particular case is satisfied that they render the prescribed
sentence unjust in that it would be disproportionate to the crime,
the criminal and the needs of society, so that an injustice
would be
done by imposing that sentence, it is entitled to impose a lesser
sentence.’
[25]
In
this matter, it involved a cold-blooded, hired killing. The second
appellant was intimately involved over an extended period.
He drove
the hitmen, he procured the murder weapon, conveyed the money and, in
general, was the lynchpin of the operation. Society
has expressed
itself strongly against such killings. In
S
v Ferreira and Others
,
[11]
Marais
JA said:
‘
But
after all is said and done, a contract killing for reward is
involved. That is, I believe, in the eyes of most reasonable people,
an abomination which is corrosive of the very foundations of justice
and its administration. … If no greater sanction for
that than
a non-custodial sentence is said by this Court to be an appropriate
response to a contract killing, I believe it will
undermine public
confidence in the courts, encourage a belief that those who instigate
contract killings will not necessarily be
visited with incarceration,
foster a perception that, provided one's motives are subjectively
pure and no matter how unreasonable
and culpable one's failure to
explore or make use of other or less drastic options may be, society
will not be greatly offended
by one's engagement of killers to do
away with another human being.’
[26]
The motivation arose from his preferred
candidate being overlooked as a delegate of a branch of the ANC. It
was purely political
in nature and did not arise from any conduct
aimed against him personally. In these circumstances, it is not
possible as an appeal
court to hold that the trial court misdirected
itself when it did not find substantial and compelling circumstances
in favour of
the second appellant. Imposing the prescribed sentence
is not unjust in that it would be disproportionate in the
circumstances
of the matter as a whole. No submissions were made in
support of the appeal against the other sentences imposed on him.
[27]
Turning to the fourth appellant, there were
no submissions that the trial court had misdirected itself or that
his sentences were
startlingly inappropriate. There would, in any
event, have been no basis for any such submission. As such, an appeal
court is not
entitled to interfere with the sentences.
[28]
In the result, the appeals against the
convictions of the second, third and fourth appellants are dismissed
and the appeals against
the sentences imposed on the second and
fourth appellants are dismissed.
GORVEN
J
I
agree.
MADONDO
J
I
agree
STEYN
J
DATE
OF HEARING: 30 October 2015
DATE
OF JUDGMENT: 5 November 2015
FOR
THE 2
nd
APPELLANT: LD Halam, instructed by Pangwa
Attorneys, Johannesburg
FOR
THE 3
rd
APPELLANT: SB Mngadi, instructed by the Durban
Justice Centre
FOR
THE 4
th
APPELLANT: M Nkomo, instructed by the Durban
Justice Centre
FOR
THE RESPONDENT: J Du Toit, instructed by the Director of Public
Prosecutions, Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal.
[1]
See
S
v Ndawonde
2013 (2) SACR 192
(KZD) para 8..
[2]
S
v Hlapezula & others
1965
(4) SA 439
(A) at 440D-G.
[3]
R
v Mokoena
1932
OPD 79
at 80.
[4]
S
v Sauls & others
1981
(3) SA 172
(A) at 180E-G.
[5]
S
v Hadebe & others
1997 (2) SACR 641
(SCA) at 645
e
-
f
.
[6]
S
v Monyane & others
2008
(1) SACR 543
(SCA) para 14.
[7]
S
v Mgedezi & others
1989
(1) SA 687
(A) at 705I-706C.
[8]
S
v Thebus & another
[2003] ZACC 12
;
2003
(6) SA 505
(CC) para 33.
[9]
S
v Ndluli & others
1993
(2) SACR 501
(A) at 504
d
-
f
.
[10]
S
v Malgas
2001
(1) SACR 469
(SCA) para 25.
[11]
S
v Ferreira and Others
2004 (2) SACR 454
(SCA) para 70.