Tetra Mobile Radio (Pty) Ltd. v Member of the Executive Council of the Department of Works and Others (482/2006) [2007] ZASCA 128; [2007] SCA 128 (RSA); 2008 (1) SA 438 (SCA); (28 September 2007)

75 Reportability
Public Procurement

Brief Summary

Procurement — Access to information — Appeal against tender award — Appellant sought access to documents to formulate grounds of appeal after unsuccessful tender bid — Respondents provided limited information, citing confidentiality — Court held that the appellant's right to a fair hearing in the appeal process necessitated access to the requested documents to enable proper formulation of appeal grounds, thereby reinforcing the principles of fairness and transparency in procurement processes.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal against an order of the Pietermaritzburg High Court (Murugasen AJ) which had refused to compel the respondents to provide access to certain documents relating to a provincial tender. The relief originally sought in the High Court was directed at obtaining reasons and documentation necessary for the appellant to formulate an appeal to a statutory tender appeals body; by the time the matter reached the Supreme Court of Appeal, the appellant persisted only with the request for access to documentation, not further reasons.


The appellant was Tetra Mobile Radio (Pty) Ltd, an unsuccessful tenderer. The principal respondents were the Member of the Executive Council of the Department of Works and other provincial procurement functionaries (described in the judgment as the “institutional respondents”), as well as Infotrunk (Pty) Ltd, the successful tenderer. The appeal concerned the extent to which an unsuccessful tenderer is entitled, under the KwaZulu-Natal Procurement Act 3 of 2001 (since repealed) read in light of constitutional procurement requirements, to obtain documentation to enable it to exercise an internal statutory appeal.


The subject-matter of the dispute was access to tender-related records (including minutes and the successful bidder’s tender documents) in order to render meaningful the appellant’s right to prosecute an appeal to the Appeals Tribunal against a decision of the Central Procurement Committee awarding a tender for the maintenance of repeater networks.


2. Material Facts


A tender (contract ZNT 2482W, Province of KwaZulu-Natal) was invited for the maintenance of repeater networks. Tetra Mobile Radio (Pty) Ltd was one of three tenderers and had held a similar contract for the preceding four years. The tender was awarded by the Central Procurement Committee to Infotrunk (Pty) Ltd, rather than to the appellant.


The appellant exercised its statutory entitlement to lodge an appeal to the Appeals Tribunal under section 20 of the KwaZulu-Natal Procurement Act 3 of 2001. Together with its notice of appeal (or, as described in the section, notification of intention to appeal), it requested written reasons for the tender award decision as contemplated by section 20(2)(b). Written reasons were furnished, but the appellant considered them inadequate because they effectively reflected only the points allocated and the basic method of allocation, and did not provide the underlying material needed to formulate properly the grounds and basis of its appeal.


The appellant then sought access to a range of tender-related documents and information, including (in substance) copies of tenders received, details of dates of receipt, preference point applications, the identities and appointment/ratification of committee members, reports and minutes of committees involved in evaluation and award, recommendations, delegation documents (if any), and a detailed exposition of points awarded. The institutional respondents provided an adjudication report and what they regarded as relevant excerpts from minutes, and they asserted that the details of tenders were confidential to each tenderer. They refused further disclosure on that basis.


The dispute before the courts was therefore whether the appellant, as an unsuccessful tenderer pursuing an internal statutory appeal, was entitled to access documentation beyond the written reasons already provided, and whether the respondents could resist disclosure on grounds such as confidentiality or by referring the appellant to procedures under the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA).


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether, on a proper interpretation and application of section 20 of the KwaZulu-Natal Procurement Act 3 of 2001, read in its constitutional setting, an unsuccessful tenderer appealing to the Appeals Tribunal is entitled to obtain the documents and information that were before the decision-maker (and related records), in order to formulate and prosecute its appeal.


A further issue was whether the institutional respondents’ stance that the appellant should instead proceed under PAIA was tenable, having regard to the statutory appeal time periods and the role of disclosure in the internal appeal scheme.


Another issue was how the court should address the respondents’ reliance on confidentiality as a basis to refuse access, including whether confidentiality could be accommodated by an appropriate protective regime rather than an absolute refusal of disclosure.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of legal principles to established facts, namely the nature of the tender appeal mechanism, the constitutional and statutory requirements of fairness and transparency in procurement, and the practical ability of an appellant to prosecute an appeal without the underlying documentation.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court treated the Procurement Act as legislation intended to give effect to section 217 of the Constitution, which requires that procurement be conducted in accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective. Although section 20 of the Procurement Act was described as “terse” and did not expressly set out a general entitlement to documentation, the court reasoned that fairness is inherent in the tender process and in the statutory appeal mechanism that forms part of that process.


The court rejected as misplaced the argument advanced on behalf of the successful tenderer that there was no obligation on the Procurement Committee to act fairly. It held that such a contention ignored both the constitutional purpose of the Procurement Act and the nature of tender procurement itself, in which fairness and transparency “permeate” the award process. On that basis, the court accepted that procedural fairness had to be understood as informing the interpretation and implementation of the appeal provisions.


A significant step in the court’s reasoning was its characterisation of the statutory “appeal” to the Appeals Tribunal as being review-like in substance, given the grounds upon which the Tribunal may interfere. The court referred to section 21 of the Procurement Act, under which interference is permitted where there is misconduct, a gross irregularity, excess of power, an improper award, or inconsistency with the Act’s objectives. The court reasoned that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Appeals Tribunal to determine such grounds without access to the record and materials that served before the relevant procurement bodies, including minutes and the reasons for decision.


From this the court drew the connected conclusion that the unsuccessful tenderer itself must have at least that information to formulate grounds of appeal. It stressed that fairness requires that a party know the case it must meet, and that without such access the statutory right of appeal would risk becoming illusory. The court thus held that section 20, read with the constitutional framework (including the court’s reference to the constitutional right of access to information), contemplated a system in which the appellant has access to the information necessary to formulate its appeal properly from the time of the award.


On the respondents’ reliance on PAIA, the court held that the argument that the appellant should follow PAIA procedures could not be sustained, pointing to the disparity between the tight time frames prescribed under section 20 for the tender appeal process and the time frames for access-to-information requests under PAIA. In the court’s view, this supported the conclusion that PAIA was not the appropriate route for this kind of disclosure when an internal tender appeal had to be pursued promptly.


As to confidentiality, the court did not accept that a general claim of confidentiality justified refusing access to the documentation necessary for the appeal. It accepted that confidentiality concerns could be addressed through a balanced protective mechanism, referring to an approach adopted in earlier litigation in which documents (or parts) could be marked confidential and disclosure limited to legal representatives and advisers for purposes connected with the litigation or appeal. The court thus favoured an approach that reconciled the appellant’s need for access with the successful tenderer’s confidentiality interests, rather than denying access altogether.


On costs, the court rejected the institutional respondents’ contention that they should not bear costs because they were merely assisting the court. It found this inconsistent with their effective opposition to the application, including their request that it be dismissed with costs. The successful tenderer’s attempt to avoid costs on the basis that it had argued a constitutional point was also rejected, because the matter was decided as one of interpretation and application of the Procurement Act in context rather than as a direct constitutional challenge. The court therefore applied the ordinary principle that costs follow the result.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court. It substituted an order compelling the first, second, fourth and fifth respondents to furnish specified documentation within fourteen days, including the minutes of the Central Procurement Committee meeting at which contract ZNT 2482W was awarded, the complete tender documents submitted by the successful tenderer (with listed components), any letters and/or reports submitted by identified consultants in connection with the tenders, and further documentation that was before the Central Procurement Committee but not included in the specifically listed materials.


The substituted order also imposed a confidentiality management regime. It required the respondents to mark those parts of documents they considered confidential, restricted disclosure by the appellant’s attorney (save for consulting counsel or an independent expert), and provided a procedure for approaching a judge in chambers in the event of a dispute about confidentiality, including the possibility of amending the confidentiality provisions if circumstances required.


The respondents were ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the appellant’s costs in the High Court application and the costs of appeal, including the costs of the application for leave to appeal and the costs of two counsel where employed.


Cases Cited


Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA)


Metro Projects CC v Klerksdorp Local Municipality 2004 (1) SA 16 (SCA)


Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121 (CC)


Naude v Fraser [1998] ZASCA 56; 1998 (4) SA 539 (SCA)


Heatherdale Farms (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Minister of Agriculture 1980 (3) SA 476 (T)


ABBM Printing & Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 1998 (2) SA 109 (W)


Legislation Cited


KwaZulu-Natal Procurement Act 3 of 2001 (now repealed)


Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (section 217; section 32; reference to the right to just administrative action in the context of administrative action)


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, although section 20 of the KwaZulu-Natal Procurement Act 3 of 2001 did not expressly provide for access to documentation, the section had to be understood in the light of the constitutional procurement framework and the inherent requirement of fairness and transparency in tender processes. The statutory appeal to the Appeals Tribunal was review-like in substance and could not be meaningful unless the Tribunal, and the appellant tenderer, had access to the material that served before the procurement decision-makers.


The court further held that reliance on PAIA as the route to obtain the documents was not appropriate in the circumstances, given the incompatibility of PAIA time frames with the expedited tender appeal time frames. It also held that confidentiality concerns did not justify a blanket refusal of access and could be managed through an order regulating the marking and limited disclosure of confidential portions, together with a mechanism for resolving disputes about confidentiality.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that fairness, transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness are constitutionally mandated characteristics of public procurement systems under section 217 of the Constitution, and that these values inform the interpretation and operation of procurement legislation intended to give effect to that provision.


It applied the principle that an internal statutory remedy described as an “appeal” may be review-like in substance where the permissible grounds of interference correspond to classic review grounds (such as misconduct, gross irregularity, excess of powers, improper award, or inconsistency with statutory objectives), and that such a remedy ordinarily requires access to the record and materials relevant to the decision.


It applied the fairness-related principle that a party exercising a statutory right to challenge an administrative procurement decision must be given sufficient information to make the right of representation and challenge real rather than illusory, and that this may necessitate access to documents that were before the decision-maker.


It further applied the principle that confidentiality in tender materials is not necessarily an absolute bar to disclosure where disclosure is required for a fair process, and that confidentiality can be protected by procedural safeguards (such as marking confidential portions, limiting disclosure to legal representatives/advisers, and providing a mechanism for adjudicating confidentiality disputes).

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[2007] ZASCA 128
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Tetra Mobile Radio (Pty) Ltd. v Member of the Executive Council of the Department of Works and Others (482/2006) [2007] ZASCA 128; [2007] SCA 128 (RSA); 2008 (1) SA 438 (SCA); (28 September 2007)

Links to summary

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
REPORTABLE
CASE NO: 482/2006
In the
matter between
TETRA
MOBILE RADIO (PTY) LIMITED ........................... APPELLANT
and
THE
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF
THE
DEPARTMENT OF WORKS ........................... 1
ST
RESPONDENT
THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL
PROCUREMENT
COMMITTEE ........................... 2
ND
RESPONDENT
INFOTRUNK
(PTY) LIMITED ........................... 3
RD
RESPONDENT
THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE APPEALS TRIBUNAL ........................... 4
TH
RESPONDENT
THE
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF
THE
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE ........................... 5
TH
RESPONDENT
CORAM: HOWIE P, MTHIYANE, LEWIS, HEHER and VAN
HEERDEN JJA
HEARD: 29 AUGUST 2007
DELIVERED: 28 SEPTEMBER 2007
Summary: Interpretation and application of the
KwaZulu Natal Procurement Act 3 of 2001 – Access to information
under the said
Act.
Neutral Citation: This judgment may be referred to as
Tetra Mobile Radio v MEC, Department of
Works
[2007] SCA 128 (RSA).
JUDGMENT
MTHIYANE JA
MTHIYANE JA:
[1] This is an appeal, with the leave of this court, against the
judgment and order of Murugasen AJ sitting in the Pietermaritzburg
High Court, refusing to grant the appellant, Tetra Mobile Radio (Pty)
Limited, an order directing the respondents to make available
to it
certain documents relating to a provincial tender. The appellant
required the documents in order to formulate its grounds of
appeal to
the Appeals Tribunal against the decision of the Central Procurement
Committee (‘the Procurement Committee’)
awarding the
tender to the third respondent, Infotrunk (Pty) Limited.
[2] The appellant was one of three tenderers who had tendered for the
award of contract ZNT 2482W: Province of KwaZulu Natal, for
the
maintenance of repeater networks. The appellant had held a similar
contract for the previous four years and had anticipated that
the new
contract would be awarded to it because of its track record in
providing the service. However, the Procurement Committee
awarded the
tender to the third respondent. The appellant noted an appeal to the
Appeals Tribunal against the decision of the Procurement
Committee in
terms of
s 20 of the (now repealed) KwaZulu Natal
Procurement Act 3 of 2001 (‘the Procurement Act’). The
relevant provisions of
the section read:

20(1)
The following entities aggrieved by a decision of the Central
Procurement Committee . . . may appeal to the Appeals Tribunal
in the
prescribed manner.
. . .
a tenderer.
(2)(a) . . . [a] tenderer must, within
five days of receipt of the notification under section 5(1)(b) or
35(2) of the decision appealed
against, deliver written notification
of an intention to appeal.
(b) . . . [a] tenderer may, together with
the notification of intention to appeal under paragraph (a), deliver
a request for written
reasons for the tender award decision.
(c) The Central Procurement Committee . .
. must deliver to the appellant the written reasons requested under
paragraph (b) within
ten days.
(d) The appellant must, within ten days
of receipt of the written reasons delivered under paragraph (c), or,
failing a request for
written reasons under paragraph (b), within the
ten days referred to in paragraph (c), submit written representations
to the Appeals
Tribunal indicating sufficiently and without
unnecessary elaboration the grounds and the basis of the appeal and
the nature of the
complaint.
(3) Upon receipt of a notice of intention
to appeal under subsection (2)(a), the Appeals Tribunal must notify
other tenderers who
may be adversely affected by the appeal in
writing of the appeal and invite them to respond within five days.
(4) No oral hearing of appeals will be
allowed unless the Chairperson of the Appeals Tribunal, in the
interests of justice issues
a directive indicating otherwise, in
which event the procedure to be followed will be as prescribed.
(5) A decision of the majority of the
members of the Appeals Tribunal will be the decision of the Appeals
Tribunal.’
[3] The notice of appeal was accompanied by a request for reasons in
terms of s 20(2)(b) for the decision taken by the Procurement
Committee. The deponent to the founding affidavit, a director of the
appellant, stated that the grounds of appeal were submitted
without
the appellant having had sight of various documents which in his view
were vital for it to formulate a proper set of grounds
of appeal and
the basis of its appeal.
[4] While reasons for the decision taken by the Procurement Committee
to award the tender to the third respondent were furnished,
the
appellant did not consider them adequate. The appellant’s
complaint was that they merely indicated the points allocated,
the
basic method of allocating points and the fact that the third
respondent had received the highest points. It contended that it
still needed further documents and information.
[5] The information requested by the appellant was the following or
was contained in the following documents:

(a)
Copies of all tenders received by you in response to tender enquiry
ZNT 2482W;
A Schedule setting forth the dates
upon which each and every tender was received by you;
(c) Copies of all applications for
preference points (ZNT 30) received by you from the various
tenderers;
(d) The names of the members of the
Tender Evaluation Committee which Committee was responsible for the
evaluation of the tenders
received in response to tender enquiry ZNT
2482W;
(e) The name of the chairperson of the
abovementioned Tender Evaluation Committee;
(f) Copies of the ratification of the
appointment of the members of the Tender Evaluation Committee by the
Minister responsible for
the administration of your department;
(g) Copies of all reports, minutes and
other documentation of whatsoever nature received in response to
tender enquiries ZNT 2482W
and dealt with by the Tender Evaluation
Committee;
(h) A copy of the recommendation made by
the Tender Evaluation Committee to the Tender Award Committee in
terms of the provisions
of section 29(2)(3) of the said Act;
(i) The name of the members of the Tender
Award Committee which Committee adjudicated the tenders received
under tender enquiry ZNT
2482W as provided for in section 29(a) of
the said Act and awarded the contract in question;
(j) In the event of any persons having
been co-opted as advisors to either the Tender Evaluation Committee
or the Tender Award Committee
or to both said Committees in terms of
Section 38 of the said Act, the name(s) of such advisor(s);
(k) Whether the function to consider and
award the tenders received under tender enquiry ZNT 2482W was
delegated to an official in
the employ of your department as provided
for in section 39 of the said Act. In the event of such a delegation
having taken place,
you are requested to provide a copy of the
written delegation;
(l) Copies of all reports, minutes and
other documentation of whatsoever nature received by the Tender Award
Committee under or in
the process of adjudicating tender enquiry ZNT
2482W;
(m) Copies of the minutes of the
deliberations of the Tender Award Committee;
(n) A detailed exposition of the points
awarded to each of the tenderers in accordance with the provisions of
the said Act.’
[6] The first, second, fourth and fifth respondents (‘the
institutional respondents’), through the Head of the Department
of Works: Province of KwaZulu Natal (‘HOD’), responded to
the request by furnishing the appellant’s attorneys with
an
‘adjudication report’, together with what the HOD
considered to be the ‘the relevant portions of the minutes
of
the Tender Evaluation Committee and the Tender Award Committee’.
The reasons furnished to the appellant were considered
by the HOD to
provide an answer to the request contained in paras (g), (h), (l),
(m) and (n) above. As to the request in para (b),
the HOD said all
tenders were received and opened on the date of the closing of
tenders. As to paras (d), (e) and (i), the response
was that the
members of the Departmental Committee which considered the tenders,
as well as the chairpersons of these committees
were named in the
relevant minutes. As to para (j), the HOD replied that the tenders
were considered by the Departmental Tender Evaluation
Committee and
the Tender Award Committee. The HOD went on to say that the
successful tenderer was approved by the Procurement Committee.
The
HOD refused to furnish any information on the details of the tenders
‘as it is considered to be confidential information
belonging
to each tenderer.’
[7] The appellant launched an application in the court
a quo
seeking an order directing the respondent to furnish it with
written reasons for the decision of the Procurement Committee and the
information listed in paragraph 5 above. As already indicated, the
application was unsuccessful in the court
a quo
– hence
this appeal. The appellant is no longer persisting in its request for
reasons but is pressing on with its claim for
access to the
documentation referred to and the respondents persist in their
refusal to furnish it.
[8] It was argued before us that the appellant, as unsuccessful
tenderer, had a right of appeal against the decision of the
Procurement
Committee (s 20(1) of the Procurement Act set out above).
Until the information requested is furnished it is impossible,
contends
the appellant, for it to formulate and prosecute an appeal
pursuant to the Procurement Act. Counsel submitted that a tender
process
and all the proceedings associated with it have to be fair.
Indeed the stated purpose of the Procurement Act as it appears in the
long title is to give effect to s 217 of the Constitution and to
provide for matters connected therewith. Section 217 guarantees
fair,
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective procurement
processes. In addition, the decision awarding or refusing
a tender
constitutes administrative action and therefore engages the right to
just administrative action. This requires that in considering
a
tender, the decision-maker must conduct itself in a procedurally fair
manner. In the present matter, the conduct of the second
respondent,
the Chairperson of the Procurement Committee, is of course not under
scrutiny. The appellant is still attempting to get
to that enquiry.
The appellant contends, however, that a fair hearing before the
Appeals Tribunal will be impossible unless it is
furnished with the
documents it requires. It thus argues that the only way to achieve a
fair hearing is for the appellant to be provided
with the required
documentation: otherwise the right of appeal is rendered nugatory.
[9] The appeal procedure, as already indicated, is provided for in s
20 of the Procurement Act. Under this section the appellant
is
entitled to reasons for the decision (subsection (2)(b)) and the
Procurement Committee is obliged to furnish reasons to the
unsuccessful
tenderer (subsection (2)(c)). But s 20 says nothing
about any entitlement to receive documentation for the purposes of
noting an
appeal or that the Procurement Committee or any other
relevant body must act fairly towards the unsuccessful tenderer.
Counsel for
the third appellant, Infrotrunk (Pty) Ltd, asserted
during argument that there was thus no obligation on the part of the
Procurement
Committee to act fairly. The argument is misplaced.
First, it ignores the fact that the Procurement Act has as its object
the giving
of effect to s 217 of the Constitution, to which I have
already referred. Second, fairness is inherent in the tender
procedure. Its
very essence is to ensure that before Government,
National or Provincial, purchases goods or services, or enters into
contracts for
the procurement thereof, a proper evaluation is done of
what is available and at what price, so as to ensure
cost-effectiveness and
competitiveness. Fairness, transparency and
the other facts mentioned in s 217 permeate the procedure for
awarding or refusing tenders.
(See
Logbro Properties CC v
Bedderson NO
;
1
Metro Projects CC v Klerksdorp Local Municipality
;
2
Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape
.
3
)
[10] Although there is no specific mention of fairness in the
section, it therefore stands to reason that the requirement has to
be
read in. The right of appeal afforded by the Procurement Act is
partly to give effect to the requirement of procedural fairness.
[11] It is significant also that the appeal provided for in s 20 is
in substance a review. This is demonstrated by s 21 of the Act
which
sets out the grounds of appeal. These are that interference by the
Appeals Tribunal may occur only where the Procurement Committee,
a
Tender Award Committee or a member of any such committee:

(a)
committed misconduct in relation to their duties as members;
(b) committed a gross irregularity;
(c) exceeded its or their power;
awarded a tender in an improper
manner; or
awarded a tender inconsistent with
the objectives of this Act.’
An Appeals Tribunal cannot determine whether any of these grounds has
been established without reference to the documents that were
before
the relevant committee, the record of the relevant meetings and the
reasons for the decision. In this matter the Tribunal
would need
sufficient information in order to determine (
inter alia
)
whether the third respondent was capable of undertaking the work.
This follows from the very nature of the process and the grounds
for
interference. There is little purpose served if the unsuccessful
tenderer does not know what case it must meet.
4
This is a basic tenet of fairness, which in turn is a fundamental
requirement of administrative action.
[12] The appellant argues that the fairness contemplated in the
tender procedure means that it should have been given sufficient
information, by way of disclosure of documents, to enable it to know
what material was before the Tender Evaluation Committee when
it
concluded that the third respondent was capable of undertaking the
work, why the appellant was unsuccessful and its reasons for
coming
to these conclusions. This, argues the appellant, flows from the
nature of the process and enquiry rather than from any specific
provision of the Procurement Act. The appellant argues that it should
have been ‘put in possession of such information as will
render
[its] right to make representations a real and not an illusory one.’
(See
Heatherdale Farms (Pty) Ltd v Deputy Minister of
Agriculture
.
5
)
[13] The argument advanced by the institutional respondents that the
appellant should have followed the procedure set out in the
Promotion
of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (‘PAIA’) cannot be
upheld. One has only to look at the disparity between
the time frames
prescribed for the request for information under the Procurement Act
(s 20) and those laid down for access to information
under PAIA
(s74─77) to conclude that the latter Act is irrelevant to the
appellant’s claim. Although the argument based
on PAIA was not
abandoned, it is not one that counsel for the institutional
respondents pursued with any degree of conviction. What
counsel
persisted in vigorously was that the institutional respondents could
not furnish the documentation because it was confidential.
The
appellant, continued the argument, thus failed to prove its
entitlement to the documents in question.
[14] The appellant contended that the respondents had not made out a
case for reliance on confidentiality: if there was any apprehension
on the part of the respondent regarding any specific document, that
concern could be met by making an order similar to the one granted
by
Schwartzman J in
ABBM Printing & Publishing (Pty) Ltd v
Transnet Ltd
,
6
where the parts of the documents in respect of which disclosure might
result in breach of confidence were to be identified and marked
as
confidential and the applicant’s attorney was prohibited from
disclosing such parts to any other party, including the applicant,
save for the purpose of consulting with counsel or an independent
expert. In that way a fair balance could be achieved between the
appellant’s right of access to documentation necessary for
prosecuting its appeal, on the one hand, and the third respondent’s
right to confidentiality, on the other.
[15] It is true that the appeal provisions embodied in s 20 of the
Procurement Act are very terse. But they do not, in my view, prevent
a conclusion that the Appeals Tribunal must have before it the same
information that was before the Procurement Committee in order
to
provide a fair hearing to the aggrieved party, in this case the
appellant. By the same token the appellant, too, must have at
least
that information to enable it to formulate its grounds of appeal. It
is clear that s 20 of the Procurement Act, read with s
217 of the
Constitution, contemplates a fair system which envisages that, from
the time of the award, the appellant has the right
of access to
information necessary to formulate its appeal properly. The argument
by counsel for the third respondent that fairness
is not inherent in
the appeal procedure provided for in s 20 would, if adopted, lead to
absurd or even unconstitutional results,
by denying the appellant
access to information, a right to which is entrenched in s 32 of the
Constitution. The argument also ignores
the grounds of appeal which
by their very nature embody the requirement of fairness.
[16] I turn to the question of costs. Counsel for the institutional
respondents argued that his clients should not be ordered to
pay
costs as they had engaged in litigation simply in order to assist the
court. The respondents, so goes the argument, were caught
between the
competing interests of the appellant, on the one hand, and those of
the third respondent, on the other. This argument
is in my view
untenable as the institutional respondents effectively did oppose the
application for access to documents. The deponent
for these
respondents, Dr Kwazi Brian Mbanjwa, even asked for the appellant’s
application to be dismissed with costs. The same
approach was adopted
in the heads. In its turn the third respondent seeks to avoid costs
by contending that it came on appeal to
argue a constitutional point
and should for that reason not be mulcted in costs. In my view this
argument is also flawed. We are
concerned here with the
interpretation and application of the Procurement Act –
legislation passed to give effect to the right
of access to
information under the Constitution. We are not directly concerned
with the interpretation and application of the provisions
of the
Constitution. I see no valid reason why costs should not follow the
event.
[17] In the result the appeal is upheld. The respondents are ordered
jointly and severally to pay the appellant’s costs of
appeal,
including those of the application for leave to appeal and the costs
of two counsel where so employed, the one paying the
other to be
absolved. The order of the court
a quo
is set aside and
replaced with the following:

1. The first, second, fourth and fifth
respondents are ordered to furnish the applicant with the following
documentation within fourteen
days of this order:
(i) The minutes of the Central Procurement Committee meeting at which
contract ZNT 2482W was awarded;
(ii) The complete set of tender documents submitted by the Third
Respondent and in particular;
(a) the Tender Form “Main Contract”;
(b) the application for preference points claim form (ZNT30, pages 1
– 12);
(c) the document entitled “additional particulars of the
tenderer” at pages 1 – IV;
(d) the tax clearance certificate submitted by Third Respondent;
(e) the authority to sign the tender;
(f) the declaration of interest;
(g) the site inspection certificate relating to Third Respondent;
(h) the “Addendum A” form which contains the list of
proposed specialist sub-contractors;
(i) the whole of part 6, together with product pamphlets submitted by
the Third Respondent;
(j) the whole of part 7;
(k) a detailed exposition of the points awarded to each of the
tenderers in accordance with the provisions of the KwaZulu-Natal
Procurement
Act (No. 3 of 2001).
Letters and/or reports, if any, submitted by consultants GA du Toit
(Pty) Ltd in connection with the various tenders;
(iv) The further documentation which was before the Central
Procurement Committee when it made its decision with regard to the
aforesaid tender and which has not been included in the above.
2. The respondents are ordered to pay the costs of this application
jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved;
3.1 On the copy of each document referred to in para 1 above, the
respondents shall mark or record that part of the document which
it
considers to be confidential.
3.2 Save for purposes of consulting with counsel or an independent
expert, the applicant’s attorney shall not disclose to any
other party, including the applicant, any part of a document in
respect of which the respondents claim confidentiality.
3.3 Should the applicant dispute any claim to confidentiality and
should the parties be unable to resolve such dispute, the applicant
shall on notice to the respondents and any person having an interest
therein, have the right to apply to a judge of the Pietermaritzburg
High Court in chambers for a ruling on the issue.
3.4 Should circumstances require, either party shall have the right
to apply to a judge of the Pietermaritzburg High Court in chambers
for an amendment to paras 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of this order.’
_____________________
KK MTHIYANE
JUDGE OF APPEAL
CONCUR:
HOWIE P
LEWIS JA
HEHER JA
VAN HEERDEN JA
1
2003
(2) SA 460
(SCA).
2
2004
(1) SA 16
(SCA) paras 11 and 12.
3
2007
(3) SA 121
(CC) paras 20 and 21.
4
Naude
v Fraser
[1998] ZASCA 56
;
1998
(4) SA 539
(SCA) at 563F-G.
5
1980
(3) SA 476
(T) at 486F-G.
6
1998
(2) SA 109
(W) at 122I – J to 123A-B.