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[2015] ZAFSHC 177
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Sidwell N.O v Buisson N.O and Others (4944/2014) [2015] ZAFSHC 177 (18 August 2015)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE DIVISION,
BLOEMFONTEIN
Application Number:
4944/2014
DATE: 18 AUGUST 2015
In the matter between:-
THAKELI THUBAKA SIDWELL
N.O
..................................................................................
Applicant
And
PHILLIPUS MARTINUS DU BUISSON
N.O
...........................................................
First
Respondent
SANET DU BUISSON
N.O
......................................................................................
Second
Respondent
N.O. OELOFSE
ATTORNEYS
.................................................................................
Third
Respondent
STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH
AFRICA
............................................................
Fourth
Respondent
TSEPO PAULOS BOTSANE
N.O
..............................................................................
Fifth
Respondent
TSEPO BENEDICT SEBUTSOE
N.O
.......................................................................
Sixth
Respondent
REGISTRAR OF DEEDS,
BLOEMFONTEIN
...................................................
Seventh
Respondent
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT,
BLOEMFONTEIN
....................................................................................................
Eighth
Respondent
RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND LAND
REFORM DEPARTMENT,
BLOEMFONTEIN
.....................................................
Ninth
Respondent
CORAM: VAN ZYL, J
DELIVERED ON: 18 AUGUST 2015
[1] The applicant brought this
application in his capacity as one of the duly appointed trustees of
the TBS Farming Trust, No:
IT1156/05 (“TBS Trust”). The
fifth and sixth respondents are the duly appointed co-trustees of the
said trust. The
first and second respondents are the duly appointed
co-trustees of the Doringboom Trust, No: IT1797/04. The applicant is
seeking
the following relief:
“1. An order cancelling and
setting aside the registration of the farm Guarriekop 330, district
Senekal, in the province of
the Free State, presently registered on
the 17th January 2014 in the name of Doringboom Trust, IT 1797/2004.
2. An order directing the First and
Second Respondents to sign all the necessary transfer documents to
register the aforesaid farm
in the name of the Trustees of the TBS
Farming Trust, IT 1156/2005.
3. An order that failing the First and
Second Respondents to transfer the aforesaid farm to the Trustees of
the TBS Farming Trust
IT 1156/2005, within seven (7) days of the
order of the Honourable Court, the Sheriff of the High Court,
Senekal, is hereby authorised
to sign the transfer documents to
transfer the ownership of the farm to the Trustees of the TBS Farming
Trust, IT1156/2005.
4. Cost order against the First, Second
and Third Respondents.”
[2] The applicant was the founder of
the TBS Trust. In terms of the letters of authority issued by the
eighth respondent (“the
Master”) on 26 August 2005, the
applicant, the fifth and sixth respondents and one Ettiene Stone were
appointed as the trustees
of the TBS trust. The farm Guarriekop 303
(“the farm”) was originally bought by the Government in
conjunction with
the ninth respondent as part of an initiative to
empower previously disadvantaged individuals. It was then registered
in the name
of the trustees of TBS trust on 9 May 2006. The
registration of the farm in the name of the trustees of the TBS trust
was done
by the offices of the third respondent (to whom I shall
refer to as “Oelofse Attorneys”) and was filed at the
deeds
office by its correspondent, Mrs Lynette Joubert. According to
the applicant, Mr Stone resigned as a trustee on 10 June 2009.
[3] On 18 November 2013 Mr Van Reenen
Steyn who is a practising attorney at Oelofse Attorneys and who also
deposed to the answering
affidavit on behalf of the first, second,
third, fifth and sixth respondents, called the applicant to the
offices of Oelofse attorneys.
According to the applicant, Mr Van
Reenen Steyn then advised the applicant that the farm had been sold
to the first and second
respondents and requested the applicant to
sign a deed of sale in this regard. The first, fifth and sixth
respondents were also
present. The applicant refused to sign the deed
of sale. He however requested a copy of the said deed of sale and was
provided
with same, signed only by the first respondent at the time.
The applicant left the meeting.
[4] On 10 January 2014 the applicant
was telephonically contacted by the first respondent and instructed
to remove cattle from the
farm. The first respondent also informed
the applicant that the farm was now his property. It eventually
turned out that the farm
had been sold to and registered in the name
of the trustees of the Doringboom Trust on 17 January 2014, as
reflected on the title
deed with number T441/2014, attached to the
founding affidavit as Annexure “L”. The title deed also
reflects that a
bond in the amount of R 1 000 000.00 had been
registered over the property, which bond is in favour of the fourth
respondent (to
whom I shall refer as “Standard bank”).
[5] Further documents were thereafter
obtained by the applicant and attached to the founding affidavit, of
which the following are
relevant to this judgment:
5.1 The deed of sale, Annexure “I”,
which reflects the first respondent as the buyer “in my
hoedanigheid as trustee
van die Doringboom Trust” and the fifth
respondent as the seller “in my hoedanigheid as trustee van
die TBS Farming
Trust”.
5.2 A copy of the power of attorney to
pass transfer, Annexure “J”.
5.3 A resolution dated 20 November
2013, Annexure “P”, which purports to be a resolution by
the trustees of the TBS
trust regarding the sale of the farm.
5.4 A letter from Mr Stone addressed to
the eighth respondent, dated 12 November 2013 and received by the
eighth respondent on 20
November 2013, Annexure “M”, in
which letter Mr Stone tendered his resignation as a trustee of the
TBS Trust.
5.5 A letter from the eighth respondent
addressed to the applicant regarding the resignation of Mr Stone,
dated 21 November 2013,
Annexure “O”.
6. The first, second, third, fifth and
sixth respondents are opposing the application. I will refer to them
as a group as “the
respondents”. In the answering
affidavit deposed to by Mr Van Reenen Steyn on behalf of the
respondents, additional documents
were referred to and attached to
the said answering affidavit, of which the following are relevant to
this judgment:
6.1 A resolution dated 20 November
2013, Annexure “VRS 2”. In the answering affidavit it is
alleged to be a resolution
passed by the majority of the trustees of
the TBS trust to sell the farm and authorising the fifth respondent
to sign any documentation
on behalf of the TBS Trust in relation to
the transport of such sale.
6.2 The trust deed of the TBS Trust,
Annexure “VRS 3”.
In an interlocutory application by the
respondents which served before me on the day of the hearing of the
main application, the
respondents sought leave to file an additional
affidavit, with an Annexure “A” attached thereto. In the
said affidavit
it was explained that two resolutions were passed by
the trustees of the TBS Trust and that due to an administrative error
during
the compilation of the papers and annexures, the wrong
Annexure “VRS 2” was attached to the answering affidavit
–
it in fact should have been the resolution attached to the
additional affidavit as Annexure “A”. The applicant
opposed
the application by filing opposing papers. Mr Hlatshwayo, who
appeared on behalf of the applicant, initially presented argument
in
support of the opposition of the application, but later in his
argument he indicated that he no longer objects to the application
being granted. I in any event considered it to be in the interest of
justice to allow the additional affidavit and particularly
Annexure
“A” thereto in order for the disputes to be properly
ventilated. I therefore granted the requested relief,
ordering the
respondents (first, second, third, fifth and sixth respondents) in
the main application to pay the costs of the application,
including
the costs of the opposition thereto, payment by the one, the other to
be absolved. I will refer to this resolution as
the resolution
attached to the additional affidavit in order to distinguish it from
Annexure “VSR 2”.
[7] According to the respondents the
applicant was not requested during the meeting held on 18 November
2013 to sign the deed of
sale, as the trustees of the TBS Trust had
at that stage not yet resolved to sell the farm. The first respondent
only signed the
offer to purchase on the said date. All parties
present, including the applicant, then agreed to meet again on 20
November 2013,
inter alia for the TBS Trust to hold a trustee meeting
regarding the possible sale of the farm. The applicant did however
not attend
the meeting on 20 November 2013 despite having been
informed about it. I will return to the detailed allegations
regarding the
passing of the relevant resolutions.
[8] In supporting affidavits deposed to
by the the fifth and sixth respondents, attached to the answering
affidavit, they averred
that since their appointment as trustees, the
applicant was unwilling to effectively work with the fifth and sixth
respondents
regarding the farming activities. They highlighted
certain alleged problematic activities by the applicant in this
regard. Due
to the applicant’s alleged failure to work together
with the fifth and sixth respondents as trustees, they (the fifth and
sixth respondents) decided to take steps to sell the farm.
[9] Mr Hlashwayo referred in his
argument to the abstract system of transfer of immovable property
which is applicable in the South
African legal system and submitted
that the power of attorney to pass transfer is fatally defective,
with the result that there
is a defect in the real agreement between
the parties which entitles the applicant to the cancellation of the
transfer of ownership.
[10] Mr Van der Merwe, who appeared on
behalf of the respondents, in his argument relied on the very same
abstract theory of passing
of ownership and submitted that the
requirements for a valid transfer of ownership had been met. In this
regard he contended that
the errors on the power of attorney are bona
fide errors which can be rectified in terms of section 4(1)(b) of the
deeds Registries
Act, 47 of 1937, and which do not invalidate the
registration of the farm in the name of the first and second
respondents.
[11] It is by now trite that the
abstract theory of transfer applies to immovable property. This was
again confirmed in LEGATOR
McKENNA INC AND ANOTHER v SHEA AND OTHERS
2010 (1) SA 35
(SCA) at par [21]. In par [22] of this judgment this
theory was explained as follows:
“[22] In accordance with the
abstract theory the requirements for the passing of ownership are
twofold, namely delivery -
which in the case of immovable property is
effected by registration of transfer in the deeds office - coupled
with a so-called
real agreement or 'saaklike ooreenkoms'. The
essential elements of the real agreement are an intention on the part
of the transferor
to transfer ownership and the intention of the
transferee to become the owner of the property (see eg Air-Kel (Edms)
Bpk h/a Merkel
Motors v Bodenstein en 'n Ander
1980 (3) SA 917
(A) at
922E - F; Dreyer and Another NNO v AXZS Industries (Pty) Ltd supra at
para 17). Broadly stated, the principles applicable
to agreements in
general also apply to real agreements. Although the abstract theory
does not require a valid underlying contract,
eg sale, ownership will
not pass - despite registration of transfer - if there is a defect in
the real agreement (see eg Preller
and Others v Jordaan
1956 (1) SA
483
(A) at 496; Klerck NO v Van Zyl and Maritz NNO supra at 274A - B;
Silberberg and Schoeman op cit at 79 - 80).”
[12] The validity of the deed of sale
is therefore not relevant and need not be decided. The relief sought
by the applicant is
dependent upon the question whether there was a
defect in the real agreement or not. However, the following
principles enunciated
in NEDBANK LTD v MENDELOW AND ANOTHER NNO
2013 (6) SA 130
(SCA), are also applicable:
“[11] It is common cause that
Riccardo forged his mother's signature on the deed of sale of the
property to the company and
that he forged his brother Evan's
signature on a document entitled 'consent to sale' that was used to
induce the Master of the
high court to sign a certificate that no
objection to the sale was made by any beneficiary. This was necessary
to enable the Registrar
of Deeds to effect the transfer of the
property to the company.
[12] It is trite that where
registration of a transfer of immovable property is effected pursuant
to fraud or a forged document,
ownership of the property does not
pass to the person in whose name the property is registered after the
purported transfer. Our
system of deeds registration is negative: it
does not guarantee the title that appears in the deeds register.
Registration is 'intended
to protect the real rights of those persons
in whose names such rights are registered in the Deeds Office'. And
it is a source
of information about those rights. But registration
does not guarantee title, and if it is effected as a result of a
forged power
of attorney or of fraud, then the right apparently
created is no right at all.
[13] ...
[14] However, if the underlying
agreement is tainted by fraud or obtained by some other means that
vitiates consent (such as duress
or undue influence) then ownership
does not pass: Preller and Others v Jordaan. That principle was
applied recently by this court
in Meintjes NO v Coetzer and Others
and Gainsford and Others NNO v Tiffski Property Investments (Pty) Ltd
and Others. (Own emphasis)
[15] It is clear, therefore, that when
Riccardo forged his mother's signature on the deed of sale of the
property and the signature
by a beneficiary of her will, Evan, on the
consent to the sale, Evan did not intend to transfer ownership of the
property and that
the power of attorney signed by the Master to
permit the registration of transfer was vitiated by the fraud and the
forgery. Ownership
did not pass to the company.”
[13] Some essential elements of
transfer by registration have also been dealt with by the learned
authors in Silberberg and Schoeman's:
The Law of Property, 5th
Edition, at p.220 and further:
“(b) The transferor and the
transferee must have the necessary legal capacity to effect a valid
and enforceable transfer.
Apart from a limited legal or contracting
capacity, an owner’s capacity to effect transfer by
registration can be limited
by legislation, conditions of title, and
the like. If an act of registration by someone without the necessary
capacity somehow
occurs, the completed transfer of the right will
remain intact until it is reversed by the prescribed registration
act, based upon
the defective transfer. In some cases, the transfer
of ownership will in any event not be reversible. The transferor must
be the
registered owner of the land to be transferred, or must be
duly authorised by the owner, and act as his or her agent. Section 20
of the Deeds Registries Act supports the common-law rule that no-one
may transfer more rights than that which is held by him- or
herself,
by providing that only the landowner may give transfer of the land or
land rights to another. This means that, normally,
the existing title
deed with regard to the relevant land must be in the name of the
transferor or his or her principal.
(d) The transferor must have the
intention to transfer the land or rights to it, and the transferee
must have the intention to receive
transfer of it. What is required,
therefore, is consensus between the parties. This requirement refers
specifically to the so-called
“real agreement” which is
aimed specifically at the passing of ownership, as opposed to the
underlying contract to
the transaction. In the context of
registration of land, the intention of the transferor usually is
apparent from the power of
attorney granted to the conveyancer to
effect transfer and registration in the name of the transferee. If
the power of attorney
has been granted due to fraudulent behaviour or
misrepresentation, or if the owner him- or herself has been
fraudulent, the fraud
or misrepresentation as such would not reverse
the completed registration procedure, even though the fraud or error
might relate
either to the essence or to the detail of the
transaction. Further proceedings in the deeds office, subsequent to
an order of court
or a mutual arrangement between the parties
involved, would be necessary in order to correct the situation. The
fraud, misrepresentation
or error would serve as the reason in a
claim for rectification of the register, but if no rectification is
requested or made,
the “erroneous” registration would
have full effect.
...
Compliance with the requirements set
out above must appear from the deeds or documents to be presented
upon an application for registration
of the transfer.”
[14] In the current instance one should
be mindful of the fact that the farm was the property of the TBS
Trust prior to transfer
and registration and not that of the
trustees, although a Trust acts through its trustees. It should
therefore be ascertained whether
the trustees were duly authorised
and therefore had the legal capacity to affect a valid transfer of
the farm.
[15] Section 21 of the Trust Property
Control Act, 57 of 1988, determines as follows regarding the
resignation of a trustee:
“Whether or not the trust
instrument provides for the trustee's resignation, the trustee may
resign by notice in writing to
the Master and the ascertained
beneficiaries who have legal capacity, or to the tutors or curators
of the beneficiaries of the
trust under tutorship or curatorship.”
[16] The Trust deed itself, provides as
follows in clause 5.6.3 thereof:
“The office of a trustee shall be
vacated if, amongst others, he resigns his office by no less than
(60) days (or such shorter
period as the remaining trustees or
trustee may agree to) by written notice to the remaining trustees or
trustee.”
[17] In the judgment of MEIJER NO AND
ANOTHER v FIRSTRAND BANK LIMITED (Formerly Known as First National
Bank of Southern Africa)
AND ANOTHER: IN RE FIRSTRAND BANK LIMITED
(Formerly Known as First National Bank of Southern Africa) v MEIJER
NO AND OTHERS
[2013] JOL 30560
(WCC) the question whether a trustee
who resigns need to comply with Section 21 or whether he or she may
resign in terms of the
manner prescribed in the relevant Trust deed,
was raised. However, I do not deem it necessary to determine the said
issue in this
instance. Although the applicant made an allegation
that the trustee, Mr Stone, had resigned as trustee on 10 June 1999,
it is
evident from the letter to which the applicant refers, Annexure
M, which Mr Stone addressed to the Master, that it is only dated
12
November 2013. According to the date stamp, it was received by the
Master on 20 November 2013 and the Master acknowledged receipt
thereof on 21 November 2013, by means of Annexure “O”.
Considering the aforesaid
MEIJER-judgment, par [11] thereof, it seems that only 21 November
2013 can be considered to be the effective
date of his (purported)
resignation; hence, after the passing of the two resolutions and
after the signing of the power to transfer.
In addition, there is no
allegation whatsoever by any of the parties that Mr Stone had also
notified the beneficiaries in writing
of his resignation as
determined in Section 21. He, therefore, in my view, did not comply
with the provisions of Section 21.
When considering the provisions of
clause 5.6.3 of the Trust deed, there is again no allegation by any
of the parties that Mr Stone
had given written notice to any of the
remaining trustees and there is no such indication in the papers, to
the contrary. His purported
resignation was therefore also not done
in accordance with the said provisions of the Trust deed.
[18] In the circumstances I have to
find that Mr Stone still held office as a trustee of the TBS Trust on
20 November 2013 and even
today still. I may mention that from the
Master`s report it is evident that no Amended Letters of Authority
has yet been issued
regarding the TBS Trust. Due to my finding that
his purported resignation did in any event not comply with the
necessary requirements,
I however do not have to make a finding
regarding the principle enunciated in WM SOEKOE AND OTHERS v LE ROUX,
Case number 898/2007,
ZAFSHC.
[19] The effect of my aforesaid finding
is that there were indeed four trustees holding office on 20 November
2013. The respondents
rely on clause 22.2.1 of the Trust deed which
determines that when there are more than two trustees, resolutions
are passed by
way of an ordinary majority of votes. They further rely
on clause 7.4 of the Trust deed which stipulates that a majority of
trustees
constitute a quorum for purposes of a meeting and that the
meeting held on 20 November 2013, complied with this provision. They
made the following allegations in this regard in paragraph 19 and 20
of the answering affidavit:
19. In accordance with paragraph 7.4 of
the trust deed, a quorum was needed to hold a meeting of trustees,
whilst the fifth and
sixth respondents were in my office, I
contacted Mr Stone telephonically in order to ensure that there was
a quorum and that
a resolution could be passed.
20. Mr Stone informed us that he had
resigned as a trustee of the TBS Farming Trust, but for the sake of
caution that he would have
no objection to a resolution being passed
by the majority of the trustees that the farm be sold and that he
would sign such a resolution.
In terms of this resolution, the fifth
respondent was authorised to sign any documentation on behalf of the
TBS Farming Trust in
order to sell the farm.”
The last mentioned resolution is the
resolution attached to the additional affidavit.
[20] In the founding affidavit the
applicant made the allegations that Mr Stone was not in attendance at
the offices of Oelofse
Attorneys on 20 November 2013 and that he
signed the said resolution in the absence of the other trustees. This
was not denied
by the respondents.
[21] When clause 7.4 is read in
context, in conjunction with the other sub-clauses of clause 7 which
deals with meetings of trustees,
there is no provision which even
nearly authorises or provides that a quorum can be constituted by
one or more trustees who are
not present at a meeting. To the
contrary. Clause 7.6 determines as follows:
“A resolution in writing signed
by all the trustees shall be valid and effectual as if it had been
passes at a meeting of
“ the trustees duly called and
constituted. (Own emphasis)”
In my view the provisions of clause 7.6
is clearly indicative of an intention that all other resolutions,
hence, resolutions that
are not signed by all the trustees and/or
oral resolutions, have to be passed at a duly constituted meeting
where a quorum of trustees
are present. The resolution attached to
the additional affidavit as Annexure “A”, falls within
the ambit of the last
mentioned category of resolutions as it was
only signed by three of the four trustees. This resolution was passed
at a meeting
that was not attended by a quorum of trustees and is
therefore not valid.
[22] The aforesaid resolution reflects
the alleged decision of the trustees of the TBS Trust to sell the
farm to the first and second
respondents at a certain price and it
contains the following:
“Tsepo paulus Botsane in sy/haar
hoedanigheid as `n TRUSTEE gemagtig word om alle dokumente te
onderteken wat nodig mag wees
vir registrasie van die oordrag van
die bogenoemde eiendom aan die Trustees indertyd van die DORINGBOOM
TRUST..”
[23] Although I am not called upon to
decide upon the validity of the deed of sale, I pause to mention that
this resolution in any
event did not specifically authorise the fifth
respondent to sign the deed of sale on behalf of the Trust. But, in
any event, my
further findings regarding the effect of the invalidity
of this resolution on the power of attorney to give transfer,
Annexure
“J”, will mutatis mutandis be applicable to the
deed of sale.
[24] My finding regarding the
invalidity of the resolution attached to the additional affidavit, is
mutatis mutandis applicable
to the other resolution, Annexure “VRS
2” attached to the answering affidavit.
[25] My finding of invalidity regarding
the two resolutions, has the consequence that the fifth respondent
was not authorised to
sign the power of attorney to give transport,
Annexure “J”. He was not authorised to conclude the real
agreement and
to give transport to the first and second respondents
by means of Mrs Lynette van Zyl nie. The unauthorised power of
attorney
and the consequent unauthorised transfer to and registration
of the farm in the name of the first and second respondents,
constitutes,
in my view, a fatal defect in the real agreement. It is
similar to the situation referred to in the Legator – judgment,
para
[25], where is is stated that “transfer by a curator
without letters of curatorship would therefore not pass ownership to
the transferee”.
[26] In addition to the aforesaid,
Annexure “J” incorrectly recorded that the fifth
respondent is the sole trustee
of the TBS Trust and that it is in
that capacity that he authorises the transfer of the farm. In fact,
the part that initially
made reference to “kragtens Resolusie”,
has even been deleted. Mrs Lynette van Zyl attested to an affidavit
in which
she explained how these errors came about, although her
allegations in that regard partly constitute hearsay evidence as she
was
not personally involved in the process explained. Be that as it
may, the fact remains that the registration was executed by the
Registrar of Deeds who unknowingly acted upon a power of attorney
which again was invalid, for the reason that the fifth respondent
was
not the sole trustee and could therefore not have authorised the
transfer and registration in such a capacity. This again is
not a
defect in the underlying agreement (the deed of sale), but in fact a
fatal defect in the real agreement.
[27] Mr Van der Merwe contended that
the aforesaid “errors” can be rectified in terms of
Section 4(1)(b) of the Deeds
Registries Act, 47 0f 1937. In my view
this contention does not hold water. It is evident from the said
legislative provisions
that their applicability is restricted to
certain specific errors, which are merely administrative in nature.
In the current instance
the incorrect recorded alleged basis of the
authorisation is a crucial aspect which affects the root and validity
of the real agreement.
[28] I am consequently of the view that
the applicant is entitled to the essence of the relief sought.
[29] Mr Hlashwayo requested that should
I grant the relief sought, I should consider to also grant as further
relief, the cancellation
of the bond registered over the farm. He
relied on the MENDELOW- judgment, supra, for the requested relief. In
my view it is evident
from the said judgment that the requested
additional relief actually follows inevitably as a result of the main
relief being granted.
[30] Regarding the costs, Mr Van der
Merwe submitted that even should the applicant be successful, he
should still be ordered to
pay the costs of the application,
including the costs of the opposition, In this regard Mr Van der
Merwe contended that due to
the unsubstantiated allegations of fraud
on the part of Oelofse Attorneys, the respondents were entitled to
oppose the application.
[31] I did not make any findings
regarding the allegations of fraud, as I did not deem it necessary.
Although I can understand that
Oelofse Attorneys view the allegations
in a very serious light, they could have come onto record by means of
an affidavit explaining
and recording the surrounding circumstances
according to their version, without having had to necessarily oppose
the application
on its merits. Instead, the respondents profusely
opposed the merits of the application and therefore I am of the view
that there
is no cogent reason why the costs should not follow the
result.
[32] The following orders are made:
1. The transfer to and registration of
ownership in the name of the Trustees of Doringboom Trust, IT
1797/2004 of the farm GUARRIEKOP
330, Senekal, Free State Province,
on 17 January 2014, is hereby cancelled and set aside.
2. The first and second respondents are
ordered to sign all necessary documentation to transfer and
reregister ownership of the
said farm to and in the name of the
Trustees of TBS Farming Trust, IT 1156/2005, within 7 days of a
request thereto by or on behalf
of the applicant, which request may
only be made after 14 days of date of this order.
3. Should the first and/or second
respondents fail to adhere to the order in 2 above, the Registrar of
this Court is authorised
and directed to sign the requested
documentation to affect such transfer and reregistration of
ownership.
4. The seventh respondent is requested
and directed to do all necessary steps to execute the aforesaid
orders of transfer to and
reregistration of ownership of the said
farm in the name of the Trustees of the FBS Farming Trust.
5. The mortgage bond registered over
the said farm on 17 January 2014 in favour of the fourth respondent
is hereby cancelled and
set aside and the seventh respondent is
requested and directed to do all necessary steps to execute this
order.
6. The first, second and third
respondents are ordered to pay the costs of the application, jointly
and severally, payment by the
one, the other to be absolved.
C. VAN ZYL, J
On behalf of the applicant:Mr M.D.
Hlashwayo
On Instructions of: Ngwane &
Associates Attorneys
Bloemfontein
On behalf of the 1st ,2nd, 3, 5th &
6th Respondents:
Adv. R. Van der Merwe
On Instructions of: Bezuidenhouts
Inc.
Bloemfontein