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[2015] ZAFSHC 116
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Van Heerden and Another v Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality and Others (707/2015, 952/2015) [2015] ZAFSHC 116 (5 June 2015)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case No.: 707/2015
952/2015
In
the matter between:
JOHANNES
VAN HEERDEN
1
st
Applicant
THE
AFFECTED MEMBERS OF BOTSHABELO
H2
COMMUNITY
2
nd
Applicant
and
MANGAUNG
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
1
st
Respondent
MAYOR
OF THE MANGAUNG METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
2
nd
Respondent
MUNICIPAL
MANAGER OF THE MANGAUNG
METROPOLITAN
MUNICIPALITY
3
rd
Respondent
MS.
PASCALINA
THAKHELI
4
th
Respondent
JUDGMENT
BY
:
DAFFUE,
J
HEARD
ON:
16
APRIL 2015
DELIVERED
ON:
5 JUNE
2015
I
INTRODUCTION
[1]
An individual, Mr Johannes van Heerden (“Van Heerden”)
and certain affected members of the Botshabelo H2 Community
on the
one hand, and the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality (“the
municipality”) on the other, are at loggerheads.
The
alleged eviction of applicants and the applicants’
“
right
to peaceful and undisturbed ownership and/or possession of their
premises”
are
the central issues in this application in so far as the merits are
concerned.
II
THE
PARTIES
[2]
Van Heerden is cited as first applicant and people described by Van
Heerden as members of the Botshabelo H2 Community are as
a group
cited as second applicant. An attorney, Mr M Khang of Mphafi
Khang Inc is the applicant’s attorney and he also
presented
argument to me on behalf of applicants.
[3]
The municipality is the first respondent and its mayor and municipal
manager are cited as second and third respondents respectively.
Ms Tascalina Thakheli, the municipality’s manager: Informal
Settlements is cited as fourth respondent. Adv. J. Lubbe
SC
assisted by Adv. T. L. Manye appeared for respondents.
III
THE
RELIEF SOUGHT
[4]
Two applications served before me for adjudication. In
application 707/2015 applicants seek a permanent interdict in terms
whereof respondents be interdicted from evicting them from their
premises and demolishing their shacks and/or houses and they
furthermore be ordered to restore the applicants to
“
their
peaceful and undisturbed ownership and/or possession of their
premises”
.
Similar relief is sought in application 952/2015, but in addition,
applicants want the court to find respondents to be in
contempt of
the court orders issued under application 707/2015 and that 2
nd
to 4
th
respondents be sentenced to 120 days’ imprisonment, suspended
for a year. The two applications were “
joint”
by
the court earlier at the request of applicants. It would be
more appropriate and correct to consolidate the applications
in terms
of rule 11, but everybody understood what was intended. A
consolidation was required in the light of the similarity
of the
relief claimed and the applicable legal principles.
IV
THE
LITIGATION IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
[5]
On 23 August 2012 Rampai J granted eviction orders in application
3354/2012, the parties being Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality
as
applicant and Thabo Kgoabane, the first respondent, any
possible/potential occupiers unknown to applicant of the vacant land
in K section, Botshabelo cited as second respondent and any potential
occupiers unknown to applicant on erven 2997 and 2874 in
H section
Botshabelo, cited as third respondent.
[6]
On 16 February 2015 applicant launched the urgent application in
application number 707/2015 referred to above. The notice
of
motion was delivered to one Nhlanhla at the 2
nd
respondent’s office that day, but it is not certain at what
time. Fact of the matter is that the application was set
down
for hearing at 16h20 that day, respondents did not oppose the
application and the following order was granted in their absence
by
my brother, Lekale J, which I quote
verbatim
:
“
1.
Dispensing with service on the respondents, alternatively, forms and
service provided for in the rules of this Honourable
Court, and
disposing of this application on an urgent basis in accordance with
the provisions of Rules 6(12) of this Honourable
Court’s rules.
2.
Condoning, to the extent to which it may necessary, the applicants
failure to comply with the provisions of
section 35 of the General
Law Amendment Act of 1955;
3. A
rule nisi
is issued, returnable on
2
nd
April 2015
, calling on the respondent to show cause, if any, why:
3.1 The
respondents should not be interdicted from evicting the applicant and
all the affected members of BOTSHABELO
H2, Community Members from
their premises and from demolition their shacks and/or house;
3.2 The
respondents should not be ordered to restore immediately the
applicants peaceful and undisturbed ownership
and/or possession of
their premises on the ground stated in the Founding Papers;
3.3 The
sheriff of this Court should not be authorized and directed, in the
event of the respondents failing to
comply with the order issued in
paragraph 3.1 and 3.2 above within one (1) hour or sixty minutes of
the order to take all steps
and generally do all that which it may
deem necessary in order to effect the restoration of the applicants
to the aforementioned
premises or the
status quo ante
;
3.4 The
respondents should not be ordered to pay the costs of this
application;
4. The
order contained in paragraphs 3.1 to 3.3 hereof will operate, pending
the final determination of this application,
as an interim interdict
with immediate effect.
5.
Directing that this order must be served on the respondents or their
Legal Representative by fax or in accordance
with the directives of
this Honourable Court.”
[7]
It is apparent from the aforesaid order that a rule
nisi
with return date 2 April 2015 was issued, but the interdicts were
ordered to operate as
interim
interdicts pending final determination of the application.
[8]
On 20 February 2015 respondents caused a notice in terms of rule
6(12)(c) to be issued, seeking the following orders:
1.
Reviewing the order granted
ex parte
on 16 December (
sic
)
2015;
2.
Rescinding the said order;
3.
Ordering the applicants to pay the costs on an attorney and own
client scale.
[9]
On 20 February 2015 Moeng AJ postponed the application in terms of
rule 6(12)(c) to 23 February 2015, suspended the application
of the
temporary interdict pending finalisation of that application and
interdicted respondents not
“
to
interfere with the proprietary rights of any person in lawful
occupation of property on or before 16 February 2015”
.
The costs were reserved.
[10]
On 23 February 2015 the matter was again heard by Moeng AJ who
postponed the application until 19 March 2015, reserving costs
of the
application. He granted orders pertaining to the filing of
answering and replying affidavits and also made the following
further
orders which I quote
verbatim
:
“
2.
The first respondent must return the property removed from the
premises on Monday, 17 February 2015 to the rightful
owners before
close of business on 23 February 2015 failing which the Sheriff is
authorised to take all necessary steps to return
the said property to
the rightful owners.
…
5.
Paragraphs
2 and 3 of the order granted on
23
February 2015
remain.”
What
paragraph 5 of the order of 23 February 2015 means is unclear.
The only order granted on 23 February 2015 is the one
by Moeng AJ and
he could surely not refer to his own order.
[11]
On 27 February 2015 application 952/2015 was issued, again on an
urgent basis, the idea being that the matter be heard at 10h30
that
Friday morning. The notice of motion was delivered that same
morning on respondent’s attorneys, but it is not
clear at what
time. The following order was issued by Moeng AJ which I quote
verbatim
:
“
1.
The service on the respondents, alternatively, forms and service
provided for in the rules of this Honourable
Court, are dispended
with and this application are disposed on an urgent basis in
accordance with the provisions of Rules 6(12)
of this Honourable
Court’s rules.
3.
A
rule nisi
is issued, returnable on
19
th
March 2015
, calling on the respondent to show cause, if any, why:
3.1 The respondents
should not be interdicted from evicting the applicant and all the
affected members of BOTSHABELO H2, Community
Members from their
premises and from demolition their shacks and/or house;
3.2 The respondents
should not be ordered to restore immediately the applicant’s
peaceful and undisturbed ownership
and/or possession of their
premises on the ground stated in the Founding Papers;
3.3
The first respondent must return the property removed from the
premises on Friday 27
th
February 2015 as well as on Monday, 17 February 2015 to the rightful
owners before 19h00 on 27 February 2015 failing which the
Sheriff of
this court is authorised and directed to take all necessary steps in
order to effect the restoration of applicant’s
property to the
aforementioned premises or the
status
quo ante
in which event the respondents shall be liable for all costs incurred
thereto.
4.
The order contained in paragraphs 3.1 to 3.3 hereof will operate,
pending the final determination
of this application, as an interim
interdict with immediate effect.
5.
The application under case no. 707/2015 is joint with this
application.
6.
The applicants are given leave to supplement their papers, should a
need arise.
7.
The respondents are ordered to pay the costs of this application.”
[12]
Respondents filed their answering affidavit and annexures thereto on
9 March 2015. On 31 March 2015 Van Heerden filed
a replying
affidavit, again alleging that he deposed to the affidavit in his
personal capacity and also on behalf of members of
Botshabelo H2
Community, who have been affected by the conduct of the respondents,
as duly authorised. Numerous confirmatory
affidavits and other
annexures were attached. The applications were argued before me
on 16 April 2015 whereupon I reserved
judgment.
V
POINTS
IN
LIMINE
[13]
Respondents rely on two points
in
limine
.
It is their case, in respect of the first point
in
limine
,
that Van Heerden purports to be duly authorised to represent the
affected members of Botshabello H2 Community, but that he has
failed,
alternatively neglected to attach such authorisation. Therefore
it is averred that Van Heerden does not have the
necessary
locus
standi
to represent the remaining applicants in the proceedings.
[14]
The second point
in
limine
relates to the court order granted by Rampai J on 23 August 2012.
In terms of that order unknown occupiers on erven 2997
and 2874 H
section Botshabelo were directed to vacate the two erven and to
remove all their property, equipment, building material
or structures
therefrom. No rescission application has been lodged in respect
of this order which is therefore still valid
and remains in force
relating to the eviction of occupiers from those erven.
[15]
I shall deal with the points
in
limine
and issues related thereto later herein.
VI
THE
MERITS RELATING TO CERTAIN FACTUAL ISSUES
[16]
Both applications have been drafted in vague and general terms.
No factual averments have been made to indicate whose
shacks and/or
houses have been demolished and whose properties – and if so,
the nature thereof - have been removed from the
various premises.
Five confirmatory affidavits of so-called affected members have been
attached to Van Heerden’s founding
affidavit. They read
exactly the same, save for the deponents’ names and residential
addresses. The deponents
confirm firstly that they entered into
“purchase agreements” with the municipality entitling
them to ownership or possession
of the respective premises for which
documentation were attached as well. Secondly, that Van Heerden
“
has
been authorised by all the affected members to approach Court on
behalf of all of the members for the necessary relief”.
Van
Heerden went further in deposing to his replying affidavit by
attaching forty two further confirmatory affidavits by other
so-called affected members with their supporting documents,
confirming his version and reading identical to the affidavits
attached
to his founding affidavit. Van Heerden and the people
he purports to represent clearly had in mind to prove that they were
owners or at least lawful occupiers of the respective premises in
section H2, Botshabelo.
[17]
Van Heerden mentions the following in the founding affidavit in
application 707/2015:
“
5.8
Pursuant to the aforementioned purchases, we did not only take
peaceful and undisturbed occupation of the premises
but also erected
shacks and built houses on the said premises.
…
5.10
Subsequent thereto we enjoyed and have been enjoying our ownership
over the premises and our peaceful and undisturbed
possession and
control in respect of the said premises until we were unceremoniously
and unlawfully despoiled by the Respondents
this morning, the 16
th
February 2015 at about 05h00.”
[18]
In paragraph 7.2 of the same affidavit the allegation is made that
“…
we
erected shacks and built brick houses on the premises”
whilst
in paragraph 7.10 it is again stated that
“…
the
Respondent arrived with the Police contingent and started to demolish
our shacks and houses without any word and/or explanation…”
.
In paragraph 7.14 it is stated that
“…
the
eviction and demolition of our shacks and houses continued and it was
still continuing when we left Botshabelo for our attorney’s
office in Bloemfontein”.
The
general drift of the founding affidavit is also reflected in
paragraph 8 where the deponent deals with urgency and in paragraph
9
where the requirements for interdictory relief are dealt with.
[19]
Van Heerden counts him in with the group of people whose rights have
allegedly been interfered with and he also refers to himself
as one
of the community members of Botshabelo H2 section. He resides
at 2279, H2, Botshabelo, but does not reside in the
area demarcated
in yellow on the map, annexure “C”. Respondents
allege that Van Heerden has not been affected
by any of their actions
as he is resident in an area sold by the municipality to a private
developer in August 2009 and transferred
in the name of the developer
on 20 June 2013. The area in yellow on the map is the
municipality’s property, demarcated
and zoned as residential
area, but still to be serviced with the necessary infrastructure
suitable for human settlement.
Respondents have targeted this
area to be cleaned up. Van Heerden does not categorically state
that his house/shack has been
demolished and that his property has
been removed from erf 2279, H2, Botshabelo. If that was indeed
the case, I would have
expected him to make that clear.
[20]
Not one of the people that deposed to affidavits, either attached to
the founding, or replying affidavit confirms under oath
that his/her
house/shack has been demolished or was in the process of being
demolished when the first order was granted and/or
that his/her
property has been removed from the site occupied by him/her.
This must be seen in light of the version put before
court by the
respondents and bearing in mind the legal principles applicable to
the adjudication of factual disputes in applications
with which I
shall deal hereunder. Respondents admit that they started
removing shacks and fences from approximately fourteen
properties at
the time when applicants took action. Only two half-built
shacks were removed. It is denied that any
person was removed
from any of the premises or that premises were occupied.
VII
LEGAL
PRINCIPLES
[21]
In motion proceedings the affidavits constitute both the pleadings
and the evidence and the issues and averments in support
of the
parties’ cases should appear clearly therefrom. See
Minister
of Land Affairs and Agriculture v D & F Wevell Trust
2008 (2) SA 184
(SCA) at 200D.
It
is trite that the applicant in application proceedings must make out
his/her case in the founding affidavit. A litigant
should not
be allowed to try and make out a case in the replying affidavit.
The founding affidavit must contain sufficient
facts in itself upon
which a court may find in the applicant’s favour. An
applicant must stand or fall by his/her founding
affidavit. See
Director
of Hospital Services v Mistry
1979 (1) SA 626
(AD) at 635H – 636D.
[22]
A court should adjudicate factual disputes in application procedure
having regard to the well-known
Plascon-Evans
Paints
dicta
recently approved and considered in more depth in
Wightman
t/a JW Construction v
Headfour
(Pty) Ltd and Another
[2008] ZASCA 6
;
2008 (3) SA 371
(SCA). I quote from paras [12] and [13]:
“
[12]
Recognising that the truth almost always lies beyond mere linguistic
determination the courts have said that an applicant who
seeks final
relief on motion, must in the event of conflict, accept the version
set up by his opponent unless the latter’s
allegations are, in
the opinion of the court, not such as to raise a real, genuine or
bona fide dispute of fact or are so far-fetched
or clearly untenable
that the court is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers:
Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck
Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA
623
(A) at 634E-635C. See also the analysis by Davis J in
Ripoll-Dausa v Middleton NO
[2005] ZAWCHC 6
;
2005 (3) SA 141
(C) at 151A-153C
with which I respectfully agree. (I do not overlook that a reference
to evidence in circumstances discussed in
the authorities may be
appropriate.)
[13] A
real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact can exist only where the
court is satisfied that the party who purports to raise
the dispute
has in his affidavit seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact
said to be disputed. There will of course be instances
where a bare
denial meets the requirement because there is no other way open to
the disputing party and nothing more can therefore
be expected of
him. But even that may not be sufficient if the fact averred lies
purely within the knowledge of the averring party
and no basis is
laid for disputing the veracity or accuracy of the averment. When the
facts averred are such that the disputing
party must necessarily
possess knowledge of them and be able to provide an answer (or
countervailing evidence) if they be not true
or accurate but, instead
of doing so, rests his case on a bare or ambiguous denial the court
will generally have difficulty in
finding that the test is satisfied.
I say ‘generally’ because factual averments seldom stand
apart from a broader matrix
of circumstances all of which needs to be
borne in mind when arriving at a decision. A litigant may not
necessarily recognise or
understand the nuances of a bare or general
denial as against a real attempt to grapple with all relevant factual
allegations made
by the other party. But when he signs the answering
affidavit, he commits himself to its contents, inadequate as they may
be, and
will only in exceptional circumstances be permitted to
disavow them. There is thus a serious duty imposed upon a legal
adviser
who settles an answering affidavit to ascertain and engage
with facts which his client disputes and to reflect such disputes
fully
and accurately in the answering affidavit. If that does not
happen it should come as no surprise that the court takes a robust
view of the matter.”
[23]
The common law rule is that an association of natural persons which
has not its own legal personality cannot, as a general
rule, sue or
be sued in its own name, either directly or indirectly through the
members of the executive in their representative
capacity. See
Erasmus,
Superior
Court Practice
,
B1-126II and
Ex-Trtc
United Workers Front v Premier, Eastern Cape Province
2010 (2) SA 114
(ECB) at 124E – 125B. Exceptions to the
normal common law rule exist, e. g. an association may sue or be sued
in its
own name if its constitution, regulations or by-laws provide
that actions may be brought in the name of the association as such.
[24]
Someone cannot institute action or defend action as agent on behalf
of his/her principal. In the case of the conclusion
of a
contract, for an example, it is only the principal that requires
rights or incurs obligations under the contract and the agent
does
not become either entitled, or obliged and cannot personally sue or
be sued under the contract. See
S.W.A.
Amalgameerde Afslaers Bpk v Louw
1956 (1) SA 346
(AD) at 355C. Again, there are a few exceptions
to the general rule and I refer to Erasmus
loc
cit
at B1 – 126B.
[25]
In so far as applicants rely on the mandament van spolie, the purpose
and principles of spoliation was recently confirmed and
summarised by
the Constitutional Court in
Ngqukumba
v Minister of Safety and Security
2014 (5) SA 112
(CC) at paras [10] – [13] and I refer to the
following extracts:
“
[10]
The essence of the mandament van spolie is the restoration before all
else of unlawfully deprived possession to the possessor.
It finds
expression in the maxim spoliatus ante omnia restituendus est (the
despoiled person must be restored to possession before
all else).
…
The main purpose of
the mandament van spolie is to preserve public order by restraining
persons from taking the law into their own
hands and by inducing them
to follow due process.
…
[12]
A spoliation order is available even against government entities for
the simple reason that unfortunately excesses by those
entities do
occur. Those excesses, like acts of self-help by individuals, may
lead to breaches of the peace: that is what the spoliation
order,
which is deeply rooted in the rule of law, seeks to avert. The
likely consequences aside, the rule of law must be
vindicated. …
[13]
… All that the despoiled person need prove is that—
(a)
she was in possession of the object; and
(b)
she was deprived of possession unlawfully.”
VIII
EVALUATION
OF THE FACTS AND LEGAL SUBMISSIONS
[26]
The first point
in
limine
has not been pleaded properly. It is apparent, if cognisance is
taken of the annexures to the founding affidavit, that at
least five
people authorised Van Heerden to launch the application on their
behalf. Several more authorisations were filed
with the
replying affidavit. However, Van Heerden cannot litigate as
agent for and on behalf of his principals, the individuals
who
apparently authorised him, and he cannot represent an entity which
does not have the capacity to sue or be sued. In either
case,
he does not have
locus
standi
to
represent either the individuals, or the group of affected people.
The group of people identified as the affected members
of the
Botshabelo H2 Community does not have a constitution and/or is not
regulated by any regulation or by-law and therefore does
not have any
capacity to sue or be sued, either in its own name or through office
bearers which have not been identified in any
event. In the
absence of a constitution the group cannot be regarded as a voluntary
association with the necessary
locus
standi
to launch these proceedings. In my view the
locus
standi
hurdle is insurmountable and the applications should be dismissed on
this basis without having to consider the merits.
[27]
A logical and necessary consequence of the above conclusion is that
all persons whose rights have been prejudicially affected
had to
become parties to the litigation and cited in their individual names
as applicants. Van Heerden is non-cited for another
reason in
so far as he does not have
locus
standi
in the application as his premises fall outside the so-called
affected area. He has not shown conclusively that his rights
had been affected at all and therefore is not entitled to any relief.
[28]
Mr Khang argued that it is common cause that people are referred to
as a group of occupiers, especially in eviction applications.
This is indeed correct and a suitable example is application
3354/2012, the order issued by Rampai J on 23 August 2012. The
case law has however developed clearly in this regard as it is not
required of an applicant in such instances to try and identify
people
illegally occupying his/her property. It is well-known that
such occupiers would not co-operate and provide their
names and
further details freely and voluntarily and will in fact make it as
difficult as possible to be identified.
[29]
In
casu
,
unlike as Mr Khang submitted, the matter is totally different.
Those that have been prejudiced must come forward and give
instructions to their attorney to act on their behalf. If they
succeed, so be it, but if they are unsuccessful and costs
orders have
to be made, the court must know against whom those orders are to be
made and the successful party is entitled to know
against whom to
execute.
[30]
I do not accept that the second point
in
limine
is good on the facts of this case and Mr Lubbe has readily conceded
this during argument. Nothing further has to be said
about
this.
[31]
As mentioned, Van Heerden in his personal capacity has no case
whatsoever. On the version of respondents which I have
to
accept for purposes of adjudication of this application, it being not
far-fetched, untenable or so improbable that it should
be rejected,
Van Heerden’s property has not been affected at all.
[32]
On the basis that I am wrong in finding that the applications should
be dismissed based on lack of
locus
standi
,
I am satisfied that neither Van Heerden, nor the so-called affected
members of the H2 Community, Botshabelo have made out a proper
case
for relief. The founding and replying affidavits are vague in
the extreme and the confirmatory affidavits do not go
any further.
Not one single person has deposed to an affidavit stating that
his/her house or shack has been demolished or
that his/her property
has been removed from his/her site. I am not prepared to accept
that all those deponents who deposed
to affidavits attached to either
the founding or the replying affidavit have suffered as a result of
any action by the respondents.
The photographs attached to the
replying affidavit do not constitute sufficient proof to support the
applicants’ version.
Not a single piece of furniture or
any other household item can be seen on the scene depicted by the
photographs. This is
a clear indication that nobody occupied
any of the half-built shacks that had been demolished. I would
have expected furniture
such as beds, tables, stoves, TV’s etc.
to be depicted on photographs if that was really the applicants’
case that
they have been evicted from their premises, i.e. either
shacks or houses. In so far as it might be suggested that brick
houses
were demolished, there is obviously no evidence whatsoever
thereof. As mentioned I accept respondents’ version in
respect
of factual disputes such as the above based on the criteria
set out in
Plascon-Evans.
[33]
Applicants cannot succeed with the mandament van spolie as they did
not prove either of the requirements for spoliation.
They
haven’t proven that they were in possession – let alone
peaceful and undisturbed possession - of the relevant
properties and
secondly, that they were deprived of their possession unlawfully.
I refer also to various meetings held with
the community as stated on
behalf of respondents, but find it unnecessary to deal with these in
any detail, save to mention that
two officials of the municipality,
without being authorised thereto, purported to sell premises and/or
issued so-called “Permission
to Occupy” (PTO)
certificates to the community. Disciplinary action has been
taken against the offenders. Applicants
failed to mention these
meetings in the founding affidavits, for which minutes were attached
to the answering affidavits.
They also failed to prove the
requirements for permanent mandatory or prohibitory interdicts.
Applicants relied on respondents’
breach of their own policy,
i.e. the by-laws relating to informal settlements and Mr Khang argued
this issue with conviction.
However, the factual foundation did
not support his arguments as applicants did not prove their
occupation, either legally, or
illegally of the particular premises.
Nothing more has to be said in this regard. Consequently the
rules
nisi
issued in both applications should be discharged and both
applications should be dismissed with costs.
[34]
Respondents requested costs on an attorney and own client’s
scale when they brought the application in terms of rule
6(12)(c) and
the costs stood over as indicated above. However I am not
prepared to grant punitive costs orders and the usual
costs orders
shall be granted. There is clearly dissatisfaction amongst
community members who might have been defrauded by
municipal
employees. The various official documentation placed before me
tend to suggest that corrupt activities occurred
and that the
community was misled. There is also no reason to make provision
for the costs of two counsel.
IX
ORDER
[35]
The rules
nisi
in applications 707/2015 and 952/2015 are discharged and applications
707/2015 and 952/2015 are dismissed with costs, such costs
to include
all costs previously reserved.
______________
J.
P. DAFFUE, J
On
behalf of the applicants: Mnr. M. Khang
Instructed
by:
Mphafi
Khang Inc.
BLOEMFONTEIN
On
behalf of the respondents: Adv. J. Lubbe SC
Assisted
by: Adv. T. L. Manye
Instructed
by:
Moroka
Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
/eb