M v M (A216/2014) [2015] ZAFSHC 36 (5 March 2015)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Divorce — Jurisdiction of regional court — Appeal against regional magistrate's ruling on jurisdiction to dissolve marriage — Parties married in foreign jurisdiction but residing in South Africa — Regional court has jurisdiction under section 28(1A) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act and section 2(1) of the Divorce Act — Appeal upheld, original order set aside, and matter remitted for continuation of trial.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


This matter was an appeal to the Free State High Court, Bloemfontein against a ruling made in the regional court during divorce proceedings. The appeal was heard by Mocumie J and Lekale J and was disposed of on an unopposed basis, with an expedited order granted to avoid further delay.


The parties were spouses in the divorce action: the appellant was the plaintiff in the divorce proceedings, and the respondent was the defendant. The underlying proceedings were a divorce action instituted in the regional court, Bloemfontein, after legislative amendments extended civil jurisdiction (including divorce jurisdiction) to regional courts.


Procedurally, the divorce action had become unopposed after the defendant withdrew her defence and counterclaim following a settlement. At that stage, and immediately before the plaintiff was to be sworn in, the regional magistrate raised a jurisdictional point mero motu and effectively brought the proceedings to an end on the basis that the marriage had been concluded outside South Africa. Leave to appeal was granted, and the matter proceeded to the High Court.


The general subject matter of the dispute was whether a South African regional court has jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage solemnised in a foreign country, where the parties are domiciled or ordinarily resident within its area of jurisdiction.


Material Facts


The parties were married on 3 November 2007 in Phomolong, Lesotho. The judgment treated the fact of a foreign solemnisation as common cause, and the appeal proceeded on the basis that the marriage was concluded outside the Republic of South Africa.


The plaintiff instituted divorce proceedings in the regional court, Bloemfontein on 22 May 2012. By 8 August 2014, the defendant withdrew both her defence and counterclaim because the parties had entered into a deed of settlement, and the divorce was to proceed as an unopposed matter.


At the point when the plaintiff was about to give evidence, the regional magistrate raised, on his own initiative, whether the regional court had jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage concluded in a foreign jurisdiction. The magistrate questioned why the parties could not finalise their divorce in Maseru, Lesotho, expressing the view that it was not far from Bloemfontein. Counsel for the plaintiff responded that the parties’ presence and established lives in Bloemfontein (including domicile, work, and issues relevant to the child’s arrangements) made it practical to proceed in Bloemfontein, although counsel did not present this as an independent legal jurisdictional basis.


The regional magistrate stated that he was not convinced that he had jurisdiction over “citizens who were married out of the borders” of South Africa and indicated that he did not accept “practicality” as a sufficient reason, effectively resulting in the divorce action not proceeding. The High Court inferred, from the ruling and absence of a formal order, that the divorce action was dismissed (or at least halted) for lack of jurisdiction.


The plaintiff was a South African citizen at the time of the marriage. When the divorce action was instituted, the judgment recorded that both parties were resident and domiciled in Bloemfontein, Free State, South Africa. The alleged irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, as the cause of action, was treated as having occurred within the regional division of the Free State.


Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether the regional court had jurisdiction to hear and determine a divorce action between parties who were married in a foreign country, where the statutory jurisdictional connecting factors (domicile or ordinary residence) existed within the regional court’s area.


This was primarily a question of law, involving the interpretation and application of statutory jurisdiction provisions in the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 (as amended) and the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, together with the legal consequences flowing from the fact that the marriage was solemnised outside South Africa. It also involved the application of law to largely common-cause facts, namely the parties’ residence and domicile in Bloemfontein at the time the action was instituted.


A further issue addressed by the High Court (though ancillary to the jurisdictional inquiry) was the duty of judicial officers to furnish reasons for their decisions, particularly where a matter proceeds on appeal and reasons are necessary to facilitate the appeal process and accountability.


Court’s Reasoning


The High Court situated the dispute against the background that the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 was amended (through the Jurisdiction of Regional Courts Amendment Act 31 of 2008) to extend civil jurisdiction to regional courts, including jurisdiction over divorce matters. The court emphasised that this legislative development was intended, among other purposes, to improve affordable access to divorce litigation, particularly for indigent litigants.


On the private international law dimension, the court stated that it is trite that the validity of a marriage concluded in a foreign country is determined by the principle of lex loci celebrationis, namely the law of the place where the marriage was solemnised. The court noted the common-law position that where a marriage is legally concluded in another country, South African courts recognise it as valid provided there were no legal impediments at the time of solemnisation, and it stated that this common-law position remains unchanged.


Turning to jurisdiction, the High Court analysed the relevant statutory provisions. It set out section 28(1A) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act (as amended), which provides that a regional court has jurisdiction for purposes of section 29(1B) if the parties (or either of them) are domiciled within the court’s area when proceedings are instituted, or are ordinarily resident within the court’s area at that date and have been ordinarily resident in the Republic for at least one year immediately prior. It also referred to section 29(1B) insofar as it links jurisdiction to causes of action occurring within the relevant regional division.


In addition, the court relied on section 2(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, which similarly confers jurisdiction in a divorce action where either party is domiciled in the area of jurisdiction when the action is instituted, or is ordinarily resident there and has been ordinarily resident in the Republic for at least one year immediately prior.


Applying these provisions to the facts recorded in the judgment, the High Court reasoned that a regional court has jurisdiction to determine a divorce action even where the marriage was concluded in another country, provided that the statutory requirements of domicile or ordinary residence (with the one-year residence requirement in the Republic, where applicable) are met. On the court’s account of the facts, the parties were resident and domiciled in Bloemfontein when the divorce action was instituted, with the cause of action arising within the Free State regional division. The court therefore treated jurisdiction as established under the statutory scheme.


The High Court was critical of the regional magistrate’s approach. It recorded that the magistrate provided no reasons for the jurisdictional ruling and did not clearly formulate an order dismissing or staying proceedings. The High Court further noted that, even when given an opportunity to furnish reasons at the leave-to-appeal stage, the magistrate again did not provide them. The court considered this failure significant, referring to Constitutional Court authority emphasising that litigants are ordinarily entitled to reasons and that reasoned decisions are indispensable to the appeal process, accountability, and transparency.


Although the absence of reasons made the appellate task more difficult, the High Court elected, in the interests of justice and expedition, to decide the appeal without requiring reasons. The court also made evaluative observations about the systemic impact of such jurisdictional misdirections in unopposed divorces, including delays, increased costs, and potentially undermining confidence in the regional court’s ability to manage divorce matters. It expressed the view that the matter indicated a need for training or improved training on divorce jurisdiction within the regional court environment.


Finally, the court considered it appropriate that the parties be permitted to proceed on the same papers in the regional court so that they would not incur the additional burden of issuing fresh summons, given that the appeal was not attributable to any wrongdoing by the parties.


Outcome and Relief


The High Court upheld the appeal. It set aside the order of the regional court and substituted it with a declaratory statement that the regional court has jurisdiction to hear the divorce action in terms of section 28(1A) read with section 29(1B) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 (as amended) and section 2(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979.


The matter was remitted to the regional court for continuation and finalisation of the trial on the same papers and annexures, with a direction that it be allocated in the first term to be disposed of speedily.


The judgment as provided did not record a costs order in the High Court proceedings.


Cases Cited


Chitima v Road Accident Fund 2012 (2) All SA 632 (WCC).


Pretorius v Pretorius 1948 (4) SA 144 (O).


Strategic Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO 2010 (2) SA 92 (CC).


Botes and Another v Nedbank Ltd 1983 (3) SA 27 (A).


S v Calitz en ’n Ander 2003 (1) SACR 116 (SCA).


Mphahlele v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd [1999] ZACC 1; 1999 (2) SA 667 (CC).


Legislation Cited


Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 (as amended), including section 28(1A) and section 29(1B).


Jurisdiction of Regional Courts Amendment Act 31 of 2008.


Divorce Act 70 of 1979, including section 2(1).


Domicile Act 3 of 1992.


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 9.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment as provided.


Held


The court held that a South African regional court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a divorce action notwithstanding that the marriage was solemnised in a foreign country, provided the statutory jurisdictional requirements relating to domicile or ordinary residence (including the one-year residence requirement in the Republic where applicable) are satisfied.


The court further held, by clear implication through its criticism and reliance on Constitutional Court authority, that judicial officers are obliged to provide reasons for their decisions, and that failure to do so undermines accountability and impedes the appeal process, although the appeal was determined without such reasons to ensure expedition.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A marriage concluded in a foreign jurisdiction is assessed by reference to lex loci celebrationis, and, where legally concluded without impediment under the law of the place of celebration, it is recognised as valid in South African law for purposes of subsequent proceedings.


Jurisdiction in divorce proceedings is determined by the statutory connecting factors of domicile or ordinary residence as set out in section 2(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, and, for regional courts, as mirrored and incorporated through section 28(1A) read with section 29(1B) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 (as amended). On this approach, the fact that a marriage was solemnised outside South Africa does not, in itself, exclude jurisdiction where the statutory criteria are met.


Courts are obliged to provide reasons for their decisions. Reasoned decisions promote transparency and accountability, assist litigants in deciding whether to appeal, and enable appellate courts to evaluate the correctness of lower-court outcomes.

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[2015] ZAFSHC 36
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M v M (A216/2014) [2015] ZAFSHC 36 (5 March 2015)

SAFLII
Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses
have been redacted from this document in compliance
with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
FREE
STATE HIGH COURT, BLOEMFONTEIN
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case
No. : A216/2014
DATE:
05 MARCH 2015
In
the matter between:-
[F…….]
[M………]
[M……]
....................................................................................................
Appellant
And
[F……]
[E…..]
[M………]
.....................................................................................................
Respondent
CORAM:
MOCUMIE J
et
LEKALE
J
JUDGMENT
BY:
MOCUMIE, J
HEARD
ON:
09 FEBUARY 2015
DELIVERED
ON
:
5 MARCH 2015
MOCUMIE,
J
[1]
The appeal came before us on an unopposed basis on 9 February
2015.The order sought was granted and handed down on 17 February
2015
as we deemed it necessary to expedite the matter. The order granted
reads:

1.
The appeal is upheld.
2.
The order of the regional court is set aside and substituted with the
following:

The
regional court has jurisdiction to hear the divorce action in terms
of section 28(1A) read with 29(1B) of the
Magistrates’ Courts
Act 32 of 1944
as amended and
section 2
(1) of the
Divorce Act 70 of
1979
.’
3.
The matter is remitted to the regional
court for continuation and finalisation of the trial, [on the same
papers and annexures.]
4.
The matter to be allocated in the first
term to be disposed of speedily.’
[2]
In 2010 the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944 (the Act) was
amended by the Jurisdiction of Regional Courts Amendment Act
31 of
2008 (the Regional Courts Act) with the purpose to, amongst others,
extend civil jurisdiction to the regional courts to deal
with civil
litigation including divorce matters. This was received with a sigh
of relief by the most indigent of our society as
it meant that
litigants could henceforth get their divorce at affordable costs.
[3]
The appellant, the plaintiff in the main action, and the respondent,
the defendant in the main action, for reasons unknown and
not
relevant in this appeal but definitely out of choice, were married in
Phomolong, Lesotho, on 03 November 2007. For convenience,
the parties
will be referred to as in the main action. Pursuant to these new
developments as set out in paragraph 2 above, on
22 May 2012 the
plaintiff instituted a divorce action against the defendant under
case number FS/BFN/RC/361/2012D in the regional
court, Bloemfontein.
On 8 August 2014 the defendant withdrew her defence and her counter
claim as the parties had entered into
a deed of settlement. The
matter proceeded on an unopposed basis.
[4]
On the verge of the plaintiff being sworn in to give evidence under
oath, the regional magistrate (Mr Mkansi),
mero
motu
, raised a point
in
limine
regarding
the jurisdiction of the regional court to dissolve a marriage entered
into in a foreign jurisdiction. The basis of raising
such point
in
limine,
as he put it, was because the
plaintiff and the defendant were different from parties who are
married in the Republic of South Africa.
He posed the contentious
question
‘…
is there a specific
reason why the parties would not go and finalise their divorce in
Maseru, Lesotho, which is not far from Bloemfontein?’
[5]
From the bar counsel for the plaintiff, responded to the question
posed by the regional magistrate as follows:

There
is no specific reason other than the plaintiff works and is domiciled
(sic)for a number of years, also his paternal grandmother
where the
child stays, is domiciled in Bloemfontein and in this matter, the
family advocate had to investigate regarding the arrangements,

regarding the child and they were also, it was easy for them to
evaluate the situation, everyone was in Bloemfontein, so the reason

was practicality. It is not a legal reason that I can submit, the
parties were in Bloemfontein, and they work here. Both parties

frequented my office several times. The previous attorneys of the
defendant, two previous attorneys were also in Bloemfontein,
and
never was it the issue raised by them or any one…’
[6]
After so interacting with the plaintiff’s
legal representative, the regional magistrate concluded that:

I
am not convinced that I have jurisdiction over the citizens who were
married out of the borders of the Republic of South Africa.
The
second reason, the question of practicality why the plaintiff cannot
pursue or proceed with this action in Maseru, Lesotho
which is about
155 less than 160 km from Bloemfontein, I do not believe the question
of practicality has merits. The plaintiff
can institute divorce
proceedings in Maseru, Lesotho, which is not far from the province of
the Free State…’
[7]
We gather from this ruling, in the absence of any order and reasons
by the regional magistrate that he dismissed the action
for divorce.
It is this decision that is appealed against with leave of the trial
court.
[8]
The plaintiff was a South African citizen at the time of the
marriage. He resides in Bloemfontein. He has been in South Africa,

Bloemfontein since he was born. When he instituted the action both
parties were residents and domiciled in Bloemfontein, Free State,

South Africa.
[9]
The main issue before the regional magistrate for determination was
an action for the dissolution of a marriage between two
people who
were ordinarily resident in the regional division of the Free State.
The cause of action, the irretrievable break down
of the marriage,
occurred in the regional division of the Free State.
[10]
Mr van der Merwe submitted that the regional court had jurisdiction
to dissolve the marriage as the plaintiff sought, based
on the
provisions of section 28(1A) read with section 29(1B) of the Act as
amended read further with section 2(1) (a) and (b) of
the Divorce Act
70 of 1979 (the
Divorce Act). The
submissions he made with reference
to case law however did not persuade the regional magistrate in any
way when he ultimately ruled
that he did not have jurisdiction.
[11]
It is trite that a marriage concluded in a foreign country is by law
determined by the application of the principle of
lex
loci celebrationis
which
means the law of the place where the marriage was solemnised.
[1]
In terms of our common law, where a marriage was legally concluded in
another country, the marriage is recognised as valid by our
courts as
long as when the marriage was solemnised there were no legal
impediments to the marriage.
[2]
This
common law position has not changed.
[3]
[12] Section 28 (1A)
of the Act as amended reads:

For
purposes of section 29 (1B), a court for the regional division shall
have jurisdiction if the parties are or if either of the
parties is-
(i)
domiciled in the area of jurisdiction of the court on the date on
which the proceedings are instituted,
(ii)
ordinarily resident in the area of the jurisdiction of the court on
the said date and has been ordinarily resident in the Republic
for a
period of not less than one year immediately prior to that date.’
[13]
To the extent relevant and referred to in s28 (1A), s29 (1B) provides
that a court shall have jurisdiction in an action which
occurred
within its district or regional division.
[14]
Section 2(1)
Divorce Act 70 of 1979
reads:

A
court shall have jurisdiction in a divorce action if the parties are
or either of the parties is –
(a)
domiciled in the area of jurisdiction of the court on the date on
which the action is instituted; or
(b
)
ordinarily resident in the area of
jurisdiction of the court on the said date and have or has been
ordinarily resident in the Republic
for a period of not less than one
year immediately prior to that date’.
[15]
It follows, axiomatically, that in terms of
s28
(1A) read with
s29(1B) of the Act as amended and
s2(1)
(a) and (b) of the
Divorce
Act, a
regional court has jurisdiction in a divorce action between
parties who were married in another country as long as (i) they are

or one of them is domiciled in the jurisdiction of the court on the
date on which the action is instituted or (ii) they or one
of them is
ordinarily resident within the court’s jurisdiction when the
action is instituted and have or has been ordinarily
resident in the
Republic of South Africa for at least one year prior to the
institution of the action. This is the legal position
in South
Africa.
[16]
After an in-depth and thorough perusal and study of the papers, and
submissions on behalf of the plaintiff, without any reasons

supporting the ruling made, it is still not clear why the regional
magistrate was of the view that he did not have jurisdiction.
There
is no indication that there are conflicting decisions on this issue
in the regional courts across the country and more specifically
in
the Free State. Neither does the regional magistrate say so
expressly. Nor does he say that the relevant sections of the Act
as
amended and the
Divorce Act are
unclear.
[17]
As indicated already, the regional magistrate did not give reasons
for his decision. He did not even expressly state that he
was
dismissing the action for divorce or staying the proceedings pending
a decision by this court on the issue of jurisdiction
that he had
raised
mero motu
.
Even when he was given the proverbial ‘second bite at the
cherry’, to provide reasons for his decision when the plaintiff

lodged leave to appeal, he again chose not to give reasons.
[18]
Courts are obliged to give reasons for their decisions. This is a
manifestation of the fundamental principle of the common
law that
justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done.
The Constitutional Court in
Strategic
Liquor Services v Mvumbi
[4]
had
the occasion to deal with a labour matter in which the Labour Court,
despite repeated requests, failed to furnish reasons for
its
decision.
[19]
At paras [15] to [17] of the judgment
[5]
the court states:

[15
]It is elementary that litigants are ordinarily entlted to reasons
for a judicial decision following upon a hearing, and, when
a
judgment is appealed, written reasons are indispensable. Failure to
supply them will usually be a grave lapse of duty, a breach
of
litigants’ rights, and an impediment to the appeal process. In
Botes
and Another v Nedbank Ltd
[6]
,
Corbett JA pointed out that ‘a reasoned judgment may well
discourage an appeal by the loser’: ‘The failure to
state
reasons may have the opposite effect. In addition, should the matter
be taken on appeal, as happened in this case, the court
of appeal has
a similar interest in knowing why the Judge who heard the matter made
the order which he did.’
[16]
That the Labour Appeal Court considered the employer’s
application for leave to appeal without requiring Nel AJ to supply

reasons, and without in their absence furnishing its own, is most
regrettable. The application before that court gave it the
opportunity
that Nel AJ let slip through his fingers, namely to give
the employer reasons for its failed attempt to review the CCMA
outcome.
[17]
In Mphahlele
[7]
this court noted
that there is no express constitutional provision for leave to appeal
requiring judges to furnish reasons for
their decisions (and on this
basis upheld the long standing practice of the Supreme Court of
Appeal not to furnish reasons when
determining applications for leave
to appeal).We add that there is likewise no express statutory
provision requiring judges who
have given judgment ex tempore to
furnish written reasons when later required. Nonetheless, as this
court pointed out in Mphahlele,
a reasoned judgment is indispensable
to the appeal process. Judges ordinarily account for their decision
by giving reasons-and
the rule of law requires that they should not
act arbitrarily and that they be accountable. Furnishing reasons-

explains
to the parties, and to the public at large which has an interest in
courts being open and transparent, why a case is decided
as it is.It
is discipline which curbs arbitrary judicial decisions. Then, too ,it
is essential for the appeal process, enabling
the losing party to
take an informed decision as to whether or not to appeal, or where
necessary, seek leave to appeal. It assists
the appeal court to
decide whether or not the order of the lower court is correct. And
finally, it provides guidance to the public
in respect of similar
matters.’
The
fact that the regional magistrate did not give reasons made our task
unnecessarily arduous, although we finally decided, in
the interest
of justice and speedy resolution of this appeal, to dispense with the
reasons.
[20]
Finally, it must be stated that for an unopposed divorce matter,
which litigants chose to be dealt with by the regional court
for the
obvious reason of affordability, to have come to this court on
appeal, even if ‘just across the road’ as the
regional
magistrate remarked, has caused more harm to the entire system than
can ever be imagined. First, it has given a wrong
impression that the
regional court is not up to the task to deal with divorce matters.
Second, it has denied the litigants in this
case their right to
approach a court of their choice and in the process denied them
access to justice and speedy resolution of
what seems to be a matter
that could have been disposed of in less than fifteen minutes at a
nominal fee. The Regional Court President
must consider this case as
one pointing to lack of training or inadequate training on divorce
matters and take steps to remedy
this, so that it should not be
repeated.
[21]
Considering the fact that this appeal was by no means as a result of
any wrongdoing on the parties’ part, they are entitled
to
proceed on the same papers to continue with the action and not issue
fresh summons.
[22]
It is for the above reasons that the order set out in paragraph 1of
this judgment, slightly amended, was granted.
B.
C. MOCUMIE, J
I
concur
L.J.
LEKALE, J
On
behalf of the applicant: Adv. R. Van Der Merwe
Instructed
by:
J.L.
Jordaan Attorneys
Bloemfontein
[1]
Chitima
v Road Accident Fund
2012
(2) All SA 632
(WCC).
[2]
Pretorius
v Pretorius
1948 (4) SA 144 (O) 147-149.
[3]
The Domicile Act 3 of 1992 provides that where either or both
parties are not domiciled in the same country or state or when
the
marriage is solemnized in a place where either or both spouses are
not domiciled, the law of the place of the husband’s
domicile,
at the time of the marriage, will govern the legal and proprietary
consequences thereof. This theory is clearly outdated
and in
conflict with the principle of equality (s9 of the Constitution of
South Africa).Legal reform is required. Compare with
the Hague
Convention of 1978.
[4]
Strategic
Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO
2010
(2) SA 92
(CC).
[5]
Mvumbi
footnote 4.
[6]
Botes
and Another v Nedbank Ltd
1983
(3) SA 27
(A).See also
S
v Calitz en ‘n Ander
2003
(1) SACR 116
SCA
.
[7]
Mphahlele
v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd [
1999]
ZACC 1
;
1999 (2) SA 667
(CC).  See also SALJ, Vol. 115, (1998)
117.