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[2015] ZAFSHC 36
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M v M (A216/2014) [2015] ZAFSHC 36 (5 March 2015)
SAFLII
Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses
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FREE
STATE HIGH COURT, BLOEMFONTEIN
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case
No. : A216/2014
DATE:
05 MARCH 2015
In
the matter between:-
[F…….]
[M………]
[M……]
....................................................................................................
Appellant
And
[F……]
[E…..]
[M………]
.....................................................................................................
Respondent
CORAM:
MOCUMIE J
et
LEKALE
J
JUDGMENT
BY:
MOCUMIE, J
HEARD
ON:
09 FEBUARY 2015
DELIVERED
ON
:
5 MARCH 2015
MOCUMIE,
J
[1]
The appeal came before us on an unopposed basis on 9 February
2015.The order sought was granted and handed down on 17 February
2015
as we deemed it necessary to expedite the matter. The order granted
reads:
“
1.
The appeal is upheld.
2.
The order of the regional court is set aside and substituted with the
following:
‘
The
regional court has jurisdiction to hear the divorce action in terms
of section 28(1A) read with 29(1B) of the
Magistrates’ Courts
Act 32 of 1944
as amended and
section 2
(1) of the
Divorce Act 70 of
1979
.’
3.
The matter is remitted to the regional
court for continuation and finalisation of the trial, [on the same
papers and annexures.]
4.
The matter to be allocated in the first
term to be disposed of speedily.’
[2]
In 2010 the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 of 1944 (the Act) was
amended by the Jurisdiction of Regional Courts Amendment Act
31 of
2008 (the Regional Courts Act) with the purpose to, amongst others,
extend civil jurisdiction to the regional courts to deal
with civil
litigation including divorce matters. This was received with a sigh
of relief by the most indigent of our society as
it meant that
litigants could henceforth get their divorce at affordable costs.
[3]
The appellant, the plaintiff in the main action, and the respondent,
the defendant in the main action, for reasons unknown and
not
relevant in this appeal but definitely out of choice, were married in
Phomolong, Lesotho, on 03 November 2007. For convenience,
the parties
will be referred to as in the main action. Pursuant to these new
developments as set out in paragraph 2 above, on
22 May 2012 the
plaintiff instituted a divorce action against the defendant under
case number FS/BFN/RC/361/2012D in the regional
court, Bloemfontein.
On 8 August 2014 the defendant withdrew her defence and her counter
claim as the parties had entered into
a deed of settlement. The
matter proceeded on an unopposed basis.
[4]
On the verge of the plaintiff being sworn in to give evidence under
oath, the regional magistrate (Mr Mkansi),
mero
motu
, raised a point
in
limine
regarding
the jurisdiction of the regional court to dissolve a marriage entered
into in a foreign jurisdiction. The basis of raising
such point
in
limine,
as he put it, was because the
plaintiff and the defendant were different from parties who are
married in the Republic of South Africa.
He posed the contentious
question
‘…
is there a specific
reason why the parties would not go and finalise their divorce in
Maseru, Lesotho, which is not far from Bloemfontein?’
[5]
From the bar counsel for the plaintiff, responded to the question
posed by the regional magistrate as follows:
‘
There
is no specific reason other than the plaintiff works and is domiciled
(sic)for a number of years, also his paternal grandmother
where the
child stays, is domiciled in Bloemfontein and in this matter, the
family advocate had to investigate regarding the arrangements,
regarding the child and they were also, it was easy for them to
evaluate the situation, everyone was in Bloemfontein, so the reason
was practicality. It is not a legal reason that I can submit, the
parties were in Bloemfontein, and they work here. Both parties
frequented my office several times. The previous attorneys of the
defendant, two previous attorneys were also in Bloemfontein,
and
never was it the issue raised by them or any one…’
[6]
After so interacting with the plaintiff’s
legal representative, the regional magistrate concluded that:
‘
I
am not convinced that I have jurisdiction over the citizens who were
married out of the borders of the Republic of South Africa.
The
second reason, the question of practicality why the plaintiff cannot
pursue or proceed with this action in Maseru, Lesotho
which is about
155 less than 160 km from Bloemfontein, I do not believe the question
of practicality has merits. The plaintiff
can institute divorce
proceedings in Maseru, Lesotho, which is not far from the province of
the Free State…’
[7]
We gather from this ruling, in the absence of any order and reasons
by the regional magistrate that he dismissed the action
for divorce.
It is this decision that is appealed against with leave of the trial
court.
[8]
The plaintiff was a South African citizen at the time of the
marriage. He resides in Bloemfontein. He has been in South Africa,
Bloemfontein since he was born. When he instituted the action both
parties were residents and domiciled in Bloemfontein, Free State,
South Africa.
[9]
The main issue before the regional magistrate for determination was
an action for the dissolution of a marriage between two
people who
were ordinarily resident in the regional division of the Free State.
The cause of action, the irretrievable break down
of the marriage,
occurred in the regional division of the Free State.
[10]
Mr van der Merwe submitted that the regional court had jurisdiction
to dissolve the marriage as the plaintiff sought, based
on the
provisions of section 28(1A) read with section 29(1B) of the Act as
amended read further with section 2(1) (a) and (b) of
the Divorce Act
70 of 1979 (the
Divorce Act). The
submissions he made with reference
to case law however did not persuade the regional magistrate in any
way when he ultimately ruled
that he did not have jurisdiction.
[11]
It is trite that a marriage concluded in a foreign country is by law
determined by the application of the principle of
lex
loci celebrationis
which
means the law of the place where the marriage was solemnised.
[1]
In terms of our common law, where a marriage was legally concluded in
another country, the marriage is recognised as valid by our
courts as
long as when the marriage was solemnised there were no legal
impediments to the marriage.
[2]
This
common law position has not changed.
[3]
[12] Section 28 (1A)
of the Act as amended reads:
‘
For
purposes of section 29 (1B), a court for the regional division shall
have jurisdiction if the parties are or if either of the
parties is-
(i)
domiciled in the area of jurisdiction of the court on the date on
which the proceedings are instituted,
(ii)
ordinarily resident in the area of the jurisdiction of the court on
the said date and has been ordinarily resident in the Republic
for a
period of not less than one year immediately prior to that date.’
[13]
To the extent relevant and referred to in s28 (1A), s29 (1B) provides
that a court shall have jurisdiction in an action which
occurred
within its district or regional division.
[14]
Section 2(1)
Divorce Act 70 of 1979
reads:
‘
A
court shall have jurisdiction in a divorce action if the parties are
or either of the parties is –
(a)
domiciled in the area of jurisdiction of the court on the date on
which the action is instituted; or
(b
)
ordinarily resident in the area of
jurisdiction of the court on the said date and have or has been
ordinarily resident in the Republic
for a period of not less than one
year immediately prior to that date’.
[15]
It follows, axiomatically, that in terms of
s28
(1A) read with
s29(1B) of the Act as amended and
s2(1)
(a) and (b) of the
Divorce
Act, a
regional court has jurisdiction in a divorce action between
parties who were married in another country as long as (i) they are
or one of them is domiciled in the jurisdiction of the court on the
date on which the action is instituted or (ii) they or one
of them is
ordinarily resident within the court’s jurisdiction when the
action is instituted and have or has been ordinarily
resident in the
Republic of South Africa for at least one year prior to the
institution of the action. This is the legal position
in South
Africa.
[16]
After an in-depth and thorough perusal and study of the papers, and
submissions on behalf of the plaintiff, without any reasons
supporting the ruling made, it is still not clear why the regional
magistrate was of the view that he did not have jurisdiction.
There
is no indication that there are conflicting decisions on this issue
in the regional courts across the country and more specifically
in
the Free State. Neither does the regional magistrate say so
expressly. Nor does he say that the relevant sections of the Act
as
amended and the
Divorce Act are
unclear.
[17]
As indicated already, the regional magistrate did not give reasons
for his decision. He did not even expressly state that he
was
dismissing the action for divorce or staying the proceedings pending
a decision by this court on the issue of jurisdiction
that he had
raised
mero motu
.
Even when he was given the proverbial ‘second bite at the
cherry’, to provide reasons for his decision when the plaintiff
lodged leave to appeal, he again chose not to give reasons.
[18]
Courts are obliged to give reasons for their decisions. This is a
manifestation of the fundamental principle of the common
law that
justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done.
The Constitutional Court in
Strategic
Liquor Services v Mvumbi
[4]
had
the occasion to deal with a labour matter in which the Labour Court,
despite repeated requests, failed to furnish reasons for
its
decision.
[19]
At paras [15] to [17] of the judgment
[5]
the court states:
‘
[15
]It is elementary that litigants are ordinarily entlted to reasons
for a judicial decision following upon a hearing, and, when
a
judgment is appealed, written reasons are indispensable. Failure to
supply them will usually be a grave lapse of duty, a breach
of
litigants’ rights, and an impediment to the appeal process. In
Botes
and Another v Nedbank Ltd
[6]
,
Corbett JA pointed out that ‘a reasoned judgment may well
discourage an appeal by the loser’: ‘The failure to
state
reasons may have the opposite effect. In addition, should the matter
be taken on appeal, as happened in this case, the court
of appeal has
a similar interest in knowing why the Judge who heard the matter made
the order which he did.’
[16]
That the Labour Appeal Court considered the employer’s
application for leave to appeal without requiring Nel AJ to supply
reasons, and without in their absence furnishing its own, is most
regrettable. The application before that court gave it the
opportunity
that Nel AJ let slip through his fingers, namely to give
the employer reasons for its failed attempt to review the CCMA
outcome.
[17]
In Mphahlele
[7]
this court noted
that there is no express constitutional provision for leave to appeal
requiring judges to furnish reasons for
their decisions (and on this
basis upheld the long standing practice of the Supreme Court of
Appeal not to furnish reasons when
determining applications for leave
to appeal).We add that there is likewise no express statutory
provision requiring judges who
have given judgment ex tempore to
furnish written reasons when later required. Nonetheless, as this
court pointed out in Mphahlele,
a reasoned judgment is indispensable
to the appeal process. Judges ordinarily account for their decision
by giving reasons-and
the rule of law requires that they should not
act arbitrarily and that they be accountable. Furnishing reasons-
‘
explains
to the parties, and to the public at large which has an interest in
courts being open and transparent, why a case is decided
as it is.It
is discipline which curbs arbitrary judicial decisions. Then, too ,it
is essential for the appeal process, enabling
the losing party to
take an informed decision as to whether or not to appeal, or where
necessary, seek leave to appeal. It assists
the appeal court to
decide whether or not the order of the lower court is correct. And
finally, it provides guidance to the public
in respect of similar
matters.’
The
fact that the regional magistrate did not give reasons made our task
unnecessarily arduous, although we finally decided, in
the interest
of justice and speedy resolution of this appeal, to dispense with the
reasons.
[20]
Finally, it must be stated that for an unopposed divorce matter,
which litigants chose to be dealt with by the regional court
for the
obvious reason of affordability, to have come to this court on
appeal, even if ‘just across the road’ as the
regional
magistrate remarked, has caused more harm to the entire system than
can ever be imagined. First, it has given a wrong
impression that the
regional court is not up to the task to deal with divorce matters.
Second, it has denied the litigants in this
case their right to
approach a court of their choice and in the process denied them
access to justice and speedy resolution of
what seems to be a matter
that could have been disposed of in less than fifteen minutes at a
nominal fee. The Regional Court President
must consider this case as
one pointing to lack of training or inadequate training on divorce
matters and take steps to remedy
this, so that it should not be
repeated.
[21]
Considering the fact that this appeal was by no means as a result of
any wrongdoing on the parties’ part, they are entitled
to
proceed on the same papers to continue with the action and not issue
fresh summons.
[22]
It is for the above reasons that the order set out in paragraph 1of
this judgment, slightly amended, was granted.
B.
C. MOCUMIE, J
I
concur
L.J.
LEKALE, J
On
behalf of the applicant: Adv. R. Van Der Merwe
Instructed
by:
J.L.
Jordaan Attorneys
Bloemfontein
[1]
Chitima
v Road Accident Fund
2012
(2) All SA 632
(WCC).
[2]
Pretorius
v Pretorius
1948 (4) SA 144 (O) 147-149.
[3]
The Domicile Act 3 of 1992 provides that where either or both
parties are not domiciled in the same country or state or when
the
marriage is solemnized in a place where either or both spouses are
not domiciled, the law of the place of the husband’s
domicile,
at the time of the marriage, will govern the legal and proprietary
consequences thereof. This theory is clearly outdated
and in
conflict with the principle of equality (s9 of the Constitution of
South Africa).Legal reform is required. Compare with
the Hague
Convention of 1978.
[4]
Strategic
Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO
2010
(2) SA 92
(CC).
[5]
Mvumbi
footnote 4.
[6]
Botes
and Another v Nedbank Ltd
1983
(3) SA 27
(A).See also
S
v Calitz en ‘n Ander
2003
(1) SACR 116
SCA
.
[7]
Mphahlele
v First National Bank of South Africa Ltd [
1999]
ZACC 1
;
1999 (2) SA 667
(CC). See also SALJ, Vol. 115, (1998)
117.