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[2007] ZASCA 98
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S v Bridges (478/2007) [2007] ZASCA 98; [2007] SCA 98 (RSA) (12 September 2007)
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
NOT REPORTABLE
Case number : 478/07
In the
matter between :
PIERRE
ROY BRIDGES
.......................
APPELLANT
and
THE STATE
.......................
RESPONDENT
CORAM : BRAND, COMBRINCK
et
CACHALIA JJA
HEARD : 12 SEPTEMBER 2007
DELIVERED : 12 SEPTEMBER 2007
Neutral
citation: This judgment may be referred to as
Bridges v The State
[2007] SCA 98 (RSA)
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT
_______________________________________________________
BRAND JA
/
BRAND JA
:
[1] This is a bail appeal. The appellant is one of four
accused persons who are charged in the Regional Court of Roodepoort
with the
manufacturing of and the dealing in a dangerous
dependence-producing substance, namely, Methamphetamine, colloquially
known as Tik-tik
or Crystal Meths. All four accused applied for bail
in the court of first instance. Two were successful while the
appellant and one
other were not. The two unsuccessful ones appealed
to the Johannesburg High Court where Pandya AJ dismissed the appeal
of the appellant
but granted bail to his co-accused.
[2] The magistrate considered the application for bail
on the basis that the appellant and his co-accused were charged with
an offence
referred to in schedule 5 of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51
of 1977
and that, in consequence, the matter was governed by
s 60(11)(b)
of the Act. In terms of this section, an applicant
for bail is burdened to satisfy the court that the interests of
justice permit
his release.
[3] The first contention raised on appeal, both in the
court
a quo
and in
this court, was that the magistrate had erred in accepting that the
appellant was charged with an offence referred to in schedule
5 of
the CPA. In support of this contention, reference was made to
reported judgments dealing with the different ways in which the
State
may establish that the accused is charged with a schedule 5 offence.
Relying on these judgments the conclusion contended for
was that, in
the present matter, the State had failed to establish the
jurisdictional fact required for the operation of
s 11(b)
in any
of these ways. I do not believe, however, that these decided cases
are of any relevance at all. At the outset of the proceedings
in the
court of first instance, the prosecutor informed the magistrate that:
‘
The
charge against the accused is manufacturing and dealing of drugs. It
is a schedule 5 offence . . . and the defence will start.’
Upon enquiry by the magistrate, the appellant’s
attorney then expressly confirmed that this is so.
[4] After this formal admission, and particularly in the
light of
s 60(2)(b)
of the Act, both the State and the court
were entitled to accept that there was no longer any
lis
between the parties about the applicability
of schedule 5. The State thus no longer had to establish anything.
The appellant’s
only answer to this formal admission on his
behalf was an attempt to rely on the principle that a party is not
bound to a concession
based on a mistake of law. I find the reliance
on this principle wholly inappropriate simply because there is no
reason to believe
that the concession by the appellant’s
attorney was indeed informed by any mistake of law. The magistrate
was therefore quite
right in approaching the application on the basis
that she did.
[5] As to the merits, the State presented the evidence
of Captain de Bruin. He described how, in a garage on premises
controlled by
the appellant, the police found a complete laboratory.
The premises are not used for any other purpose than the production
of drugs.
In the laboratory they found fourteen to fifteen litres of
Methamphetamine oil which would be sufficient to manufacture about
four
to six kilograms of Crystal Meth, with a street value of R300
per gram. When the police arrived on the scene they found a small
amount
of finished product, as well as a manufacturing process in
progress. They also found equipment in a condition which indicated
that
the activities, of what Captain de Bruin perceived to be a
syndicate, had been going on for quite some time. None of these facts
were earnestly disputed by the appellant, save that he denied the
intention to use the Methamphetamine for the production of dangerous
dependence-producing drugs. At face value his explaination as to what
he was manufacturing is, to say the least, most peculiar indeed.
[6] From the appellant’s own evidence, it appears
that he has no assets of any value in his own name; that he is not
married
and has no children; that he conducts his business outside
the borders of this country in Zimbabwe and the Congo, and that he is
himself addicted to drugs. Moreover, he at least
prima
facie
told an untruth about where he would
get his bail money from.
[7] Against this factual background the magistrate’s
reasons for refusing bail appear to have been essentially threefold:
Firstly,
that the appellant is facing very serious charges which
carry severe penalties. Secondly, that the State presented a very
strong
case against the appellant; and thirdly, that since the
appellant has both the know-how and the means to continue
manufacturing these
dangerous drugs, there is the real danger that he
may continue the illegal activities of the syndicate and that his
release would
therefore create a danger to society.
[8] Since I am not satisfied that any of these
considerations can be described as a misdirection, it is not open to
us to interfere
with the magistrate’s decision on appeal. It
follows that in my view the appeal stands to be dismissed.
…………………
..
F D J BRAND
JUDGE OF
APPEAL
Concur
:
COMBRINCK
JA
CACHALIA
JA