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[2015] ZAGPPHC 1011
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Pan African Congress of Azania and Another v Electoral Commission of South Africa and Another (50743/2015) [2015] ZAGPPHC 1011 (12 August 2015)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NUMBER: 50743/2015
DATE:
12 AUGUST 2015
PAN AFRICAN
CONGRESS OF
AZANIA
...................................................................
First
Applicant
LUTHANDO
MBINDA
...............................................................................................
Second
Applicant
ELECTORAL
COMMISSION OF SOUTH
AFRICA
..............................................
First
Respondent
LETLAPA
MPHAHLELE
.......................................................................................
Second
Respondent
REASONS
MABUSE J:
[1] This matter came
before me as an urgent application on 21 July 2015. After the matter
had been debated before the Court on 23
July 2015 I dismissed the
application with costs without giving any reasons. I have now been
requested to furnish reasons for my
order. These are therefore the
reasons for the order that I made on 23 July 2015.
[2] In the urgent
application the applicants had sought the following prayers among
others:
“2. That the
First Respondent be ordered to normalise communication with the First
Applicant forthwith and unless directed
otherwise by a competent
court, the First Respondent be compelled to communicate with the
leadership of the First Respondent elected
at its National Conference
on 27 and 28 September 2014 of which Mr. Luthando Mbinda is the
President and Mr. Narius Moloto, the
Secretary General of the PAC;
3. that the First
Respondent restore the status of the PA C as contemplated in the
Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act of 1997
and that
the current suspension is terminated in terms of the aforesaid
legislation and the First Applicant’s status be reinstated
with
immediate effect"
The application is
founded on an affidavit by Narius Moloto as indicated above, an adult
male and a duly elected appointed Secretary
General of the First
Applicant. It is opposed by the First Respondent. I was prepared to
accept that prayer 2 of the notice of
motion contained an error and
to overlook such error.
[3] The first
applicant is described as a party duly constituted as such in terms
of its constitution since 6 April 1959. According
to the Second
Respondent’s opposing affidavit, the First Applicant is
described as a political party registered in terms
of the laws of
this country and governed by its own constitution. The Second
Applicant is described as the President of the First
Applicant, duly
elected to the position of the President of the Applicant at the
National Conference of the First Applicant on
28 September 2014. The
First Respondent is the Independent Electoral Commission of this
country which has been duly constituted
as such in terms of the
constitution of this country and which has its principal place of
business situated at Election House,
Riverside Office Park,
Centurion, Gauteng. Its constitutional duties include, among others,
funding registered political parties
in this country. It derives its
powers and authority to execute the said powers and duties from the
Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (the
Constitution) and from the Funding Act.
[4] The Second
Respondent is a major male person duly represented by his attorneys.
In his opposing affidavit, the Second Respondent
describes himself as
the president of the First Applicant duly elected as such in terms of
the Constitution of the First Applicant.
[5] The purpose of
this application was set out as follows in the founding affidavit.
The Applicants seek an order compelling the
First Respondent to
comply with its own undertakings and decisions recognising the First
Applicant and the Elected National Executive
Commission as
representatives of the First Applicant together with an appropriate
order of costs.
[6] The battlefield
between the applicants and the First Respondent is the decision taken
by the First Respondent and communicated
to the First Applicant in a
letter dated 17 June 2015 in terms of which the funding to the PAC,
that is the First Respondent, was
suspended with immediate effect in
terms of the Funding Act. I will revert to this letter later during
the course of this judgment.
[7] There is a
struggle for power in the PAC. This struggle is within the national
party. There are two factions within that party.
Each faction is
striving for the mastery of the national party. Whichever faction
gains the mastery of the national party selects
the parliamentary
candidates for the party. The two factions are prepared to fight like
Kilkeny cats for the mastery of the national
party. So a faction that
wins the election has a representative in the Parliament provided
that it has gained sufficient proportional
votes. The two factions
call themselves by the names which are in all respects similar to the
PAC. For purposes of this judgment
I will refer to one faction as the
“Letlapa Mphahlele faction”, named after the Second
Respondent in this application
and the other faction as the “Luthando
Mbinda faction”, named after the Second Applicant in this
application.
[8] Although Letlapa
Mphahlele, the Second Respondent, has joined the skirmish, the fight
in this matter is not so much between
the two factions as it is
between the Luthando Mbinda faction and the First Respondent. But it
is not as if the other faction has
no role to play in this fight
between the applicants and the First Respondent. In fact it is as a
result of the Letlapa Mphahlele
faction that the First Respondent
took the impugned decision or a step that constituted the subject
matter of these proceedings.
The history of the PAC is common cause
between the parties. What is clear though in the papers is the
continued infights that have
bedevilled the First Applicant. This
matter though has nothing to do with the fight for leadership of the
PAC. I already have set
out in paragraph 6 supra what the fight
between the Applicants and the First Respondent in this matter is.
[9] The letter in
which the First Applicant was informed that funding for it would be
suspended was, for the purposes of this matter,
preceded by, among
others, the following the following sequence of events. These are by
no stretch of imagination exhaustive. These
are in my view the
immediate events.
9.1 On 5 August 2014
the Narius Moloto informed the First Respondent that one Mr Mphethi
had been charged with misconduct and that
internal disciplinary
proceedings were continuing. He informed the First Respondent
furthermore that Mphethi’s position as
the president of the
First Applicant had been terminated and that he was no longer a
member of its National Executive Committee.
9.2 On 3 September
2014, the Second Respondent, Mphethi and the First Applicant launched
an urgent application in which they sought
an order in terms of which
Narius Moloto and the National Executive Committee of the First
Applicant were interdicted from interfering
with the administration
of the First Applicant. The said application, served before
Bertelsman J on 16 September 2014 under Case
No. 65798/2014, who
struck it from the roll.
[10] On 8 September
2014 the First Respondent wrote a letter to the First Applicant,
Narius Moloto on one hand and Mphethi on the
other hand in which it
formally gave them notice in terms s 6(7) of the Funding Act to
suspend funding to the First
Applicant. The said
letter, written by Mr Moepya of the office of the First
Respondent, stated
as follows, among others,;
10.1 since the
matter concerning the dispute in the leadership of the party(PAC) was
raised with Mr Mphethi and Mr Moloto, no action
appears to have been
taken by any of the leaders involved in the dispute;
10.2 Both leaders
seem attuned to writing to the Electoral Commission as if they were
in fact the leaders of the PAC;
10.3 the actions of
the PAC placed the Electoral Commission in a very difficult position
as it is not in a position to determine
which of the two leaders
should be recognised;
10.4 the role of the
Electoral Commission in the matter at hand is defined in law, except
where a competent court directs otherwise;
10.5 in any legal
proceedings involving inter-party disputes, the Electoral Commission
can only be a respondent by virtue of these
defined roles;
10.6 Mr Mphethi
submits in his correspondence that the banking details of the PAC
have changed;
10.7 as the
Accounting Officer in terms of the Funding Act, he will await the
immediate direction from a competent authority or
a court of law on
whose leadership should be recognised as the official leadership of
the party;
10.8 in terms of s
7(b) of the Funding Act, the Electoral Commission hereby gives notice
of the intention to suspend future funding
to the party and Messrs
Mphethi and Moloto are required to furnish reasons within thirty(30)
days of the writing of this letter
as to why the party’s
allocation should not be suspended;
10.9 according to
the records of the Electoral Commission, Mr Moloto is the PAC’s
Accounting Officer and he will be held accountable
for the funding
which has already been allocated to the party for the year 2014/2015
financial year;
10.10 all other
correspondence from the Pac can no longer be reacted upon until the
leadership has been resolved.
[11] On 29 September
2014 the First Respondent received, under the letter head of the
First Applicant, a letter in which the First
Respondent was informed
of the outcome of the First Applicant’s National Conference
held on 27 and 28 September 2014 in Bloemfontein.
According to this
correspondence, the new leadership of the First Applicant was Mr
Mbinda, who had been elected as the president
of the movement, Mr
Sibusiso Xaba, who was elected as the deputy president of the PAC, Mr
Narius Moloto who remained the secretary
general and a member who had
been assigned to liaise with the First Respondent, and finally, Mr
Bernett Yoko, who remained the
secretary general of the party.
[12] On 10 October
2014 the First Respondent received a letter from the Second
Respondent. In this letter the Second Respondent
advised the First
Applicant that the election of the office bearers of the First
Applicant is held once every three years and not
annually. In that
manner he cast doubt over the validity of the election of the office
bearers of the First Applicant that was
held on the 27th and 28th of
September 2014.
[13] On 21 October
2014 the First Respondent informed the First Applicant that it’s
funding or allocations had been suspended
for failing to respond
within 30 days after it had been so requested to furnish reasons why
the allocation should not be suspended.
On 23 December 2014, Mr
Moloto informed the First Respondent that the First Applicant’s
National Executive Committee had
endorsed the National Disciplinary
Committee’s recommendation to expel Mr Mphethi from the party
for a period of two years.
[14] On 13 March
2015 the First Respondent met with the delegation from the Lethlapa
Mphahlele faction which was led by the second
respondent.
[15] On 2 April 2015
the First Respondent’s vice president, Mr I T Tselane, wrote a
letter to the First Applicant. The said
letter read as follows:
“In view of
the above the Commissioner has decided to revise its position as
articulated in the letter of 8 September 2014
and to normalise
communication with the PAC forthwith. To that end and unless it is
directed otherwise by a competent Court the
Commissioner will
henceforth communicate with the PAC’s leadership elected at its
National Conference on 27 and 28 September
2014 of which Mr. Mbinda
is president and Mr. Moloto is general secretary. ’’
Quite clearly the
first respondent had taken a formal decision to recognise the
leadership of the PAC.
[16] In a letter
dated 7 April 2015 the First Respondent, through Mr Tselane again,
informed the PAC that the First Respondent had
revised its decision
as set out in its letter dated 8 September 2014; that it would then
normalise communication between it and
the PAC by communicating
forthwith with the leadership of the PAC that they had been elected
at the Conference of September 2014
at which the Second Applicant was
elected as president and Mr Moloto as the secretary general.
[17] Quite clearly
the First Respondent received a deluge of correspondence from the two
factions, each one of them trying to unseat
the other; each one of
them claiming to be the legitimate leadership of the PAC. It became
difficult for the First Respondent to
establish which of the two
factions represented the legitimate leadership of the PAC.
[18] On 16 April
2015 the First Respondent met, this time, with a delegation of the
Second Respondent and also Mr. Mphethi. At this
meeting the Second
Respondent expressed his displeasure at the substantive merits,
processes and effect of the First Respondent’s
decision as
communicated in its letter dated 7 April 2015.
[19] According to
the applicants, despite the fact that the aforesaid letters seemed to
be a regurgitation of the concerns of Mr.
Mphahlele, it clearly
attempted to contradict a decision made by the First Respondent on
those very same facts and under the same
circumstances as the letter
issued on 7 April 2015. The Applicants were of the view that it was
not up to the Second Respondent
or any member of his delegation to
approach the First Respondent and to make it change its decision nor
was it up to the First
Respondent to do so in clear contradiction of
its undertakings to abide by an order of competent court. The
Applicants also took
umbrage to the fact that the First Respondent
seemed to have taken a decision only after it had listened to the
representations
made by the Second Respondent. They felt that their
goose was cooked at that meeting. They felt that the Second
Respondent had
led the First Respondent by the nose.
[20] On 15 May 2015
the First Respondent wrote a letter to the Applicants in which it
indicated to them that it had held a meeting
with the Letlapa
Mphahlele faction on 7 April 2015.
[21] Following this
meeting of 16 April 2015, Mr. Tselane then wrote to both factions in
particular the Second Applicant and the
Second Respondent and
requested them to make their written submissions to the First
Respondent not later than 20 May 2015. In response
to an invitation
by the first respondent to the Applicants to make submissions, on 19
May 2015 the Secretary General made his submissions
to the First
Respondent which were delivered by hand. After considering such
submissions by both the First Respondent took the
impugned decision
on 17 June 2015 and notified the two sections accordingly.
[22] What happened
thereafter was that the First Respondent issued a letter dated 17
June 2015 and forwarded same to the applicants
on 19 June 2015. I
wish to quote the contents of the letter dated 17 June 2015 copiously
for it contains not only the full reasons
why the First Respondent
suspended the funding for the First Applicant but also the reasons
why the First Respondent retracted
its letter dated 8 April 2015. The
said letter reads as follows:
“1. I refer to
my letter of 15 May 2015 and thank you for the written
representations received in response thereto.
2. / accept that it
has taken some time to respond to your written representations.
However, as you are well aware, this matter
has a long and tortious
history about which the parties have divergent narratives. As a
result, the Electoral
Commission required
an opportunity to comprehensively consider the written
representations and its supplementary documents, to ensure
that the
decision taken by it is proceduralfy fair and lawful.
3. Having now
studied your respective written representations and taken legal
advice, the Commission is convinced that it's decision
articulated in
its it’s letter of 8 April 2015 was taken in a manner that was
not procedurally fair, in that the Commission
failed to afford the
faction of the PAC Leadership aligned to Notios Mphahlele and Mphethi
notice of its intention to make such
a decision, and an opportunity
to make representations prior to taking the decision which handset**,
clearly affects the rights
and legitimate expectations of that
faction.
4. As a result, the
Commission is advised that the decision was taken irregularly and
that the Commission is duty-bound to disavow
alliance on it and
retract the letter of 8 April 2015.
5. I accordingly
write to advise you of the Commission’s decision to disavow the
reliance on the decision and retract the
letter of 8 April 2015. The
effect of this decision is that the situation will revert to the
status quo that obtained prior to
the dissemination of that letter,
being that:
5.1 the Commission
wilt henceforth no longer act upon any correspondence from the PAC
until the leadership dispute had been resolved
by a pronouncement of
a Court of competent jurisdiction of whom the Commission should
recognise as comprising the lawful leadership
of the party; and
5.2 the Commission
suspension of the future funding of the PAC contemplated in the
Public Funding of Represented Political Parties
Act
103 of 1997 (“the
Funding Act”), as contemplated in s. 6(7) of that Act, is
reinstated with immediate effect
6. The respective
written representations again underscore the fact that there are
different factions simultaneously contained in
that they constitute
legitimate leadership of the PAC. The representations also illustrate
that each of the factions has a different
factual and legal narrative
of the situation that presently obtains as far as the leadership of
the PAC is concerned. The Commission
has neither a conditional **
mandate nor an institutional capacity to resolve these disputes.
7. The Commission
regrets the situation that has arisen where a registered party such
as the PAC is hampered in its purpose of serving
as a representative
of the citizenry in exercise of their political rights guaranteed in
s. 19 of the Constitution. However, for
as long as the current
situation continues where different factions simultaneously contend
that they constitute the legitimate
leadership of the PAC, the
Commission is not in a position to determine with whom it should
lawfully and legitimately liaise, making
the position adopted by it
appropriately ** necessary for the Commission to perform its
constitutional and statutory obligations.
It is for this reasons that
the Commission proposes that the different factions of the PAC should
consider submitting the leadership
dispute to arbitration in order to
resolve the current impasse effectively, finally and expeditiously.
Failing these, the Commission
will await the resolution of this
dispute by an order of Court of competent jurisdiction, and the
Commission would accordingly
act on such an order.
8.
9. Finally, / must
regrettably deal with the unfortunate aspersions cast upon the
integrity of the Chief Electoral Officer and "the
Commissioner
from the Eastern Cape", which I surmise ** is intended to refer
to Commissioner Finca that appear on page 16
of Mr Moloto's letter of
19 May 2015. No factual basis has been advanced in the letter for
these spurious claims of partiality,
and they stand to be rejected in
totality.
Yours faithfully IT
Tselane
(Mr. Vice Chair
Person)”
[24] The reasons for
suspending any further funding of the First Applicant were set out in
paragraph 6 and 7 of the letter I quoted
above.
[25] The Applicants
have built their case around the provisions of s. 6(7) of the Funding
Act. Mr. Liversage, counsel for the applicants
submitted that s. 6 of
the Funding Act imposed an obligation upon the political parties that
received money from the fund to keep
separate bank account for
allocation of such funds to the Party. The said section furthermore
demands an appointment of an accounting
officer by the receiving
party to account for all the monies that have been allocated to such
a party;
25.1 furthermore it
directs that: a receiving party’s accountant must keep separate
books and records in respect of all monies
received from the Fund and
all monies involving transaction with those monies. In brief it
requires the receiving party to account
fully and respect all the
monies that it received from the First Respondent;
25.2 it directs that
within the two months after the end of a financial year, the
accounting officer of the party must prepare its
financial statements
and submit the books and records to a registered auditor;
25.3 that the
auditor so appointed must express an opinion as to whether or not the
allocated monies were spent for purposes for
which they had been
allocated to the party receiving them and that the report and audited
statements must be submitted within three
months after the end of the
party’s financial year to the first respondent;
25.4 that the first
respondent may appoint an auditor to verify the reports and audited
statements submitted to it; and
25.5 that the
auditor general may at any time audit any political party’s
books, records of account and financial statements
relating to monies
allocated to the party from the Fund.
[26] The Applicants,
as I indicated earlier built their case around the provisions of s
6(7) of the Funding Act. This is so because
of paragraph 5.2 of the
said letter in which the First Respondent indicated that it had
decided to suspend the future funding of
the First Applicant as
contemplated in s 67 of the Funding Act.
[27] Accordingly s 6
is aimed at a party’s conduct with regard to proper bookkeeping
system of monies which the party has
received from the First
Respondent. It is in the context of this application as imposed upon
a political party that the provisions
of the Funding Act must be
evaluated.
[28] Section 6(7) of
the Funding Act empowers the First Respondent to suspend the
allocation of monies to a political party if satisfied
on reasonable
grounds that that party has failed to comply with any requirement of
the Funding Act.
[29] Having regard
to the short history that I have sketched above, the question now is
was the First Respondent entitled to take
the decision it took on 17
June 2019 and, if so, did the First Respondent follow the correct
procedure in doing so?
[30] There is no
doubt that, in terms of the provisions of s 6(7) (8) the First
Respondent possesses the power to suspend the funding
or all
occasions to any political party. The PAC is indeed a political
party, but the First Respondent’s powers are not unlimited.
Before exercising such powers, the First Respondent must be satisfied
on reasonable grounds that the party concerned has failed
to satisfy
the requirements of the Funding Act. The unending squabbles between
the two factions, the numerous court applications
the parties or the
factions within the party have been involved in, the numerous
meetings the two factions have had with the First
Respondent and the
numerous correspondence exchanged between the two factions on one
side with the First Respondent have made it
difficult for the First
Respondent to identify the legitimate leadership of the First
Applicant. The First Applicant, I must assume,
is a juristic person
and can only function through its legitimate leaders.
[31] Even before the
First Respondent can take a decision in terms of s 6(7) (a) of the
Funding Act, it has to follow the procedure
set out in s 6(7)(b) of
the Funding Act. This section provides that:
“(b) The
suspension of a political party’s allocations may be ordered in
terms of paragraph (a) only if the Commission
-
(i) by written
notice has informed the party of the proposed suspension and the
reasons therefore; and
(ii) has called on
the party to furnish reasons, within the period specified in the
notice (which may not be shorter than 30 days
as from the date of the
notice), why its allocations from the fund should not be suspended."
[32] The First
Respondent’s letter dated 8 September 2014 serves the purpose
contemplated in s 6(7) (b) of the Funding Act.
The intention to
suspend funding to the PAC was communicated not only to the PAC but
also the two factions in this letter. Secondly,
the two factions were
requested, as enjoined by s 6(7) (b)(ii) to furnish reasons within 30
days of the notice why the funding
should not be suspended. It is not
in dispute that the said period came and passed and that neither of
the parties responded accordingly
to the notice.
[33] It is contended
by Mr. Liversage that the First Respondent was functus officio with
regard to its decision of 17 June 2015.
The applicants contend that
the First Respondent became functus officio after having decided on
17 June 2015 to withdraw the PAC
allocations. I do not understand
this argument.
[34] Somewhere in
his heads of argument, Mr. Liversage argued that the First Respondent
became functus officio once it had taken
its decision of 7 April
2015. There is no merit in this argument. This contention is
contradicted by the fact that the First Respondent
retains the power
to terminate the suspension if it is satisfied, considering the
subsequent conduct of the party, if the suspension
is no longer
justified. It provides as follows:
“Subject to
paragraph (b), the Commission -
(ii) must terminate
the suspension if satisfied in the light of the party’s
subsequent conduct, that the suspension is no
longer justified. ”
Accordingly, once the First Respondent has decided that the
allocation of monies to a political party
should be suspended the
First Respondent does not have to go back to court in order to have
its decision reviewed if it wants to
act in terms of s 6(7) to
terminate the suspension of such allocations. In equal measures, once
it has decided to terminate the
suspension of the allocation of
monies to a party the First Respondent does not need any leave of the
Court in order to terminate
the suspension.
[35] This Court is
not interested in knowing about the many fights the factions had been
involved in nor is it interested to know
the results of such fights.
This Court has no interest in this matter to know or even establish
who the legitimate leaders of the
party are. The issue in this
application is whether the circumstances existed in terms of which
the First Respondent could suspend
the PAC’s allocated monies
and, if so, whether in taking such a decision, the correct procedure
was followed. I am satisfied
that this decision of 17 June 2015 was
preceded by the circumstances which justified the decision taken on
17 June 2015 and accordingly
I was satisfied that the Applicant’s
application could not succeed.
[36] Apart from
raising a point that once it decided on 7 April 2015 to forthwith
communicate with the leadership of the First Applicant,
the First
Respondent became functus officio, the Applicants have not seriously
charged the decision that the First Respondent took
on 17 June 2015.
At any rate there is no application before this Court to review and
set aside the impugned decision on the basis
that when the First
Respondent took it, it was already functus officio. Nowhere in their
papers to the Applicants pray that the
said decision be set aside.
They have not raised with any clear voice the validity or invalidity
of the decision. Firstly a decision,
once made, is valid, binding and
has consequences until it is set aside by a Court of law, on
application by a party that holds
a contrary view. It is the law as
pronounced prominently in Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of
Capetown and Others 2004(6) SA
222 SCA at paragraph 26 where the
Court had the following to say:
.. the
Administrator’s permission was unlawful and invalid at the
outset... but the question that arises what consequences
follow from
the conclusion that the Administrator acted unlawfully. Is the
permission that was granted by the Administrator simply
to make it
invalid, as if it never existed? In other words, was the Cape
Metropolitan Council entitled to disregard the Administrator’s
approval and all consequences merely because it believed that they
were invalid provided that its belief was correct. In our view,
it
was not, until the Administrator’s approval (and does also the
consequences of the approval) is set aside by a Court in
proceedings
for judicial review it exist in fact and it has legal consequences
that cannot simply be overlooked. The proper function
of the modern
state will be considerably compromised if all administrative acts
could be given effect to or ignored depending upon
the view the
subject takes of the validity of the Act in question. No doubt it is
for this reason that our law has always recognised
that even an
unlawful administrative act is capable of producing legally valid
consequences for so long as the unlawful act is
not set aside. ”
[37] In his heads of
argument, Mr. Moerane raised the point that the application does not
comply with the requirements of a final
interdict and should
therefore fail. An Applicant for a final interdict must satisfy the
Court that:
37.1 it has a clear
right to the relief that it seeks;
37.2 that there is a
reasonable apprehension that such right has been or is expected to be
infringed; and
37.3 that it has no
similar protection through the ordinary means.
The Applicant must
satisfy all these requirements and not only one or two. In the
instant matter, the application cannot pass the
first hurdle. The
Applicants have not established a clear right. This is so because
while one faction claims that the Second Applicant
is the president
of the First Applicant another faction raised the same claim to the
presidency in respect of the Second Respondent.
The two factions each
claims that the other of them is not the legitimate leadership of the
First Applicant.
[38] As no rights of
the Applicants have been infringed by the impugned decision, the
applicants also fail on this ground.
[39] With regards to
the said requirement it was open for the Applicants to launch a
review application, to challenge the validity
of the decision of the
First Respondent and to have it reviewed and set aside. This has not
been done and as I have already stated
somewhere supra, the said
decision will stand. I accept that Mr. Liversage raised this points
only in his heads of argument in
which he stated that the First
Respondent’s decision to suspend the PAC’s funding stands
to be reviewed and set aside
in terms of s 6(2)(c)(i) and/or s
6(2)(b) (i) of the Promotion of Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA),
alternatively in terms of s 6(2)(b)
of PAJA were not being rationally
connected to the purpose of the empowering provisions or the purpose
for which it was taken.
Before the Court there was no application to
review and set aside the impugned decision, despite this argument.
P.M: MABUSE JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
Counsel for the
applicants: Adv. Liversage
Instructed by:
Van der Merwe & Associates
Counsel for the
first respondent: Adv. Moerane (SC)
Adv. Lecoge
Instructed by: MB
Tshabangu Inc
Date Heard: 23
July 2015
Date of Judgment:
8 December 2015