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[2021] ZASCA 164
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African Transformation Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (643/2021) [2021] ZASCA 164; [2022] 1 All SA 615 (SCA); 2022 (4) SA 409 (SCA) (2 December 2021)

THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case
no: 643/2021
In the
matter between:
AFRICAN
TRANSFORMATION MOVEMENT
APPELLANT
and
THE
SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY
FIRST
RESPONDENT
THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH
AFRICA
SECOND RESPONDENT
AFRICAN
NATIONAL CONGRESS
THIRD RESPONDENT
DEMOCRATIC
ALLIANCE
FOURTH
RESPONDENT
ECONOMIC
FREEDOM FIGHTERS
FIFTH RESPONDENT
INKATHA
FREEDOM PARTY
SIXTH RESPONDENT
FREEDOM
FRONT PLUS
SEVENTH RESPONDENT
UNITED
DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT
EIGHTH RESPONDENT
AFRICAN
INDEPENDENT CONGRESS
NINTH RESPONDENT
CONGRESS
OF THE PEOPLE
TENTH RESPONDENT
GOOD
PARTY
ELEVENTH RESPONDENT
AFRICAN
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC
PARTY
TWELFTH RESPONDENT
PAN
AFRICANIST CONGRESS OF
AZANIA
THIRTEENTH RESPONDENT
AL-JAMA-AH
FOURTEENTH
RESPONDENT
Neutral citation:
African
Transformation Movement v The Speaker of the National Assembly and
Others
(Case no 643/2021)
[2021] ZASCA 164
(2
December 2021)
Coram:
PETSE AP, NICHOLLS and GORVEN JJA and KGOELE and SMITH
AJJA
Heard
:
3 November 2021
Delivered
:
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, publication
on the Supreme Court
of Appeal website and release to SAFLII. The date and time for
hand-down is deemed to be 09h45 on 2 December
2021.
Summary:
Review – rationality – request for vote by secret
ballot – discretion of Speaker – requirement that requesting
party discharge
onus to prove need for secret ballot – no onus on
requesting party – Speaker materially misconstruing basis on which
to exercise
discretion – reviewable – appeal upheld.
ORDER
On appeal from:
Western Cape
Division of the High Court, Cape Town (Lekhuleni AJ, sitting as court
of first instance) judgment reported
sub nom
African Transformation Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly
and Others
[2021] 2 All SA 757
(WCC):
1       The appeal is
upheld with costs, such costs to include those occasioned by the
employment of
two counsel.
2       The order of the
high court is set aside and the following order is substituted:
‘
1      The decision by the
first respondent to decline the applicant’s request for the motion
of no confidence
in the President to be conducted by secret ballot is
reviewed and set aside.
2       The applicant’s
request for such motion to be conducted by secret ballot is remitted
to the
first respondent for a fresh decision.
3       The first
respondent is ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of suit, such
costs to include
those occasioned by the employment of two counsel.’
JUDGMENT
Gorven
JA (Petse AP, Nicholls JA and Kgoele and Smith AJJA concurring)
[1]
This appeal arises
from a motion of no confidence in the President of the Republic of
South Africa (the President), Mr Cyril Ramaphosa.
[1]
It was tabled by the appellant in this matter, the African
Transformation Movement (the ATM), on 11 February 2020. The
basis
for the motion was, in essence, the contention of the ATM that
State Owned Entities had collapsed on the watch of the President,
that he had misled Parliament in stating that there would be no
load-shedding but that this had eventuated, and other aspects of
alleged poor performance of his role.
[2]
Having tabled the
motion, the ATM, on 24 February 2020, requested that the
first respondent, the Speaker of the National
Assembly
(the Speaker), hold the vote of no confidence by secret ballot.
Salient points raised by the ATM in support of the request
were:
‘The learnings from the 2017 Unanimous
Judgment of the highest Court in the land, the Constitutional Court
in the matter between
the United Democratic Movement v Speaker and
others were seminal in providing guidance on how the Speaker is to
exercise this enormous
power, so that rationality is observed.
We take liberty to remind the Speaker about
some of the considerations and constraints that the Speaker should
take into account in
exercising the power to decide whether or not to
grant the secret ballot, as per the Constitutional Court judgment in
the aforementioned
case.
. . .
Considerations
●
That there must be a proper and rational basis
which makes the Speaker decide whether the vote in a motion of no
confidence against
the President should be through an open or secret
ballot.
●
The power that is vested in the Speaker in
deciding to grant or not to grant a secret ballot in a motion of no
confidence belongs
to the people and therefore it must not be
exercised arbitrarily or whimsically.
●
The Speaker when exercising the power must be
guided by the need for effective accountability; what is in the best
interests of the
people and obedience to the Constitution.
●
The Speaker must always consider real
possibilities of corruption and whether all Members of Parliament
will be able to exercise their
votes in a manner that will not expose
them to illegitimate hardships.
●
The Speaker must also consider whether the
prevailing atmosphere is generally peaceful or toxified and highly
charged when deciding
to grant or deny a secret ballot.
Constraints
●
To enhance the accountability obligation of the
President.
●
To allow members to honour their constitutional
obligation without fear.
●
To note that the consequences of a dishonest
vote are adverse or injurious not so much to the individual member
but to our democracy.
●
To note that dishonesty in the form of bribes
can cause a member not to vote according to his or her conscience.
●
To note that anybody including members of
Parliament or the Judiciary anywhere in the world could potentially
be “bought”.
●
“When money or oiled hands determine the
voting outcome particularly in a matter of such monumental
importance, then no conscience
or oath finds expression”.
It is common cause that some members of the
governing party may have been persuaded by the solid grounds for the
motion of no confidence
in President Ramaphosa but may be constrained
by party line which in terms of the obligation to their “oath of
office and to the
people of South Africa” is inconsequential.’
[3]
On 26 November 2020,
the Speaker advised the ATM that the motion would be debated on
3 December 2021. On 26 November 2020,
the ATM
telephonically enquired concerning a response to the request that the
vote be held by secret ballot. The Speaker then sent
a letter dated
5 March 2020 (the 5 March letter), declining the
request. She averred that it had been sent to the
ATM on that date.
The ATM denies having received the 5 March letter prior to
26 November 2020, but nothing turns on
this issue. On
27 November 2020, the ATM requested the Speaker to review
her decision but, by letter dated 30 November 2020,
the
Speaker indicated that she stood by her initial decision.
[4]
This prompted the
ATM to launch an urgent application in the Western Cape Division
of the High Court, Cape Town (the high court).
A rule
nisi
with the following interim relief was sought:
‘. . .
2.1       The
decision by the [Speaker declining] the request by the [ATM] to
decide the motion of no
confidence in the President by secret ballot
be and is hereby set aside.
2.2       The
request by the [ATM] for a motion of no confidence in the President
to be decided by secret
ballot, be remitted to the [Speaker] for her
to make a fresh decision on the voting mechanism to be used in the
parliamentary sitting
scheduled for 3 December 2020 which
is to commence at 14h00.
2.3       In
deciding on the voting mechanism to be implemented . . . the
[Speaker] be directed to take
cognisance of:
2.3.1
all issues of freeness and fairness;
2.3.2
the individual consciousness of the voter or the individual MP
casting the vote rather than the mandate of
the political party in
which the voter affiliates, and
2.3.3
the [Speaker’s] request that such voting be conducted by way of
secret ballot.
.
. . .’
[5]
It was directed that
the application be heard on 3 and 4 February 2021. As a
result, the ATM requested that its motion not
be tabled so as to
await the outcome of the application. The Speaker was cited as the
first respondent. A number of other respondents
were cited and
served. None of the other respondents opposed the application or took
part in the appeal. The matter was heard by
Lekhuleni AJ and, after
reserving judgment, the application was dismissed with costs on
26 March 2021. The appeal is before
us with the leave of
the high court.
[6]
It was agreed by all
that the matter is foursquare a rationality review. In
Ronald
Bobroff and Partners Inc v De La Guerre; South African Association of
Personal Injury Lawyers v Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development
,
[2]
the Constitutional Court explained the basis for a rationality
review:
‘A rationality enquiry is not grounded or
based on the infringement of fundamental rights under the
Constitution.  It is a
basic threshold enquiry, roughly to
ensure that the means chosen in legislation are rationally connected
to the ends sought to be
achieved. It is a less stringent test
than reasonableness, a standard that comes into play when the
fundamental rights under
the Bill of Rights are limited by
legislation.’
This dictum referenced the matter
of
Albutt v
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others
(Albutt)
:
[3]
‘The Executive has a wide discretion in
selecting the means to achieve its constitutionally permissible
objectives. Courts may not
interfere with the means selected simply
because they do not like them, or because there are other more
appropriate means that could
have been selected.  But, where the
decision is challenged on the grounds of rationality, courts are
obliged to examine the
means selected to determine whether they are
rationally related to the objective sought to be achieved.  What
must be stressed
is that the purpose of the enquiry is to determine
not whether there are other means that could have been used, but
whether the means
selected are rationally related to the objective
sought to be achieved.  And if, objectively speaking, they are
not, they fall
short of the standard demanded by the Constitution. .
. .’
And it was further explained in
Democratic
Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
(Democratic Alliance)
:
[4]
‘. . . Once there is a rational relationship,
an executive decision of the kind with which we are here concerned is
constitutional.’
Significantly for the present
matter, it went on to hold:
‘It follows that both the process by which
the decision is made and the decision itself must be rational. . .
.’
[5]
[7]
In
United
Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others
(UDM)
,
[6]
the Constitutional Court spoke on whether a vote by secret ballot is
permissible:
‘Both possibilities of an open or secret
ballot are constitutionally permissible. Otherwise, if Members always
had to vote openly
and in obedience to enforceable party
instructions, provision would not have been made for a secret ballot
when the President, Speaker,
Chairperson of the National Council of
Provinces and their Deputies are elected. And the Constitution would
have made it clear that
voting would always be by open ballot.’
It is thus common ground that the
Speaker has the power to direct that a vote in the National Assembly
be held by secret ballot.
[8]
For the purpose of
this appeal it is accepted by the Speaker that there is no onus on a
requesting party such as the ATM to make out
a case for a vote by
secret ballot. The Speaker accepted the finding of the high court on
that issue. In my view, as will become
apparent from the discussion
below, that concession was correct. As such, the parties agreed that
that issue is not before us. The
only issue on appeal is a narrow one
as will become clear in due course.
[9]
In the present
matter, the objective sought to be achieved is the proper exercise of
the discretion of the Speaker in deciding on
a request for a vote by
secret ballot. The ATM submits that the Speaker failed to appreciate
that a party requesting such a vote
has no onus to discharge. This,
it says, visits her decision with gross irrationality.
[7]
Since she failed to appreciate ‘
how
she was to go about making her decision she could not properly and
lawfully apply her mind to the merits’.
[8]
In such circumstances, the correctness of the ultimate decision is
irrelevant.
[10]
For this
proposition, the ATM called in aid the matter of
Allpay
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer
of the South African Social Security Agency and Others
.
[9]
Here, the Constitutional Court held:
‘This clear distinction, between the
constitutional invalidity of administrative action and the just and
equitable remedy that may
follow from it, was not part of our
pre-constitutional common-law review.  The result was that
procedure and merit were sometimes
intertwined, especially in cases
where the irregularity flowed from an error of law. This was not,
however, a general rule and did
not necessarily apply where
procedural fairness was compromised. Even under the common law the
possible blurring of the distinction
between procedure and merit
raised concerns that the two should be not be confused:
“Procedural objections are often raised by
unmeritorious parties.  Judges may then be tempted to refuse
relief on the ground
that a fair hearing could have made no
difference to the result.  But in principle it is vital that the
procedure and the merit
should be kept strictly apart, since
otherwise the merits may be prejudged unfairly.”’
[10]
That application was brought under
the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2 of 2000 (PAJA).
[11]
Albutt
also treated procedural
fairness as a requirement for rationality in a context where PAJA did
not apply. It related to a decision
to pardon certain convicted
offenders by way of a special dispensation process.
Albutt
held that the victims of the offences were entitled to be heard prior
to such a decision being made. It framed the enquiry as follows:
‘. . . The question for determination is
reduced to whether the decision to exclude victims from participating
in the special dispensation
process is rationally related to the
objectives that the President set out when he announced the
process.’
[11]
The court analysed the facts
required to arrive at a decision and held, in developing the
reasoning underlying that matter:
‘. . . As with the TRC process, the
participation of victims and their dependants is fundamental to the
special dispensation process.’
[12]
and:
‘. . . It follows therefore that the
subsequent disregard of these principles and values without any
explanation was irrational.
On this basis alone, the decision to
exclude the victims from participating in the special dispensation
process was irrational.’
[13]
and finally:
‘. . . Indeed, the context-specific features
of the special dispensation and in particular its objectives of
national unity and
national reconciliation, require, as a matter of
rationality, that the victims must be given the opportunity to be
heard in order
to determine the facts on which pardons are
based.’
[14]
And, as noted above, in
Democratic
Alliance
, it was held that the process of arriving at a decision
must be rational. It is thus correct, as contended by the ATM, that
where
the procedure or approach decided on to determine the facts on
which a decision is to be based is incorrect, this gives rise to
irrationality.
The rational connection must, accordingly, be that the
chosen procedure will provide the correct facts and circumstances on
which
to found the decision in question.
[12]
The Speaker
submitted that, if it is to found a rationality review, the incorrect
procedure used must be material to the decision
arrived at. I have no
difficulty with that proposition. It seems to me that this goes to
the heart of the rational connection test.
If the decision is founded
on a procedure which failed to understand the nature of the
discretion to be exercised, this will be material.
This was explained
in a decision of this court in
Hirt
and Carter (Pty) Ltd v IT Arntsen N O and Others (Hirt
and Carter)
:
[15]
‘An error of law can, in appropriate
circumstances, found a review in terms of the common law. This is so
when the error is material
and affects the outcome of the
proceedings. . . So too, where it can be said that the tribunal asked
itself the wrong question or
based its decision on some matter not
prescribed for its decision or failed to apply its mind to the
relevant issues in accordance
with the behests of a statute.’
Hirt and Carter
follows a long line of
cases such as
Hira
v Booysen
,
[16]
where Corbett JA held that
our courts draw a
distinction between an error of law on the merits and a mistake which
causes the decision-maker to fail to appreciate
the nature of the
discretion or power conferred upon him and as a result the power is
not exercised.
[17]
[13]
On the basis of
Hira
v Booysen
, the
power to make a decision is not exercised if decision makers
misunderstand the nature of the discretion afforded them. If the
correct legal basis on which to arrive at a decision is misconstrued,
the decision cannot be rationally connected to the purpose
for which
the power to decide is granted. Such a decision is vitiated by
irrationality.
[14]
Having set out the
basic principles governing a rationality review involving procedure,
it remains to consider their application to
the decision of the
Speaker in the present matter. As indicated in
UDM,
the court held
that the Speaker has the power to decide whether to hold a vote of no
confidence in the President by open or secret
ballot. Significantly,
it said:
‘But, read together, sub-rules (1) and (3) of
rule 104 empower the Speaker to predetermine a manual voting system
that may not permit
a recordal or disclosure of the names and votes
of Members. That is an indiscriminate manual secret ballot procedure.
Indiscriminate
because it is not limited to the election of the
President, Speaker or Deputy Speaker. It is not incident-specific and
must thus
apply just as well to any incident of voting for which the
Speaker may prescribe a secret ballot including the removal of the
President.
The National Assembly has, through its Rules, in effect
empowered the Speaker to decide how a particular motion of no
confidence
in the President is to be conducted.’
[18]
The neutrality of the last
sentence makes clear that, when a motion of no confidence in the
President is to be decided, the Speaker
must ‘. . . decide
how. . . [it] is to be conducted’. This does not
seem to me to presuppose a default position
of either an open or a
secret ballot. It simply requires a decision on how that particular
motion is to be conducted. The slate is
clean.
UDM
explains
that this involves a judgment call by the Speaker:
‘. . . But, when a secret ballot would be
appropriate, is an eventuality that has not been expressly provided
for and which then
falls on the Speaker to determine. That is her
judgement call to make, having due regard to what would be the best
procedure to ensure
that Members exercise their oversight powers most
effectively. . . .’
[19]
The crisp issue in this matter is
whether the Speaker correctly approached the matter in order to make
that judgment call.
[15]
In this regard, the
Constitutional Court mentioned certain factors to be taken into
account by the Speaker, as well as some constraints.
The bedrock
principle is that members of the National Assembly:
‘. . . are required to swear or affirm
faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the Constitution and
laws. Nowhere does the
supreme law provide for them to swear
allegiance to their political parties . . . in the event of conflict
between upholding constitutional
values and party loyalty, their
irrevocable undertaking to in effect serve the people and do only
what is in their best interests
must prevail . . . .’
[20]
This, in turn, means that, in a
motion of no confidence:
‘Each Member must, depending on the grounds
and circumstances of the motion, be able to do what would in reality
advance our constitutional
project of improving the lives of all
citizens, freeing their potential and generally ensuring
accountability for the way things
are done in their name and
purportedly for their benefit. So, the centrality of accountability,
good governance and the effectiveness
of mechanisms created to
effectuate this objective, must enjoy proper recognition in the
determination of the appropriate voting
procedure for a particular
motion of no confidence in the President. That voting procedure is
situation-specific. Some motions of
no confidence might require a
secret ballot but others not, depending on a conspectus of
circumstances that ought reasonably and
legitimately to dictate the
appropriate procedure to follow in a particular situation.’
[21]
[16]
As soon as one says
that the decision on a voting procedure is ‘situation-specific’
and involves a ‘conspectus of circumstances’,
it implies a fresh
consideration on each occasion such a vote is called for. This,
again, shows that a neutral point of departure
is appropriate.
[17]
With that backdrop,
the approach taken by the Speaker to exercise her discretion must be
evaluated. In order to do so, the reasons
given by the Speaker for
her decision must be examined. These were given on three different
occasions. Two were contained in the
5 March letter and that of
30 November 2020 and the third in her answering affidavit. It is
worth quoting excerpts from the
5 March letter and the answering
affidavit which bear on her approach in arriving at the impugned
decision.
[18]
The Speaker said, in
the 5 March letter:
‘The Constitutional Court has indicated that
a secret ballot becomes necessary where the prevailing atmosphere is
toxified or highly
charged. You have not offered proof of a highly
charged atmosphere or intimidation of any member(s) in this
particular case.’
The 5 March letter also contended
that the ATM had ‘not proffered concrete evidence that members
would deviate from’ their ‘oath
of faithfulness to the Republic
and obedience to the Constitution and laws’.
[19]
The following
relevant averments are found in the answering affidavit:
‘In the
first instance, the ATM is the subject of an onus to place sufficient
reasons or evidence before me that would constitute
compelling
reasons for me to exercise my discretion in its favour.
In the absence of such compelling reasons or
evidence, any Member, if the ATM’s conduct is to be accepted, would
be able to force
a motion of no confidence to be held by secret
ballot relying solely on their
ipse dixit
, the consequence of
which would be to render nugatory the discretion afforded to me.’
And, later:
‘What the Court should not lose sight of more
than anything else is that the ATM itself bore a burden to place
cogent and compelling
reasons before me as to why secrecy on the
facts of this case was justified.’
Further:
‘Moreover, the ATM did not and cannot present
a single shred of evidence that demonstrates a reasonable basis for a
secret ballot.
It relies on unsubstantiated and speculative claims to
justify a secret ballot.
I am advised that if the ATM is correct, it
would make a mockery of what the Constitutional Court held in
the
UDM
case.
This is because by simply asking for a secret
ballot – without presenting any objective reasons justifying same,
as the ATM has
done in these proceedings – my discretion will be
reduced to a rubber stamp and I will be compelled to grant it.’
[20]
What is clear from
these responses is that the Speaker held the view that the ATM bore
an onus to show the need for a secret ballot
by producing evidence or
reasons for that procedure to be adopted. It is clear that she did
not understand her need to approach the
motion of no confidence by
deciding ‘. . . what would be the best procedure to ensure that
Members exercise their oversight powers
most effectively. . .’.
[22]
She did not set out to determine ‘. . . the appropriate voting
procedure for [that] particular motion of no confidence. . . ’.
[23]
She did not have as her point of departure that ‘. . . some motions
of no confidence might require a secret ballot but others not,
depending on a conspectus of circumstances that ought reasonably and
legitimately to dictate the appropriate procedure to follow
in [that]
particular situation’.
[24]
[21]
The imposition of an
onus on a party requesting that a vote of no confidence be held by
secret ballot is a fundamentally flawed approach
to the exercise of
the discretion of the Speaker. She asked the wrong question. It was
‘has the ATM discharged the onus to convince
me to decide that a
vote by secret ballot should be held’. That question implied a
point of departure that, absent the discharge
of such an onus, a vote
of no confidence in the President should be by open ballot. She did
not ask ‘what would be the best procedure
to ensure that Members
exercise their oversight powers most effectively’ as regards this
particular vote of no confidence, given
a conspectus of the
reasonable and legitimate circumstances obtaining at that time which
could assist in arriving at that decision.
She laboured under a
misconception that, if a requesting party did not have to discharge
an onus, any request for a secret ballot
had to be approved.
This shows that she misunderstood the nature of the discretion to be
exercised. The incorrect procedure of requiring
the ATM to discharge
an onus was material to the resulting decision.
[22]
There was thus a
failure to exercise the discretion accorded to her. All of this
demonstrates that the decision of the Speaker was
vitiated by
irrationality. As such, the high court should have reviewed and set
aside her decision. This all means that the appeal
should be upheld.
[23]
It was conceded by
the Speaker that there was no reason why costs, either in this Court
or in the high court, should not follow the
result. Nor can I think
of any.
[24]
In the result, the
following order issues:
1       The appeal is
upheld with costs, such costs to include those occasioned by the
employment of
two counsel.
2       The order of the
high court is set aside and the following order is substituted:
‘
1      The decision by the
first respondent to decline the applicant’s request for the motion
of no confidence
in the President to be conducted by secret ballot is
reviewed and set aside.
2       The applicant’s
request for such motion to be conducted by secret ballot is remitted
to the
first respondent for a fresh decision.
3       The first
respondent is ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of suit, such
costs to include
those occasioned by the employment of two counsel.’
T
R GORVEN
JUDGE
OF APPEAL
Appearances
For
appellant:
A Katz SC (with him M Mhambi)
Instructed by:
MB Magigaba Attorneys, Durban
Matsepe Attorneys, Bloemfontein
For first
respondent:
K Premhid
Instructed by: State Attorney, Cape Town
State Attorney, Bloemfontein
For second
to fourteenth
respondents:
No appearance
[1]
Section 102(2) of the
Constitution provides for motions of no confidence in the President.
It reads:
‘
If the National Assembly, by a
vote supported by a majority of its members, passes a motion of no
confidence in the President, the
President and the other members of
the Cabinet and any Deputy Ministers must resign.’
[2]
Ronald
Bobroff and Partners Inc v De La Guerre; South African Association
of Personal Injury Lawyers v Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development
[2014]
ZACC 2
;
2014
(3) SA 134
(CC);
2014 (4) BCLR 430
(CC) para 7.
[3]
Albutt v Centre for the
Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others
[2010]
ZACC 4
;
2010
(3) SA 293
(CC);
2010
(5) BCLR 391
(CC)
para 51.
[4]
Democratic Alliance v
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
[2012]
ZACC 24
;
2013
(1) SA 248
(CC);
2012
(12) BCLR 1297
(CC)
para 32.
[5]
Democratic Alliance
para 34.
[6]
United Democratic
Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others
[2017] ZACC 21
;
2017 (5) SA 300
(CC);
2017 (8) BCLR 1061
(CC) para
60. Sections 86, 52 and 64 of the Constitution read with Part A of
Schedule 3 to the Constitution were referenced as
authority for the
second sentence of the quote.
[7]
Hirt and Carter (Pty)
Ltd v IT Arntsen N O and Others
[2021] ZASCA 85.
[8]
ATM’s emphasis.
[9]
Allpay Consolidated
Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer
of the South African Social Security Agency
and Others
[2013] ZACC 42
;
2014 (1) SA 604
(CC);
2014 (1) BCLR 1
(CC) para 26.
See also
Hirt
and Carter
fn
7 above.
[10]
References omitted. The
quote is from H W R Wade
Administrative
Law
6 ed (1988)
at 533-4. The footnote states that ‘[the] remarks are as
applicable to our law as they are to English law’.
[11]
Albutt
para
52.
[12]
Albutt
para
61.
[13]
Albutt
para
69.
[14]
Albutt
para
72.
[15]
Hirt and Carter
para
30.
[16]
Hira v Booysen
1992
(4) SA 69 (A).
[17]
Hira
v Booysen
at 90.
[18]
UDM
para 67.
[19]
UDM
para 68.
[20]
UDM
para 79, citing s 48 of the Constitution read with item 4 of
Schedule 2.
[21]
UDM
para 83.
[22]
UDM
para 68.
[23]
UDM
para 83.
[24]
Ibid.