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[2015] ZAGPPHC 527
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Monsato SA (Pty) Limited v Slatter (21842/2015) [2015] ZAGPPHC 527 (1 July 2015)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE
NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO. 21842/2015
DATE:
01 JULY 2015
In
the matter between:
MONSATO
SA (PTY)
LIMITED
........................................................................................
PLAINTIFF
And
SLATTER,
JOHANNES
JACOBUS
...............................................................................
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
SIBUYI
AJ.
[1]
.
This is a summary judgment application wherein plaintiff seeks
summary judgment against the defendant in respect of two claims
for
payment of R757 395,00 and R222 607, 00, respectively, together with
interest thereon and costs on the scale as between attorney
and
client. The basis of plaintiff’s claims against the defendant
is a continuing covering suretyship agreement contained
in a credit
application document, annexure "C” to the plaintiff’s
particulars of claim (“’the credit
application”).
The underlying debts, on which the plaintiff relies, arose from the
sale and delivery of maize to a close
corporation, J & J
Graanbemarking BK ("the close corporation”).
[2]
,
It is alleged that the defendant bound himself in his private and
individual capacity as surety for and co-principal debtor with
the
close corporation in favour of the plaintiff for the due performance
and payment by the close corporation of all amounts owing
to or to
become owing by the close corporation to the plaintiff in terms of
the agreement or agreements of sale between them. The
suretyship was
given as continuing and covering surety for the present and future
obligations of the close corporation to the plaintiff.
[3]
.
The credit application was in Afrikaans and incorporated in a 6-page
document to which I refer in some detail herein below. The
first
page, which is not numbered, is a covering or title page identifying
the documents as follows:
INSLUITEND
DIE MAATSKAPPY SE STANDARD TERME EN VOORWAARDES”
[4]
,
It comprises of bold headed sections A to F. The underlined portions
are completed in manuscript. In the numbered page 1 it reads
as
follows:
Ek/ons
JOHANNES JACOBUS SLATTER________________________ (‘die
kliente’)
doen
hiermee aansoek vir kredietfasiliteite vir die opening van ‘n
rekening met MONSATO Suid-Afrika (Edms) BEPEK (‘die
Maatskappy’) AFDELING A (moet voltooi word deur alle kliente);
AFDELING
B (moet voltooi word deur alle kliente);
AFDELING
C (moet voltooi word deur alle kliente);
AFDELING
F (bevat die bapalinge en voorwaardes tot
hierdie
kredietaansoek en sluit die borgstelling in en moet onderteken word
deur alle kliente);
[5]
.
The numbered pages 1 to 3 of the credit application is a printed form
providing for factual particulars regarding the applicant
for credit,
including its financial and banking particulars. These parts of the
document were completed in manuscript insofar as
they were
applicable. Section F of the credit application comprises of 2 pages.
They are the last 2 pages of the document, numbered
as pages 4 and 5.
The credit application’s standard terms and conditions appear
on these last two pages under the heading:
“AFDELING
F:
VERKOOPSVOORWAARDES
Insluitend
sessie van boekskuld en borgstelling”
[6]
.
The standard terms are then specified under five headings reading:
“1.
VERKOOPSVOORWAARDES”;
“2.
DEURLOPENDE DEKKINGSBORGSTELLING”;
“3.
SESSIE”;
“4.
ALGEMEEN”; and
“5.
OPENBAARMAKING VAN PERSOONLIKE INLIGTING”.
[7]
,
The suretyship undertaking on which the plaintiff relies for its
claims appears under the second heading in clause 2 of the standard
terms and conditions as follows:
“2
DEURLOPENDE DEKKINGSBORGSTELLING
2.1
Die person wat hierdie aansoek namens
die Klient teken:
2.1.1
waarborg deur sy/haar handtekening dat
hy/sy die nodige magtiging het om dit te doen;
2.1.2
bind hierby homself/haarself in sy/haar
pesoonlike hoedanigheid as borg en mede-hoofskuldenaar met die klient
ten gunste van die
maatskappy
vir die stiptelike uitvoering van enige verplingtinge van die klient,
en vir die betaling deur die klient aan die maatskappy
van enige
bedrag wat nou of ter enige tyd stiptelike uitvoering van enige
verpligtinge van die klient, en vir die betaling deur
die klient aan
die maatskappy van enige bedrag wat nou of ter enige tyd verskuldig
mag wees aan die maatskappy deur die klient;
2.1.3
verstaan dat sy/haar aanspreeklikheid
vir die bedrag wat deur die klient aan die maatskappy verskuldig is
nie beperk is tot enige
kredietlimiet wat die maatskappy aan die
klient toestaan nie;
2.1.4
erken en verstaan dat as borg en
mede-hoofskuldenaar hy/sy afstand doen van enige voorregte waarop
hy/sy regtens geregtig mag wees
insluitende, maar nie beperk tot:
2.1.4.1
Uitwinning - die reg om tee is dat die
maatskappy eers optree teen die klient vir die betaling van enige
uitsaande skuld an die
maatskappy voordat opgetree word teen die
borg;
2.1.4.2
Sessie van aksie - die reg om van die
maatskappy tee is dat die aksie vir betaling van die skuld aan die
borg sedeer word voordat
aksie teen die borg geneem mag worg;
2.1.4.3
Die voordeel om gelykdige aangespreek te
word en skuldsplitsing - die reg van ‘n mede-borg om slegs
aanspreeklik te hou te
word vir sy/haar pro rata gedeelte van die
hoofskuld;
2.1.4.4
Die reg
tot verrekening deur die maatskappy.
2.2
Hierdie borgskap word gegee as ‘n
deurlopende dekkingsborgestelling vir huidige, sowel as toekomstige
aanspreeklikheid van
die klient aan die maatskappy.”
[8]
,
The last page of credit application, numbered page 5, (the second
page of section F) is the signature page that the defendant
signed to
signify his agreement to the contractual terms and conditions
contained in the credit application. It is bold headed
and reads as
follows:
“Ek/Ons
die ondergetekend waarborg hiermee dat alie inligting verskaf in
hierdie aansoek waar en korrek is en stem ooreen
dat alle transaksie
gesluit met die maatskappy onderhewig sal wees an die terme en
voorwaardes hierin vervat en onderneem om gebonde
te wees aan alle
terme en voorwaardes, en sonder om die algemeenheid daarvan te
beperk, veral paragraaf 1 (die borgstelling), in
sover die
laasgenomde verband hou met die ondertekenaar.”
[9]
. The
signature page then continues (immediately below the above wording):
“Aldus
voltooi deur die klient te
SPRINGS______________________________________
op
hierdie 6de dag van _______________________ MEI____________________
2011
VOLLE
NAAM: JOHANNES JAGQBUS SLATTER_____________________________
(HANDTEKENING):
(Defendant’s signature)___________________________________
Vir
en names die Klient, behoorlik daartoe gemagtig
AS
GETUIE (voile name): M S RANJOMIA____________________________________
(HANDTEKENING
VAN GETUIE) (Witness’ signature)___________________________
[10]. The underlined portions of the
signature page are completed in manuscript. The remainder is part of
the printed form. Lastly,
the defendant and the witness only appended
their initials on the numbered pages 1 to 4 of the credit application
and not on the
covering and last signature pages.
[11]. In due course the defendant entered
appearance to defend, the plaintiff applied for summary judgment and
thereafter the defendant
filed an opposing affidavit wherein he
denied liability. The defendant admitted in his opposing affidavit
that he signed the credit
application on behalf of the close
corporation but denied that he had signed such document in his
personal capacity or that he
intended to bind himself personally,
jointly and severally, as surety and co-principal debtor in solidum
to the plaintiff. The
defendant’s alleged defence is to the
effect that the caveat subscriptor rule does not apply to this
matter. The basis for
the alleged defence is that the plaintiffs
representatives had misled him into signing the credit application
containing the suretyship
agreement, by not pointing out the
suretyship undertaking to him. The defendant’s version being
that he “glanced over”
the credit application document,
initialed each page, and signed the last page without reading the
document.
[12]. It is contended on behalf of the
plaintiff, among other valid contentions, that the signature page of
the credit application
is drawn and printed in a format that cannot
but attract the attention of any person called upon to sign it. It
draws particular
attention to the suretyship undertaking in a clear
unambiguous manner. In such circumstances the fact that the defendant
alleges
that he merely glanced over the page before he signed it,
without taking cognisance of its contents or significance, does not
afford
him grounds for avoiding the operation of the caveat
subscriptor rule. That to come to such a conclusion would emasculate
the rule
and would, indeed, introduce a degree of paternalism in our
law of contract at odds with the caveat subscriptor rule".
[13], However, I do not agree with the
contention that the defendant does not allege any factual
circumstances from which any further
obligation to draw his attention
to the suretyship undertaking can be inferred. The plaintiffs case,
properly summarised from the
opposing affidavit, is that he was not
aware that he signing a credit application containing a suretyship
agreement. The plaintiff
did not bring this fact into his attention.
Had he been made aware of the fact that the credit application
document contained the
suretyship agreement he would not have sign
it.
[14]. I agree with the contention of the
plaintiffs counsel that the credit application document does seem to
draw defendant’s
attention to the suretyship obligation that he
was undertaking by signing the document. However, the problems with
that are twofold:
firstly, the defendant having considered ail the
facts of this matter and the balance of probabilities. As correctly
pointed out
by defendant’s counsel, at this stage of the
proceedings, the defendant is not required to persuade the court of
the correctness
of the facts stated by him, where the facts are
disputed, that there is a preponderance of probabilities in his
favour, nor does
the court endeavour to weigh or decide the disputed
factual issues or to determine whether or not there is a balance of
probabilities
in favour of the one party or the other. That must only
happen at the trial stage.
[15]. I now have to consider the relevant
question. Whether the facts alleged by the defendant constitute a
good defence in law
and whether such defence appears to be bona fide.
In Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd
[1]
,
when sued qua surety for payment of a debt, the appellant raised the
defence of justus error, maintaining that when he signed
the credit
application form on behalf of the debtor, he had not known that it
embodied a personal suretyship obligation. It was
common cause that
no one had informed the appellant that such an obligation was
embodied in the form. The High Court dismissed
the appellant's
defence and gave judgment for the respondent. The SCA held, that the
furnishing of a document which was misleading
in itself, without more
could constitute a misrepresentation which rendered the contract void
ab initio
[2]
.)
In conclusion, the SCA, with Navsa JA dissenting, held that the
induced a fundamental mistake on the part of the appellant: He
had
been under the impression that he was signing a credit application
form on behalf of the company, whereas he had undertaken,
in
addition, a personal suretyship for the debts of the company. It
followed that the suretyship obligation was void ab initio
and that
the appeal had to succeed
[3]
.
[16]. In the light of the above SCA
decision, I am of the view that the defendant's above-mentioned
defence, if ultimately proved
at the trial of the matter, may amount
to valid defence in law to the plaintiffs claims. This being the
threshold to overcome an
application for summary judgment, summary
judgment must be refused. At the summary judgment stage of
proceedings the rule does
not require a convincing defence by the
defendant but a bona fide defence, which is good in law.
[17]. Summary judgment is an extraordinary
and stringent remedy, which ought to be granted only if there is no
doubt that the plaintiff,
has an unanswerable case. However, if doubt
exists then summary judgment should be refused
[4]
.
In the light of the above, I find that the plaintiff in this matter
has no unanswerable case. Therefore, I am satisfied that the
defendant has a bona fide to the plaintiffs claims and summary
judgment must be refused.
I
accordingly order as follows:
1
Summary judgment is refused.
2
Leave is granted to the defendant to
defend the action.
3
The costs of this application are to be
costs in the cause.
SIBUYI
A J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
For
the plaintiff Advocate F. G. Barrie SC
Instructed
by Smit Sewgoolam Incorporated
For
the defendants : Advocates H. P. West
Instructed
by Kruger & Okes Attorneys
Date
of hearing 5 June 2015
[1]
See 2005 (2) SA419 (SCA)
[2]
See paragraphs [2] and [3] thereof
[3]
See paragraphs [12] thereof
[4]
See Tesven CC and Another v South African Bank of Athens
2000 (1) SA
268
(A) at 277H -
278A.