Welverdiend Properties Share Block (Pty) Ltd v Welverdiend Home Owners Association and Others (7334/15) [2015] ZAGPPHC 594 (12 May 2015)

68 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Property Law — Lease Agreements — Rights and Management Control — Applicant, a long-term lessee of Khaya Ndlovu under a 99-year notarial deed of lease, contended that the first respondent, a homeowners association, unlawfully interfered with its management rights and asserted ownership claims over the property following a purported transfer of environmental authorisation. The applicant sought to prevent the first respondent from asserting these rights, arguing that it retained full management and control over the property as per the Share Blocks Control Act and its lease agreement. Court held that the first respondent's claims were unfounded and that the applicant maintained its rights and control over Khaya Ndlovu, thus granting the relief sought by the applicant.

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[2015] ZAGPPHC 594
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Welverdiend Properties Share Block (Pty) Ltd v Welverdiend Home Owners Association and Others (7334/15) [2015] ZAGPPHC 594 (12 May 2015)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED√
____
12/5/2015
____
_________________
DATE

SIGNATURE
CASE
NUMBER: 7334/15
DATE:
12 May 2015
WELVERDIEND
PROPERTIES SHARE BLOCK (PTY) LTD

Applicant
v
WELVERDIEND
HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION

First Respondent
TREVOR
JORDAN PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD t/a
JORDAN
PROPERTIES (PTY)
LTD

Second Respondent
PORTION
6 OF THE FARM WELVERDI END 243 (PTY) LTD

Third Respondent
MEC,
LIMPOPO
DEPARTMENT
OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL
AFFAIRS AND
TOURISM

Fourth Respondent
JUDGMENT
[3]
BRIEF FACTS
The
applicant is a long term lessee over Khaya Ndlovu in terms of a 99
year notarial deed of lease which is registered at the Deeds
Office,
Pretoria. A copy of the lease is annexure ‘KN4’ to the
founding affidavit. The lease commenced on 12 July 2004.
The Khaya
Ndlovu property is owned by the third respondent which was duly and
originally incorporated on 26 June 2003. The third
respondent then
was known as Richacres Investments 9 (Pty) Ltd. It acquired the
present name in July 2005. The third respondent
is the “landowner”.
The applicant has annexed as ‘KN6’ a layout diagram
showing the remaining extent of
Portion 6 of the Farm Welverdiend
243KT. The leased Portion A, Khaya Ndlovu, is cross-hatched as shown
and marked A. Portion 15,
the Manor House, is shown in white and
marked D on ‘KN6’. Richoil Welverdiend Investments 7
(Pty) Ltd, according to
the applicant, was originally involved in the
Khaya Ndlovu development. Mr. Trevor Jordan was and still is a
director of Richoil.
The applicant contends that it was set up by the
landowner, commencing in 2004 and that the second respondent and
Richoil were
also involved in its setting up. Mr Trevor Jordan
(Jordan) was the main man and the driving force in its establishment.
The applicant
contends that it was established for the share block
scheme which was set up over the whole farm. The relevant authority
for the
establishment of a private resort over the farm was
originally granted to the second respondent on 2 November 2004 by the
Limpopo
Provincial Government. The Environmental Authorisation is
annexure ‘KN5’ to the founding affidavit. ‘KN5’

consists of a covering letter and the Limpopo Provincial Government’s
Record of Decision “RoD”. The applicant,
after the
granting of the Environmenta
l Authorisation, was incorporated by Richoil which is one of
the Jordan entities. Upon the setting up of the share block scheme,

according to the applicant, the landowner directed by Mr Jordan
sub-divided Portion 15 of the Farm on which the “Manor-House”

is situated. The portion, according to the applicant, was then sold
and transferred to the Trevor Jordan Trust thereby ceasing
to form
part of the private resort originally authorised under the RoD and
separated from Khaya Ndlovu. The Trevor Jordan Trust
is registered at
the Masters Office, Pretoria under IT1547/1991. The trust, according
to the applicant, has its place of business
at the “Manor
House”, Khaya Ndlovu, Hoedspruit, Limpopo Province situated on
Portion 15 of the remaining extent of
Portion 6 of the Farm
Welverdiend 243. The portion is substantially within Portion A of the
property over which the applicant holds
the lease. Mr Trevor Jordan,
a director and shareholder of the landowner, in 2004 represented the
landowner which is now represented
by Mr. Dirk Schoeman (Schoeman).
In December 2004, according to the applicant, the second respondent
and the first respondent purported
to conclude an agreement
effectively transferring the Environmental Authorisation ‘KN5’
from the second respondent
to the first respondent. From then, the
applicant contends, the first respondent has interfered in the
management of Khaya Ndlovu
by the applicant. This interference has
resulted in this application which is opposed by the first, second
and third respondents.
[4]
The first respondent, according to the applicant, has represented to
the applicant and third parties that it is the holder of
rights in
terms of the Environmental Authorisation annexure ‘KN5’.
Further, the first respondent is said to have asserted
rights in
terms of the Environmental Authorisation against the applicant. The
applicant contends that the first respondent is not
the holder of
rights in terms of annexure ‘KN5’ and that it must be
stopped in its tracks as a matter of urgency.
[5]
The Memorandum of Association of the applicant gives the main object
of the applicant as:

to
o
perate
a share block scheme in respect of certain immovable property
situated at the Remain
in
g
E
xtent
of Portion
6 of
F
a
rm
Welverdiend
2
43,
r
e
gistration
d
ivision KT Northern Province.

[6] The applicant
contends that it enjoys management and administrative control over
Khaya Ndlovu in terms of,
interalia,
the Share Blocks
Control Act No. 59 of 1980 (“SBCA”), its Articles and
Memorandum of Association and the lease agreement.
[7] The applicant
contends that it has been managing and running Khaya Ndlovu for more
than ten years. This does not seem to be
controverted.
[8] It is perhaps
important to mention that all shareholders of the applicant,
according to the applicant, are also members of the
first respondent.
The first respondent, however, has members in excess of 100 who are
not shareholders of the applicant. All members
have equal voting
rights.
[9] It is also
noteworthy that the relationship between the applicant represented by
its board and Trevor Jordan and Trevor Jordan
entities, according to
the applicant, has deteriorated. This, according to the applicant,
was caused by the landowner which granted
and registered various
servitudes over Khaya Ndlovu without the applicant’s consent.
This included rights of traverse for
the Manor House and for several
owners of shares in the adjacent Leadwood development.
[10] It is also
significant to note that the relationship between the applicant and
the first respondent, according to the applicant,
was amicable and
co-operative prior to 2014. The majority of some members of the first
respondent have been and are Raptors View
property owners and holders
of transverse rights over Khaya Ndlovu. The relationship between them
and their representatives and
the applicant is said to have been
friendly.
[11] The purported
granting of transverse rights to members of Leadwood, according to
the applicant, showed the breaking up of the
relationship between the
applicant and the first respondent. Case number 1275/15 which the
applicant has instituted deals with
these rights.
[12] The applicant
contends that the Annual General Meeting (“AGM”) of the
first respondent decided that the first respondent
would merely
collect levies from the Raptors View traverse holders for payment
monthly over to the applicant. The first respondent,
then, neither
sought nor performed any management or similar role in respect of
Khaya Ndlovu, according to applicant. This set
up changed after the
2014 AGM when the new board of the first respondent published a
manifesto, annexure ‘KN8’, from
which it can be gleaned
that the first respondent was to be given a considerably expanded
role in relation to Khaya Ndlovu. The
board of the applicant was
increasingly concerned and unhappy about the first respondent’s
conduct of wanting to become more
actively involved in the management
of Khaya Ndlovu.
[13] The applicant
contends that on 6 October 2014 the first respondent and the
landowner entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(“MoU”)
which is annexure ‘KN9’ to the founding affidavit. In
terms of the MoU, the first respondent would
become owner of the
shares in the Landowner Company which would then make the first
respondent the owner of Khaya Ndlovu. It was
then envisaged,
according to the applicant, that that would include “the right
to sell a maximum of 303 traverse rights over
the property”.
Leadwood development would be granted various commercial and
non-commercial traverse rights. Paragraph 5 of
the MoU, according to
the applicant, evinces that the applicant’s long-term lease
over Khaya Ndlovu would be cancelled. A
sectional title scheme in
relation to 35 stands only would substitute the lease. The applicant
would then lose its management and
control over the property in that
it would then be reduced to managing through a proposed new Home
Owners Association a greatly
reduced area consisting of 35 stands
only. The applicant contends that it only became aware of the
contents of the document after
10 January 2015.
[14] The applicant
contends that a settlement proposal was put forward at a meeting
which was arranged by the first respondent and
the Jordan entities on
10 January 2015. The proposal, according to the applicant, was
conceived by the second respondent and the
Landowner. The applicant
was neither invited nor consulted about the proposal and the meeting.
The proposal, according to the applicant,
was similar to the MoU
except for one difference which was that the first respondent would
take over the management of Khaya Ndlovu
and its wildlife instead of
becoming the owner of the property. The first respondent, as it was
contended, would be responsible
for the RoD while the applicant would
merely be responsible for “matters relating to stands and
houses”. The applicant
concluded that the first respondent, the
second and the third (the landowner) had intended to usurp the
authority and status of
the applicant’s board which was being
sidelined as though it and its members had no direct and substantial
interest in the
property. The applicant’s members, according to
the applicant, had major direct investment in Khaya Ndlovu compared
with
the indirect investment and interest of outsiders.
[15] On 16 December
2014 the board of the first respondent wrote a letter (annexure KN11)
to the board of the applicant informing
it that the two respondents
and the Landowner had entered into a formal agreement dated 15
December 2014 in terms whereof the first
respondent accepted full
assignment of the obligations and rights of the RoD. The letter
specifically stated that the first respondent
was then “both
the
de
facto
and
de iure
implementing and
management agent for the requirements of the RoD for Welverdiend. A
copy of the agreement is annexure ‘KN12’
to the founding
affidavit.
[16] The agreement,
according to the applicant, appears to have been concluded “for
the purpose of formally transferring the
rights, obligations and
responsibilities of the Record of Decision (“RoD”)”.
The applicant contends that the
agreement demonstrates that the three
parties are “committed to professionally managing operating and
developing the subject
property described as Portion 6 of the Farm
Welverdiend 243KT.” The developer, according to the agreement,
would notify the
Provincial Authorities within 30 days of signature
thereof as required by clauses 7.15 and 7.16 of the RoD.
[17] The first
respondent, also at about the same time, sent a “special WHOA
News Bulletin December 14” to all its members
announcing the
purported transfer of the responsibility of the RoD from the
developer to the first respondent. The said “assignment”,

according to the first respondent, was based on clauses 7.15 and 7.16
of the RoD.
[18] The applicant, in
its letter dated 17 December 2014 - Annexure ‘KN14’ to
the founding affidavit, denied that the
Environmental Authorisation
(“EA”) rights were assignable without a formal
application to the relevant Limpopo Authorities.
The letter stated
that the applicant “has and retains full rights, management,
administration and control over Khaya Ndlovu.”
The letter
states that the interference with the operation and management of the
property by the first respondent’s board
would not be tolerated
by the applicant. The letter further threatened that a new company
called the Welverdiend Stakeholders Association
would be formed to
manage and administer the affairs of Khaya Ndlovu together with
Raptor View transverse owners and the applicant.
[19] The applicant
discovered that the landowner represented by Schoeman on 11 December
2014, wrote a letter to the first respondent
purportedly confirming
that the first respondent was authorised to act as their “authorised
manager and agent to ensure compliance
with the RoD” relevant
to the property in question. The letter ‘KN15’ required
the first respondent to appoint
a suitably qualified Environmental
Control Officer (“ECO”) which is also said to stand for
Environmental Conservation
Officer. It is noteworthy that the EA had
been held by the second respondent and not the landowner.
[20] The first
respondent held the view that the EA over Khaya Ndlovu had been
transferred to it simply because the rights and obligations
of the
EA, according to it, had been “assigned” to it in terms
of the MoU (‘KN 12’) and the letter from
the landowner
(‘KN15’). Paragraphs 7.15 and 7.16 of the RoD were also
said to allow for that and that the relevant
authorities had,
accordingly, been informed as required.
[21]
The applicant contends that the alleged transfer of the EA is null
and void. It bases the contention on the fact that:
1.
Paragraphs 7.15 and 7.16 of the RoD do not provide for the assignment
or transfer of the rights as contended for by the first
respondent;
2. The Environmental
Impact Assessment Regulations 2010 published under GNR543 dated 18
June 2010 were not complied with. These
are,
inter alia,
regulations 39 and 40. Regulation 39 provides that a holder of an
EA may apply to the relevant competent authority for amendment
should
there be material change in the circumstances which existed when the
authorisation was granted. Similarly an application
is required where
any detail contained in the EA has to be amended, added, substituted,
corrected, removed or updated. Regulation
40 provides that such
application must be in writing and properly motivated. A change in
terms of regulation 39(2) requires such
application.
[22] The applicant
regarded the first respondent’s and Mr Leo Smith’s (Leo
Smith) assertion of their alleged authority
over Khaya Ndlovu under
the EA as serious and unwarranted interference in its affairs. Leo
Smith is a director of the first respondent.
He claimed to be the
Environmental Conservation Officer of Welverdiend based on the first
respondent’s purported assumption
of the EA. The applicant did
not recognise this. The applicant contends that in line with its
responsibilities it was erecting
fence on the boundary between its
property and the Manor House (Portion 15) and doing bush clearing
when the first respondent and
the Trevor Jordan Trust took exception
to it and removed the fence. Leo Smith and security guards from
Kamakaze Company, according
to the applicant, forcibly removed the
erected fence and took control of the main entrance gate to the
property. Mr. Craig Beaten
(Beaten), the applicant’s manager of
Khaya Ndlovu and those who helped him were physically prevented from
carrying out their
work. It is contended that the guards physically
threatened members of the applicant. The applicant further contends
that the dispute
is between the applicant, Trevor Jordan Trust and
the Landowner. Criminal charges, according to the applicant, have
been laid by
it with the SAPS in Hoedspruit who are investigating the
complaint. The guards, according to the applicant, remain positioned
at
the main gate in addition to the contracted Protrack security
guards at Khaya Ndlovu. They control the entrance to khaya Ndlovu
in
order to impede the applicant in the execution of its job. The
applicant contends that the first respondent and the applicant
are in
a stand-off position regarding the execution of its job.
[23] The first
respondent in its email to the applicant (‘KN22’),
according to the applicant, demonstrates its intention
to want to
manage the entire farm. The applicant, through its attorneys Adams
and Adams, addressed a letter to the first respondent
with a view to
getting it to desist from its conduct but this did not assist as the
first respondent then wrote to the applicant’s
members. Their
letter is annexure ‘KN24’. The letter proposes the
conversion of the Khaya Ndlovu development from a
share block to
sectional title scheme. The proposal, according to the applicant,
involves,
inter
alia,
the taking away of
the applicant’s management rights and transferring management
control of the common land to the first respondent.
This, apparently,
did not go down well with the applicant’s members several of
whom, according to the applicant, have invested
as much as RS million
or more in Khaya Ndlovu. They too appear to be aware that the
proposal will result in the applicant’s
members losing
management and control over the common land.
[24] The applicant
believes that the first respondent supported and assisted by the
second respondent and the Jordan entities are
planning to take over
control and management of Khaya Ndlovu and relegate the applicant and
its management rights to a minor role.
The applicant identifies the
people behind this being the directors of the first respondent,
including four members of the minority
group of the applicant’s
shareholders one of whom is Leon Smith, an owner of a property on
Leadwood and the ninth respondent
in the legal proceedings to cancel
transverse right servitudes instituted by the applicant under case
number 1275/2015.
[25] To achieve what
it wants the first respondent, according to the applicant, has –
1. without reference
to or consultation with the applicant’s board, taken active
steps to sidestep and neutralise the applicant’s
board and its
management and control over Khaya Ndlovu by putting forward a
settlement proposal and a sectional title proposal
directly to the
members of the applicant;
2. informed all
members of the applicant and the first respondent who include
traverse owners from Raptor View and Leadwood that
it is now the
holder of the EA;
3.
destroyed a section of fencing done by the applicant using outside
security guards and employing physical force and threats;
4.
maintained the Kamakaze guards on the property controlling access to
the entrance gate and Khaya Ndlovu;
5. called the security
guards said to be an “anti-poaching” unit on the
applicants property with unknown instructions;
6.
appointed Leo Smith as the ECO under its authority while Leo Smith,
according to the applicant, has a significant conflict of
interest
with the applicant in two cases and interferes in the execution of
the applicant’s job of resolving disputes between
its members.
7. caused a situation
on the property which has now become intolerable and charged with
tension.
The applicant, as a
result, has asked the court to regard the matter as urgent.
[26]
The applicant contends that:
1.
it is the holder of a 99 year lease of the property which entitles
and obliges it to take control of and manage the property;
2. the first
respondent has no rights arising from the purported transfer of the
EA and that it therefore has no right to interfere
in the management
of the property;
3. it has a
prima
facie
right to restrain the first respondent from contending that
it holds rights and/or may exercise rights in terms of the EA;
4.
the first respondent has, by its conduct, threatened the right of the
applicant to manage the property and that the applicant
has a
reasonable apprehension that the first respondent, in future, may
repeat the conduct unless the first respondent is restrained
from
doing so;
5.
the balance of convenience favours the granting of the interim relief
to the applicant;
6. the first
respondent will suffer no prejudice should the interim order be
granted in that the first respondent, for more than
ten years, had
been playing a passive role;
7. if relief is
refused substantial and self-evident prejudice will be suffered by
the applicant and that the balance of convenience
substantially
favours the applicant and the grant of such relief;
8. the respondent, not
desisting from its conduct, leaves the applicant with no adequate
alternative remedy except to approach the
court for urgent relief;
9. the relief in Part
B of the notice of motion will proceed in the normal way as set out
in Part B.
[27]
As I have alluded thereto, the first, second and third respondents
oppose the application. They are represented by Schoeman,
an attorney
on the non-practising roll. He is the deponent to the answering
affidavit. He states that he was involved in the “acquisition

of the Remaining Extent of Portion 6 of the Farm Welverdiend no.
243KT (“the property”) by the third respondent (“the

landowner”), the conceptualisation of the development and the
subsequent establishment of the Share Block Scheme which is
operated
on the property by the applicant.”
[28]
The respondents aver that the applicant is not entitled to the relief
which it seeks.
[29]
The respondents (i.e. the first, second and the third respondents)
conceded that they delivered the answering affidavit out
of time and
they accordingly sought condonation for that. Their application was
not opposed and is, accordingly, granted.
[30]
The respondents filed notices in terms of Rule 35(12), Rule 7 and
Rule 47(1). The applicant responded to the notices. Mr. Labuschagne,

for the applicant, submitted that the respondents’ application
for security for costs could be reserved for determination
together
with Part B and any counter-application instituted by the
respondents, if any. Similarly costs of the application, according
to
Mr. Labuschagne, could be reserved for determination together with
Part B and any counter-application instituted by the respondents,
if
any. I find merit in this.
[31]
The respondents’ opposition to the application is based on the
following grounds:
1.
Non-joinder of the registered owners of Portion 15 (a Portion of
Portion 6) of the Farm Welverdiend No. 243KT (Portion 15). The

registered owners of Portion 15 are the trustees for the time being
of the Trevor Jordan Trust (Master’s Reference No. 17
1537/1991
(“the trust”).
Mr Labuschagne for the
applicant submitted that the rights of the registered owners of
Portion 15 were not affected and that it
was unnecessary to join
them. While there is merit in the submission, it is also so that
there is a relationship between those
owners and the second
respondent.
2.
The relief sought in Part A is academic in view of the fact that the
environmental authorisation (EA) ‘KN5’ has lapsed.
It will be remembered
that the EA was held by the second respondent. It will also be
remembered that an agreement ‘KN 12’
was concluded by and
between the second and the first respondent purportedly transferring
the EA from the second respondent to
the first respondent. The EA was
valid for two years from 2 November 2004 until 2 November 2006. The
respondents say that it expired
either on 29 October 2006,
alternatively on 2 November 2006. The respondents, according to the
applicant, based a number of what
they said and did on the fact that
their agreement, ‘KN12’, was a valid agreement in terms
of which they could say
what they said and do what they did. Evidence
evinces that they proceeded and acted like they did because they
regarded themselves
covered by this agreement. They, according to the
applicant, also purported to act under and by virtue of the
environmental authorisation.
This, the respondents confirm in their
answering affidavit. They in paragraph 7.14.3 of their answering
affidavit say: “Inasmuch
as the first respondent has at times
purported to act under and by virtue of the environmental
authorisation it was mistaken.”
This is clearly an admission on
the part of the respondents. This lends credence to the applicant’s
case. The respondents,
after the problem had arisen and after the
applicant had told them that the EA was only held by the second
respondent and that
it was not capable of being transferred, conceded
in paragraph 4.10 of their answering affidavit that the EA had lapsed
and incapable
of being transferred. The respondents state that the
first and second respondents in entering into the agreement, ‘KN12’,

had done so “on the mistaken assumption that the EA still
existed.” They state that they were advised that no rights
had
been transferred in terms of the said agreement. It is clear that the
first respondent acted under and by virtue of the EA
and the
agreement, ‘KN12’. Although the respondents clearly say
that the EA has lapsed and that no rights were transferred
in terms
of the agreement, such purported agreement still exists in that it
has never been renounced and declared invalid. The
fact that the
respondents have now been advised about the invalidity thereof does
not mean that the first respondent will desist
from acting as it did.
The respondents are also not saying that this will not happen again.
This, it must be remembered, has the
effect of confirming what the
applicant is complaining about. A proper consideration of the
applicant’s case evinces that
it cannot be correct that “the
application for interim relief is a purely academic exercise.”
It is significant to
note that the respondents were only advised that
the EA had expired in 2006 and that the EA , in any event, did not
grant rights
of management and control. This can clearly be gleaned
from paragraph 4.17 .3 of the answering affidavit and this, in my
view,
supports the applicant’s complaint and strengthens its
request for interim relief. Evidence shows that the applicant,
indeed,
needs assistance.
3.
The applicant asks the Court to grant an interdict which has the
effect of preventing the first respondent from carrying out

activities and functions which all the parties have contractually.
The applicant, in my view, has demonstrated that it had been
enjoying
the management and control of the property for more than ten years.
Evidence does not demonstrate interference from the
side of the
applicant. The opposite appears to be the case. The respondents’
evidence bolsters this.
4. The application is
not urgent. Once more evidence which is easy to follow, based on
confirmed facts, demonstrate that the matter
is, indeed, urgent.
There is no doubt about it. I regard the matter as urgent. If regard
is had to the evidence it becomes understandable
that there, indeed,
is a link between the relief sought in Part A and the relief sought
in Part B. Regarding prayer 1 of Part A
of the Notice of motion I
have already found that the matter is urgent. As regards prayers 2.1,
2.1.1 and 2.1.2 evidence has revealed
that the first respondent,
indeed, purported to act under and by virtue of the EA. The first
respondent has not categorically said
that this will not happen
again. The prayers are perfectly warranted. With regard to prayer 1
of Part A of the Notice of motion,
the need remains there for an
order declaring invalid the purported transfer of rights held in
terms of the EA, ‘KN5’,
from the second to the first
respondent. Coming to prayer 2 a declaration that the second
respondent was the holder of rights in
terms of the EA would be
proper; however this may not be necessary.
[32]
There is indeed a relationship between Part A and Part B of the
Notice of motion. The first respondent has not undertaken not
to
repeat its activities complained of by the applicant. This is what
makes the relief sought in Part A of the notice of motion
relevant.
There are a number of worrisome activities by the first respondent
that developed as a result of the EA and the purported
agreement
between the first and the second respondents. Part A of the
applicant, in my view, should be granted.
[33]
Mr. Labuschagne has provided me with a draft order which I have
perused. I agree therewith and I am happy to make it an order
of the
court.
[34]
In the result, I make the following order:
The
draft order I have marked “X”, signed and dated is made
an order of the Court.
__________
M.W.MSIMEKI
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
Counsel
for the
Applicant:
Adv.
Labuschagne
Instructed
b
y:
Adams
& Adams
Counsel
for the
respondents:
Adv. Geldenhuys
Instructed
b
y:

c/o
Coetsee
V
an
Rensburg
I
nc.
Date
Heard:

24 February 2015
Date
of
Judgment:

12 May 2015
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
In
the Urgent Court held on 24 February 2015 before Msimeki J
CASE
NO: 7334/15
In
the application of:
WELVERDIEND
PROPERTIES
SHARE
BLOCK
(PTY)
LTD
Applicant
and
WELVERDIEND
HOME
OWNERS
ASSOCIATION
First Respondent
TREVOR
JORDAN PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD
tla
JORDAN
PROPERTIES
(PTY)
LTD
Second Respondent
PORTION
6
OF THE
FARM WELVERDIEND
243
(PTY)
LTD
Third Respondent
MEC,
LIMPOPO DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
ENVIRONMENTAL
AFFAIRS
AND
TOURISM
Fourth Respondent
DRAFT
ORDER
IT
IS ORDERED:
1.
Pending the finalisation of the relief set out in Part B of the
application, and any counter-application instituted by the
respondents,
if any, the first respondent is restrained and
interdicted from:
1.1. Representing to any
third parties that it is the holder of rights in terms of an
environmental authorisation granted by the
Limpopo Department of
Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism on 2 November
2004 in terms of Sec 28(a) of the Environmental
Conservation Act, 78
of 1989, as set out in annexure “KN5” to the founding
affidavit (“the Environmental Authorisation”);
1.2. Unlawfully asserting
rights in terms of the Environmental Authorisation.
2.
The first, second and third respondents’ application for
security for costs is reserved for determination together with
Part
B, and any counter-application instituted by the respondents, if any.
3.
Costs of the application are reserved for determination together with
Part B, and any counter-application instituted by the respondents,
if
any.
BY
THE COURT
_______________
THE
REGISTRAR