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[2015] ZAGPPHC 180
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Mnguni v Prima Inspectacar Wonderboom (Pty) Ltd (A609/2012) [2015] ZAGPPHC 180 (14 April 2015)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE NO:
A609/2012
DATE: 14 APRIL
2015
REPORTABLE
OF INTEREST TO
OTHER JUDGES
In the matter
between:
MANDLA STANLEY
MNGUNI
.............................................................................................
APPELLANT
and
PRIMA INSPECTACAR
WONDERBOOM (PTY)
Ltd
....................................................
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Heard
on: 26 March 2014
Handed
down on: 14 April 2015
KUBUSHI,J
[1] Mandla Stanley
Mnguni, the appellant in this instance, sued, Prima Inspectacar
Wonderboom (Pty) Ltd, the respondent ,for the
payment of an amount of
R70 000 being a deposit he paid as part of the purchase price of a
motor vehicle he wanted to buy from
the respondent.
[2] The trial court
on 3 February 2012 found in favour of the respondent and dismissed
the appellant’s claim with costs. Consequently,
with leave of
the Supreme Court of Appeal, the appellant is before us appealing
against the whole of the said judgment and order
of the trial court.
[3] At the
commencement of the hearing of this appeal, the appellant’s
counsel moved an application for the recusal of one
of the sitting
judges, namely, Bofilatos AJ. However, during argument on this point
he withdrew the application.
[4] The dispute
between the parties emanates from a transaction that went horribly
wrong. The factual matrix is that on 27 November
2009 the appellant
expressed an interest to buy a white Toyota Hilux LDV D4D double cab
motor vehicle (the motor vehicle) from
the respondent. The purchase
price of the motor vehicle was R208 935. The appellant inspected the
motor vehicle which was on the
shop floor and was satisfied with the
condition in which it was. The appellant having shown interest was
asked to pay in a refundable
amount of R1 000 as a “holding
deposit” which he did. The respondent is a dealer in the sales
of motor vehicles and
was, during these negotiations represented by
one of its sales persons, Petrus Johannes Bouwer (Bouwer).
[5] On 4 December
2009 the appellant returned to the respondent’s premises and
paid a deposit of R70 000 leaving a balance
of R138 935. The Rl 000
“holding deposit’
1
was paid back to him.
Initially the appellant had intended to finance the balance of the
purchase price however he talked to his
father who offered to pay
that balance for him. He went with his father to the respondent’s
premises on 7 or 8 December 2009
to show him the motor vehicle which
he intended purchasing. After inspecting the motor vehicle his father
was also satisfied about
the condition of the motor vehicle. On 10
December 2009 the appellant together with his father returned to the
respondent’s
premises with the intention to pay off the
outstanding balance and to take delivery of the motor vehicle. The
appellant gave Bouwer
a cheque of R138 935 which was in full and
final settlement of the outstanding balance. However, when he wanted
to take delivery
of the motor vehicle the motor vehicle could not
start even after it was jumped started. The appellant then informed
the salesman
that he was no longer interested to proceed with the
deal and demanded return of his money, the R70 000 paid in as a
deposit and
the cheque of R138 935 paid to respondent. He was
informed that the cheque is already at the bank and that he will not
get the
R70 000 back. The appellant’s father subsequently
instructed the bank not to pay the cheque.
[6] I should state
that during his evidence in chief, the appellant mentioned that the
motor vehicle aiso had a dent and its tyres
were worn out, which
according to him was not the case when he and his father inspected
the motor vehicle. However, 1 do not intend
to deal with these
averments as they were not pleaded.
[7] It Is common
cause that the appellant was given an ‘offer to purchase’
by Bouwer which he signed. The ‘offer
to purchase’ signed
by the appellant which, formed part of the record, was not dated.
There was as a result a dispute at
the trial between the parties as
to when this ‘offer to purchase’ was given to and signed
by the appellant. According
to the appellant he was given the ‘offer
to purchase’ which he signed at the time when he paid the
deposit of R70 000,
that is on 4 December 2009. He signed the 'offer
to purchase’ as proof of payment of R70 000, he said. In
addition he was
given a tax invoice which indicated the outstanding
balance. To the contrary, the respondent’s evidence was that
the appellant
was given the ‘offer to purchase’ and
signed it when he paid the holding deposit of R1 000, that is on 27
November
2009.
[8] There was also a
dispute as to the contents of the ‘offer to purchase’
which the appellant signed. The appellant’s
evidence was that a
copy of the ‘offer to purchase’ which was given to him
and which he signed consisted only of a
single page. The respondent’s
version on the other hand was that the 'offer to purchase’
consisted of two pages. The
contents of the 'offer to purchase’
were on a single page which was typed on both sides. The terms and
conditions to the
‘offer to purchase’ were on the reverse
side of the single page. It was the respondent’s evidence that
the appellant
was made aware of the said terms and conditions. The
respondent’s witness, Bouwer, averred that the terms and
conditions
were read out to the appellant and he (Bouwer) made the
appellant aware that by signing the ‘offer to purchase’
he
(the appellant) will be legally bound by them. This was vehemently
denied by the appellant.
[9]
The appellant's case in terms of his particulars of claim, which was
also his evidence at the trial, was that there was no agreement
of
sale concluded between the parties because the respondent refused to
sign the
offer
to purchase’ until the full purchase price had been paid.
Having initially paid a deposit of R70 000, when he tendered
to pay
the balance outstanding the respondent delivered to him a defective
motor vehicle which resulted in him refusing to proceed
with the
transaction. The agreement between them was as such never concluded.
He as a result claimed the return of the deposit
paid. In replication
to the respondent’s plea, the appellant pleaded the provisions
of
inter alia
sections
16
,
17
,
18
,
19
,
20
,
48
,
61
and
65
of the
Consumer Protection Act 2008
,
which entitled the appellant to cancel the agreement with impunity,
should the trial court conclude that an agreement was in fact
concluded between the parties. He pleaded further that in so far as
the written agreement provides for the respondent to retain
the
deposit as
rouwhoop,
that
such clause was unfair, unreasonable and unjust and falls to be
declared unjust by the court and that it was in contravention
of
s16
of the
Consumer Protection Act.
[10
]
In the converse the respondent’s case was that the parties
signed an ‘offer to purchase’ which governed the
terms
and conditions of the sale. The appellant alleged in its pleadings
that in terms of the purchase agreement it was entitled
to beep the
deposit as
rouwkoop
.
At the trial Bouwer testified that he signed the ‘offer to
purchase' on the same day, 27 November 2009, that the appellant
signed even though it was not at the same time. He also alleged that
the ‘offer to purchase’ was signed by his manager
Andries
as well. The respondent produced an undated ‘offer to purchase’
which was signed by both parties. The said
‘offer to purchase’
was accepted into the record as exhibit A2a.
WAS THERE AN
AGREMENT OF SALE BETWEEN THE PARTIES?
[11] At the
commencement of the trial the parties’ counsel were of the view
that the issue which required determination by
the trial court was
whether or not the appellant was entitled to the return of the R70
OOO. This main issue had the following underlying
issues as well,
namely, whether or not there was an agreement of sale between the
parties; whether or not the respondent failed,
neglected or refused
to deliver the motor vehicle; and whether or not the
Consumer
Protection Act applies
.
[12] Based on the
factual background of the case, the trial court came to a finding
that it was never an issue whether or not there
was an agreement of
sale between the parties and concluded as a result that an agreement
of sale existed between the parties. Consequently,
according to the
trial court, the only issue that remained to be determined was
whether or not the appellant was entitled to claim
the return of the
deposit of R70 000 that was paid to the respondent as a deposit
towards the purchase price of the Toyota Hi Lux
LDV motor vehicle,
without having alleged repudiation and acceptance of such repudiation
in his particulars of claim. And if so,
whether the conduct of the
respondent in failing to deliver the said motor vehicle on the date
the full purchase price was paid,
entitles the appellant to the
refund of the R70 000 without having alleged and proved cancellation
of the agreement.
[13] The trial court
having ruled that there was an agreement between the parties was of
the view that the appellant should have
alleged and proved
repudiation and acceptance thereof as well as cancellation of the
agreement to enable him to base his claim
on restitution. It
concluded as such that since the appellant did not approach the court
based on repudiation and acceptance thereof
and/or cancellation of
the agreement his claim should consequently not succeed It as a
result found in favour of the respondent
and dismissed the
appellant’s claim.
[14] The appellant
in his notice of appeal raised numerous grounds of appeal. However
the only one canvassed at the hearing of the
appeal was in respect of
the non-conclusion of the sale agreement The contention by the
appellant’s counsel is that in terms
of a copy of the ‘offer
to purchase’ that was given to the appellant, the appellant is
the only one who signed that
‘offer to purchase’. He
asserts also that the said ‘offer to purchase did not contain
the terms and conditions
of the sale on the reverse side of it as
alleged by Bouwer. According to counsel, the tax invoice which was
given to the appellant
had a condition which stipulated that the
giving of a cheque does not amount to payment until the cheque is
met. Therefore, taking
into account that the appellant had signed the
‘offer to purchase’ which had not been accepted, the
appellant returned
on 10 December 2009 to the respondent’s
premises and gave Bouwer a cheque for the balance of the purchase
price with the
intention to conclude the agreement. His contention
was that the terms and conditions underpinning the payment of the
deposit was
an oral agreement. He submitted in argument that the
payment of the R70 000 deposit was a separate agreement - in fact,
according
to him, there were three agreements concluded by the
parties. The first one was an oral agreement in respect of the
payment of
the R1 000 ‘holding deposit’ which was paid
back; the second which was also oral was in respect of the payment of
the
deposit of R70 000 and lastly, the written ‘offer to
purchase’ which was in respect of the balance of the purchase
price. The ‘offer to purchase’, however, remains inchoate
because the respondent did not sign.
[15] To my mind, the
trial court must have arrived at its finding that an agreement of
sale was concluded between the parties, by
inference that the parties
had not intended for the purported agreement to be valid and binding
only when reduced to writing. The
trial court even went as far as to
state in its judgment that it was not material whether the agreement
was oral or written in
order to determine the issues in this matter.
My view is that the trial court was wrong to have concluded as such
and in this regard
it erred.
[16] I should also
at the outset state that I do not agree with the appellant's counsel
that there were three agreements entered
into by the parties. What I
can say is that there were negotiations which started when the
appellant expressed an interest to purchase
the motor vehicle from
the respondent, which negotiations culminated into a written
agreement the terms and conditions of which
are embodied in the
‘offer to purchase'. I am as a result prepared to accept that
the said terms and conditions were incorporated
on the reverse side
of the page which contained the ‘offer to purchase’, as
alleged by the respondent
[17] The general
rule is that an agreement must be expressed by the concerned parties
either verbally, in writing or by conduct.
Where an agreement does
not in law have to be in writing, such an agreement will have binding
force only if the parties agree beforehand
that writing shall
constitute a formality. The agreement of sale in this instance was
not required in law to be in writing. An
oral agreement would have
sufficed and would have been of force and effect. However, to my
mind, the parties in agreeing to sign
the ‘offer to purchase’
agreed that the agreement between them will be in writing and as such
imposed the reduction
of the agreement of sale to writing as a
formality without which the agreement could not come into existence.
An inference can
also be made from clause 15 of the ‘offer to
purchase* (the non-variation clause) which stipulates that:
“
15.
No variation of the terms and conditions herein shall be of any force
or effect unless in writing and signed by both you and
me.”
Consequently,
it was, in my opinion, material that the agreement between the
parties be in writing since such agreement could only
be regulated by
the terms and conditions contained in the ‘offer to purchase’.
See
SA Sentrale
Ko-operatiewe
Graanmaatskappy
Bph v Shifren en Andere
1
[18]
It is trite that in order for a valid agreement to come into
existence the parties thereto must reach
consensus.
There
must be a meeting of the minds regarding the conclusion of a legally
binding agreement between them. The law of contract requires
that the
expression of such
consensus
be
done through the process of offer and acceptance. See
Collen
v Rietfontein Engineering Work
3
.
[19]
In this instance, the offer by the appellant was valid but what was
in issue was the acceptance, the question being whether
or not there
was a valid acceptance. Acceptance must comply with certain
requirements in order for it to be valid. Firstly, the
acceptance
must be made with
animus
contrahendi
by
the person to whom it was addressed (the offeree). Secondly, it must
correspond to the exact terms of the offer, failing which
it becomes
a counter offer. Thirdly, the acceptance must be communicated to the
offeror. Lastly, to be effective, it must take
place before the offer
is terminated.
Only the last two
requirements are in dispute in this instance.
[20] The appellant
contends that the offer it made to the respondent was not accepted
because at the time it terminated the offer
it had not been signed by
the respondent and as such the agreement was not concluded. In terms
of his evidence when he signed the
‘offer to purchase’
the respondent or its representative did not sign. He in fact did not
see the respondent’s
representative sign the
(
offer
to purchase* Bouwer’s evidence, on the other hand, was that the
‘offer to purchase’ was signed. He however
conceded that,
although he signed the ‘offer to purchase' the same day that
the appellant signed it, he did not sign it in
the presence of the
appellant. Even though he did not mention the date that his manager,
Andries, signed the ‘offer to purchase’
his testimony was
that he also signed.
[21] It is a general
rule that acceptance must be communicated or brought to the knowledge
of the offeror. The communication of
acceptance can take any form
except where the offeror has presented a particular method of
acceptance, in which case the acceptance
must be made in the
prescribed manner in order for an agreement to come into existence.
[22] Clause 1.2 of
the offer to purchase states the following:
"1. I
acknowledge and agree:
1.1...
1.2 that until the
offer is accepted in writing by a duly authorised manager on your
behalf, you shall not be obliged to deliver
or make available to me
the vehicle sold.”
[23]
My view is that, in this instance, the appellant prescribed a
particular form of acceptance. The terms of this clause, are
a clear
declaration that the ‘offer to purchase' could only come into
existence (be accepted) upon signature by the ‘duly
authorised
manager' of the respondent. A prescribed method of acceptance
constitutes the only method of acceptance which is capable
of giving
rise to the agreement. See
Law
v Rutherford
4
.
Therefore, the only way in which it could be said there was
acceptance was when ‘a duly authorised manager' had signed the
offer to purchase on behalf of the respondent. If it is to be
accepted that Bouwer and his manager, Andries, did sign the offer
to
purchase on behalf of the respondent accepting the appellant’s
offer, two questions come to the fore. Firstly, is Bouwer
or Andries
duly authorised managers in terms of the ‘offer to purchase’;
if so, did such acceptance come to the knowledge
of the appellant
(was it communicated to the appellant)?
[24] The issue of
whether Bouwer and/or Andries were duly authorised managers to sign
the ‘offer to purchase
'
on behalf of the respondent
did not arise on the pleadings nor was it canvassed during trial and
as such the trial court did not
deal with it. I shall accept, for
purposes of this judgment, that either of them was a duly authorised
manager.
[25] As already
stated, in this instance, the appellant prescribed writing as a form
of acceptance and as such for the appellant’s
‘offer to
purchase’ to be accepted, in terms of clause 1.2 of the 'offer
to purchase’, a ‘duly authorised
manager' had to sign.
Where the fact of signature was not observed what would conclude the
agreement was the communication of the
fact to the appellant that the
signature has been appended to the ‘offer to purchase’.
It is common cause that Bouwer
and Andries did not sign the ‘offer
to purchase’ in the presence of the appellant Bouwer's evidence
is that he together
with his manager did not sign the ‘offer to
purchase’ in the presence of the appellant As such there was no
way the
appellant would have known that the ‘duly authorised
manager' signed and/or that the respondent accepted the offer. The
evidence
in this instance indicates that the appellant was not aware
of the acceptance neither does the evidence establish that the
acceptance
was ever brought to the appellant’s knowledge. My
view is that for the acceptance to have been communicated to the
appellant
he should have been provided with a copy of the ‘offer
to purchase’ duly signed lay or on behalf of the respondent In
short, a copy of the 'offer to purchase’ which was signed by
Bouwer and Andries should have been furnished to the appellant
This
was not done and in my opinion the acceptance was not communicated to
the appellant I therefore have to conclude that the
acceptance did
not come to the knowledge of the appellant
[26] The appellant
also contends that if it can be found that the offer was accepted,
that such acceptance was done after he terminated
the offer. The
issue raised by the appellant is that at the time he terminated the
offer - when he was given a defective motor
vehicle, the respondent
had not accepted the offer, that is, the ‘offer to purchase’
had not been signed by the respondent
However, the respondent’s
version is that the 'offer to purchase’ was already signed at
that time. According to Bouwer,
it was signed on 27 November 2009.
Since 1 have already concluded that the respondent’s acceptance
of the offer was not communicated
to the appellant, I conclude as
well that at the time the appellant terminated the offer it had not
been accepted. The acceptance
had not come to his knowledge because
it had not been communicated to him.
[27]
Where a method of acceptance of an offer has been prescribed,
compliance therewith can be validly circumvented only by a successful
argument of a tacit waiver of the prescribed method. See
Law
v Rutherfurd
above
5
[28]
From his conduct, it can be argued that the appellant had tacitly and
unilaterally agreed to disregard writing as a form of
acceptance of
the ‘offer to purchase’. He paid the full purchase price
- the deposit and the balance - and was ready
to take delivery of the
motor vehicle even though he was not aware whether the respondent has
signed the offer to purchase or not
He was stopped in his tracks only
by the fact that the motor vehicle was defective at the time of
delivery. If the motor vehicle
had been in good condition he would
have proceeded with the transaction. However, in the circumstances of
this case, full performance
by the appellant cannot in my view be
regarded as compliance with the prescribed formalities. A court can
still declare such agreement
invalid for lack of compliance with the
self-imposed formalities. In this regard see
Goldbaltt
v Freemantle
5
where
the court declared an agreement invalid even though the offeror had
already started to supply the goods which formed the subject
matter
of the agreement.
[29]
A further challenge is that, in this instance, tacit waiver was
neither pleaded nor canvassed at the trial, that is, no evidence
was
furnished to establish the waiver of the prescribed method of
acceptance. Thus the respondent cannot avail itself of this defence.
The rule is that the person who alleges waiver bears the
onus
to
prove that the right holder, with full knowledge of his or her right
decided to abandon it. See
Law
v Rutherfurd
above
and
Palmer
v Poulter
6
.
[30]
The consequence of failing to comply with the prescribed method of
acceptance is that no agreement comes into existence. It
is said that
prescribing writing as a method of acceptance is the same as imposing
writing as a formality (self-imposed formality)
as both go to the
validity of the agreement - non-compliance of both results in the
agreement being void. If writing is prescribed
it means writing has
been imposed as a formality because if an offer is not accepted in
that manner no agreement comes into being.
See
Coldbalt
v Freemantle
above.
[31] An offer may be
revoked or amended freely at any time before the agreement is
concluded as such the appellant was entitled
to terminate the offer.
In the premises I conclude therefore that no valid agreement of sale
came into existence.
IS THE APPELLANT
ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF
[32]
Counsel for the appellant submitted in argument that the appellant’s
cause of action is based on restitution or repayment
of performance
in the light of the unsigned agreement alternatively on
condictio
indebftf.
He
relied in this regard on the following authorities, the unreported
Cape High Court judgment in
Eloff
v Dekker
8
,
Legator McKenna Inc v Shea
9
and
Amler’s
10
.
[33]
In my view, the appellant’s cause of action cannot be based on
restitution or repayment of performance. Even though I
am not in
agreement with the trial court’s finding that there was an
agreement of sale between the parties, the trial court
was however
correct to conclude that the appellant could not base his claim on
restitution because such claim has to be preceded
by cancellation of
an agreement. The appellant must have accepted performance and
derived no benefit from such performance as well
before he can claim
for restitution. In this instance, it is common cause that the
appellant did not accept performance. He can
therefore not rely on
restitution as a cause of action. See
Sacher
v African
Canvas
& Jute Industries (Pty) Ltd
10
.
[34]
The appellant’s cause of action based on
condictio
in debeti
is
in my view correct. The appellant was obliged to base his claim for
the repayment of the deposit on unjust enrichment - the
condictio
indebiti.
In
the circumstances of this case, condiction was the only remedy
available to him. He had no claim against the respondent
ex
contractu,
and
as he was suing for repayment of a sum of money he obviously could
not avail himself of restitution as he wanted to do. See
Akbar
v
Patel
11
.
[35]
The argument by the respondent’s counsel that the appellant
could not base his cause of action on
condictio
indebiti
because
the payment was not made in the mistaken belief that the payment owed
is unfounded. It has been held that
condictio
indebiti
may
also be used to reclaim performance made in terms of an invalid
agreement if the invalidity thereof is due to failure to comply
with
prescribed formalities. It is common cause that in this instance the
appellant is claiming payment of money due to failure
of an agreement
to comply with prescribed formalities - the failure by the respondent
to sign acceptance of the ‘offer to
purchase’ as
prescribed by the offeror. In such circumstances recovery by
condictio indebiti
is
allowed without enquiry whether the party claiming was aware of the
invalidity or not or whether his or her mistake was one of
fact or
law. See
LAWSA
12
[36]
However, it has been held that if a plaintiff wishes to claim
repayment of a sum of money paid to a defendant under an inchoate
agreement, in an action founded on enrichment, he or she must aver
that the defendant is unwilling or unable to carry out his or
her
part of the undertaking. As long as the defendant is ready and able
to give effect to such an agreement, there can be no question
of
unjust enrichment on his part at the expense or detriment of the
plaintiff. A plaintiff must therefore allege in his or her
pleadings
that the defendant was unwilling or unable to perform his or her side
of the void agreement. See
Ahhar
v Patel
above
13
.
[37] To my mind the
appellant did indeed allege in his particulars of claim that the
respondent was unwilling or unable to perform
its side of the void
agreement. The appellant’s particulars of claim are couched
like this:
“
3
On or about the 27
th
November 2009, the plaintiff expressed his interest in purchasing
from the defendant a 2005 Hilux 3 D4D Toyota Raider Babbie for
the
purchase price of R189 950. Defendant refused to conclude a contract
with Defendant until the full purchase price was available.
4.
The Defendant
prepared annexure “XI” hereto but refused to sign same
until the Plaintiff had the full purchase price
available for
payment.
5.
On the 2
nd
December 2010, the Plaintiff paid to the Defendant the sum of R70
OOO. This is confirmed by annexure “Xl” hereto.
6
.
On or about the 9
th
December 2009 the Plaintiff tendered to pay to Defendant the balance
of the purchase price in the sum of R138 935-00. The Defendant
failed/neglected/refused to deliver the Toyota vehicle described
above to the Plaintiff, against payment of the sum of R138 935.
In
fact, on or about 9
th
December 2009, the parties
discovered that the Toyota vehicle in question could not be started
and therefore could not be delivered
by the Defendant to the
Plaintiff, even if the full price was paid.”
[38]
The general rule is that once a transfer
indebite
has
been established, the
onus
is
on the defendant to prove that the payment did not enrich him or her.
See
ABSA
Bank Ltd v Standard Bank of
SA Ltd
15
.
[39]
The respondent, in this instance, did not plead or establish at the
trial that he was not enriched but he instead pleaded
rouwhoop.
Clause
6 of 'the offer to purchase’ upon which the respondent relies
on stipulates that:
“
If
a deposit has been paid by me it will be held by you until acceptance
of the offer, and upon acceptance will be applied in reduction
of the
purchase balance. If I default and do not perform in terms of this
contract, the deposit shall be forfeited to you as rouwkoop.”
[40] This defence
cannot avail the respondent as I have already concluded that there
was no acceptance of the offer which invalidated
the ‘offer to
purchase’. It can therefore not be said that the appellant
defaulted and/or did not perform in terms
of the 'offer to purchase'.
[41] Therefore the
appeal stands to succeed. The deposit should be returned to the
appellant.
[42] Consequently, I
would make the following order:
a. The appeal is
upheld.
b. The judgment of
the trial court is set aside and substituted with the following:
w
i.
The plaintiffs claim succeeds with costs.
“
i. The
plaintiff's claim succeeds with costs
ii.
The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff an amount of R70 000
with interest thereon at the rate of 15.5%
per
annum from
2
December 2009 until date of final payment.”
c. The respondent is
ordered to pay the costs of the appeal which costs shall include the
costs of the application for leave to
appeal in the trial court as
well as in the Supreme Court of Appeal.
E.M. KUBUSHI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
I
concur
G.
BOFILATOS
ACTING
JUDGE
OF
THE HIGH COURT
I concur and it is
so ordered
T. RAULINGA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
On
behalf of the appellant:
ZEHIR
OMAR ATTORNEYS
c/o
Friedland Hart Solomon
&
Nicolson
Suites
301 Bloch 4
Monument
Office Park
79
Steenbok Ave
Monument
Park
PRETORIA
On
behalf of the respondent:
Adv*
P | Gr«yllng
Instructed
by:
VEZIA
DE BEER INCORPORATED
c/o
Ehlers Fafeude Inc
Ground
Floor Sandwoodparfe 3
Queens
Crescent
LYNWOOD
PRETORIA
1
1964
(4) SA 760
(A) at 706C - G
3
1948 (1) SA 413
(A) at 428
4
1924
AD 261
5
at
263
5
1920 AD 123
6
1983
(4) SA 11
CO 20D
8
Case number 1461/2006 dated 28 November 2007
9
[2009]
2 All SA 45
(SCA)
10
7
ed p100
10
1952 (3) SA 31
(TPD) at 36A-C
11
1974 (4) SA 104
(TPD) at 106D
12
First Reissue Vol 9 para 79 at p66
13
at
106H -107A
15
[1997] ZASCA 71
;
1998
(1) SA 242
(SCA) at 2S2F